United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Since the ending of the Cold War in 1991, the world has seen reduced travel restrictions, the proliferation of commercial air travel, and access to most countries (for example throughout much of the European Union) as a result of globalization, the relaxation of impediments to imports and exports, and the continuance of free markets. What has ensued has been weakened border security where it is tepid at best to nonexistent at worst. Subsequently, it has allowed for ease of movement for nefarious types employed in drug and human trafficking businesses, cross border illegal arms sales, the transit of counterfeit goods, and the movement of terrorists and their organizations with the follow-on establishment of their cells.

Those involved in national intelligence should see this as a concern. Intelligence community (IC) members (particularly those that are allies with the United States) must strive for greater situational awareness with regards to what is occurring and not just within their own organizations, but what is taking place throughout non-intelligence sectors of government as well as the world at large (Weaver, 2016). When leaders make decisions, the outcomes could be profound; there may be unintended secondary and tertiary effects on efforts occurring both within one’s country and the contiguous nations and regions beyond their sphere of influence especially in the realm of intelligence collection when looking to globalization’s impact. Policy makers and intelligence professionals alike will have to work with one another to overcome challenges between the two (Jervis, 2010, p. 203). Particularly, this is seen as ← 1 | 2 → true when considering countries as a primary unit of analysis in the context of international relations (Lamy, Masker, Baylis, & Owens, 2015). More pointedly, with communication allowing for the proliferation of messaging, as communication fosters the burgeoning of information, and as economic transformation occurs in the backdrop to globalization, intelligence leaders will have to “think globally as they act locally” (Lamy et al., 2015). IC members, in the conduct of their activities with policy makers, will need to work together to generate requirements during the first phase of the intelligence cycle, and as they look further the next phase when moving to activities centered on collection (and collection platform tasking) (Lowenthal, 2015). What becomes increasingly apparent is a need to afford greater consideration to a more comprehensive and global perspective.

Consider the United Nations (U.N.); dialog among the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members is quite complicated (Weaver, 2016). The U.N. has undergone extensive changes over the years and has seemingly improved its efficiency as it has conducted business (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-196, 1999). Contemplate the Iranian nuclear program and what transpired throughout the summer of 2015. It was seemingly understandable that all five permanent Security Council members were congruous in their pursuit of a homogeneous approach in their attempt to thwart this country in its effort to develop a nuclear weapon (Obama, 2015). All five wanted to halt it of the uranium enrichment program; all had a desire to reward Iran through the walking back of sanctions for irrefutable actions and behavior that was favorable to the permanent members as was evident through the actual agreement’s implementation.

Nevertheless, what appears as an integrated effort in one part of the world does not necessarily transcend to other locations and senior intelligence leaders should have an appreciation for this (Weaver, 2016). The Ukrainian security crisis currently underscores this. Since the fall of 2014, escalation of tensions has resulted in Russia annexing Crimea and with the continuation of this country to provide Russian backed rebels with materiel support necessary to wreak havoc throughout Ukraine to the consternation of the United States (U.S.), most of Europe, and many other allies throughout the world (DOD Press Briefing, 2015).

Even though the U.S. and other permanent security members required unanimity (Russia notwithstanding) on the Iranian nuclear program, here the non-Russian western members of the U.N. Security Council regard Russia as a potent antagonist. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member ← 2 | 3 → countries (with great contribution by U.S. forces) have even gone as far as participating in Atlantic Resolve, a show of force exercise in Eastern Europe (in former Warsaw Pact countries). Among the activities, these have included the deployment of Army tank and mechanized forces to Latvia, A-10 attack aircraft to Romania, F-15 fighter jets to Bulgaria; the U.S. even has a training force in Ukraine ostensibly to assist in education of the country’s guardsmen (Weaver, 2016). All of this is intended to showcase to Russia that the United States and her allies still have capacity to project forces even though many of these countries are still actively engaged with operations in the U.S. Central Command area of operations to include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and other countries.

What’s more, is that NATO in general (and more specifically the United Kingdom, and France with the United States - three of the five permanent U.N. Security members) is poised to implement the Very High Joint Readiness Task Force (VJTF) as a direct corollary to Russia’s forays into Ukraine thereby building on initiatives previously developed under the NATO Response Force (NRF) construct brought to fruition early in the millennium (Weaver, 2016).

These exercises and developments are underpinned by the necessitation of heterogeneous allied intelligence organizations focusing collection efforts to better assess Russia’s intentions at home in the context of what is occurring elsewhere throughout the globe. What’s more is that efforts to implement Ukrainian training initiatives can be used to further the gathering and collection on Russia, the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by the Russian backed rebels, and her equipment capabilities.