

PART 2

Cartographies of Citizenship and (Non-)Belonging



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## National Belonging in Cosmopolitan Times

**ABSTRACT:** The role of the nation in the contemporary cosmopolitan era is hotly contested. In some quarters the nation is perceived to be a divisive relic which needs to be replaced by a more inclusive cosmopolitan alternative. Elsewhere the nation is assumed to have taken-for-granted cohesive qualities which can be used to address the challenges of living in an era of super-mobility and super-diversity. I argue that neither of these polarised positions is helpful and that a more nuanced and emotionally attentive understanding of nation is required. I begin by arguing that current engagements with the nature and contemporary significance of nations are curiously narrow. Then, drawing on my work on the emotional geographies of 'Scottishness', I demonstrate why we need a more meaningful engagement with the nation and suggest one possible route – an engagement with the practices and emotional experiences of nation – through which this might be achieved.

### Introduction

Academic literature on nation, nationalism and national identity has traditionally been a minefield of competing and contradictory opinion. Ongoing debates around fundamental questions including, for example, the age and origins of nation (in both abstract and specific terms) and the relationships between 'banal' and 'hot' forms of nationalism (Jones and Merriman 2009) are, in part, what makes this area of scholarship so vibrant and engaging. Over the past two decades or so, in light of the increasing impact of globalisation, debates have broadened to consider the role and significance of the nation and national affiliations in a world which is increasingly interconnected and where identity and belonging are increasingly informed

by transnational and cosmopolitan connections. However, what I want to argue in this chapter is that whilst in some academic quarters the nature and power of nation is keenly studied and explored, in other related areas of academic and public life there appears to be a curiously narrow engagement with what nations are, how they 'work' and their significance in contemporary life. In particular, as I will go on to argue, such narrow engagements tend to down-play or ignore the emotional dimension of the ways in which nations are understood and experienced.

There are, of course, some good examples of works that explore people's emotional engagements with national identity (Edensor 2004). But what I want to argue here is that all too often, in both academic and public life, debates around the contemporary role and significance of nation can become incredibly polarised because of a lack of engagement with emotional experiences of the nation, and that this is potentially dangerous, both socially and politically. This is perhaps most noticeable at both extremes of a political and intellectual spectrum where, at one end, there is a disdain for nations and a belief that we live in a world where nations are a diminishing (and increasingly insignificant) inheritance from a bygone age which should be replaced by a 'post-national' political order based on cosmopolitan principles. Whilst at the other end of the spectrum, the nation is perceived to have (often taken-for-granted) cohesive qualities that are assumed to be inherently beneficial for states that are trying to address the challenges of living with difference in an era of super-mobility and super-diversity. The aim of this chapter is to argue that neither of these polarised positions is useful and that within some academic and public debates there needs to be more nuanced and emotionally attentive engagements with the nation in order to fully understand its role and significance in the *contemporary cosmopolitan world*.

Given the abundance of competing theories of nation, I begin by briefly defining the nation and sketching out its conceptual and etymological history which, as I will argue later, is significant for the ways in which nations are academically researched and instrumentally used in social policies. Building on this work, I then move on to explore three contrasting factors that I argue have negatively influenced the extent and nature of engagements with nation in the academic and policy worlds. The first two

of these factors emerge out of disagreements in understandings of the role and significance of the nation that exist both within and between various academic literatures. The third factor takes the form of a 'blind faith' that exists in some areas of public policy. This arises where policies reflect an assumed belief that national belonging can produce a common and unshakable ground between the diverse ethnic and religious communities that exist within many state borders. By way of an example, I explore the way in which the UK's New Labour government instrumentally used ideas of 'Britishness' in an attempt to promote social cohesion and question the extent to which national belonging is an appropriate 'tool' with which to achieve this policy objective.

Drawing on my own previous research on the emotional geographies of 'Scottishness' (Wood 2007) the final section of this paper will demonstrate why we need a more meaningful engagement with the nation in the contemporary era. It will also suggest one possible route – an engagement with the *practices* and *emotional experiences* of nation – through which this might be achieved.

## Defining the Nation

Whilst today the nation may be defined as 'a named human population which shares myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity and equal rights and duties for all members' (A.D. Smith 1995, 56–57), the meaning of the word nation has shifted significantly over time (Connor 1978; Williams 1983). Originally referring to a blood-related group, by the early seventeenth century nation was also being used to describe the inhabitants of the state regardless of their ethno-national composition. Nation became a proxy for less specific human categories such as *the people* or *the citizenry*. By the end of the seventeenth century the nation began to be used as a substitute for the state itself. According to Connor (1978) confusion of terminology was precipitated by the writings of scholars such as John Locke who, in espousing the

doctrine of popular sovereignty, identified *the people* as the source of all political power.

Conceptions of nation and state were further blurred by ideas of nationalism. As Graham Smith (2000) highlights nationalism refers to two ideas. The first is the idea of belonging to a nation, and the second is the corresponding political ideology which holds that the territorial borders of a state and a nation should be coincidental, producing a nation-state (Seton-Watson 1977). With these distinctions in mind, it is popularly thought that there are two forms of nationalism (Brown 1999; Spencer and Wollman 2002): one that is expressed along ethnic and/or cultural lines, and another that rests on a civic-territorial conception of the nation. However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, the perceived mutual exclusivity of civic and ethnic nationalism has received significant critique (see Calhoun 1997; Connor 1993; Guibernau 1996; A.D. Smith 1986).

Nationalism began to significantly alter the prevailing political system in eighteenth-century Europe (Penrose 1997) as the ideology of nationalism adopted Romanticist conceptions of the nation as the 'natural' units of population that the state should serve. Penrose argues that nationalist rhetoric invests the nation-state with a 'natural, and hence inviolable, right to power' (1997, 18), as nation-states are perceived to be the only political units that allow the needs of the people or, more accurately, the nation to be served by the state.

There are many ways in which this etymological and conceptual history of nation and nationalism is significant for the ways in which nations are understood and studied. However, for the purposes of this chapter I want to draw out three strands that are significant for the development of my argument. The first is perhaps the rather obvious point that the geopolitical system is dynamic and is the product of considerable conceptual shifts; over time the structure of the geopolitical world has changed significantly with, for example, the development of modern nations and states and there is no reason to believe that the world's geopolitical structure will not change significantly in the future.

The second strand that I want to pick up here is that the ambiguity between understandings of nation as an ethnic group and civic conceptions of nation as the people or the citizenry lies at the heart of questions over

whether national belonging is an appropriate tool for promoting social cohesion in states which, demographically, are often multi-national and/or multi-ethnic. I will explore this point in further depth in the following section of this chapter. Finally, the third strand that I wish to draw out is that nationalism is not just a political ideology; rather it is also a *route to belonging*. As such, nationalism relies on personal affiliations and attachments that are perceived to be *essential* and it is through this perceived essentiality that the nation gains its emotional power and political tenacity (Calhoun 1997; Tamir 1993; Wood 2007). For me, understanding the personal emotional attachments that people have to nation is crucial to understanding its present (and future) role and significance in the geopolitical world. It is for this reason that I argue that in order to fully understand the emotional dimension of nation we need to have a more meaningful engagement with this phenomenon. However, before developing this argument I need to firstly explain how and why I think that engagements with the nation are becoming increasingly limited.

## Limits to meaningful engagement

For me, a meaningful engagement with the nation is one which takes the nation seriously; which engages with this phenomenon – and its social, cultural, political and emotional dimensions – in an open-minded and critical fashion. My intention here is not to attempt to provide some kind of blue-print for how academics, policy makers and others should engage with the nation, rather I want to demonstrate that current engagements with the nation are, at times, unhelpfully limited. There are a number of factors that contribute to limited engagements with the nation but, crudely speaking, the arguments that I will shortly outline can be summarised into limitations in the *conceptual engagement* with nation and limited engagements with *the 'doings' of nation* (those practices and emotional experiences of nation-building, national belonging and national identity). In this section I want to explore why these limited engagements occur.

*Cosmopolitanism and nationalism: opposing ideologies?*

It has become commonplace to argue that the pressures of global forces in the contemporary world are undermining the foundations on which the nation and, by extension, the nation-state is traditionally based such as, for example, national sovereignty, economic autonomy and social identity. Mark Juergensmeyer (2002) suggests that civic (or secular) nationalism reached the widest extent of worldwide acceptance in the mid-twentieth century. By the second half of the twentieth century, Juergensmeyer (1993; 2002) argues, the nation-state was becoming an increasingly fragile entity, especially in those nation-states created by retreating colonial powers in Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia and Eurasia. Here it is argued that factors including, border disputes between neighbouring states, threats to economic sovereignty by multinational corporations, and secessionist aspirations by minority ethnic groups began to dissolve the 'ideological glue' that held nation-states together and raised questions about the very idea of the nation as a basis for politics.

Undoubtedly the nation-state (underpinned by the ideology of nationalism) has the capacity to induce internal and external conflicts that can be discriminatory, divisive and violent. As Calhoun argues, the hyphen that ties together nation and state binds the notion of 'a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a modern polity with unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal administration' (2007, 3). This, as the history of the twentieth century tells us, is potentially a recipe for disaster with the nation-state being the source of many social and political evils including, to name but a few, ethnic cleansing, war, enforced migration, and the discrimination of ethnic minorities by dominant national groups. Such atrocities have led not only to the criticism of particular political regimes, but also to critiques of the concept of nation, and a desire to find an alternative and more socially desirable basis for politics. Perhaps the most popular of these alternative forms of politics has been cosmopolitanism (Kymlicka 2001; Yeğenoğlu 2005).



According to Kymlicka, cosmopolitans in the current era are ‘almost by definition, people who regret the privileging of national identities in political life, and who reject the principle that political arrangements should be ordered in such a way as to reflect and protect national identities’ (2001, 204). Whilst at present cosmopolitanism is almost always defined in contrast to nationalism, this has not always been the case (Bowden 2003; Calhoun 2008; and Kymlicka 2001). Indeed, as Conversi reminds us the term cosmopolitan has its roots in ancient Greece where it described someone ‘who considered the entire humankind as more meaningful than his or her own city, group, region or state’ (2001, 34). Cosmopolitanism received renewed attention during the Enlightenment when it was argued that the emancipation of individuals from ascribed roles and identities was central to social progress. Modernity liberates people from traditional identities and fixed social roles and ‘fosters an ideal of autonomous individuality that encourages individuals to choose for themselves what sort of life they want to lead’ (Kymlicka 2001, 203). For one of these Enlightenment thinkers – the Marquis de Condorcet – cosmopolitanism was the ‘natural’ and inevitable outcome of this process of individualisation. Thus people might be born into particular ethnic, linguistic and religious communities but individuals emancipated from fixed social roles would not see their options as limited or defined by membership of their inherited cultural group (Moore 2001).

Condorcet believed that as membership of cultural groups became optional voluntary ethno-cultural identities would gradually lose their political importance and a single cosmopolitan society, based on a universal language, would emerge. Writing before the age of nationalism, Condorcet could not have foreseen the obstacle that nationalism would present to the fruition of a cosmopolitan society. From the late eighteenth century nationalism became a primary geopolitical force based on (and promoting) the kinds of ‘backward’ ethno-cultural groups that the Enlightenment cosmopolitans were trying to move beyond. It is perhaps because of the severity of the impact that nationalism has had on cosmopolitan ambitions that cosmopolitanism tends to be commonly perceived as being in opposition to nationalism. This perception has undoubtedly,

in part, been strengthened by some of the exchanges that have occurred between cosmopolitans and nationalists. For example, Ulrich Beck (2002) referred to nationalism as an enemy of cosmopolitan societies arguing that, in the wake of the collapse of communism, nationalism was 'the remaining real danger to the culture of political freedom at the beginning of the 21st century' (2002, 38). Although Beck's thesis has been refined in the post 9/11 era to consider a plural conception of *cosmopolitanisms* that consider non-Western visions of cosmopolitanism (see Beck and Grande 2010; for a feminist critique see Vieten 2012) his work is still grounded in the notion that the nation is not fit for purpose in a world where social, economic and environmental processes, risks and challenges are global rather than national in scale.

Equally, nationalists have often viewed cosmopolitanism with deep suspicion. Ernest Gellner suggests that nationalists have been hostile 'not merely to rival cultures, but also, and perhaps with special venom, to bloodless cosmopolitanism, probably because they perceive it an ally of political centralism' (cited in Conversi 2001, 37). Whilst there is an emerging critique that a false opposition is being perpetuated in the academic literature between cosmopolitanism and nationalism (see, for example, Bowden 2003; Conversi 2001 and Kymlicka 2001), what is important in the context of this chapter is how the opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism (whether 'false' or not) influences academics' and policy makers' engagements with the nation.

Beck (2006) argues that there is often a taken-for-granted assumption that the nation and the state are the only social and political forms of the modern world that can organise societies. Where agents subscribe to this belief Beck (2006, 24) calls this a *national outlook* whereby individuals use conceptualisations of nationalism to frame their understandings of society and the geopolitical organisation of the world. Where this belief influences the perspective of academics, Beck (2006) states that this is *methodological nationalism* and, as such, influences the ways in which research questions are conceptualised and the language that is used to understand and describe the empirical world. Beck argues that the world which is currently 'being shaken to its foundations by the problems produced by the triumph of its civilization cannot be adequately grasped, investigated or explained within

the national outlook (of agents) or within the framework of methodological nationalism (the perspective of the scientific observer)' (2006, 24, see also Beck and Grande 2010). To this end, Beck (2006) argues that there needs to be an epistemological turn in the social and political sciences whereby there is firstly a critique of methodological nationalism and, secondly, there is the development of a new paradigm of *methodological cosmopolitanism* and with it a new cosmopolitan imagination.

Cosmopolitanism is a heterogeneous ideology. However, according to Kleingeld and Brown the 'nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated' (2009: online). Thus cosmopolitans seek to challenge commonly recognised emotional attachments to, for example, fellow-citizens, the local state, and cultural groups in order to create 'citizens of the world' (Benhabib 2008, Nussbaum 2002 [1996]). As with the Enlightenment cosmopolitans, different articulations of contemporary cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways some focusing on global political institutions, others on universal moral norms or relationships. Different perspectives also exist regarding the extent to which cosmopolitanism can (or should) engage with, or move beyond, traditional social allegiances. At the extreme end of the scale Nussbaum (2002 [1996]) recognises that attachments to other individuals or social groups exist (for example, to family, neighbours and fellow city-dwellers) however, she only recognises and values these attachments because of their instrumental use in achieving universal good (cf. Calhoun 2003). For Nussbaum, attachments to individuals or social groups can (and in some instances should) exist, but the strongest obligation of each person should be to humanity as a whole, not to particular social groups.

According to Calhoun (2003) a more moderate alternative to the 'extreme' cosmopolitanism outlined above is one that recognises that allegiances are multiple and overlapping so that in addition to relationships and affiliations with particular individuals and social groups, 'one also stands in an ethically significant relationship to other human beings in general' (Scheffler 2001, 115, cited in Calhoun 2003, 539). One of the key proponents of this more moderate articulation of cosmopolitanism is David Held

(2010 and 1995) who argues that one of the main appeals of cosmopolitan democracy is that people can gain from the benefit of multiple citizenships, occurring across a range of spatial scales that inform their everyday lives. Calhoun (2003) argues that Held's (1995) approach is moderate because he does not privilege the universal ahead of the particular in all cases and nor does he argue that cosmopolitanism is free from ethnic and cultural particularity (see also Yeoh 2004).

As this more moderate approach suggests cosmopolitanism and nationalism need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Bowden (2003) argues there may be mutual benefit in some kind of practical mediation between cosmopolitanism (which is often critiqued for being too abstract a concept to attract popular support and loyalty) and nationalism (which is often critiqued for being too introverted and exclusionary). However, all too often cosmopolitanism and nationalism are conceptualised as opposing ideologies and, for me, there has yet to be any sustained meaningful discussion between the two camps, which might usefully address some of the deficiencies (and dangers) of nationalism and some of the emotive and experiential weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. This lack of exchange may, in some part, be explained by concerns by scholars of cosmopolitanism over the reification of the nation and nationalism through methodological nationalism (Beck 2006) and also a desire by cosmopolitans to promote an alternative epistemological framework through methodological cosmopolitanism (cf. Vieten's 2012 discussion of Beck's 'situated' discourse as a member of the German post-Holocaust generation). However, as some cosmopolitan theorists have argued, the emotional and political power of nation and nationalism is not diminishing despite the attempts of cosmopolitans to create an alternative modernity (Cheah 2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). It seems to me then that there needs to be a greater understanding of the potential compatibility of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, which requires more rather than less meaningful engagements with the nation. It is one thing to argue that cosmopolitanism may offer a morally and politically more attractive alternative to nationalism, but it is another to hope that by ignoring or down-playing the significance of the emotional power of the nation that it will go away. However, as the next section demonstrates, it is not just cosmopolitans who have limited engagements with the nation.

*Conceptual differences in theories of nation and nationalism*

The second reason for why there have been limited meaningful engagements with the nation comes from within academic studies of nation and nationalism. Just as scholars of cosmopolitanism have attempted to distance themselves from the insidious and divisive qualities of nation, some scholars of nation have tried to diffuse the emotional power of nation by exposing its modern and socially constructed nature. Whilst most theories of nation and nationalism presuppose the existence of an emotional bond between members of a nation (Anderson 1983; Calhoun 1997; Connor 1993) and the territory or homeland that they occupy (Connor 2001; Penrose 2002), the extent to which the emotional dimension of nationhood is engaged with varies between several different theoretical standpoints. Primordialist theories of nation assume that nations are 'natural' divisions of humanity and that people's loyalty and emotional connections to these phenomena are inbred through primordial ties such as blood, speech, and customs (A.D. Smith 1999).

In recent decades, primordialist theories of nation have received heavy criticism from modern constructionist scholars for their essentialist outlook and have been blamed for triggering the dark and dangerous consequences of nationalism (see, for example, Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). However, as Tilley (1997) demonstrates, critics can sometimes miss the subtlety of primordialist arguments. For example, Geertz presents a far more complex argument in his (1973) book *The Interpretation of Cultures* to the one described in Eller and Coughlan's (1993) critique as he does not argue that primordial ties are 'natural' *per se*, rather he argues that such ties are *assumed* to be 'natural'. The work of primordialists has been maligned and caricatured to such an extent that Horowitz (2004) suggests that there is reason to suspect that many scholars no longer read works that engage with primordialism.

Modern constructionist theorists have, in many ways, attempted to diffuse the dangerous, emotive, primordial elements of nation by demonstrating their relatively recent and socially constructed nature (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In detaching concepts of nation and nationalism from ideas of essentialism, 'naturalness'

and perennality, modernists have implicitly attempted to withdraw some of the grounds on which people legitimise their often violent and divisive claims to nationhood and the need to protect their national identity. However, as some critics have argued, modern constructionists present a dispassionate and often unrealistic, 'rational' account of ideas of nationhood (Hoben and Hefner 1991; Hutchinson 1994), that often bear little relation to people's *lived experiences* of nation. Despite significant attempts by some modernist scholars, people's emotional attachments to nation and national identity cannot be 'explained away' through 'rational' explanations because, as Walker Connor convincingly argues, 'people do not die voluntarily for things that are rational' (1993, 206).

Connor (1993, see also Conversi 2002) is one of a small but growing number of ethno-symbolist scholars who have argued that dispassionate modern constructionist theories of nationhood are not useful because a 'rational' belief in the modern origins of nation does not necessarily negate the *emotional experience* of nation as something that is much older, enduring and 'natural' (A.D. Smith 1986, 1997, 2009; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004). This idea is significant because it suggests that there is a difference between the 'facts' of nationhood and people's emotional experiences of nationhood. Indeed, as Connor argues it is 'not *what is*, but *what people perceive as is*' (1993, 197) that is important in people's experience of national identity.

What I want to argue here is that modern constructionist theories of nation, whilst being useful for explaining the origins of nation and revealing the ways in which nations are instrumentally 'used' by national elites for their own political, economic and social ends have hindered meaningful engagements with nation; our understandings of how nations 'work' as emotive phenomena and how national belonging is (re)produced and experienced (Wood 2007). This is significant, because if it is agreed that nations can be divisive and dangerous, then it is important that we understand how they gain their emotional power and what kinds of emotional needs and desires need to be met by any future political alternative to the nation (or how current emotional attachments might be tempered). Therefore, there needs to be a more meaningful engagement with the

nation so that we understand not only how these phenomena are produced but also how they are lived and emotionally experienced in *everyday* life (Antonsich et al. 2014).

### *The assumed power of national belonging*

The final reason for why in some quarters there have been limited meaningful engagements with nation differs significantly from those that I have proposed so far. Here I argue that meaningful engagements with nation by scholars and policy makers have been limited by an almost 'blind faith' that nations possess certain characteristics that can be positively 'used' by state policy makers to achieve particular social aims including, for example: loyalty to the state and its endeavours; an emotional investment in a common good; socially cohesive communities and behaviours that are deemed to be morally and publicly desirable. One example that is illustrative of this phenomenon is the former UK New Labour government's instrumental use of 'Britishness', which was largely continued after 2010 by the Coalition Government.

In recent years events like the (2001) urban riots in Oldham and Bradford, and the (2005) 7/7 London bombings have raised serious questions about the challenges of living with and managing diversity and difference (see Amin 2002, 2003; Parekh 2000; Valentine 2008; Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Kofman 2005; Vieten 2013). For example, the key conclusion of the Cantle Report on the 2001 urban riots was that people from different ethnic and faith groups were not mixing and were leading 'parallel lives' (Home Office 2001). Similarly, in the wake of the (2005) London bombings Trevor Phillips, the then head of the Campaign for Racial Equality argued that Britain was 'sleepwalking towards segregation' (Phillips 2005). In an attempt to address these issues the New Labour government developed a number of policy initiatives grounded in a concept of 'meaningful citizenship' (Home Office 2001) that attempted to promote social cohesion across Britain's diverse ethnic and faith communities. These policy initiatives included mandatory citizenship education for 11–16 year olds,

which was introduced to the English school curriculum in 2002, and the introduction of citizenship tests and ceremonies for those seeking to acquire British citizenship (Home Office 2002).

Although these policies utilised conceptions of citizenship to promote social cohesion, the kind of 'active citizenship' (Blunkett 2003) that the New Labour government proposed was grounded in a shared national identity. Rejuvenating and promoting 'Britishness' as a positive and useful political resource was a cornerstone of several policy initiatives that were put into place during the Blair administration and continued to play a central role in the thinking of Gordon Brown's government (Brown 2009). One example of this at work is in the policy literature that discusses the development of citizenship education in schools.

According to the Blair administration's *Advisory Group on Citizenship*, citizenship education aims to bring about a change in the political culture of Britain, both nationally and locally, so that people understand themselves to be *active citizens* who are 'willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life' (Advisory Group on Citizenship 1998, 7; see also Kearns 1995; Osler and Starkey 2001). Citizenship education is understood to create a 'common ground between different ethnic groups and religious identities' that will promote greater social cohesion (Advisory Group 1998, 17). Indeed, it is hoped that citizenship education will help communities to 'find or restore a sense of common citizenship, *including a national identity* that is secure enough to find a place for the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom' (Advisory Group 1998, 17, emphasis added).

Similarly, in a (2007) report by the *Commission on Integration and Cohesion* entitled *Our Shared Futures* it is recommended that the Government's policy on integration and cohesion should include a national shared futures programme that reflects positively on the diversity of experience in Britain. According to the Commission:

The starting point for this must be the traditions and heritage of the country and its regions stretching back over hundreds of years – with a recognition of the important role dissent and non-conformism have played in the past, alongside a binding national narrative. (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007, 49)



There are a number of potential problems with assuming that the nation is a route to social cohesion. Firstly, the academic literature on citizenship raises a number of questions regarding the utility of a 'brand' of citizenship that attempts to draw on both a shared national identity *and* a plurality of cultures (such as that promoted by the New Labour government). Kymlicka (2001) argues that liberal accounts of citizenship, that implicitly assume that citizens will share not only a set of political principles, but also a common language and sense of membership in a national community, do not understand the nature of social unity in multiethnic and multination states like the UK. Moreover, I would argue that such accounts also use the unhelpfully ambiguous sense of nation explained earlier which contains the seeds of potential tensions between those who conceive of nation as an ethnic group and those who regard it in more civic terms as the citizenry.

Secondly, there is little engagement with how (in practical terms) a shared national identity and culture might be used as an instrumental route to social cohesion. Beyond the rather vague rhetoric embedded in the policy literature there tends to be little detail on the precise nature of those national narratives that might bind the nation together and little acknowledgement of how these may potentially differ between social communities (based on, for example, ethnicity, faith, gender, sexuality, and age) that are located across a diverse range of spatial locations. In many ways this lack of detail is unsurprising due to the fact that nations are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) that 'work', in part, because their imprecise nature allows its members to imagine their own place and role within that community. This is not a problem *per se*, but this vagueness does allow for a geography of Britishness to be produced which may contain potentially competing national narratives that divide, rather than unify, a national community.

Hence, it cannot be taken for granted that a shared national identity and culture is a route to social cohesion, rather more research needs to be conducted into the ways in which people experience the nation and understand their role within and relationship to the nation. In particular, a greater understanding of the geographies of national identity and belonging is required before any firm statements can be made regarding its utility as a unifying force at the national scale.

In this section I have made a number of cases for why I think there have been limited meaningful engagements with the nation drawing on the influence of cosmopolitanism, disagreements within the nations and nationalism literature and the 'blind faith' in nations and nationalism that can be perpetuated by some states. In the final section of my chapter I want to demonstrate what a more meaningful engagement with the nation might look like. The following work is not intended to provide some kind of blueprint for future research. Rather it is hoped that it will inspire a dialogue about how nations are empirically researched and offer one potential route (a starting point) to a more meaningful engagement with the nation.

## Towards more meaningful engagements with the nation

What interests me in many of the discussions of nation, nationalism and cosmopolitanism that I have outlined above is the curious absence of people's (everyday) experiences, desires and interests. Works on vernacular and visceral cosmopolitanism (see Nava 2007 and Werbner 2011) partially address this gap; these feminist works take into account the voices of everyday people, e.g. in London (Nava 2007). However, cosmopolitanism literature at large also tends to ignore the increasing power of nation and nationalism in the current era. Cosmopolitan scholars may call for a shift to methodological cosmopolitanism but there is still, in many parts of the world, a clear desire for national autonomy. For example, ongoing calls for national secession in the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain (see also the theme of language provisions, in the chapter by Naomi Wells in this book), the recent electoral success by the New Flemish Alliance in Belgium and the rise of the Scottish National Party and substantial support (45 per cent) for independence in the recent (2014) Scottish referendum, as well as the success of the SNP in the 2015 Westminster election, demonstrate that nationalism and the desire for national autonomy is staging something of a comeback at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Gillespie 2015). Whilst various theories have been suggested for this upsurge in nationalism including a backlash against those global institutions that are held

responsible for the 2008 financial crisis (Roubini 2014), what is not clear in these analyses is why it is nationalism (rather than an alternative political response) that has been so popular. What is it about nationalism that is so attractive? What is nationalism perceived to offer people that other political ideologies do not?

Angharad Closs Stephens' (2013) book *The Persistence of Nationalism* partially answers these questions by demonstrating the power of the national imaginary and the difficulties of escaping this. What is missing from this account though (and many others) is an engagement with the experiential and emotional dimension of nations and nationalism. Most theories of nation and nationalism acknowledge the emotional power of these phenomena however, as I explained earlier, many works on nation and nationalism are limited with regards to exploring how nations and nationalism 'work' as emotional doings.

Several years ago I conducted research on the role and significance of emotions in the (re)production of Scottish national identities (Wood 2007). Part of this work was based on a study of T in the Park a weekend, outdoor rock and pop festival (sometimes referred to as Scotland's Glastonbury) that takes place annually and which forms part of the summer music festival circuit. Part of the research that I conducted at this event involved conducting short on-the-spot interviews with audience members as close to the moment of performance as possible (usually at the end of the act) (Wood et al. 2007). What was really revealing about the responses that I obtained was that people (both Scots and non-Scots) often said that they experienced an intimacy between themselves and other members of the audience during the musical performances. Participants were not initially told that my research was exploring experiences of national identity; however Scottishness was frequently used (by Scots and non-Scots) as an explanation for why people were experiencing the performances in the way that they were (Wood 2007). In the absence of any other explanation, membership of a Scottish community and the experience of a shared sense of belonging and national identity was used to explain the feelings of intimacy that Scots experienced and which they perceived other Scots to experience too through their facial gestures and bodily behaviours. What-is-more people often drew on notions of primordial attachments (e.g. shared blood) to explain why this phenomenon was occurring. For example Scots talked

about how other Scots knew ‘in their guts’ how they themselves were feeling; what it felt like to experience Scottishness and talked of their shared Scottishness as being ‘like an instant bond’ (Wood 2007, 206). Conversely some respondents also stated that non-Scots couldn’t possibly experience the performance in the same way and that they might find the intense atmosphere in the crowd to be intimidating. This research demonstrates not only the strength of attachment that people have to their national identities but it also gives some insight into how national identities ‘work’ and when they occur. I argue that to ignore or downplay the sense of national belonging that people feel and experience in their everyday lives (as many scholars of cosmopolitanism do) is potentially dangerous as it ignores the emotional power of nations and the ‘triggers’ to people experiencing their national belonging in intensive and emotive ways. Equally to think that national belonging is always a productive and benign force (as it tends to be when used as an instrument of community cohesion) is equally dangerous as it ignores the ways in which national identity is often experienced as a primordial entity even though people may normally consider their national identity to be more civic and inclusive in nature. It is for this reason that I argue that there needs to be a greater understanding of people’s emotional experiences of nation, national identity and national belonging. Of course not all experiences of national belonging are dangerous or divisive, but the way that this phenomenon works emotionally means that the ‘triggers’ of national belonging have the potential to be used for dangerous and divisive ends. Something that politicians and world leaders know only too well.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to make a case for why there needs to be a more meaningful engagement with the nation in some academic and policy quarters. In recent years engagements with the nation have been limited by, amongst other things, the political aspirations of some cosmopolitan scholars, wholesale rejections of primordialism by modernist scholars of

nation and nationalism, and a 'blind faith' in the cohesive power of national belonging. This, I have argued, has led to a curious lack of meaningful engagement with what nations are and how they 'work'.

Whilst there may be good reasons for wanting to diminish the emotional power of nation (and to lessen its often violent and divisive nature), what I hope this chapter has demonstrated is that this cannot be achieved by ignoring the ways in which nations are emotionally experienced, or through writing the nation out of the political lexicon. Neither is it useful to blindly believe that – at the opposite end of the spectrum – the nation is a benign force that can unite ethnically and socially diverse peoples in an unproblematic manner. What I hope the final section of this paper demonstrates is that the nation is enduring (at least in the medium term) and that in order to properly understand its role and significance in the present (and future) geopolitical system it needs to be engaged with in a more meaningful manner.

I have suggested one possible route to achieving this goal, through a study of the *practices* and *emotional experiences* of nation. My research builds on previous works that unsettle many of the binaries that surround conceptualisations of the nation and highlights the fact that people's emotional experiences of nation can belie the facts of its creation (A.D. Smith 1995; Connor 1993). This means that experiences of nation cannot be taken for granted and there needs to be a greater and more meaningful understanding of how the nation 'works' across space and across different social and cultural landscapes, in order to properly assess its nature, role and possible utility in the current (and future) geopolitical system.

This call for a more meaningful focus on the nation is not to suggest that nations are the only or the best way of organising the geopolitical system. We live in a time when serious political and moral questions are being asked about the role of nations (through, for example, the works of cosmopolitan scholars) and the challenges of living with difference. Undoubtedly the role and significance of the nation has, and is continuing to, change and there is nothing to suggest that, in time, significant changes will not occur in the ways in which the geopolitical system is structured and organised. Indeed, it is precisely because *there is the potential for political change* that we need to have a more meaningful engagement with the

nation. In doing so, we might better understand the nation's tenacity, its emotional power, and the kinds of needs and desires that any political alternative to the nation will need to fulfil.

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ULRIKE M. VIETEN<sup>1</sup>

## Notions of Conflict and ‘New’ Citizens’ Inclusion: Post-Cosmopolitan Contestations in Germany

**ABSTRACT:** The German sociologist Ulrich Beck became renowned as an advocate of European cosmopolitanism; Germany, however, has a very dark history when it comes to cosmopolitan citizens. What is at stake is a gap between symbolic exclusion from the national community, rooted in the long-lasting ideological effect of ethno-national citizenship in Germany, and a rise in mixed-heritage identities on the ground referring to an already existing vernacular multicultural society. In this chapter, focusing on Berlin, different narratives of key minority political activists illustrate individual success despite vulnerability and conflicts, and are juxtaposed with the populist xenophobic debate of the day. In this way the chapter explores the ways hate crime and institutional racism are significant within the background scenario of how ‘new’ citizens feel and display their belonging within the German national community, and also influence layers of transnational and cosmopolitan identity that include intersecting angles, such as locality, age, class, gender and religion.

Goethe Street, Goethe hiking trail, Goethe museum, Goethe prefab houses, whatever. Discussions and theatre performances are pretty much focused on this. Equally there are a lot of lectures around here. You are permanently confronted, somehow. And the same goes for Buchenwald; plenty of people come to see the concentration camp; and if friends and family are visiting me, of course, I will show them around, and also lead them to visit Buchenwald. It means I am pretty much aware of this, and kind of constantly working on this topic. Talking about Buchenwald, I think it is important to add that Weimar is a place where Nazis also head to. By now, there have been two attempts by Nazis to have big demonstrations organised here. But we also had big counter demonstrations; we’ve got a left-wing anti-fascist movement; plenty of people voicing protest against Nazis, and an alliance of citizens

1 If not stated otherwise, all translations from German into English are by the author.

against Nazis here in Weimar and surrounding areas. (Ercan, interview in Weimar, 17 February 2011)<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

Looking back at my research stay in Germany between October 2010 and May 2011, I wondered why it didn't occur to me initially to travel to Weimar, in order to conduct an interview with a 'new' German citizen of partly Turkish (Kurdish, actually) heritage. My prejudiced perspective might have been related to a largely West German 'lens', taking for granted that Berlin is the obvious multicultural metropolitan space in which to look for the mingling of and distinctions between different ethnic and religious groups. Having said that, there are some cities in the West of Germany – Cologne and Düsseldorf, Essen and Duisburg, all in the federal state of North Rhine Westphalia; the *Hanse* cities of Bremen and Hamburg in the North West; Frankfurt am Main in Hesse – where you expect to find larger Turkish communities. However, this goes hand in hand with the assumption that there is no space for Turkish-Germans in the East of Germany.

Indeed, you still don't find that many in Weimar, I learned later.

- 2 'Goethestraße, Goethewanderweg, Goetheplattenhaus gibt es, Goethemuseum und was es alles gibt. Die Diskussionen und Theaterstücke drehen sich viel darum herum. Es gibt viele Lesungen. Da bist du ständig damit konfrontiert. Und mit Buchenwald auch, weil sehr viele Menschen kommen; sehr viele Menschen, wenn die mich besuchen, bring ich sie zu den Orten und auch nach Buchenwald. Dann sehe ich das ständig und dann setze ich mich ständig damit auseinander. Bei Buchenwald ist noch wichtig, hinzuzufügen oder insgesamt, weil Weimar so ein Ort ist, ist es natürlich auch ein Ort, wo die Nazis viel marschieren wollen. Und es gab schon Versuche, hier zwei Aufmärsche zu machen. Dann gab's immer einen großen Protest dagegen. Es gibt auch ne linke antifaschistische Bewegung; viele Menschen, die dagegen protestieren, ein Bürgerbündnis und äh... hier in Weimar und Umgebung.'

In contrast to Berlin and its metropolitan area of more than 3.5 million inhabitants, Weimar has a population of approximately 65,000; in Weimar, visible minorities are even less visible than they are elsewhere in Germany. So, what is special about Weimar?

Weimar embodies an awful lot of what is (in-)famous about Germany: the Classical writers and intellectuals Goethe and Schiller, the 1920s art and architecture movement *Bauhaus*, 'Weimar' as the First Democratic Republic of Germany, the National Socialist regime following the republic, the concentration camp Buchenwald. Weimar enshrines provinciality as well as German national history, or, to turn this around, German national identity as condensed in provinciality. In that respect Weimar signifies the German *Kulturnation's* symbolic space, where history has imprinted its presence and leaves its mark on sites which attract crowds of international twenty-first-century tourists. Weimar, which was also a GDR city between 1949 and 1989, is historically charged, and certainly no one can deny its significance to any inheritance of German national identity.

And it is through a link to the famous *Bauhaus* that Ercan enters the scene. Ercan, a 'Wessi' – a West German – who was born in Rüsselsheim, another small city, but located in South Middle West Germany, in the federal state of Hesse. Rüsselsheim is well known for its car industry and is a place where Turkish and Kurdish men, first on their own and later with their families, have settled since the 1960s. Ercan, one of my younger interview partners, originates from a Kurdish and Alevi family background. He moved to Weimar to do his PhD at the Bauhaus University and he is involved with radical left socialist politics and the *Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung*, an educational charity foundation linked to the post-socialist party *Die Linke*. What is fascinating about Ercan's narrative, in particular, is a concrete indication of a more vernacular emergence of 'new' Germans, a merging and melting of different national and cultural histories into the contemporary and future make-up of Germany as a multicultural society. So, is there once again a thriving cosmopolitanism on the ground, going beyond the character of 1920s Berlin to encompass a growing 'relaxation' of the old ethno-past? This leads us to further question the place of migrants and their offspring and the space of hybrid national identities in the concept of cosmopolitan Europe, or cosmopolitan Germany.

## Cosmopolitan ambitions of 'new' European citizens

Some contemporary scholars propose a cosmopolitan Europe or suggest we should approach European issues through a cosmopolitan lens (e.g. Beck and Grande 2007, Rumford 2007). These purposeful interventions reflect to a certain degree present-day attempts to normalise what emerged historically as an upper-class and highly individualised cultural competence in different parts of the world and across various societies (Nava 1998; Stevenson 2003; Mouffe 2004; Calhoun 2007). Following Calhoun's (2007) critical view of cosmopolitanism as being no antidote to nationalism, and not living up to its promises of racial, gender and class equality (Vieten 2007; 2012), what matters when looking at the vernacular everyday within nation states is the question of how cosmopolitan openness can be actually lived (Nava 2006, 2007; Valentine 2008). How does a subjective cosmopolitan consciousness relate to nationally and territorially nested classed, racialised and gendered hierarchies, on the one hand, and current spatial-social transformations, on the other?

Nedelcu (2012) convincingly illustrates how contemporary migrants show a specific form of cosmopolitan capacity by linking different localities through and in their transnational lives. In what ways is cosmopolitanism an appreciated topic in contemporary Germany – a Germany with a toxic history concerning twentieth-century cosmopolitans, including the mass murder of Sinti and Roma, as well as Jews?

Mandel (2008) explores in more depth the complicated ethno-relationships in Germany, such as the relationship between majority ethnic Germans with minority ethnic Turks. Whereas a postmodern cosmopolitan image of Berlin prevails in the media and in public discourse, she finds continuing racial stereotyping when it comes to the Turkish community, for example those living in the borough of Kreuzbe.g. However, she also encounters 'in-between' feelings of belonging, torn between the demands of Turkish national identity and German hybrid identities, alongside a very creative cultural and political local space.

Kaya (2012: 161) argues that 'German-Turkish transmigrants' are effectively involved in producing cosmopolitan identities as 'a form of

multilocality [...] in both real and symbolic terms, in order to position themselves *vis-a-vis* the risk of being excluded by the majority society.'

So how do late modern 'national-cultural' cosmopolitan claims and cosmopolitan practices fit together when it comes to the situation of 'new' German citizens?

This chapter is part of a larger theoretical project (Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014) developing the notion of new European citizens as a metaphor for building transnational identities within a framework of Europeanisation, and also highlighting the potential of specific regional identities, typical of federal states, in a transformed and transgressive democratic counter-space of civic society. This original approach supplements more conventional discourses on migration, enhancing our understanding of emerging transnational societies. Through a unique dataset derived from in-depth interviews based on narrative methodology (Andrews et al. 2013; Esin 2011), this chapter demonstrates the practical (and in some cases conflict-ridden) empirical effects of contemporary cosmopolitanisms in Europe, whose conceptual elements have been outlined elsewhere (Vieten 2007; Vieten 2012),

The argument unfolds within two sections. First, I will contextualise some conceptual aspects of the post-migration condition of German society and the relevance of the city space to the idea of 'being a new citizen' in a post-cosmopolitan age. Then, secondly, I will bring in interview sequences drawn from a larger study,<sup>3</sup> introducing some key political activists who live or have lived in Berlin, the capital city of Germany. It is argued here that 'new' citizens are involved in a variety of 'enacted' (Isin and Saward 2013) forms of citizenship, advancing active political practices and civic interventions in the city space where they live their daily life.

'New' citizens' post-cosmopolitan practices and struggles are unfolding alongside and in spite of a strong anti-Muslim discourse in Germany, as we will see later. This anti-Muslim discourse mainly targets Turks as the

3 The study was associated with the 'Inclusive Thinking' research group and generously funded by the Dutch VSB fund; particular thanks go here to Prof. Halleh Ghorashi, VU Amsterdam.

biggest 'ethno'-religious national minority. Even the individual 'new' citizens who I spoke to, who are highly educated and – with regard to social status – can be regarded as very well 'integrated' and successful, share the deeper vulnerability and experience of actual or perceived victimhood felt by the entire minority community. The different narratives are juxtaposed with the populist xenophobic debate of the day. In this way, the chapter will explore the significance of hate crime and institutional racism to the background scenario of how 'new' citizens feel and display their belonging to the German national community, on the one hand, and to layers of transnational identities (which include intersecting angles such as locality, age, class, gender and religion), on the other.

## The Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany

The Turkish community is the largest national minority in Germany in terms of numbers, and also, being predominantly of the Muslim religion, Germany's most vilified non-Christian group post 9/11. They are addressed in the public debate as a single ethnic minority, without further differentiating to take account of, for example, a Kurdish background. Characteristically, Turkish immigrants have settled in big cities, not only in Berlin but (as mentioned above), in Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt am Main or cities in North Rhine Westphalia like Essen, Duisburg and Cologne. Whereas long-term settlement of Turkish people took place across West Germany following their immigration as so-called 'guest workers', the different historical make-up of the social and economic fabric of the GDR means that only a few Turkish people live in the east part of Germany, even today. The structural outcome of this lack of long-term ethnic minority settlement in East Germany creates an uneven space for the political-civic participation of visible minorities, and leaves fewer opportunities for individual multicultural encounters on all sides. Despite Germany's 'secular republican' claim, a strong Christian influence persists with regard to its educational institutions as well as its social fabric and welfare system. Also



significant, as a legacy of its communist orientation, is the fact that 'East Germany is one of the most secularized parts of Europe' (Biendarra and Leis-Peters 2007, 2).

The Turkish daily newspaper *Today's Zaman* reported in 2012 that 'about 2.7 million German citizens have a background of Turkish migration. Twenty-seven per cent of Turks living in Germany were born there, and 39 per cent have been living in Germany for more than 30 years.' Further, *Today's Zaman* reckons, 'the proportion of this 2.7 million who consider Germany their homeland has decreased in the past few years; only 15 per cent regard it as home, whereas in 2009 this figure was 21 per cent. A further 45 per cent consider both Turkey and Germany to be home, and 39 per cent named Turkey alone.'

According to Eccarius-Kelly (2010, 105), despite the change in naturalisation law in 2010, '[s]ocietal violence, however, affects the quality of life of Turkish/ Kurdish immigrants and ethnic Turkish/ Kurdish Germans. As permanent residents and citizens, the minorities experience occasional physical attacks by right-wing groups, neo-Nazi organisations, and militant nationalists from Turkey.' The majority of Turkish and Kurdish migrants have settled in big cities, as outlined above. Hence, in the next section I will talk briefly about the city in a cosmopolitan sense, and link the city space to the visible participation of its citizens and denizens.

## City space, citizenship and the post-cosmopolitan condition

The city space is central to our images of modernity and cosmopolitan life, and also to the visibility of difference and the presence of minorities. It links to perspectives that stress 'the primacy of the city over the nation' (Christensen 2012, 891), also emphasising the *polis*, the city space where local political organisation and action take shape.

This is true not only for activities such as the Gezi Park protests that took place in Istanbul in May 2013, claiming a democratic right to the city for all citizens, but can also be witnessed when it comes to the rise

of visible anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner protests, for example those in Dresden. Looking at the most recent German far-right populist movements, PEGIDA (*'Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes'*, translated into English as 'Patriotic Europeans against the rise of Islam in and across the West'), visible not only in the East German city of Dresden but mushrooming across the country, it seems that alongside an everyday urban cosmopolitanism a negative cosmopolitanism has (re-)evolved in Europe, which dismisses certain bodies or groups according to shifting racialised and classed boundaries (Vieten 2011; 2012).

Having said that, a new urban generation of citizens from a migrant background underscores the presence of multiple diasporic and transnational identities in Europe (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014). The transnational orientation of these 'new' citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds seems to fit best into the contemporary world of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000).

Following from these considerations, it is argued here that gendered, classed and religiously and ethnically laden symbolic boundaries in contemporary Europe – Germany being a case in point – refer to problematic and contradictory 'post-cosmopolitan' (Dobson 2003) urban spaces. Hence, the contemporary struggle about who has the 'right to the city' (Vieten and Valentine 2015) and the right to belong to the nation is still very much shaped by violent ruptures and ideological barriers (e.g. an ethnic-national imagining of who is included in the 'people'). This long-lasting block in Germany, for example, is perpetuated by violent hate crime incidents which have been downplayed in the past. It exists despite distinctive regional policies which might positively impact on individual social mobility and achievements. Germany, as one of the big players in the EU, has recently subscribed to a more liberal democratic agenda, even promoting a 'culture of welcome' for foreigners and encouraging inclusion. This is a significant departure from Germany's long history of immigration denial and its track record of drawing political boundaries along ethno-national lines.

Still, the transnational and multi-layered aspirations and identifications of Turkish/Kurdish 'new' citizens disrupt the hegemonic narrative of a territorialised, European-bounded national citizenship, particularly if they have been naturalised and obtained legal German citizenship. 'Acts

of citizenship', according to Isin (2008, 39), are 'those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing in new actors [...] through new sites and scales of struggle'. It is here that 'new', transnationally oriented German citizens disrupt a system that still takes for granted territorial notions of citizenship and belonging. They live in Europe, but they are not regarded as European; or are they? They have German citizenship, but they are not regarded as German; or are they?

What is at stake is a gap between, on the one hand, symbolic exclusion from the national community, rooted in the long-lasting ideological effects of ethno-national citizenship in Germany, and, on the other hand, a rise in mixed-heritage identities on the ground, within a vernacular multicultural society. In what ways has this paradox been inscribed in the lives of 'new' Germans from a partly Turkish or Kurdish background?

Before I turn to my interview partners' experiences and my discussion of the tensions outlined above, I will give some information on the methodology used and on the interview sample itself.

## Giving a name to individual voices

This study was part of a larger research project looking at intersecting points of inclusion with respect to 'new' citizens in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013; Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014).

I interviewed 14 Turkish-German key minority activists in some of the largest cities of Germany between autumn 2010 and spring 2011. Apart from a snowball system at a later stage, I got to know my interview partners through personal and political (left-wing) contacts. Further, I approached individuals I came across as publically renowned minority activists (e.g. in newspapers, on TV and on the internet). A comment on the notion of 'key minority activists' might be necessary here: I approached minority citizens who held positions of individual power marked by influence in and on institutions, or who I perceived as intervening in public debates with respect to

local and national affairs. They advocated to some degree the interests of minorities and were involved in human rights and women's rights.

Interviews were conducted in the participants' offices or homes or in cafés, depending on the space they preferred or on what was accessible for the scheduled time of the interview. All 14 semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim; they lasted between 50 minutes and 1.5 hours. Two out of 14 interviews were conducted in English; the others were held in German. I interviewed slightly more women than men (8 to 6).

In terms of social class, about half of my respondents' came from working-class families and the other half from a middle- or upper middle-class background. A significant number of my interview partners exemplified upward social mobility and – if they had immigrated as children – they received their education in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The majority were of Turkish ethnic background (10) and – although this was not explicitly asked and thus indicated – might be categorised as heterosexual. Ten of my interview partners regarded themselves as Muslims, and expressed clear secular views.

Unlike many other empirical studies, in which interviewees' birth names are not disclosed to ensure that they feel safe, in this study 12 out of the 14 interview partners were happy to openly share their names. All but three were well known to the public, and some could be even labeled as VIPs, so they were used to standing up and speaking out publically. In hindsight, I particularly appreciate their willingness to be mentioned by name. One important epistemic element of the research was to not only *give a voice to minorities*, but *name* individual key minority activists in order to strengthen the right to *civic individualisation*. This is not to suggest that my interview partners' more privileged social position could be easily generalised, or lumped into one specific structural group positioning. Rather, it is intended to support the idea of role models and shed light on *individual agency*, actual and *active* civic change.

In the next section, I will focus on minority activists who live or have lived in Berlin. I will examine how we find repercussions of the complexities outlined above in the testimonies of the people I spoke to. What do well educated and politically engaged 'new' Germans have to say about the situation they live in? What are the implications of the pressure to speak German, or the desire to pass as a German?

## Berlin: Turkish-German dilemmas and options

In twenty-first-century Germany the *Shoa* is part of the collective memory across the metropolitan city of Berlin. As a visible testimony of mid-nineteenth-century Turkish immigration, we also find in Berlin the first Turkish cemetery, founded in 1861. Compared to the widespread and noticeable commemoration of Jewish culture and pre-Holocaust cosmopolitan life all across Berlin, an awareness of the close nineteenth- and early twentieth-century bond between Germany and Turkey is almost absent in the public sphere.

Today, Berlin is home to the biggest Turkish community outside Turkey (roughly 110,000 people). Official statistical records regarding ethnic minorities and religious belief do not exist in Germany, so information is measured according to 'nationality'. The capital city of Berlin is divided into administrative areas known as *Bezirke* (districts, similar to boroughs in London). The three districts most frequently mentioned in the context of Turkish settlement are Kreuzberg,<sup>4</sup> Wedding and Neukölln. All three districts are located in the old West of the city.

According to Mühe (2007, 64), '[i]n the districts of *Neukölln*, *Kreuzberg* and *Mitte*, the number of welfare recipients makes up more than 11 per cent of the population – the highest in Berlin.' The percentage of welfare recipients can be an indicator of poverty and lower-class status, associated with low income, poor housing, precarious living conditions and lower access to consumer goods.

Since the 1990s politicians have accused the Turkish community, in particular those who live in Kreuzbe.g. of embracing 'parallel societies' (*Parallelgesellschaften*). This negative attitude towards the existence of Turkish-speaking neighbourhoods and the maintenance of non-German

4 Today the *Bezirk* is named Friedrichshain-Kreuzbe.g. Friedrichshain is 'old east' and now a chic place where a lot of tourists go for leisure purposes (restaurants, bars, shops). In contrast to Kreuzberg it is a young, white and middle-class space.

cultural habits may explain the way some of my Turkish-German interview partners reflected on matters *of language, culture and inclusion*.

Prof. Dr H.H. Uslucan, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies and Integration Research at the University of Essen-Duisburg, moved to Berlin with his mother in 1973. He was born in Anatolia in the 1960s, and he belongs to the generation whose fathers migrated first to West Germany and brought the family at a later stage, all of them settling in the new homeland. Prof. Uslucan reflects on his upbringing in different social-cultural neighbourhoods, pinpointing some of the effects of living in a more homogenous lingual-cultural environment and the advantages of moving to an upper-class area.

My father moved to Germany at the beginning of the seventies and due to the right to bring in his family he brought us to Germany as well. I went to school in Turkey for two years; in that respect my educational socialisation was shaped by my heritage in Turkey. Well, I came with my brother and my mother to Germany in 1973; first to Neukölln. At that time this district wasn't the notorious place it is known as today, as it is stigmatised nowadays. I attended a German language class for six months, and I was quite successful. It meant I could leave the third class [of primary school] after two months and switch to the fourth class. As far as my educational/ school career is concerned the migration did not impact negatively on my school performance. ... We moved to Schöneberg at that time. I think that was a very important push to my personal development. Previously, in our house [in Neukölln] we used to live with six or seven Turkish families; in Schöneberg, we were the only Turkish family. Thus, learning German, learning the language with my peer group increased; the boys and children who I used to play with in the yard, they were Germans.<sup>5</sup>

- 5 ,Mein Vater ist Anfang der 70er Jahre nach Deutschland gekommen und hat im Rahmen der Familienzusammenführung uns nach Deutschland geholt. Ich habe in der Türkei zwei Jahre auch die Schule besucht, also so dass ein Anteil der schulischen Sozialisation auch hier in der Herkunft festgelegt wurde, so dass ich auch einen Teil der... der Sozialisation und der schulischen Sozialisation in der Türkei durchgeführt hab. Ja ich bin mit meinem Bruder und meiner Mutter 1973 nach Deutschland gekommen und äh... zunächst nach Neukölln (Berlin). Das ist damals also kein so skandalträchtiger Bezirk gewesen, wie es gegenwärtig stigmatisiert wird. Äh... und hab nen Deutschkurs besucht, ein halbes Jahr und war recht erfolgreich, so dass ich also die dritte Klasse nach zwei Monaten wieder verlassen konnte und mit der vierten angefangen habe, also so dass, was die schulische Karriere betrifft quasi die Migration

Schöneberg (-Tempelhof) is a more prosperous district of (West) Berlin. Prof. Uslucan remembers it as a crucial turning point in his further educational achievements and learning of German as his second language that his parents moved to a more affluent neighbourhood of Berlin. Even more important, it opened up possibilities for mixing and mingling with German children on a day-to-day basis. From this perspective, it seems that a cultural or linguistic ghetto inhabited by a minority can impede an individual's integration.

We should keep in mind that Prof. Uslucan entered the German education system in the mid-to-late 1970s, a period in which the governing Social Democratic party encouraged social mobility. There was, however, no master plan for the integration of immigrants.

The issue of language and identity also came up in an interview with another academic, who moved to Germany quite recently and had already lived in other countries beforehand. This interview partner grew up in an upper middle-class family in Turkey and gained her doctorate outside of Turkey.

So in Germany there are two nationalities or two groups, you are either a Turk, undifferentiated for the immigration background, or whatever, you are either a Turk or you are German. It's almost two different categories that are in opposition to each other and of course I don't understand why I am going to be this Turk for the rest of my life because I also made a lot of effort to be German or be just this new German.

Whereas speaking the main language of the country of residence might help with daily communication and increase the chance of career success, this matter proves more complicated when considering that a more cosmopolitan and mobile life might mean moving countries frequently, and – as far as academics and professionals are concerned – English has become the

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nicht sehr früh schon zur schulischen Beeinträchtigung geführt hat. Wir sind dann umgezogen nach Schönebe.g. Das war glaub ich jetzt für die eigene Entwicklung ein wichtiger Schub. In dem Haus vorher waren wir sechs, sieben türkische Familien, und in Schöneberg waren wir die einzige, also so dass quasi das Deutsch lernen, Sprache lernen im Peerverbund viel größer war, mit den Jungs und den Kindern, die auf dem Hof waren, das waren alles Deutsche.

*lingua franca*. Further, the dilemmas implicit in the two-tiered positioning – the positive and privileged position of the citizen of the world or cosmopolitan, on the one side, and the negative view of cosmopolitan activity in which the mobility of migrants is restricted (Vieten 2007), on the other side – are carried through into the contemporary situation of non-Western migrants: although they live an everyday cosmopolitan life, the national integration policy and cultural order attempts to domesticate them.

In the interview we touched on the issue of what it means to raise a child. Here, enforcement of a language creates paradoxical results and even painful mothering experiences.

R: They said we should talk to her in German hoping her German would improve.

I: Who told you?

R: The kindergarten teachers.

I: Ok.

R: But I think they are instructed from somewhere that they have to tell these immigrant parents that they have to speak to their child in German. How many times do I have to change my mother tongue with my child? So I continued speaking in English with her and her father was speaking in German. Actually her German is much better than her English but this concept of integration looked absurd to me especially as cosmopolitan people like me who constantly have to change their mother tongue according to the country of integration.

While conducting research on Kurdish mothers in London, Erel (2013) noticed that despite making efforts to raise their children embedded in an understanding of Kurdish history, tradition and culture, the women being interviewed identified positively with British society. 'I have found that all mothers in this study, regardless of their orientation to cultural change or continuity, positioned themselves as part of British society. They claimed rights for themselves and their children' (2013, 981). However, the situation in Germany looks different, with a strong external demand to integrate *culturally*. Most of my interview partners expressed a struggle in identifying positively with Germany, as 'new' Germans.

Mr Kilic,<sup>6</sup> a member of the Green party and an MP in the *Bundestag* at the time of the interview, sums up what the situation looked like when he

6 [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memet\\_K%C4%B1%C4%B1%C3%A7](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memet_K%C4%B1%C4%B1%C3%A7)



moved to Germany as an adult. He immigrated in the early 1990s, pursuing legal studies and completing an MA in European law. He had already trained as a solicitor in Turkey.

It was a very interesting time to come to Germany; the time of the reunification when the wall went down, a very vibrant period. Having said that there was also a strong nationalistic mood. East Germany ... 'We want to have a healthy national consciousness', all these slogans. Or 'The ship is full'. All this somehow fueled Rostock, Hoyerswerda, Lichtenhagen. There were arson attacks on shelters for refugees. In Moelln and Solingen migrants were burnt to death. These were racists who did this. I knew Germany of course for Goethe and Schiller, and particularly my favourite philosopher, Nietzsche. I read his work in Turkish. Of course, I knew immediately that those who attacked refugees and migrants could not be regarded as representative of the German people as a whole. Well, I believe I am not mistaken in this. For sure, there were also people hiding behind the curtain, and actually siding with this, but then there were *Lichterketten*, hundreds of thousands of people went onto the streets, until the Nazis somehow withdrew. At that time I began working with the *Ausländerbeiräte*.<sup>7</sup>

As will be illustrated next, the shadow of the hate crimes and anti-Muslim racism of the early 1990s is reflected in the testimonies of my interview partners, not only in Berlin, but also in other major cities. In this regard the findings of this study complement Mandel's (2008) observation that Turkish immigrants and 'new' citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds are

- 7 „Als ich 1990 nach Deutschland kam, war es eine sehr interessante Zeit sozusagen mitten drin in der Wiedervereinigung. Mauer ist gefallen und eine sehr bewegte Zeit. Aber es gab auch ziemlich starke nationale Töne. Ostdeutschland... „Wir wollen auch ein gesundes nationales Selbstbewusstsein haben“ - all diese Sprüche, oder „Das Boot voll“, haben dazu geführt, dass in Rostock, Hoyerswerda, Lichtenhagen Flüchtlingsheime in Brand gesteckt worden sind, in Mölln und Solingen Migranten verbrannt worden sind. Die Rassisten haben so was gemacht. Ich kannte Deutsche natürlich von Goethe, Schiller, insbesondere mein Lieblingsphilosoph Nitsche. Ich hab ihn in türkischer Sprache gelesen. Ich wusste sofort, dass diese Leute nicht die Repräsentanten des deutschen Volkes sein können. Ähm... ich glaube, dass ich mich nicht geirrt habe. Sicherlich, es gab auch viele Leute, die hinter Vorhängen applaudiert haben, aber dann gab es Lichterketten, Hunderttausende Menschen auf die Straße gegangen, bis die Nazis sich klein gefühlt haben. In dieser Zeit hab ich mich bei den *Ausländerbeiräten* engagiert.“

not included in the claim of an open-minded European Germany. It is here that the long-lasting shadow of history and the drawing of ethno-national boundaries triggers experiences of exclusion and non-belonging.

## Post-Unification Germany in the 1990s: the peaceful change and its violent aftermath

The initially calm and peaceful transition from the communist system in the East and the social-liberal market system in the West (*Rheinischer Kapitalismus*) to the post-1990 united Germany left different sections of German society shattered, shaken and uncertain about their future. What is significant is the scale of racist attacks on black people, refugees and Turkish immigrants from the early 1990s in both West and East Germany, reaching a peak in 1992 and 1993.

Bauböck (2010: 800) reflects on the meaning of the arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen in the context of citizenship status:

The 1992/93 arson attacks on Turkish immigrants in the German towns of Mölln and Solingen triggered a debate in Turkey about emigrants not being sufficiently protected while they are foreign nationals. The German naturalization requirement to renounce a previous nationality meant, however, that Turkish emigrants would lose their rights to unconditional return to Turkey, to own land and to inherit property there. Turkey therefore introduced in 1995 the so-called pink card, which secured all these rights (apart from the right to vote) for former citizens who had to renounce their nationality.

In the East, Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen became synonymous with racist attacks on non-white refugees. Solingen is a town in North Rhine Westphalia not unlike the cities of Essen, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. Two Turkish women and three girls were murdered here on 29 May 1993. On 23 November 1992, in Mölln, a town in Schleswig-Holstein, a Northern federal state in West Germany, two Turkish girls and their grandmother had died under similar circumstances. In both cases, racists and, as it turned out,

neo-Nazis had targeted Turkish family homes and murdered women and children in cowardly arson attacks.

These racist murders provided a landmark within the trauma of many 'new' Germans from a Turkish or Kurdish background. When I asked my interview partners to name three or four important historical dates or events they remember from the past 40 years, the majority immediately came up with 'Mölln and Solingen'. Some of their comments are given here as examples.

Solingen and Mölln are central and divisive experiences for me. That ... you know ... people are still being burnt and this is happening at the turn of the 3rd millennium. (Cakir, Frankfurt am Main)<sup>8</sup>

Clearly Mölln, Mölln is a household name, of course 11 September, too. But I have to say the first thing was Mölln. I was deeply shocked. Well, at that time I often had nightmares, for example, that suddenly ... there was a Turkish family in my neighbouring house, I lived in the Lindenstrasse, and you know they had a house. And I had this dream that their home was burnt. (Yuksel, Bremen)<sup>9</sup>

Very important is the Turkish house burning in Mölln. I had my first nervous breakdown on that occasion. At that time I was preparing for my first law exams and, in general, was not following that much what was going on around me in terms of political and social events. I was only concentrating on law and my exams, and I was walking in the Schulterblatt [in the St Pauli quarter of Hamburg] and then I saw this poster, on the window of a bookshop. I don't know how I did it, but until then I had ignored completely what was going on and then I saw this poster and fainted on the street. It really got me. Besides, I became sick with shingles. Well, it happened at a time in my life where I was bound to do my studies and could not engage in politics. I think I had to do my law exams four weeks later. Hence, this

8 'Solingen und Mölln sind für mich sehr einschneidende Erlebnisse. Dass... in einem... also kurz vor dem dritten Jahrtausend Menschen immer noch verbrannt werden.'

9 'Also Moelln, Moelln ist so ein Begriff, ne 11 September. Also ich muss sagen, als Erstes, Moelln so. Das war ziemlich ... da war ich ziemlich geschockt. So, und hatte ja damals auch Träume gehabt, dass plötzlich die... das war ne türkische Familie, die im Nachbarhaus, ich wohnte da in der Lindenstraße, und die hatten da ja ein Haus. Und da hab ich geträumt, dass deren Haus abbrennt, so ne.'

breakdown and realising that I couldn't do anything about what was going on politically was a very influential experience for me. But, you know, I wanted to pass that exam. (Gul, Hamburg)<sup>10</sup>

Yes, it was 1992, 1993, those fascist attacks against... well, let me think, against migrants, refugees, here in Mölln, Solingen and there were others, because there were a lot of places where these things happened. That was, you know, the debate around the time.... 92/ 93; these were the years when I got politicised. (Ercan, Weimar)<sup>11</sup>

Prof. Karasoglu, another interview partner, also mentioned these years of racist attacks, which for her were connected to a life-threatening personal experience. A Molotov cocktail was placed in front of her office while she was working at Prof. Uslucan's Institute in Essen.

Another interview partner confirmed the centrality of these years in her research observations: 'I find the burning of the houses in Mölln and Solingen very vivid in many of the Turkish immigrants' memories here. Especially then there were other burnings. About 1992, 1993, 1994' (H., Berlin).

- 10 'Ganz wichtig ist der türkische Hausbrand in Mölln. Da hab ich wirklich meinen allerersten Zusammenbruch gehabt. Also hatte ich dann auch nicht. Aber da steckte ich mitten in der Examensphase in meinem ersten Staatsexamen und kriegte eigentlich weder gesellschaftspolitisch noch überhaupt irgendwas mit. Also ich kriegte gar nichts mit, außer Jura und Examen und ging im Schulterblatt entlang und dann hing ein Plakat, war bei der Buchhandlung. Und ich hatte das, ich weiß gar nicht, wie ich's geschafft hab, aber ausgeblendet bis dahin, bis mir irgendwie dieses Plakat... und brach wirklich mitten auf der Straße zusammen. Es hat mich echt eingeholt. Und kriegte dann sofort ne Gürtelrose. Es war... es war in ner Phase, wo ich partout nicht irgendwas hätte machen können und auch nicht äh... weil ich... ich glaube, ich hab vier Wochen danach Examen geschrieben oder so. Es war irgendwie... aber das ist ganz, ganz prägend, da irgendwas, so was mitzukriegen und nichts tun zu können oder wollen, also ich hätte... können hätte ich ja. Aber ich wollte ja nicht, weil ich wollte ja dieses Examen...' (Gul, Hamburg).
- 11 'So 92 bis 93 die faschistischen Angriffe gegen... lass mich überlegen... gegen die Migranten, Flüchtlinge hier.... Mölln, Solingen und andere, weil es gab ja viel andere. Das war... und die Debatte drum herum. 92/93 – das war so das... das waren auch die Jahre, wo ich mich sehr politisiert habe.' (Ercan, Weimar).

As argued at the very beginning, the contested post-cosmopolitan urban space unfolds with contradictory claims: on the one hand there is a vernacular presence of settled migrants across all major West German cities; on the other, persistent anti-Muslim racism prevails, targeting Turkish individuals and families and extending to become institutionalised racism (Vieten 2014). The long-lasting impact of the hate crimes of the 1990s shapes the feeling of all minority communities and individuals in contemporary Germany.

### Excursus: The 'Sarrazin' debate in 2010

In late summer 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a former member of the Executive Board of the *Deutsche Bundesbank*, published a book with the title *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany does itself in).<sup>12</sup> Jürgen Habermas writes about this book, and the message it conveys, in *The New York Times*:

Since the end of August, Germany has been roiled by waves of political turmoil over integration, multiculturalism and the role of the 'Leitkultur,' or guiding national culture. This discourse is in turn reinforcing trends toward increasing xenophobia among the broader population.... 'Germany Does Away With Itself,' a book that argues that the future of Germany is threatened by the wrong kind of immigrants, especially from Muslim countries. In the book, Thilo Sarrazin, a politician from the Social Democratic Party who sat on the Bundesbank board, develops proposals for demographic policies aimed at the Muslim population in Germany. He fuels discrimination against this minority with intelligence research from which he draws false biological conclusions that have gained unusually wide publicity. (28 October 2010)

- 12 Since then he has published more books with similarly populist titles, such as *Europe does not need the Euro: how political wishful thinking led us into crisis* (2012) and *The new character assassination: the limits of free opinion in Germany* (2014).

In 2012, Sarrazin's populist book became a German bestseller, running in its seventeenth edition and selling 1.5 million copies.

Prof. Y. Karakosglu, introduced above, told me in our interview:

This is something which strikes me so much. Two or three or four weeks ago when Sarrazin's book was published. I got a call from Martin Spielberg from the *Zeit* and he asked me 'What do you think about the discourse? What do you think about people thinking about Sarrazin's book?' And I said 'Oh, this book, it was sent to me in advance. I had a glance on it and now in my opinion this will not cause much discussion because it is so un-intellectual and it has such stupid ideas and I think we are far beyond this in Germany with our discourse on integration.' Two days later, I realised that the comments on it, in the newspaper, were so positive. I called him and said, I was totally wrong, I didn't realise what the main ideas in society, the main fears in society, are. What I would say is he [Sarrazin] was able as a social democrat in a very important position in the economic system in Germany to use expressions which the man on the street would like to use and always feared. Of course, he was then considered to be politically incorrect. Now, the barrier is opened, the barrage is open. Everybody is able to speak about the issue the way he or she always wanted to and use all kinds of expressions, can use all kinds of stereotypes, because it is allowed, he is allowed to. .... And people are now happy about being able to do it in a non-differentiated way. And Sarrazin thinks it is an achievement to do this, but what strikes me is a lot of others, politicians and so on, would ... and also scientists would speak about his book as 'Okay, there are some terms and some expressions which are really racist, but mainly using figures that are really, really interesting he did something that helped us to open the discourse.' I don't understand it. Really, I am helpless.

Sarrazin got plenty of media attention in 2010, and therefore was able to spread his opinion among a range of different audiences; neither Chancellor Merkel nor other prominent politicians shunned Sarrazin. Despite the lack of outrage among the German elite about Sarrazin's populist right-wing message, a counter-publication by authors from various ethnic, national and religious backgrounds was released at the beginning of 2011. Edited by Hilal Sezgin, its title *Deutschland erfindet sich neu – Manifest der Vielen* (Germany invents itself anew – Manifesto of the many) engages expressly with Sarrazin's book, but also critiques the way politicians, the media and civil society responded to prejudice against Turkish, Jewish and Muslim communities.

The public debate following Sarrazin's publication recalls events in the Netherlands more than a decade ago, when the 'new realism' (Prins 2002) marked the start of an openly aggressive public 'anti-tabooing' campaign targeting visible minorities and migrants, although in the Netherlands the principal targets were Moroccan-Dutch 'new' citizens.

## Concluding remarks

The chapter presented the findings of an original study on the intersectional positioning of minority 'new' citizens, moving beyond the migration debate and approaching Turkish- (Kurdish-) Germans as individual citizens, who have to cope with the post-1989 violence as a collective traumatic experience. All of my interview partners come from a highly educated and elite section of the 'new' German citizens; they have hybrid migrant identities as well as a vernacular post-cosmopolitan life with transnational orientations, despite mostly living a local city life. Speaking the German language and excelling in higher education creates opportunities; individual social mobility means that 'new' Germans have achieved some public and political visibility. When it comes to broader issues of inclusion, however – such as being accepted as a transnational migrating actor – the German *culturalising* discourse (Vieten 2007) falls short of providing an all-inclusive cosmopolitan society. The racist violence against Turkish immigrants that took place in the aftermath of German unification in 1989 has had a long-lasting traumatic effect on most ethnic Turkish- and Kurdish-Germans, despite their individual achievements and successes in the Germany of today.

Following Sarrazin's populist racist writings back in 2010, another unsettling affair hit the headlines in 2013 concerning the racist murder of several Turkish men (and one Greek man) by the NSU (National Socialist Underground). And in 2014, previous waves of racist statements and actions were succeeded by the populist right-wing demonstrations of PEGIDA, which hit city streets in Germany. Having said that, counter demonstrations

still largely outnumber neo-nationalist sentiments. The recent welcoming of (Syrian) refugees by Munich's inhabitants in September 2015, for example, indicates a spontaneous response to the needs of Middle Eastern refugees seeking asylum and a new life in Europe. These positive vernacular actions do offer another model of civic consensus in cosmopolitan compassion. So, is this good news, indicating grassroots changes and a move to a more open and cosmopolitan society in the new Germany?

Societal divisions and conflicts hint at wider contestations about group belonging, inclusion and everyday cosmopolitan openness towards difference and the Other in Germany. It seems the popular mood is divided in the German public domain: on the one hand, the inadequate *institutional* handling of the NSU affair<sup>13</sup> and the lack of robust efforts to tackle the roots of the more recent PEGIDA protests may indicate 'institutional racism' (Vieten 2014), but this exists alongside undeniable vernacular multicultural orientations. On the positive side, my interview partners' left-wing political identities, and their engagement with the local sites in which they live, underline a strong civic identity corresponding with the ideal of the 'good citizen'. As newcomers to German society, however, these citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds can be seen to have *performed as* rather than identified as citizens of the German city-*polis*.

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PIOTR GOLDSTEIN

## Everyday Active Citizenship the Balkan Way: Local Civil Society and the Practice of ‘Bridge Building’ in Two Post-Yugoslav Cities

**ABSTRACT:** Active citizenship in the post-war Western Balkans has traditionally been studied in the context of either Western-style (and usually foreign-funded) Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or, more recently, protest movements. This chapter highlights a wider range of better- and lesser-known forms of civil society in the contemporary post-Yugoslav space. It shows how interest associations, student unions, religious groups and online communities can all contribute to vibrant civil society, even if their work seems distant from the post-war area's current problems. This civil society, the chapter argues, creates an environment in which the people of the western Balkans can enact their citizenship and, little by little, ‘build bridges’, across ethnic lines and beyond.

### Introduction

Active citizenship, as Fuller et al. (2008) put it, ‘broadly understood, can mean any form of productive contribution to society.’ In the Western context, however, such ‘productive contribution’ has been usually seen as connected to either economic activity (*ibid.*, 157) or engagement in the political affairs of the country (Kearns 1995; Marinetto 2003). In the South-East European context, the issue has been mostly discussed in relation to protest movements, particularly the most recent ones in various cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2014 and in other successor states of former

Yugoslavia and in wider South-Eastern Europe since 2011 (Sardelić 2013; Štikš and Horvat 2014).

In this chapter I look at a different type of active citizenship. I argue that active participation in local civil society<sup>1</sup> can be considered to be a form of active citizenship, even if the sector of civil society in which a person is active is not particularly political. Or, rather, that it does not seem to be of immediate political significance when considering the notion of political in its narrow sense: related to party-politics, governance, formal projects of 'democratisation' and other endeavours of quantifiable outcomes. Considering everyday *practices*, this chapter engages with theories which call for appreciation of such practices, particularly the theory of micro-politics (Goldfarb 2006, 2008) and that of everyday peace (Mac Ginty 2013). It also draws close to the theory of acts of citizenship (Isin 2008) and that of vernacular cosmopolitanism (Bhabha 1996).

Jeffrey Goldfarb's theory of micro-politics stem from his study of student theatres in Poland in the late 1970s and of the forces which eventually led to the fall of the communism in the late 1980s (Goldfarb 1980, 2006). Goldfarb argues that the political changes that happened were catalysed by a range of small and seemingly unimportant everyday behaviours and events. Meetings of individuals in spaces of political privacy, for instance by the kitchen table, and poetry events, which were condemned by communist authorities, but during which participants 'conducted themselves as they would at any cultural gathering' (Goldfarb 2006, 11) were according to Goldfarb important catalysers of change. He convincingly argues that 'people acted as if they lived in a free society and a free society resulted' (*ibid.*, 69). In the context of quite different realms and problems Roger Mac Ginty (2013) points out that for post-conflict societies, seemingly small changes, such as 'storeowners painting their storefronts' or 'the resumption of cultural practices that declined during conflict' (*ibid.*, 56), can constitute a more

1 In this chapter I understand civil society in a (neo-)Tocquevillian manner, i.e. as associational life in all its richness (Tocqueville 1956). However, in places, I also refer to the understanding of civil society as the counter-balance to the state, as promoted, most notably, by Antonio Gramsci (2007).

meaningful indicator of positive transmission than Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product and other formal indicators.

More theoretically, Engin F. Isin distinguishes between *acts* and *actions* of citizenship (Isin 2008). ‘To act [...] is neither arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation. With that creative act the actor also creates herself/himself as the agent responsible for the scene created’ (Isin 2008, 27). And citizenship ‘involves practices of making citizens – social, political, cultural and symbolic’ (ibid., 17). While acts are not practices (ibid., 18), acts and practices are strongly bound and dependent on each other. The practices which this chapter considers allow for acts of citizenship, allow for creation of scenes within which citizenship is enacted and in which under some circumstances acts can become actions.

Finally, we may perceive everyday active citizenship described in this chapter as an instance of vernacular cosmopolitanism (as defined by Bhabha 1996). Such connection however needs to be made with caution. If we take cosmopolitanism as, first of all, appreciation of (national) cultures other than our own, then calling the ‘bridge building’ practices in the post-war Western Balkans ‘cosmopolitan’ is likely to obscure the nature of these practices rather than explain them. For in the area in question, unlike in the Western Europe, ‘building bridges’ is often about appreciation of a local culture which has been hybrid for centuries, rather than of ‘new hybridities’ (Beauregard and Body-Gendrot 1999; Binnie et al. 2006), of well-known rather than of unknown (for my short discussion on this see Goldstein 2015). While Nava (2002) tells us that ‘*ordinariness* and *domestication* of difference are the distinguishing marks of vernacular cosmopolitanism in urban Britain today’ (ibid., 94), talking of ‘domestication of difference’ in Western Balkans would be inappropriate, if not for anything else, for that it would be hard to say which of the cultures would be *domestifying* and which *domestified*. However, if we consider cosmopolitanism more broadly, as appreciation of human (and not only national/ethnic) difference, then we may point out also here, within practices of Western Balkan active citizens, what Bhabha calls “‘vernacular cosmopolitan’ negotiation [...] between the “insufficiency of the self” [...] and the needs of modern, urban communities of interest and inquiry’ (Bhabha 1996). Such negotiation is an important element of the ‘bridge building’ which this chapter discusses.

In this chapter I link the above theories to argue that the engagement of individuals in the (broadly understood) civil society can be seen as a sign of everyday peace, an important part of micro-politics, a field for acts of citizenship and in many instances for what can be perceived as vernacular cosmopolitanism. Or in other words, that this engagement is worth appreciating as an important step on the region's route to social and political change.

## Method and setting

This chapter is based on findings of mixed-methods research conducted in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Sad, Serbia between 2010 and 2014, within two larger research projects. The research consisted of ethnographic investigation with local civil society actors combined with 77 interviews, two questionnaire surveys distributed among both leaders and 'regular members' of associations, and photography used as a research method.

The two cities, Mostar and Novi Sad, were chosen for a range of superficial similarities that go in pair with profound dissimilarities which make them an excellent setting to explore a wide range of challenges (and opportunities) of contemporary post-Yugoslav societies. These two cities may at first seem similar: each is in a way its country's 'second city' (Novi Sad is the second biggest city in Serbia, while Mostar is the capital of Herzegovina, one of Bosnia-Herzegovina's two historical constituencies); both cities are multi-ethnic; both had important bridges destroyed during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s; both are post-industrial and both have large student populations.

However, everyday life in these cities is shaped by what makes them very different. Mostar, once multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan, has experienced all the atrocities of the recent wars. Its bridges, most notably the centuries old 'Old Bridge', were destroyed in fighting between former neighbours. The city still bears the stigma of war as it is hard to find a building, particularly in the city centre, that would not be covered in bullet



holes, and war-time ruins are omnipresent across the city. Most importantly though, the city is divided. Bosniak and Croat populations, once evenly spread across the town now live separated by an invisible wall that runs along *Bulevar* – a multi-lane road which used to constitute the front line at the time of war. The two sides of the city are home to two city centres, two universities, two separate post office companies, two electricity and heat providers, etc. Citizens of Mostar sometimes smile when they say ‘there is two of everything here’, but for many of them this truth is deeply painful.

Novi Sad is very different. It was established in 1748, within Habsburg Empire, as an effect of cooperation between local Hungarians and Danube Swabians and a large Serbian minority and, despite large population shifts after Second World War and throughout recent conflicts, it remains multi-ethnic. Nowadays it is home to a Serbian majority and a multitude of minorities, most notably Hungarians, but also Croats, Ruthenians, Romanians, Slovaks, Roma, Jews and others. Unlike Mostar, it was not affected by direct fighting. Its bridges were bombed, but not by locals, but by NATO, an ‘external enemy’. It would be wrong however to think of Novi Sad as untouched by war – many of the city’s men were incorporated in the Serbian army and the huge influx of refugees became a root of many today’s conflicts. The minorities experienced ‘low level violence’ (Bieber and Winterhagen 2006), but this was enough for incurring long lasting resentment and mistrust.

## Bridge building

During the wars of the 1990s both Mostar and Novi Sad had important bridges destroyed. The destruction of one of them in particular – Mostar’s Old Bridge – was frequently used in the Western media as a symbol representing divided communities (Bicic 1993; Sudetic 1993; Williams 1993). In the aftermath of the wars, the international community has sought to rebuild trust and dialogue across communities in order to prevent a return to the violence of the 1990s. A key metaphor has been that of ‘bridge

building', and civil society was viewed as having a key role to play in this process. Civil society has been expected to foster inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation, and to assist in many other tasks such as promoting minority rights and gender justice, or healing psychological trauma.

The metaphor of *bridges* and *bridge building*, used by foreign media and donor institutions, was probably even more powerful on the local level. The post-1944 cultural mythology of Yugoslavia was built on the symbol of the bridge and Ivo Andrić's Nobel-winning *The Bridge on the Drina* (1977) was the apotheosis of Yugoslav literature.<sup>2</sup> The bridge described by Andrić was not only a connector between places and people. It was also a witness to events important for the surrounding communities, for men and women, young and old, soldiers and civilians, educated cosmopolitans and those who have never left the town.

Another metaphor is that of the Balkans themselves as a bridge: a bridge between East and West, Eastern and Western Christianity, and the influences of Islam and the Western world.<sup>3</sup> In this context, (re)building bridges can be equated with re-building not only the prosperity, but also the international significance of the entire region.

In the aftermath of the inter-ethnic violence which accompanied and followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it is easy to think of 'bridge building' in that region mostly in relation to ethnicity. However, there are also other 'bridges' that need to be built. Tensions and discrimination based on gender, age, class, sexual orientation, physical ability, or being local or a newcomer to the city, are all vivid in the region. For many young or elderly people, the generational conflict is the one that they need to face on an everyday basis. For many of the refugees and the displaced, but also for those who moved into a city for economic reasons, being looked upon as unwanted *došljaci* (newcomers), supposedly more primitive than the

2 I am grateful to Dr Adelina Angusheva-Tihanov for this assertion.

3 These metaphors and their echoes were explored, for instance, by Todorova (1997) and Goldsworthy (2002). For further analysis, placed in the particular context of the destruction and rebuilding of Mostar's Old Bridge, see Gunzburger Makaš (2001).

‘old settlers’ (*starosjedioci* / *starosedeoeci*) of the city, is a significant trauma.<sup>4</sup> Thus, in this chapter I agree with Piekut et al. (2012) who advise us to ‘shift the discussion on social diversity from ethnic diversity to broader social diversity’. In line with this scope, I do approach work of civil society actors that operate in the field of ‘broader social diversity’, and that actively are involved with ‘building bridges’ across various, not only ethnic, lines.

## Local civil society

The literature on Western Balkan/South East European civil societies is often explicit in reducing the study of these civil societies to NGOs or, even further, to foreign-funded NGOs (see, for instance, Dević 2003, 7; Fagan 2010, 50; Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović 2013, 9; Stubbs 1999, v). This is despite the fact that the authors often recognise that such reduction is problematic. One of its consequences is that, as Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović put it, ‘a variety of traditional grass-roots institutions, networks, practices and actors, with a potentially more constructive input towards aims of post-conflict transition have been overlooked’ (Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović 2013, 9). In this chapter I argue that the part of civil society which has been overlooked is in fact much more ample, and by no means less significant, than that comprised of NGOs.

4 *Starosjedioci* in Bosnian and Croatian and *starosedeoeci* in Serbian. The tension between *starosjedioci* / *starosedeoeci* and *dosljaci* has been described, for instance, in Paolo Rumiz, *Maschere per un massacro. Quello che non abbiamo voluto sapere della guerra in Jugoslavia* (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 2011, 103–104) and analysed further in Jansen (2005).

*(Typical) NGOs*

My research revealed that, at least for Mostar and Novi Sad, most people, be they foreign researchers or local activists, define NGOs in a way similar to Claire Mercer (2002). According to her review of literature on NGOs, these are:

[t]hose organizations that are officially established, run by employed staff (often urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more often the case, international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced. NGOs may therefore be international organizations or they may be national or regional NGOs. They are seen as different from Grassroots Organizations (GROs) that are usually understood to be smaller, often membership-based organizations, operating without a paid staff but often reliant upon donor or NGO support. (Mercer 2002, 6)

This is a rather Western definition, which would be inappropriate, for example, in Poland, where few of the NGOs are run by employed staff. However, it seems to be accurate in Mostar and Novi Sad. By accurate I mean that this definition in principle encompasses organisations which would consider themselves NGOs and that would be regarded as such, also by local and foreign donors, researchers, and other relevant players. Of course, not all Mostar and Novi Sad NGOs employ staff on a full-time basis; many of them are small and many are badly financed. However, the general idea of differentiating NGOs from GROs, and seeing the former as operating on a possibly larger budget, seems to have a large following.

While such NGOs receive a lot of academic, media and public criticism, it is wrong to think that all such associations are corrupt, inefficient, etc. Similarly, it would be naïve to perceive all other types of civil society actors (as listed below) as automatically good and possessing all the qualities that 'typical' NGOs are said to lack. What is more, there exists a multitude of definitions and some of them would consider all types of the civil society actors I analyse, to be NGOs, as they are non-governmental and to a larger or smaller extent organised. Thus, for the sake of clarity, I refer in this chapter to 'typical' NGOs as defined above, but also to associations, which includes the full range of formal and informal civil society groups, including the 'typical' NGOs. I use the term NGOs (without the qualifying 'typical') whenever this distinction is of secondary importance.

*Informal groups, movements, zero-budget initiatives*

To register an NGO or in fact an ‘association’ or ‘association of citizens’, since ‘NGO’ is not a legal term in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia, takes money, time and effort. The advantage of registering is that a registered association is a legal entity and, among other things, can receive donations or conduct business to raise funds for its activities and initiatives. However, many groups see no need for such benefits and refrain from registering, either not to waste time and money on what they perceive as unnecessary, or in a conscious act of disengagement with the government’s bureaucratic structures. Such groups tend to operate without money or rely on small donations of those involved when there is a need to pay for something. For instance, group members make donations to rent a hall for activities or to buy audio equipment (Interviews #21, August 2010, and #47, January 2011, in Novi Sad). In some cases they arrange in-kind donations.

It would be wrong, however, to think of such groups as always small and insignificant. A good example of such an unregistered, yet significant, initiative (or movement) is Novi Sad’s *Inicijativa za Društveni Centar* (Initiative for the Social Centre). The initiative, calling itself ‘social movement’ (Društveni Centar n.d.), was formed by ‘associations of citizens [including ‘typical’ NGOs], informal groups and prominent individuals, active in the field of creativity, education, humanitarian work, environmental protection, sustainable development, activism, working with children, youth, persons with disabilities, Roma and other sensitive groups’ (ibid.). Their idea was to transform the old abandoned building of an army barracks, 7,293 m<sup>2</sup> in size and close to Novi Sad’s city centre, into a social centre, a space that would ‘enable anyone who engages in activities of significance for society, to accomplish his/her ideas and projects’ (ibid.). In practice, this would mean that, for instance, ‘*Ogledalo*’, an independent theatre which in over 20 years of its history never had its own space for rehearsals and performances, could finally find such a space in the barracks’ many empty rooms.

I first learned about the initiative in mid-November 2011, when a professionally made film (Gmizić et al. 2011), nearly half an hour long, was posted on YouTube, and promoted through Facebook. In the film, leaders of various associations, along with some internationally known Novi Sad

artists and academics, spoke, mostly from within the barracks, about the great potential of the place. Their contributions were interspersed with shots from former military objects converted into social centres in Slovenia (*Metelkova* in Ljubljana) and Croatia (*Rojc* in Pula).

About one month later, on 22 December 2011, around 100 people gathered outside the barracks, listened to a couple of short speeches (interpreted into sign language) and then entered the place in what they have called 'illegal but legitimate' action. Armed with brooms and spades they instantly started cleaning the barracks. Soon afterwards an intensive programme of events started. These included crafts workshops, lectures, discussions, film screenings, exhibitions, fencing classes for children and adults, fitness classes, regular vegetarian and non-vegetarian meals cooked by volunteers, dancing parties and late evening concerts among other events. Everything was free to attend and only symbolic donations were encouraged in exchange for meals. At the same time thoughtful organisation and some fundraising were evident. For instance, soon after the opening, two serviced mobile toilets appeared on the site. Such amenities cannot be funded by small donations and must have been provided as an in-kind donation by the enterprise managing these toilets. There were additional signs of professionalism, efficiency and engagement on the part of those involved in *Društveni Centar*: excellent media coverage, a professional website, a power generator that allowed events after sunset, and regular publically-announced letters of support from associations and other institutions in Serbia and other post-Yugoslav countries. The occupation of the barracks, and the intensive programme of events that came with it, lasted 22 days, until 13 January 2012, when the activists were expelled from the buildings by military personnel. However, negotiations with the local government and the engagement of many of the activists lasted much longer.

The initiative could have registered and acted as an NGO, but those who formed it decided not to register, despite the suggestion of Novi Sad city council that this would ease the negotiations between the Initiative and the city authorities. In the eyes of people engaged in the initiative, keeping away from the government-operated register made them even

more non-governmental and confirmed their role as a civil society actor.<sup>5</sup> At the same time the initiative was well organised and gathered an impressive number of supporters. According to my interviewee, the initiative was empowered by the work of about 40 ‘active, loyal and persistent’ individuals, who between mid-December 2011 and 24 January 2012, when the interview took place, ‘gave 100% of [their] time’. It also had the support and involvement of several hundred more people who, informed through the e-mailing list, would come to participate in meetings and activities (interview #53, January 2012, Novi Sad), and of several thousand ‘friends’ with the initiative on Facebook (4869 on 15 June 2013).

The opportunities for active citizenship that *Društveni Centar* created were at least of two types. First of all, the people who were engaged in the Initiative made a very active and strong stand on how they wanted the cultural landscape of their city to look like. They wanted change and they worked towards this change, with their words, hands and brooms. But also, those engaged created a certain ‘alternative reality’ in a broader sense – one based on ‘building bridges’. A reality in which all generations cooperated for common good, in which speeches were interpreted into sign language, in which both vegetarians and meat-eaters were satisfied and in which everyone felt that their voice counted and that their contribution was important. Paraphrasing Goldfarb: they acted as if they lived in an equal society, hoping that an equal society will result.

A different example of an active, well organised group which is unregistered and operates without budget is Novi Sad’s *FreeTeam Pokret* (‘FreeTeam Movement’). FreeTeam regularly organises not only weekly Free Hugs but also Free Salsa, Free Yoga and Free Film Screenings. While this does not sound particularly serious, projects like Free Hugs should probably not be seen as insignificant in a post-war region where reconciliation and the rebuilding of trust are still needed. Also organising Free Film Screenings

5 Informal communication with people involved in the Initiative, December 2011 – January 2012, Novi Sad. This indicates that these activists understood civil society to be most of all the counter-balance to the state, as according to Gramsci (2007).

can be seen as a manifestation of active citizenship. In 2010 neither Mostar nor Novi Sad had cinemas. In Mostar the reason was clear – it could not be decided on which side of the city the cinema should stand. In Novi Sad, copyright piracy was usually blamed, yet some of my interviewees believed that the lack of a cinema was also linked to local politics (interviews #18, August 2010, and #35, October 2010, in Novi Sad).

### *Facebook and other online communities*

Many NGOs use Facebook as a tool. Taking into consideration that ‘everyone has it’, it is excellent for communication and for spreading news about new events. But at the same time Facebook has proved to be a useful path for initiatives that only later, after a successful start-up as a Facebook group, transformed themselves into real life projects. This was the case of MOSTIMUN – Mostar International Model UN – supposedly the first ever joint initiative of students from both of Mostar’s universities (the Bosniak Džemal Bijedić University and the Croatian *Sveučilište*). In this city, divided by invisible barriers along ethnic lines, Facebook appeared to be a safe space to meet and plan a joint event. Online meetings soon became real ones, bringing together not only foreign participants but also young Mostarians from both sides of the *Bulevar*.

While some of the events started on Facebook later led to establishing NGOs, others have remained in the form of on-line communities. This does not mean that their activities are less ‘real’. Actually some of Mostar’s and Novi Sad’s Facebook groups have a much larger ‘membership’ than many of these cities’ NGOs and some organise events and activities on a regular basis. One example of such Facebook group can be *Novosadska Kritična masa* (Novi Sad Critical Mass) – a community group of over 5,000 members which is the main forum for the organisation of monthly cycling rides, many of which are attended by several hundred people. At the same time these groups do remain ‘virtual’ – they have no employees, no running costs, have very horizontal (if any) leadership structures, are easily accessible, can easily appear, and equally easily disappear. However, their



role as counter-balance to the state or as places of encounter should not be ignored. Similar roles are played by some (but by no means all) mailing lists and other mediums facilitating online communication.

### *Religious organisations*

Religious organisations are often omitted in research on the region's civil societies. This is understandable as including religion and its institutions in a research project always brings in a whole new range of problems and questions and this is even more the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia where religion is considered the determinant of ethnic belonging.

The questionnaire survey which I conducted showed that the world of the religious on the one hand, and of those engaged in all other associations on the other, are quite separate, and/or that religion is a taboo among people engaged in the work of most associations. While only 15.3 per cent of my respondents clearly stated adhering to one of the region's traditional religions, many others did not reply or provided evasive answers, e.g. 'believer' or 'liberal'. What is more, of the 131 respondents to my survey whom I have reached through a range of channels, only two admitted to belonging to a religious organisation.

However, through interviews I discovered that in fact many religious organisations interact with other civil society actors, including 'typical' NGOs. This happens in several ways. First, many religious organisations, especially multi-confessional or protestant, are in their nature and programming very similar to (non-religious) NGOs: they have leadership emergent from, or in another way close to the membership base, they have budgets nourished by sponsors and/or membership fees, they provide for the integration, education (in this case usually religious) and/or recreation of the members, etc.<sup>6</sup> Second, many religious organisations are involved in

6 It was my observation (confirmed in interview #20, August 2010, in Novi Sad) that the choice of programmes and the way that Protestant and ecumenical organisations operate is closer to that of NGOs than of Orthodox or Catholic groups, and that

humanitarian activities and for specific programmes they liaise with NGOs to use their expertise and field-related-experience. Third, religious movements – like, for example, Taizé<sup>7</sup> – are at the same time an alternative and a ‘springboard’ for engagement in activities of NGOs. They are an alternative because even though they are not considered to be NGOs, they meet the same needs for the individual: a chance to meet interesting people, to travel together, to be involved in something ‘big’ and so forth. Therefore they are able to attract those who are intimidated by NGOs which are often criticised, or who simply feel better in a large and well established community in which they can remain as passive and as anonymous as they wish. Conversely, these movements can also sometimes be a ‘launching pad’ since through their meetings or pilgrimages, young people get accustomed to being in a group, engaging in logistical planning, etc., and in this way develop confidence in due course to take on NGO initiatives. By means of training and activities with a ‘tag’ of a religious group participants become active citizens and in many cases this acquired activism remains by no means confined to their religious community.

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this is mostly because of their more horizontal structures. The same idea was referred to by Putnam who wrote that ‘all religious groups blend hierarchy and equality, but networks within Protestant congregations are traditionally thought to be more horizontal than networks in the Catholic Church’ (Putnam 1992, 173).

- 7 According to its official website ‘[t]oday, the Taizé Community is made up of over a hundred brothers, Catholics and from various Protestant backgrounds, coming from around thirty nations. By its very existence, the community is a “parable of community” that wants its life to be a sign of reconciliation between divided Christians and between separated peoples.’ (Taizé n.d.) While the very Community is relatively small, thousands of young people participate regularly in pilgrimages to the French village of Taizé where the monastery is located or to other international encounters organised by the Community, meet regularly to sing songs from these pilgrimages, etc. Thus, one can talk about the ‘Taizé movement’ consisting of people engaged in all these activities, those who organise local meetings, etc.

*Student Unions*

Student Unions, both in Mostar and Novi Sad, are bodies traditionally attached to universities. Nevertheless, their activities and scope of work are often similar to those of NGOs and other associations. Furthermore, it seems that they have always been easily accessible (at least for students) and for this reason several of the leaders of associations in Mostar and Novi Sad mentioned activism in student unions as their first leadership experience (interviews #19 and #23, August 2010, and #34, October 2010, in Novi Sad). In Mostar, where the two universities are among the most visible manifestations of division between the different ethnicities, student unions and their activities appear to play an important role in the process of (re)building trust between young people of these different ethnic groups. For example, Bosniak and Croat, the languages of the two universities and according to many, the main reason for ethnically-divided education in Mostar (Hromadžić 2008, 556–558), become a shared ‘*naš*’ (our [language]) when students from the two unions get together to put on a public speaking competition (Interview #13, April 2010, in Mostar).

*Associations established in the time of communist Yugoslavia*

Professional, interest-based and charitable organisations, such as associations of poets, journalists, fishermen and dog breeders, chess clubs, or associations of people with disabilities, existed in the times of communist Yugoslavia and many of them still operate. However, they are rarely considered in the research on Western Balkan civil societies. Probably one of the main reasons for that is that their status as civil society actors can be easily questioned. In the context of research which is trying to establish links between the work of civil society actors and processes of reconciliation and democratisation, associations of dog breeders or cyclists do not seem worthy of serious consideration. However, one of the points which this chapter is trying to demonstrate is that such associations should not be seen as automatically less significant for the sought after processes of ‘bridge building’ than the ‘typical’ NGOs.

A mountaineering club in Mostar, in whose activities I had a chance to participate, is a good example. The club does not resemble 'typical' NGOs: it is not a think-tank, not an advocacy organisation, and it would be difficult to trace any conscious attempts on the part of its leadership to build any kind of bridges. Still, the mountain hikes that it organises are a unique phenomenon in Mostar and it can be argued that they contribute to building numerous 'bridges'. These hikes regularly bring together Bosniaks and Croats, and also young and old, locals and foreigners, and people of different social strata. The contrast between the cheap flip-flops and old T-shirts of some participants, and the expensive mountain gear of others, attracts the attention of people like myself but does not seem to be a serious problem for those regularly taking part in the hikes. Without declaring any pro-diversity agenda the club and the participants of its hikes actively create a new reality. It is a 'small thing' – micro-politics – but an important one at that.

## Conclusions

This chapter examined how citizens of two post-Yugoslav cities actively practise their citizenship by engaging in work of local civil society. It argued that it is worthwhile to consider this civil society in its broad sense: as comprised not only of 'Western style,' 'typical' NGOs but also of local professional, interest, sport and charitable associations, informal groups and movements, online groups, student unions and religious associations. These actors dramatically vary in their engagement, or lack of it, in (traditionally understood) politics and in the type of opportunities they create. Their commonality however is that they intend to change today's, often conflicted, reality.

These actors, these 'institutions' of broadly understood civil society, provide for what we could see as *acts of citizenship* (Isin 2008). They form a setting for the 'routines, rituals, customs, norms and habits of the everyday

through which subjects become citizens' (Isin 2008, 17), a setting for 'cultivating citizenship' (ibid.) and for 'enacting' it. A setting in which 'subjects [are] becoming activist citizens through scenes created' (ibid., 38). In which acts may turn into actions. Many of them also allow for practices of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Bhabha 1996), in its broad sense, opening to human other and negotiating common aims across (not only ethnic) difference.

Theories of micro-politics and of 'everyday peace' direct us into recognising the value of seemingly unimportant actors and practices which, little by little and often in a very unpronounced fashion, contribute to changes on a larger scale. Time will show whether this is the case with civil society (in its broad sense) in the post-war Western Balkans and whether its 'micro-efforts' will contribute to serious change. Meanwhile, however, we may appreciate that there are many citizens who decide to be active citizens, to enact their citizenship, and who, through everyday involvement in their associations, do create certain new realities.

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