

3 The Creation of a New Community and Social Integration

Relations with the Authorities and the New Political System

The post-war residents of Zhovkva and Krzyż were confronted not only with a new material and cultural reality, but also with a political and social one. This meant, above all, that they had to adapt to a new political system. Attitudes to the communist authorities were most clearly expressed in conversations with Poles who migrated to Krzyż from the pre-war eastern provinces; they were quick to notice that the political reality of the new Poland would have much in common with the Soviet system they had escaped. Many of them had sensed this danger before they arrived, but had hoped that the communist regime in nominally their “own” country would be somehow different. Their illusions were dispersed once they arrived in the “Recovered Territories.” Apparently the “repatriated” eastern Poles, who had experienced Soviet occupation in 1939–41, were better prepared for the realities of communist Poland than others – the only surprise they experienced was positive, when life under this regime later turned out to be less brutal than the Soviet system. People who came to Krzyż from central and western areas of Poland remembered their reactions to the political change as a time of disorientation and insecurity; they were afraid of political persecution. All of the interviewees in Krzyż perceived the communist authorities as a foreign imposition. They reconciled themselves to the idea of life under a communist regime because they had no other choice, but they were certainly not enthusiastic about it.

The one voice of approval came from a party veteran, a communist since before the war, who was an active party functionary in Krzyż after 1945. For him, the installation of a communist government was an integral part of the process of post-war reconstruction and an effective mechanism for the introduction of social order in the insecure territories of the new Polish West.

The director of the secondary school, D., became the new municipal [secretary], and we took hold of the reins of the town, and of the railways, and we kept close control. [...] Someone had to do it. We couldn't let it all go to ruin, because we would have all dropped like flies. If nothing had been done here, the Germans could have returned (K28Am).

This respondent's chaotic and disconnected narrative about the construction of a new system – he was quite heavily ill at the time of the interview – was comprised

in large part of propaganda staples: the challenges of life as a “pioneer” in the new lands; the feeling of ideological obligation; and the imperative of defending the “Recovered Territories” from enemies on all sides, whether internal ideological foes or the external threat of German revanchism. There was little reflection on his personal experiences, which were subordinated to the dictates of the ideological front.¹⁸² This stand-alone narrative is important because it serves as a mirror against which all of the other Krzyż testimonies are reflected, showing the reverse image of other people’s memories.

Interestingly, no such accounts were found in Zhovkva, despite the fact that there were quite a few representatives of state power among the respondents. The fact of living in a communist country rarely featured as a separate theme in these interviews. This is presumably a consequence of the fact that for migrants who moved from eastern Ukraine or Russia to Zhovkva (who formed the bulk of the party activists), there was no real change in situation: they moved from Soviet communism to Soviet communism, and their own political identities were often so obvious that they hardly warranted explicit commentary. Rather, the opposite was true: the political system they knew from their former homes was the most familiar part of their lives in Zhovkva; it facilitated their adaptation to their new place of residence. “Old” residents of Zhovkva and Ukrainians resettled from Poland certainly felt more of a change, yet they appear to have experienced the political upheaval less acutely than the people of Krzyż. For the Poles in Krzyż, the new Poland signified a loss of a genuinely sovereign state. For the Ukrainians in Zhovkva, the Soviet regime was yet another occupation – even if it was more brutal than the previous one.

The new system was more than a set of ideological principles. For people in both Krzyż and Zhovkva, the everyday “face” of the new authorities was what mattered most. While the difficulty for residents of Krzyż was to accept the very fact of a change in political system, for people in Zhovkva, the greatest problem was the distribution of power: one group, migrants from eastern Ukraine and Russia, held all the cards. The “Easterners” in Zhovkva took up the majority of positions of power – their dominance was visible in the police, the military, the town and *raion*¹⁸³ party committees, and all of the largest companies and

182 Ewa Nowicka has written about the specific characteristics of narrative biographies by political activists, on the example of interviews with members of the Communist Party of Greece, see: Nowicka, “Wojna jako element opowieści.”

183 *Raion* was (and is still in most post-Soviet states) an administrative unit usually two levels lower than the level of the union republic (the union republic was divided into *oblasts* and *oblast* was divided into *raions*).

public services.¹⁸⁴ Autochthonous locals and Ukrainians resettled from Poland speak about this fact in bitter tones to this day, but also emphasize that there was nothing they could do to rebel against the situation.

Ukrainians after the war were in those... non-management positions. The management positions were taken by, well, I mean jobs like secretaries of the district [*raion*] committee [of the Communist Party], directors of the executive committee, commanders of the police, these were taken by people who liberated our lands – “liberators” who were sent by the state institutions – you know which ones. [...] Their aim was to bring Soviet government to these western regions. [...] And if locals tried to take control, to take up any important jobs... Well, you know, Ivan¹⁸⁵ would come along, and that was that! He was the boss and you had to do what he said. The law was the law. [Well the law is one thing, but people had opinions, didn't they?] Sure, anyone could have an opinion about the situation, but if you said anything anywhere – they would pay you a visit in the evening and you'd end up dead or in Siberia (Z15Am).

The political privilege enjoyed by people sent from the East also meant economic benefits. The Easterners in Zhovkva lived in the best town houses, had larger incomes, and had better access to scarce goods and services. Whilst other groups in Zhovkva accepted the Easterners' political privileges with a certain resignation, the material advantages inflamed tensions.

Loads of Russkies came over here, they were all these party types, and they took up the best houses... [...] And if you were a party type, a *Russki*, then you had a right to get an apartment quicker, you could do all sorts of things, but if not... [...] They made this distinction, that if you were in the party, like in our factory, because I worked, we worked, and we had specific quotas that meant we were always working, and we had a break that was long enough to quickly eat something and then go back to work. But those communists, they would play cards, sit around, and they had small quotas and they got paid a lot (Z8Af).

All of the interviewees in Zhovkva shared a conviction that being on the side of the authorities was worthwhile in economic terms. Younger respondents also saw the long-term effects of the Easterners' material privilege. They frequently

184 Tarik Cyril Amar makes a similar point about Lviv, in: Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv*, pp. 185–220. William Risch writes about the natives of Western Ukraine being underrepresented in all political bodies of the *oblast*, *raion* and city, see: William Jay Risch, *The Ukrainian West. Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 53–81.

185 Ivan (one of the most popular Russian names) means here simply a person of Russian nationality.

noted that the state of inequality continued until after 1991 – those who previously had power were able to smoothly accommodate themselves to the new circumstances and secure their futures.

They just raked in the money. Look at who owns the shops now: the [former] first secretary of the district committee owns the market, the one near the synagogue, that one belongs to the first secretary. W. owns the sawmill, but where did he get that money from? (Z27Bm).

Such statements show that the genuinely existing social divisions from the first post-war years, which were based on place of origin and/or political outlook, continued to have significance in the minds of most Zhovkva residents of the oldest and middle generations. The Easterners themselves were also aware of their position relative to others. They admitted that people from their group occupied the most privileged positions in the community, although in many cases, they considered this situation to have been perfectly natural, seeing no reason to repent.

Yes, the directors of the factories were [...] mostly from either eastern Ukraine or Russia. That is true. [You mean Ukrainians weren't allowed to take up these positions? The local ones, I mean?] I don't know if they weren't allowed or not, maybe they just weren't educated. Here in western Ukraine, people weren't very educated (Z10Af).

Easterners who were not directly connected to the state apparatus, and who were often critical of Soviet power (e.g. because they had been victims of Stalinist terror), considered the local division of power unfair and admitted that the locals had every reason to be ill disposed towards them. Nonetheless, their statements often contained a sense of helplessness – what could they have done in this situation?

They called us *Moskals*, “the *Moskals* have arrived.” I tell you, the local population didn't really want the *Moskals* here. Some people from the KGB and the police, they treated the locals badly. They hadn't done anything bad, but they still treated them badly. People from the East were in all the important positions everywhere, and that was also wrong (Z11Af).

Respondents in Krzyż did not have a feeling that any particular group of residents was politically more privileged in the post-war years. People who were politically involved in building the new regime (as opposed to physically rebuilding Poland) were a small minority among the interviewees; political officials who worked in Krzyż tended not to stay there in the long term. The only statements about inequalities between different migrant groups were related to the worse situation among Poles from the pre-war eastern provinces and central regions,

who were cut off from their homelands; these differences, however, did not affect anyone's relationship with state power.¹⁸⁶

Residents of both Krzyż and Zhovkva perceived the post-war state to be an oppressive force against ordinary individuals. People who were politically suspect were persecuted fiercely, that is, above all, individuals with the “wrong” past, such as former members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations or the Polish Home Army.¹⁸⁷ Residents of both towns who had been involved in resistance movements during the war were painstakingly harassed, including in cases where the accusations were leveled at relatives rather than the victims themselves. Interviewees recalled their ordeals with a hardly diminished dread.

My sister, she was in the resistance [the UPA] [...] And there was this guy K., from the KGB. My God, he would summon me to their office, to the KGB, every week. And he would say: “where is your sister? Where? You must know.” And I would tell him that we didn't know where my sister was... [...] “Who do you know? Who was that? Who was there?” I would say to him: “I don't remember anyone, no-one talked to me, I was still little.” He would bang his fists on the table and scream at me like a madman (Z3Af).

When they [the Security Department, *Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*, UB] let me out [after an interrogation], I was terrified, I still feel it now. They were here once, all over the place. They wore these white coats, because that's what they wore in the UB. [...] When I saw [someone] in a white coat, it didn't even have to be someone from the secret police, I got such shudders (K16Af).

The fear felt by people with “bad” pasts was thus similar in Krzyż and Zhovkva. There was however a difference between the towns in that in Krzyż, the situation normalized relatively quickly, as shown by the complete absence of accounts of such fear in the interviews with the younger generation, who were born after

186 Philipp Ther provides statistics that show an over-representation of people from central Poland in the institutions of state power, in particular the police – the Civic Militia [*Milicja Obywatelska*] and secret police – the Security Department [*Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*], as well as their economic privilege, see: Ther, “The Integration of Expellees.” Tomasz Molenda has shown that a similar situation prevailed in the Krzyż area (a majority of the post-war heads of the villages [*soltysi*] came from surrounding villages), see: Molenda, “Zmiany ludnościowe,” p. 90.

187 The Home Army [*Armia Krajowa*] was the military of the Polish Underground State during the Second World War. It was founded in 1939 as the Union of Armed Struggle [*Związek Walki Zbrojnej*] and transformed into the Home Army in 1942. It was dissolved in 1945. After the war, many former members settled in the “Recovered Territories” in the hope that the communist authorities would not persecute them in the new surroundings.

the war (with one exception, discussed below). In Zhovkva, on the other hand, almost all of the respondents from the second generation and many from the third remembered both their own anxieties and those of their parents, as well as concrete acts of repression.

They didn't want to register us. I even remember, there was this lady at my dad's workplace, M., one of the Russian liberators, and she could even talk about my sick dad in terms like: "Not much of a doctor is he?" She spoke Russian. Yes, I think they [the speaker's parents] felt that oppression, they got through it somehow, but... I don't know. I think that they had a hard time, because dad had already suffered under the Stalinist [repressions] (Z41Bf).

Besides people with "suspicious" pasts, the few remaining representatives of ethnic minority groups were also victims of state violence: Poles in Zhovkva, and Germans – real or imagined – in Krzyż. People from these families remembered the anxiety that reigned in their households about letting out the truth of their difference – and the potential consequences of such a slip. State policies made it perfectly clear that the results of such carelessness could be tragic. The fear of informers is a recurring theme in the interviews, especially with speakers who were children at the time.

The younger children were taught that, firstly, you weren't allowed to talk on the street about things that had been discussed at home. On holidays, if we shared Christmas wafers or Easter eggs,¹⁸⁸ we had to black out the windows with blankets, so that no-one could see from outside, so that no-one could hear, so no-one could snitch on us (Z28Bf).

My father-in-law was going to his son's christening [...] and the UB came long and took him away to Piła [the district capital]. Then they took his shoes away and let him out on foot, and he couldn't attend his own son's christening. We had UB officers around here, they're mostly dead now, otherwise I would... I'm telling you, they persecuted my father-in-law. The UB was here in Żelichowo [a village near Krzyż] too, and they listened out for everything under your windows, checking what we were saying, what was going on. Checking if people weren't teaching their kids German (husband of respondent K39Bf).

The situation in the "Recovered Territories" was such that it was not only "real" Germans who were afraid of state harassment. Anyone who was suspected of having links with "Germanness" could fall victim, for example, people with

188 In Polish Catholic tradition, special wafers are shared between family and friends at Christmas time, and eggs are painted and taken to the church for blessing at Easter.

“German-sounding” names.¹⁸⁹ One of the interviewees, who changed her surname to a “more Polish” one, said: “I was forced to do this by the authorities. [...] I know that’s what happened, although my parents resisted for a bit, but everyone was agreeing to these things, so there was nothing doing” (K34Bf). Such situations show how deeply the state interfered at this time in the life of the individual, and how painful this interference could be: in addition to physical persecution, people were deprived of a right to their own identities and forced to rupture their symbolic bonds with parts of their family history.

In Zhovkva, resettlers from Poland were a potentially suspect group – in part because of their relatives living abroad. A clue as to the scale of fear experienced by people is visible in the fact that the oldest respondents were still afraid to talk about their attitudes to Soviet power. We can discern from half-uttered words and unfinished statements that the often explicitly declared disengagement from political issues was, in fact, a product of fear. Only the children broke the silence of the parents.

Later, when they came here, life wasn’t sweet over here either, because of course, the regime that was in power then, it wielded horrific means of control over people. They had to know literally everything about you, from A to Z. That’s why my parents, when they came here, were subjected to a certain level of discipline. They were always being listened to and interrogated by the KGB (Z33Bm).

The most important characteristic of memory about post-war relations with the authorities is that everyone felt fear: people who had a reason to be afraid, and those who believed they had no guilt, were equally vulnerable to the sensation of insecurity. In both towns, the situation can be conceived of as a permanent “threat of potential guilt,” which was fully detached from any real guilt or absence thereof. Especially in Zhovkva, recollections of the first post-war years were above all memories of fear, and of a latent threat that seemed to practically hang in the air. After nocturnal arrests, adults came to work to find that colleagues had gone missing, and children noted that classmates had disappeared (“then we came to school the next day, and so many kids had gone, five kids. And we were afraid to ask out loud where they were, what had happened to them” [Z28Bf]). In Krzyż, repressions were less severe, but there were enough minor infringements for the overall situation to become unsafe. In the fragment cited below, there is a striking sense that the new authorities were not only making life difficult for

189 Forcing people to change “German-sounding” names was a common practice in the “Recovered Territories.” In Silesia, 200,000 people had already changed their names by 1947, see: Nitschke, “Repolonizacja czy polonizacja?”

people directly, but also pitting them against each other, exploiting mutual animosities as a means of internal control.

Those first years in Krzyż were very tough, because they were supposedly building communism, but there were people who were hostile towards the system. [...] Someone came to our house and saw that my dad had a [picture of] Piłsudski¹⁹⁰ on horseback, and of course he was called out to the party office, he had to explain the Piłsudski. [...] There was an unfriendliness developing then between people, people would sniff around each other's houses, just in case, God forbid, they had a radio. If someone heard that you had a radio, you weren't allowed to have a radio, they would come and start listening in, snitching on you (K35Af).

And once again, despite the essential similarity, there is a fundamental difference between the situations in Krzyż and Zhovkva: the fear felt by people in the Ukrainian town did not disappear after the first post-war years; it weakened, but it remained an inseparable component of life in the Soviet Union right until the fall of the regime. This is shown by interviews with younger respondents: even those who were born in the 1960s and 1970s remembered instances of their parents behaving strangely, in ways they did not then understand. They remembered both their parents' fear and their own anxiety.

For instance, more or less until 1985 or so in Lviv and Galicia, it was dangerous to display any real private culture. That meant that anything fancy or different, like gloves with fingers, serviettes with crowns, or a dinner set with forks and knives [at the lunch table]. [...] It was just that if the wrong person saw that, if they informed on you, there was a real possibility you would end up in Siberia. [...] [That was the situation right up to the 1980s?] [...] Maybe those same repressions weren't happening any more, not like people remembered from back then, but in any case, things were happening. I remember very well, for example, that when my grandparents laid the table nicely, with napkins, with decorations, with knives and forks, they always locked the door with the key (Z1Cf).

People born in Krzyż after the war sometimes recalled their parents' fears, but these memories concerned a distant reality so remote for them that it was often a source of amusement or perplexity, not something to be treated seriously. Post-war generations could feel uncomfortable in socialist Krzyż, but they were never threatened by the system.

190 Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), Polish politician, an independence activist and member of the military, one of the creators of the revival of the Polish state after 1918. After 1945 he was considered a “bourgeois reactionary” by official historiography, while in the mass consciousness he remained a symbol of patriotism (and anticommunism).

My dad, when we lived here in Łokacz [a village near Krzyż], he would listen to Radio Free Europe, and it had to be quiet, he was so afraid. “Because of the NKVD [i.e. the Soviet, not Polish, secret police,]” we would laugh. And he would reply: “You have no idea about the NKVD, a black car will come, arrest me, and take me to prison.” And he was really afraid of this, always. The doors had to be locked, the windows closed, to make sure that, God forbid, no-one was listening in (K20Cf).

Fear of the authorities also had a significant influence on relations between different groups of residents. In Krzyż this phenomenon was fairly marginal, and its effects were most visible in the very first months, when people did not know anything about each other, although this was also a factor that acted as an obstacle to social integration. Zhovkva, however, was a real “society of whisperers”¹⁹¹ in miniature: people were afraid of each other, did not talk about their wartime pasts, and did not strike up neighborly or friendly relationships for a long time. Resettlers were afraid of locals, locals were suspicious of the new arrivals, and everyone feared the migrants from the East (who, in turn, were afraid of the local “bourgeois-fascist nationalists.”) People who had already had negative experiences of Soviet repression, i.e. those who had been deported or released from camps or prisons, were especially careful.

Back then, in Stalinist times, no one asked who you were or where you came from. [...] At school, [...] we were a class of 14 people. I sat with a girl [...] who had been deported, she came from Iavoriv [a town in western Ukraine], and she only recently told me her history. [...] No one in school asked, because the children had been taught not to ask questions about where others were from. She came to my house a lot, we were good friends, but no one asked anything (Z29Af).

It is especially surprising that even resettlers, some of whom had practically been neighbors before their deportation, were distrustful of each other. In Krzyż, whilst there were sometimes prejudices within the group of “repatriates,” especially between people who had arrived from what are now Belarus and Ukraine, everyone knew where everyone else came from and what they had been through during the war. The Poles from the East had a distinct feeling of being different to the settlers from central and western regions of Poland, and they were able to converge around a certain group solidarity: an awareness of a shared fate and shared loss created a deep bond between them, which remained strong for many years after the war. Ukrainian resettlers had no such bond between them, and

191 Orlando Figes coins the term “society of whisperers” to describe Stalinist Russia, in: Orlando Figes, *Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008).

their solidarity was limited to families who came from the same village; everyone else, even those who had likewise been deported, was treated with distrust. Many people said that they had only recently discovered that neighbors or work colleagues had also been resettled. When mutual distrust is so profound and long lasting, it is difficult speak of any real social integration. Elementary social bonds were eventually created, but by force of circumstance, and these bonds remained somewhat superficial. Mutual distrust also contributed substantially to the fragmentary nature of local memory.¹⁹²

The authorities did not only monitor relations between people; their ambitions extended to exercising complete control over all aspects of social life. This was especially felt in the sphere of religion, from which the state felt a need to protect its citizens. In this regard, residents of both Krzyż and Zhovkva perceived state policies as yet another form of oppression. Like in other spheres, the difference between Krzyż and Zhovkva was in the scale and severity of interference. In Krzyż, an unsuccessful attempt by so-called patriot priests¹⁹³ to take over a local village church ended in fiasco and a compromise by the authorities; no further attempts of this nature were made.

They were supposed to close the church in Huta Szklana [village near Krzyż]. But how many people came, my God! There was shouting and screaming, and they didn't let them close it. Some other priest was supposed to come, maybe some kind of communist or something. The authorities apparently wanted to close it, but they didn't. They would have had to fight with people (K20Af).

In Zhovkva, the sphere of institutionalized religion was entirely domesticated by the state. The Roman Catholic Church was closed down and the Greek Catholic church was forcibly converted to Orthodoxy. The faithful in Zhovkva tried to resist, but their efforts only provoked the state to escalate its repressions. The pre-war residents of Zhovkva remembered these events unequivocally – in their testimonies, the town's new pastors were “KGB agents” (“They just called themselves “Orthodox,” but they were all Chekists... The whole KGB, the district directors and even more senior people than that, they grew beards, and [pretended to be

192 I make this argument in further detail in later chapters, on the memory of Others.

193 “Patriot priests” was the name given to a group of Catholic clergy in socialist Poland who supported the regime and the systemic changes in the country after 1944. They were most active in the years 1949–1956, and the movement's formal representation took the form of the Committee of Priests [*Komisja Księży*] which was part of the official veterans' organization called Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy [*Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację*, ZBoWiD.]

priests]” [Z2Am]). An underground Greek Catholic church acted as a new form of resistance, lasting right until the collapse of the USSR.¹⁹⁴ Its significance for the functioning of a new community was double-edged. On the one hand, people who congregated around illegal practices gained a certain autonomy in acting against the oppressive state, which could facilitate the formation of a new social solidarity based on their opposition identity. On the other hand, the danger associated with illegal worship intensified people’s distrust of others and increased their guardedness in relations with people from various backgrounds. The Zhovkva testimonies paint a picture rife with secondary divisions and judgmental relations between residents. Rather than uniting, community members were divided between those who “conformed” and practiced in the official church, and those who remained “resolute” and refused to step inside the compromised institution. The divide was strengthened by the tendency for underground worshippers to be mainly comprised of “old” locals of Zhovkva and the surrounding villages, whereas the majority of resettlers (and the few Easterners who were practicing believers) attended the Orthodox Church. A minority of the latter group, especially people originally from the region around Chełm (in today’s eastern Poland) were already Orthodox anyway; others had accepted the change, or did not consider it particularly important, such as the following speaker:

There was an Orthodox church, because they had closed the [Greek] Catholic Church in 1947. [...] [And did your family attend the Orthodox Church service?] Yes, we attended the church, and we still go there now. [But back then, when you started going to the Orthodox Church, did you not feel that it was somehow different from the Greek Catholic one?] No. We prayed, we prayed in our own way, no one said anything different. The Lord’s Prayer is the same after all, right? (Z16Af).

Despite the formal approval with which the Orthodox Church operated, people in Zhovkva remembered religious practice as a sphere of life in which the state constantly interfered; it often appeared as a pretext for harassing citizens. Both older and younger respondents had clear memories of their teachers, who were obliged to record the names of pupils who attended religious services, and to try and prevent children from going on carol-singing expeditions. Teachers from the East stated in their interviews that they had to act this way; otherwise

194 For exhaustive studies on the underground Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, see: Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton–Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996); Serge Keleher, *Passion and Resurrection – The Greek Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine, 1939–1989* (Lviv: Stauropegion, 1993).

they would have lost their jobs. Teachers who were locals from Zhovkva and surrounding villages said that they tried to fulfill their duties in such a way as to do minimal harm to children and their parents. Their testimonies contain a hint of conspiracy, and a certain satisfaction at having deceived their communist colleagues. This is essentially the only instance in which pressure from the authorities pushed residents of the town to build any kind of internal solidarity; however, even in this case, only a part of the community was implicated, and people even kept up their guards against local children.

I have this, you know, problem with my throat. And often, when we went out to catch those children singing festive songs, I would go... [loud clearing of throat]. The next day, the children at school would come to me and say: "Mrs. I., you gave us a signal, and we escaped" [laughter]. I was afraid of some of the children though, some of the classes, and in some classes I would say: "What are you talking about, I just have a problem with my throat." But with some of them you could be open (Z1Af).

Compared to the situation in Zhovkva, the atmosphere in Krzyż was idyllic. The oldest respondents recalled that party members and people who held prominent positions were pressurized not to go to church, at least not too ostentatiously. Nonetheless, the vast majority of interviewees agreed that, whilst the state would have preferred to see the churches empty, no one was prevented from worshipping ("Although there were different organizations and party secretaries, I never had a situation where someone said to me 'you're not allowed to go to the church' or 'your children [shouldn't be going to church]'" [K3Af]).

The example of the state's treatment of religious practices clearly shows the most substantial differences in the starting positions from which new communities were formed in the two towns. The most important difference was the scale of repression: whilst in Krzyż there was just one failed attempt by loyalist priests to take over the church, in Zhovkva one could be sentenced to a long exile in Siberia for illegal worship. In Zhovkva, the paralyzing fear that affected everyone made it impossible for them to achieve any real integration, while in Krzyż people came together in resistance against the state. The privileged position of one group in Zhovkva, related to their close identification with state power, aggravated the already existing divisions in society and strengthened mistrust; the absence of a similar phenomenon in Krzyż meant that state power was considered something foreign, located outside the community; even party secretaries could be "our people" ("All those secretaries were so... We all knew each other, and I don't know why they did all that recording" [K3Af]). A final important question concerns social authority. In both towns in the post-war period, there was a complete loss of authority, caused by migration and the necessity of

reconstituting social bonds on the one hand, and the hostile state's appropriation of all the key social institutions on the other. In this context, the legally existing Roman Catholic Church in Krzyż played an extremely important role – as it did everywhere in Poland; it was the only institution that had not been taken over by the state. In Soviet Zhovkva, the regime worked hard to make sure that no such authorities could emerge, and in doing so it deprived the population of a very important tool in the process of social integration.

To Build Everything Anew, or the Social Wild West

One of the interviewees gave the following answer to a question about social life in the early post-war years: “What do you mean? Everyone was new here! No one knew anything. [There weren't many local people?] There weren't any. Take our street – not a single local, not one. We were all from somewhere else” (Z19Af). This short statement provides a perfect inroad to the following analysis of how post-war social integration is remembered by residents of Krzyż and Zhovkva.¹⁹⁵ This section of the book considers the social dimension of integration, or in other words the issue of how and to what extent a new community was formed in both places. The individual dimension of integration, i.e. the topic of identity transformation among migrants, is the subject of the next chapter.¹⁹⁶

Besides the objective material and cultural differences, and difficult relations with the state in the new political system, a third substantial challenge the resettlers faced was the fact that they had to build relations from scratch with other migrants. Both towns after the war were agglomerations of diverse groups. Aside from the few locals who remained in Zhovkva, everyone was foreign to

195 By social integration I mean the process whose end objective is the creation of a harmonious and cohesive social whole by previously disparate and disconnected elements (both groups and individuals), by mutual recognition and adaptation. My understanding of this concept is close to that from the book: Mirosława Marody and Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, *Przemiany więzi społecznej* (Warszawa: Scholar, 2004). The most general and widely accepted definition of social integration is the following: “Social integration refers, in the first instance, to the extent and intensity of the interlinkages among the constituent parts of social unit,” see: Richard Münch, “Social integration,” in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 11, ed. Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes (Amsterdam & New York: Elsevier, 2001), p. 7591. In this particular case, the social unit is the local community.

196 Czesław Osękowski has also insisted on the necessity of distinguishing these two dimensions of integration (the social and the individual) in the context of the “Recovered Territories,” see: Osękowski, *Społeczeństwo Polski Zachodniej i Północnej*.

their new places of residence; however, this “foreignness” was a matter of degree, and the different levels of otherness created a peculiar and at times unclear situation. The majority of studies on social integration in the Polish “Recovered Territories” emphasize the inadequacy of classical theories of assimilation and integration as tools of analysis in this particular context: the absence of a receiving community and the fact that a new society was built from nothing make this case exceptional. In Krzyż the situation was yet more specific, because the town’s proximity to the pre-war border meant that some of the new residents, the “neighbors from across the river,” were *de facto* almost locals.

In Zhovkva, the settlers from nearby villages were in similar circumstances. These two groups of settlers had a very specific status: although they were both “nearly” locals, this “nearly” meant very different things. The Poles from across the river in Krzyż formed a group of migrants who could easily adapt to the German heritage of the town: they had the appropriate cultural competences and social and political potential for fast adaptation. At the same time, they did not take up the role of local “hosts” in Krzyż – they were settlers like everyone else, just perhaps “better equipped” for the role; their dislike of German culture in post-war conditions was surely a major factor in their reluctance to become “locals.” Migrants from nearby villages in Zhovkva, meanwhile, took up the functions of “locals” fairly quickly, treating the town as their own; the very few “real” locals who remained in the town perceived them, against the background of alien hordes arriving from both East and West, as allies – rural and backward, perhaps, but allies nonetheless. Because of these nuances, the status of the group of “neighbors” was ambiguous in both towns: sometimes they had a “superior” status to other migrants as hosts, and at other times they were settlers like the others, with the same rights and difficulties. It appears that this dual role had a negative effect on their social integration; it was conducive to the strengthening of mutual stereotypes.

In both towns, the first prominent demarcation line was the divide between “repatriates” on the one hand, and locals and “neighbors” on the other.¹⁹⁷ Negative experiences are predominant in the testimonies of “repatriates:” above all, they

197 Interesting analogies comparable to the process of constructing relations between locals and settlers in Poland and Ukraine are provided by studies that focus on the integration of eastern Germans in West Germany after the war, see: Rainer Schulze, “Growing Discontent: Relations between Native and Refugee Population in a Rural District in Western Germany after the Second World War,” in: *West Germany under Construction. Politics, Society and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 53–72.

complained of a lack of assistance and of basic everyday sympathy. Instances in which locals who were relatively well off refused to offer a helping hand remain to this day a painful memory.

[They treated us] like dogs. My sister-in-law had a seven-month-old baby when she arrived here, she had no milk, she had nothing. [...] When we came to Drawsko, we walked for three kilometers on foot, I remember how I went with her, and they whistled at us like we were dogs. “Go away, go away, go! There’s no milk for you here.” That kind of thing, it stays with you; we didn’t forget that (K31Af).

An equally strong memory is the lack of understanding and empathy shown by the locals, alongside the accusation that the “repatriates” had come to Krzyż/Zhovkva in order to make a quick buck by taking German/Polish property. It was hurtful to the resettlers that locals judged them to have purely material motivations, oblivious to the tragedy of their recent ordeals; moreover, difficulties were aggravated when they were treated like foreigners by their own compatriots. Another painful memory for the “repatriates” was the feeling of inferiority relative to the others, due to their less favorable material circumstances. Both the eastern Poles in Krzyż and the Ukrainians resettled from Poland in Zhovkva formed a specific economic sub-class in their new places of residence. Not only were they poorer in absolute terms than migrants from Wielkopolska or central Ukraine; crucially, they also could not benefit from assistance provided by relatives living in the vicinity. Their material poverty, cultural differences, and the fact that the majority of “repatriates” came from rural backgrounds prompted many locals to label them as “bumpkins” [pl. *wsioki*] (“They laughed at us, that we came laden with paper bags. [...] We were always worse than them” [K2Af]).¹⁹⁸ Respondents who experienced resettlement as at least young adults were able to analyze their emotions at the time, and to consider rational justifications for the behavior of the locals. Speakers who were children in that period continued to hold feelings of resentment, and recollections of their childhood, a time when the lack of basic food supplies was a symbol of their poverty, evoked very negative emotions.

The second day in school [...] we stood on opposite sides of the corridor along the walls – on one side the foreigners like me [the interviewee was born in Germany into a Polish family that emigrated to Germany in the late 1920s and in 1945 re-emigrated to Poland], and those from the East, and on the other side the kids from Drawsko and

198 For an analysis of the problem of the economic marginalization of Ukrainian migrants, see: Volodymyr Kitsak, “Rozselennia ukrainsiv Polshchi v URSR (1944–47). Pereselennia ikh iz pivdennykh ta skhidnykh oblastei v Zakhidnu Ukrainu,” *Moloda Natsia*, Vol. 1 (2000), pp. 96–122.

Wieleń [villages in the vicinity of Krzyż] [...] They're standing there along the wall, each of them holding a chunk of white bread stuffed with sausage, eating. As for us, standing on the other side with no breakfast, because you couldn't buy bread in those days, not everyone had money, let alone sausages of course – where were we supposed to get them? We looked across at them as they ate. I remember that to this day... I came home, I told my parents, and my mother said: "Son, where am I supposed to get breakfast for you?" [cries] (K25Bm).

There was a family of [locals] living near us, they were rich. They had two girls, like my sister and I, the same age. And we used to run over to them to play. But we were poor then. They had white bread. Our mother would cook us flatbreads [*palanychky*],¹⁹⁹ she fed us as best she could. And L. over there, she would sometimes give us a couple of slices of bread, and we would eat it... [voice trembling] (Z12Bf).

Tellingly, the only people to remember relations between “repatriates” and locals as positive were... the locals. In their testimonies there is no hint of dislike of the “repatriates” or of any belief that they had arrived in Krzyż/Zhovkva with material gain in mind. The locals constructed narratives of spontaneously helping their new neighbors, sometimes coloring their stories with a somewhat magnanimous and condescending commentary about the ways in which the “repatriates” were actually different to them (“We helped them in everything, we gave them everything, everything... But they had lived differently over there, they were differently educated. They were different...” [Z2Am]). The theme of objective differences between the “repatriates” and other settlers is present in the interviews from both towns, but in very differently forms. In Zhovkva, assessments of the other groups lack specifics and are typically vague, limited to a simple statement of an opinion (though a very certain one) that the others were “different.” It would be difficult to gain any insights from these testimonies as to how exactly Ukrainians from Poland were different to Ukrainians who had lived in or near Zhovkva before the war. On the one hand, this could be because there really were only minor differences between these two groups of Ukrainians – the exception being the minority of resettlers from the Chełm region in Poland who were Orthodox Christians. Another factor could be that no image of a settler from Poland solidified in Ukrainian social memory: no staple figure was created by mass culture, the way that the “repatriate” from the eastern *Kresy* was turned into a cultural phenomenon in Poland. Residents of Zhovkva looked at each other through labels that magnified difference, but the social imaginary did

199 *Palanychky* [in Ukrainian; the Polish equivalent is *podpłomyki*] are a simple flatbread, usually made without yeast, which can be made without an enclosed oven.

not provide any specific features of the resettlers' alterity to give the topos any substance.

In Krzyż, the situation was different. Above all, the objective difference between the Poles from the pre-war eastern provinces and the other settlers were genuinely significant. Additionally, collective narratives about resettlement created, with time, specific images of the "repatriated" eastern Pole and the "settler from the centre" (for example, the aforementioned film *All Friends Here*), which also influenced the autobiographical memories of the people in Krzyż.²⁰⁰ Individual memories are imbricated in the social memory of the collective in which one lives; collective memory frames autobiographical memory, allowing people to interpret their own lived experience. It is precisely a function of these rich social frames of memory that interviews in Krzyż contained many extensive accounts of the differences between Poles from the East and other regions. Even after many years, these opinions were replete with mutual prejudices, which were strongest between people from the former eastern provinces and from Wielkopolska. Besides emotional accusations of inhumanness and lack of empathy, some of the Easterners talked in depth about the specific character of people from Wielkopolska: as miserly, hard-headed, and practical. Most often these traits aroused dislike on the part of the eastern Poles, although sometimes they were impressed (by "Poznanian orderliness,") and others told stories with a large helping of humor. Respondents originally from Poznań, on the other hand, were convinced of the civilizational inferiority of the settlers from the East, believing them to be backward, careless and lazy. They struggled to understand differences in everyday customs, and were perplexed by the Easterners' attachment to traditional rural architecture and agricultural methods, as well as their inability and/or unwillingness to use the existing equipment of the German houses.

They [Poles from the East] were different to us, and I think they were perhaps a little backward as well. I remember that when we arrived here, they didn't know what a washing line was, like how we hung up our clothes to dry on a line, with clothespin. They would just throw their clothes on a blackcurrant bush to dry, and trample them in cold water. But they learned that all here, they learned it (K22Af).

Such opinions about the "impurity" of the Easterners and the condescending satisfaction of the locals when they "became civilized" must have provoked deep indignation in the "repatriates." Fuel was added to the fire by the fact that Poles from central regions and Wielkopolska often thought of the Easterners, who were

200 Cf. Tomczak, "Obraz osadników w prasie."

mostly very proud of their Polish identity, as essentially second-class members of the nation. Their pity was aroused not just by the “repatriates’” material poverty or civilizational difference, but also their different accents and vocabulary – their dialect was frequently mistaken for Ukrainian. This theme was sometimes raised jokingly; whilst speakers added straight away that there were no conflicts, these assertions were tinted with a conviction of their own superiority.

There was an old lady [from the East], she’s dead now. [...] And this lady could speak Polish well if she wanted to, but if she didn’t want to, she would go off babbling in Ukrainian, and I couldn’t understand anything, not a word. I nodded my head, but I didn’t actually understand any of that Ukrainian. And her daughter, it’s been so many years since the war and she still hasn’t learned to speak Polish properly! (K23Af).

After noting the linguistic difference of the eastern Poles, it was only a small step to then discount their Polishness more generally. Statements to this effect were usually made indirectly, through layers of phraseological padding of which speakers were perhaps unaware; when asked, they categorically denied that they could ever doubt the Polishness of the migrants from the East.

Here we were all Poles, not from the other side of the [river] Bug, there weren’t any of them here. Everyone here was Polish. [But those people from the other side of the Bug – weren’t they also Poles?] Yes of course they were. It’s just a way of speaking. Mrs. S. [a teacher] came from over there after all. I don’t know what to call it... You know, they always had a different accent, they spoke completely differently, so that’s what people said: that they had come from the other side of the Bug (K25Bf).

One of the consequences of these mutual prejudices was that initially, the groups kept very much to themselves. This peculiar social segregation was visible in both groups, “repatriates” and “locals,” which remained more or less closed to people from outside for a long time. Significantly, people in Krzyż remembered this phase as a time of “internal” consolidation, without hostility to others – people who had arrived from the same regions were spending time together and inviting each other to weddings and baptisms, thereby compensating for the absence of extended families that had been left behind (“On Sundays we went to visit friends and acquaintances. [...] To other people with whom we came here” [K26Bf]).²⁰¹ In Zhovkva this memory took on a slightly different form.

201 As existing scholarship and my observations from Krzyż and Zhovkva both show, social divisions in rural areas were much stronger and longer lasting than in urban environments. This is well illustrated by the case of a village near Krzyż, where train loads of “repatriate” Poles from the same village in former eastern Poland had settled together. Here, it was only in the third generation that mixed marriages between

Because of distrust within the settler groups, the prejudices held by locals did not strengthen the bonds of solidarity among “repatriates” to a similar extent as in Krzyż. There was a more intensive process of keeping others out, rather than building ties within the group, for example among the youth: “Once a young man started courting our daughter and others started shouting: *What’s this? Going out with a settler? Haven’t you got your own girls?*” [Z3Af]. This was a kind of negative consolidation based on isolation, rather than community construction.

A completely separate issue is the question of how relations between the “Easterners” in Zhovkva on the one hand, and locals and/or Ukrainian resettlers on the other, were remembered. Although objective differences between these groups of residents were no less significant than those between Poles from Wielkopolska and the pre-war East in Krzyż, the Zhovkva interviews differ in that they contain no humorous elements. This may be a reflection of the fear that people had felt several decades previously, or perhaps it is the result of a still-lingering animosity. Where laughter does feature in accounts of this period, it is bitter, as if the speaker was unsure whether crying may not have been a more appropriate emotion.

They got married [in a church], so we went to have a look at what it was like... [laughter]. Just to have a look. After the part where they kissed the icon, they all started drinking champagne. She worked in the cafe here near the church, and he was a brigadier. At that time there wasn’t yet so much pressure to join the party. And we just watched them drinking champagne... (Z2Am).

Zhovkva residents who came from Galicia remembered their relations with the Easterners as above all cautious; they may not have been outwardly kind towards them, but out of fear of the possible consequences of conflict, they tried to maintain at least cordial relations with them. At the same time, they emphasized the borders of their familiarity and largely kept to themselves.

If a girl was seeing a Russian, then people would mock her, saying... you know... But if ever a big conflict were to arise, there had to be no conflict. Like, between the Easterner teachers there were no conflicts. Everyone thought whatever they thought, in their heads, but they wouldn’t say it out loud, no... People didn’t talk, because they were afraid of saying what they really thought. [...] We were a bit careful towards them, so as not to say anything out of order... We wouldn’t be hostile to them, no (Z1Af).

eastern and local Poles started to occur. The integration of migrants in large towns proceeded much faster. There were fewer social constraints and more possibilities: if someone wanted to be rid of the label of an “eastern bumpkin,” a large city in Galicia or in the “Recovered Territories” was the ideal place to do so.

The only people who spoke of positive encounters with the Easterners were locals who, because of their own positions in the community, had entered the privileged group and become part of the apparatus of power. As beneficiaries of systemic change, they no longer remembered any conflicts or difficulties with the migrants from the East, who were part of their own professional and social circles.

We would all get together and have fun together, and no one ever felt any distance. What did it matter if you worked for the police? For example, the wife of the police chief worked with her [the speaker's wife] together in the school, they worked in the same school. Then the wife of that KGB employee, what's her name, who lives in Rava [Rava-Ruska, a town near the Polish border] now? She also worked there. And we weren't afraid of anyone, and no one was afraid of them (Z20Am).

Such relationships with locals were the main reason why the majority of the Easterners continue to have positive memories to this day of the social aspect of their first years in Zhovkva. The Easterners tend to remember kind people, a generous environment, and warm neighborly relations.

Hospitable people, generous. [...] There was a lady who worked as a cleaner at the factory. We didn't even have a bowl for doing our laundry, we didn't have that... that sieve for cabbage. She brought them to us, and looked after our son, once he was born. I would be called out to the middle school or to the high school if someone was sick, and I would substitute [...] and she looked after my son. And I have to say that people were very kind to me, the other teachers too (Z11Af).

Perhaps it really was the case that the Easterners were lucky, and they met the most generous souls among the Ukrainians and Poles, who had no qualms with them and actively offered to help their "brother *Moskals*." It does nonetheless seem more likely that the majority of Easterners lived in a kind of ghetto composed of people from their own circles, as well as locals who aspired to join their ranks. The rest of the population tended to treat them well, but this was usually a calculated act of pragmatism or a result of fear, rather than genuine benevolence. Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that the testimonies of Easterners did occasionally contain accounts of hostile relations, but these were to be found exclusively in interviews with people who entered into marital relations with locals; in other words, these were the individuals who definitely had frequent, intensive contact with the autochthonous population.

I arrived, and they didn't call me anything other than *Moskal*, as if I was a *Moskal*. But what have I got to do with the *Moskals*? [laughter] I always laughed, because my mother-in-law always called me *Moskal*, and my daughter's husband's mother called me her "Little Jew" [*Zhydivochka*], because I had curly hair (Z10Af).

Many Easterners also claimed that the place of origin of their neighbors and colleagues had no significance to them. Perhaps this was a sign of the Soviet Union's cosmopolitanism, but it can also be interpreted as a form of shortsightedness, as well as a lingering disinterest in the situation of other resident groups. It was easy to have no concern for the town's social stratification when one was sitting pretty at the top.

The Long-term Consequences of Post-war Divisions: Integration Processes Among the Younger Generations

The post-war divisions did not affect just the oldest generation. Respondents who were born after the war, that is, people for whom Krzyż/Zhovkva was the only social reality they knew, also remembered mutual prejudices. In this generation as well, there was a strong memory of prejudices held between "repatriates" and settlers whom the forced migrants considered to be "locals" (in Krzyż, those from central and western Poland, and in Zhovkva, Poles and Ukrainians from Galicia). People whose childhood fell in the immediate post-war period generally talked about their own experiences; meanwhile, younger respondents who were born in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s discussed the relations they had observed between their parents and others, or the stories they had heard from them.

People here didn't accept us too willingly, because they said we were Poles. My mother told me on several occasions that she had even been brought to tears. [...] They mocked us, because of some words and phrases that were similar to Polish. We had lived with Poles before, and they laughed at us that we were "bloody Poles." They always called us resettl... reshittlers [*peresrantsi*], saying that we had been resettled, we were foreign, Poles. "What are you doing here, go back to your Poland," they would say (Z18Bf).

Here they [the speaker's parents] were called Ukrainians, because we had lived with Ukrainians after all, and we had some mannerisms in our speech that were more Ukrainian, needless to say. Before they adapted, before they [learned to speak] Polish correctly, that was another problem (K20Cf).

Significantly, it was only the children of resettlers who remembered conflict, similar to the situation among the oldest generation. The children of "locals" had no recollection of treating the "repatriates" differently to anyone else. They spoke at length about the differences that they felt even in their own generation – mostly in linguistic usage – and about their awareness of the divergent experiences that different groups had had during the war; but their testimonies tended to verge towards stories about helping the resettlers and how the speakers

themselves and their parents had been involved in the construction of a harmonious environment of social solidarity. Interestingly, in accounts of relations with their classmates in school, these respondents remembered themselves in the role of generous guides, who helped the “repatriate” children to learn the ropes of the correct “Polish” customs that were acceptable in the new Poland.

The teachers taught us that you couldn't just tease them. That maybe they talked a bit differently or something, but you weren't allowed to tease them for it, you had to help. So that they started speaking properly as soon as possible (K1Bf).

The exact opposite image was often to be found in the recollections of people whose families had moved from the East – memories of being ostracized at school, discriminated against by teachers, and facing up to a widespread absence of openness and a lack of understanding that the families of forced migrants had lost everything they had previously accumulated in life, as well as their homelands.

Some of the teachers treated us, kids from the East, worse. [...] Worse than that, I still remember, I'm not sure why [...] there was this incident, where [a student] had turned 18 and was called to pick up his ID card. This guy went to the office, and on the card it said he was born in the USSR – well, we all had that written. [...] And he objected that he wasn't born in the USSR, that he wouldn't accept this ID. And they harassed him, they really had a go at him, it was pretty unpleasant, though I don't know the details (K26Bf).

The resentful voices of the children of eastern Poles may be a reflection of the actual behavior of their classmates and teachers, but they could equally be part of their emotional reaction to the trauma of resettlement. The children of locals rarely noticed the delicate nuances of their schoolmates' emotional baggage, because their socialization within the family environment had not equipped them with the appropriate tools for such empathy; it did not instill in them a strong enough sensitivity towards difficult experiences. For their part, the children of resettlers were hypersensitive towards any instances of being treated as different, as this was a way for them to process the loss their parents had experienced and to deal with the taboos and silences that weighed on them in the public sphere. In this situation, it was easy for them to assign negative attitudes to the fairly neutral behavior of others. In the case of the young man who railed against the inscription on his ID card, the teachers who tried to persuade him to accept the document may well have been trying to protect him from serious trouble with the authorities, rather than act out of spite.

Whereas in Krzyż the division between “repatriates” and locals remained significant in the middle generation, in Zhovkva the most prominent fissures were between the “Easterners” and the rest of the population – both locals and

Ukrainians resettled from Poland. The overall picture that can be discerned from speaking to residents in their forties, fifties and sixties (at the time of the interviews) is one of tense relations, or at best of mutual indifference; the groups remained strictly separated from each other. This is well illustrated by a statement made by a woman whose parents were resettlers, who spontaneously described her relations with her peers from Easterner families as positive – but when asked to elaborate on this opinion, she revealed that these relations were good because they were superficial. The speaker, in other words, did not maintain contact with anyone from this group (“Personally, no. It just so happened that I didn’t make any friends like that” [Z6Cf]). Others spoke outwardly about segregation and animosity; these statements contained echoes of the post-war mistrust towards Soviet “liberators.” They were ill-disposed towards their peers from the ruling castes and tried not to enter any kind of relations with them. If this turned out to be impossible, they maintained their distance and remained cautious, and even applied this principle to children from primary school. Parents remembered the terror of the post-war years too strongly to not try to inculcate a sense of caution in their children.

In my class there was this girl, Y., who was the daughter of a judge. [And how was she treated by the class?] How? Well the Russkies were what they were, we were careful with them. And this one, she was always “friendly” [said through gritted teeth]... We didn’t really understand it, but in spite of everything we were afraid of offending her in some way, or her father. When your father is a judge... we didn’t trust people like that, there were rumors that they had been sent here as spies (Z5Cm).

The children and grandchildren of the Easterners appear to have lived in a completely separate world to their local contemporaries, with those worlds rarely overlapping. Local social life was configured in such a way that the borders between the groups were fairly impermeable. One of the most important separating mechanisms was at the level of school education: as noted previously, there were two institutions, a Ukrainian-language (“ordinary”) school and a Russian-language one (the “Russian” school). The children of Easterners attended, needless to say, the latter, and the rivalry between the two institutions – such as in sport or academic competitions – was fierce and not always gentlemanly. Unwritten social rules strengthened the segregation: fraternizing with the enemy was strongly frowned upon, and a young woman who agreed to go on a date with a soldier would immediately be vilified as having loose morals.

The barracks, the gendarmerie, the soldiers – girls who were friendly with them were, well, let’s say, a certain category of girls. I was brought up in such a way that I could never belong to that category of girls. I had no contact with [the soldiers]. As for military

families – my parents had no contacts like that, none at all. They all studied at the Russian school, they had their own circles (Z1Bf).

The division formed by institutional means and social norms was consolidated by fear on the one hand, and by dislike and jealousy on the other; the Easterners had special access to scarce goods, as the locals were well aware. Military personnel and many of the civilian Easterners had advantageous positions in the shady makeup of Soviet society: they could buy goods in special stores, and in ordinary shops they could obtain supplies under the counter; they also had more opportunities to travel. Understandably, such special entitlements made other residents of Zhovkva bitter. One of the younger interviewees remembered access to chewing gum as the defining symbol of segregation: “You have to understand, chewing gum was something only the ‘whites’ could have” (Z1Cf). In the recollections of locals, the children of Easterners also behaved in a way that betrayed their position. They were not only better off materially, politically more privileged and potentially more secure; they also – perhaps above all – made sure the other people of Zhovkva knew it.

Those people didn't try to learn our language, they didn't try to integrate in any way, they were absolutely convinced that if they spoke Russian, everyone else should understand them, although they didn't make an effort to understand others... [...] Their superiority was visible on absolutely all levels, and only a very small group of people tried to integrate, I mean to try to talk to their neighbors and so on. But the thing was, they didn't need to try to get to know their neighbors. They lived in special apartment blocks that were built for them, and they only socialized in their own circles (Z1Cf).

Like their parents, the majority of children from Easterner families did not remember any difficulties in their relationships with their peers. None of them remembered shopping in special stores or other signs of their privilege. They did attend the Russian-language school, sure, but so did many other children from different backgrounds – including some children whom one might least expect. One of the interviewees argued for the equality that reigned in his school by citing the example of a Ukrainian boy whose parents had been active in the UPA; the family had returned from exile and sent their son to the Russian-language school because he spoke no Ukrainian.

And he graduated with us, this friend of ours. [...] No one made any fuss, you know, whether you were a Ukrainian or whatever... My God... It was a very good school, a Russian school, it was called the Russian School no. 2. We lived together perfectly well (Z38Cm).

The sense of comfort and harmony with which the children of the Easterners lived was rarely troubled; perhaps even less frequently than the bliss of their

parents. Statements about peaceful coexistence and mutual tolerance abound in these interviews. One testimony contrasts with this general picture, however; the speaker was from the family of a serviceman and a Ukrainian resettled from Poland. The woman bitterly recalled the lack of acceptance among the local Ukrainians, the abuse she received as a child, and the sadness and regret she still felt.

We're the second generation now, but they still call us *Moskals*, they don't call us Ukrainians. [...] And how I suffered in school! [...] I come home [from school] and I say: "Mother, listen, I was at this girl's house, and her mother said, 'that *Moskal* is here again.'" I ask, "why did she call me that, what's that all about? Do they hate me so much, or do we have this name somewhere, or what is it?" And my granny told me "no, it's because your father is a Russian," and she burst out laughing – she found this hilarious, you know. [...] And I went out with her brother for five years, but they didn't agree for him to marry me, because I was a *Moskal* (Z16Bf).

Similarly to the oldest generation, the exceptional case of a person who remembers strained relations between locals and Easterners was an individual who had close contact with the other group – as if the only guarantee of decent relations between the groups was their superficiality. Both interviewees, the older woman (Z10Af) and the younger one, complained about the rejection with which they were met when they wanted to cross the divide (or in the case of the older woman, once they had already crossed the divide). It would appear that this rejection later affects their perceptions of relations with locals for the rest of their lives: pre-existing scars amplify neighborly conflicts, tensions and misunderstandings. Tellingly, the younger woman was born to a mixed family, but not to a mixed marriage between a Russian and a local Ukrainian; her mother was a Ukrainian from Poland. If we consider the biographies of the interviewees in Zhovkva, it is striking that this type of marriage happened much more frequently than marriages between locals and migrants, with marriages between locals and Easterners especially rare in the oldest generation. It would appear that Easterners and resettlers were to an extent united by their common ostracism by the locals, as the following quote shows.

[Our] street was inhabited almost entirely by resettlers, they lived in practically every house, and we, people of the same age, we stuck together. And there were also people from eastern Ukraine, because there had been a famine in eastern Ukraine, and many people came here from there. And we were close to them as well. I mean, we were friendlier within our own group, but we had good contacts with them as well, because they had had a tough time and so had we. You see, they understood us and we understood them well (Z18Bf).

The density of accounts of conflict in interviews with the second and third generations in Zhovkva, and the fading of animosity in the same generational groups in Krzyż, show that in these societies, the processes of social integration developed in two different directions. In Krzyż, divisions gradually vanished. In the increasingly revitalized town, there were more and more factors that united residents rather than divided them; a sense of community was evolving. The most important elements, described in detail in many testimonies by people who were children in the post-war years, were school, sport and the scouting movement. School brought people together through its universality and relatively low level of ideologizing, at least in the first years after the war, when pre-war textbooks and curriculums were still in use, pre-war teachers taught in the classrooms, and religion was still a compulsory subject.²⁰²

Scouting and sport were important because they were voluntary. As Zdzisław Mach argues, the ability to actively organize social life and feel one's own influence is an essential factor that determines the success or otherwise of the third phase of migration, the phase of aggregation. Even during the times when state interference in the structure and activities of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association was at its greatest, young people in Krzyż treated the scouting movement as something they themselves helped to form, as a sphere of autonomous action; they were fairly effective in resisting the state's efforts to appropriate and discipline the organization. The Catholic Church played an even more significant role in facilitating social integration. I described earlier the example of people uniting to defend their local parish from the advances of "patriot priests." Equally important, however, was the status of the church as the only legally operating institution that retained its authority and autonomy after the war.²⁰³ Young people treated forms of activity within the church, such as altar service, as a substitute for an independent and patriotic social movement.

202 Authors such as Czesław Osękowski and Julia Makaro have written about school and sport (in the sense of supporting a team) as factors that were conducive to the integration of people born in the "Recovered Territories," see: Osękowski, *Społeczeństwo Polski*; Makaro, *Gubin*.

203 Marcin Zaremba has noted this exceptional position of the church in post-war Polish society, in his "Trauma wielkiej wojny. Psychospołeczne konsekwencje II wojny światowej," *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, No. 2 (2008), pp. 3–42. For more information regarding the Catholic Church in communist Poland, e.g. about state-church relations and the role of the church in shaping public resistance against the regime, see: Brian Porter-Szucs, *Faith and Fatherland. Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Mixed marriages could be a substantial step in the integration process, and were already fairly common among the generation of people born in the 1930s, who entered adulthood in the “Recovered Territories.” Accounts of such relations were usually full of warmth and humor: interviewees told various amusing anecdotes about cultural differences and minor difficulties in adapting to each other’s ways at the level of everyday life. Although respondents who entered such marriages remembered initial difficulties, narratives of gradual accommodation were predominant; with the passage of time, the cultural differences no longer had any significance.

The best illustration of how things became normalized is that I married a woman from Poznań. Me, from Lwów, and her, from Poznań. And I remember that when we went to say our vows, the priest said: “Whoa, you’re from completely different ends of the country! Lwów and Poznań, fancy that!” [...] Of course, the differences gradually faded. Today no one goes about saying that someone is from Poznań, they just say that we’re all from Krzyż (K17Am).

For children born to such couples, the different backgrounds of their parents were perceptible only in minor trifles, such as culinary habits. No interview contained references to significant differences between their parents’ mentalities or identities, and no one remembered any conflicts resulting from such differences.

Once we were a little bit older, those differences had already faded; at most, they liked different foods – say, Poznań-style potatoes as opposed to more eastern dishes. As for me, I didn’t notice anything at all, I didn’t see any differences related to my parents being brought up in different ways or in different places (K2Cf).

The younger the respondents, the more likely they were to declare that, although they were aware of their own family’s history, the family backgrounds of other people had no meaning for them. I heard many firm opinions from interviewees that people simply did not talk about such issues, or that they had no idea where their friends’ families had come from – not because it was a secret or taboo, but because it was simply unimportant.²⁰⁴ “No, we don’t [talk about] where our grandparents came from. We were never very interested in that kind of thing.

204 For comparison, another study that shows the disappearance of distinctions between groups in the third generation in another post-migration community is: Werner Holz, “Traces of German-Czech History in Biographical Interviews at the Border: Construction of Identities and the Year 1938 in Bärenstein-Vejprty,” in: *Living (with) Borders. Identity Discourses on East-West borders in Europe*, ed. Ulrike H. Meinhof (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 95–118.

I have no idea why friends would need to know where my granny is from, it wouldn't change anything (K25Df)."

In Zhovkva, things were different. In the high-pressure times of the 1940s and 1950s, there were no social mechanisms that could act as a positive catalyst for social integration, unlike in Krzyż – such as common schooling, a united church or grassroots social movements. The schools in Stalinist Zhovkva were an instrument of oppression, and they also divided the children into a privileged and a subjugated group. The division was reinforced by spatial segregation (in the case of military families, who lived in a special district of the town) and material distinctions that were related to the distribution of goods. The available forms of social engagement, such as the Pioneer scouting organization, were completely subordinated to the state and therefore did not play an integrative role; the same could be said of the Orthodox Church. In the first generation of settlers, there were relatively few mixed marriages; crossing boundaries between groups was still too big a taboo. The few instances of mixed marriages among the interviewees could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Moreover, characteristically, respondents felt somehow obliged to explain or even justify their choice, whereas for the respondents in Krzyż there was nothing unnatural about marrying across the divide.

Lots of people here married like that. Lots, because after the war, you know... There are people who, for example, hated them: "Oh you *Moskal!*" This and that. These types, you know them... We had lived here and there, and we didn't really care, as long as a person had a good heart. And that is how we still live. He [the speaker's husband, a Russian] never interfered with anybody, he never got involved in politics, he never argued with anyone (Z16Af).

If in Krzyż the most serious problems for mixed marriages were to do with what to serve for a festive meal, in Zhovkva they could be of greater consequence because they raised essential questions, like national identity and one's view of the past. Many respondents made it clear that potentially controversial topics were not discussed at home – not because they were unimportant, but rather in order to protect the fragile unity of the family. Still, deep-lying mutual prejudices and irreconcilable differences in political or other opinions made themselves known in banal, everyday situations.

In terms of confrontations, I remember my dad, because he comes from near Volia Vysotska near Zhovkva, and there were lots of Bandera supporters in his family, *Banderites*. [...] So sometimes my dad would, you know – when generations argue they will reach for all the available arguments. There's no holding back when the situation gets emotional. [...] So they were arguing about something, and she [the speaker's Russian grandmother] called him a *Banderite*, saying "because of people like you I've suffered all

my life, always running away,” and he answered back, calling her a “vagabond,” and so it went on. But on the whole we didn’t talk about that (Z43Cf).

Of course, there were also stories of family harmony. Most commonly, however, these were furnished with ironic commentary or facial gestures that strongly suggested a different subtext: that we talk to each other because we have to, but in reality everyone knows we are different.

My son is married, and my daughter-in-law, K’s [the speaker’s granddaughter’s] mother, her grandfather was sent to the camps, he was even in the Halychyna Division [SS Galizien, a German military division during the war], and then he was with the *Banderites*. And yes, we talk to him [laughter] (Z20Am).

The absence of social factors facilitating integration did not prevent it totally, but certainly slowed down the integration. Whereas in Krzyż, differences began to diminish in the second generation and had completely disappeared by the third and fourth generations, in Zhovkva the differences continued to divide people. Their pertinence is shown by the fact that the 1990s in Zhovkva did not bring openness towards the various identities and group memories that had been hitherto suppressed, but the opposite: the return of open conflicts on two fronts: religion and politics. The dispute between the Greek Catholics, who demanded the return of the Basilian church and monastery, and the Orthodox, who had occupied it since Soviet times, is remembered in Zhovkva as two separate narratives with no overlap. The two camps blame each other and are to this day unwilling to compromise. The Orthodox feel disparaged by the hostility of the Greek Catholics, which they consider to have been undeserved. Especially in conversations with older people, there comes across a conviction that the Greek Catholic Church is a forgery dreamed up by local nationalists.

There used to be one church, the Orthodox one, and everyone went to the same church, and everything was fine. I didn’t even know there was such a thing as a Greek Catholic Church. But once Ukraine became independent, how they started to fight, the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics, provoking each other all the time...! They drove them out of that church, there were services being carried out outside the church doors, it was an absolute nightmare! (Z10Af).

The Greek Catholics answer with accusations to the effect that the Orthodox made the return of the church unnecessarily difficult, tried to steal valuable relics, and even betrayed their nation by preventing Orthodox believers from being “true” Ukrainians. They considered the Orthodox Church in Zhovkva to be nothing more than a Moscow agent, and Russian dominion over the local parishes was a particular thorn in their side (“We never went to Russia to install the Kyiv patriarchate there, so why should we have a Moscow patriarchate? [...]

As my grandmother used to say, Moscow needs to shove its nose in everyone else's business" [Z19Bf]). Both narratives contributed to the reactivation of divisions that had begun to fade by the end of the 1980s. These divisions reverberate in Zhovkva society with the echoes of old prejudices, and they pit people against other who had apparently nearly forgotten who arrived from where in the 1940s and why. Meanwhile, each side is convinced of their own moral correctness, as well as the wrongness of the other.

When that war began, that division into different churches, there was, for example, an old lady, 87 years old, she's dead now, and she was like family to us. And when that storm started to brew, she just turned her back on us. We became enemies, we didn't even say hello to each other for ten years, even though she had looked after me as a child, but she wouldn't talk to me because I was a traitor. [...] All the Orthodox were enemies to her, we were all *Moskals* (Z20Bm).

A simple example: it's the Easter procession, the Way of the Cross. The whole town is taking part: the Polish Church, the Autocephalous Church, the Greek Catholic Church, all of these confessions are out on the streets. But Comrade H. – the priest from the Russian Orthodox Church – he doesn't even open the church doors. He doesn't go out with the people. [...] [And who goes to that church?] Well there are a couple of idiots who do. There's no other word for it (Z29Bm).

Interestingly, the religious conflict also became a platform on which new prejudices grew, as a result of the convergence of old wounds and new power divides. Since "*Moskals*" and "idiots" attended the Orthodox Church, everyone else who adhered to Orthodox religious practice must also have had a similar status. The new division of power in the town and the political fall from grace of the old elite, together with the religious conflict, led to the emergence of new social stigmas. In this situation, resettlers were especially prone to feeling victimized, believing that they were yet again being unfairly discriminated against.

People now say: "you resettlers, you go to the Russian Church because you're not real patriots." [...] If you have a look at our church, the Orthodox one, the Russian one, it's only laborers who go there. No one from management. The dentist, all the doctors, they all go to the Catholic Church, even if their father was Orthodox.²⁰⁵ [They go to the Greek Catholics?] Yes, for example, my wife's sister has started going to them as well, she converted from the Orthodox Church to the Catholic one. She says: "everyone goes there, I'm the only one here..." So it's about her career and all that. You can't be a manager and go to the Orthodox Church (Z5Bm).

205 When this particular interviewee uses word "Catholic," he of course means Greek Catholic – this is a fairly common language practice in Zhovkva.

The religious conflict acted as a prelude to extreme tensions with a political basis, whose zenith occurred during the referendum on Ukrainian independence in 1991. This conflict was, effectively, the second act of the same drama, with the same cast: on one side, the Zhovkva residents who had arrived from the East; on the other side, “real,” Galician Ukrainians; and the resettlers caught in the middle, although on this occasion they took the side of the locals in much greater numbers. The axis around which the conflict turned was the issue of language, although conflicting regimes continued to play a similar role: Easterners felt unjustly persecuted and discriminated against, and the locals perceived the installment of Ukrainian as the state language to be rightful revenge for years of oppression against their own native tongue.²⁰⁶

They're still as stubborn as goats can be. Whereas *Moskals* turn up, they always bring their own people and let them rule...! So pack your bags and be off with you if you don't like it here. [But no one has left?] No, no one, what would they do over there? They're not fools after all, quite the opposite. They try and come here and make a life of it. [...] They live in Ukraine but they're Russian, and they want Russian to be the [official] language as well, because they refuse to speak Ukrainian (Z19Af).

Against the background of this conflict, the position taken by Zhovkva's Poles is especially interesting. Despite their unwavering anti-Soviet stance, during the Ukrainian “national rebirth” they were firmly on the side of the Easterners. Perhaps they were expressing a simple solidarity between two minorities, of which one had suddenly lost its dominant position and the other was unsure what its fate might be under the new regime; perhaps they were driven by a fear that the reawakening of western Ukrainian nationalism under the sign of Stepan Bandera would not necessarily be a positive change for them. A middle-aged Polish woman remembered Ukrainian nationalism in the early 1990s as “wild,” virulent, and uncompromising. She said that she had been afraid of

206 The issue of language and nationality in Ukraine in the 1990s is explored, among others, in: Ian Bremmer, “The politics of ethnicity: Russians in the new Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, No. 46(2) (1994), pp. 261–283; more information concerning the relationship between language and identity in Ukraine, with a particular focus on Russians' responses, can be found in: Roman Solchanyk, “Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects,” in: *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka and Roman Solchanyk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 539–554; Taras Kuzio, Robert. S. Kravchuk, Paul D' Amieri, eds., *State and Institution Building in Ukraine* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

her own husband, a Ukrainian from near Zhovkva, who told her that if he had known of her Polish roots before their marriage, he would never have tied the knot with her.

Accounts of these religious and political conflicts differ in their temperature. Memories of confessional disputes remain heated to this day, arousing strong emotions even among people who are generally detached from politics. Political and linguistic issues, on the other hand, which returned as an echo in the period of the Orange Revolution of 2004, retain a potential for conflict only among the most “fanatical” representatives of both camps, to borrow a word used by the above interviewee. The majority of people in Zhovkva believed that the flames of conflict were gradually dying down, and that the present-day situation was free of problems.

However, interviews with people from the fourth generation showed that social integration had taken place in Zhovkva. Whereas they did remember the conflicts of the 1990s, they thought of them as something from the past that could only interest older people. These recent disputes had no relevance to them.

I think that's an issue for older people mainly. Once in a while I hear that this person is from that church, and that person is from a different one, and someone else used to be a communist. Sometimes, though not very often, you might hear that someone is a Jew, another person a Russian, a Pole, and so on. Ukrainians can blurt stuff like that sometimes. But for there to be openly hostile relations, no... (Z47Cf).

The youngest generation's openness to the future of their town in both Krzyż and Zhovkva, and their backing away from historical prejudices, can be seen as a sign of a very positive development – that social integration has been completed, and that the young people pay no attention to personal origins because everyone is simply local. Even if some respondents still harbored the divisions from 60 years previously, these are merely examples of unsuccessful psychological integration, which occur everywhere. Nonetheless, a comparison of the development of the integration process in the two towns prompts us to retain certain reservations. If society in Krzyż appears to have overcome its fractures to such an extent that problems seem unlikely to occur, the same cannot be said of Zhovkva.

Paradoxically, although the differences between certain groups of migrants were objectively greater in Krzyż than among most of the new residents of Zhovkva, they turned out to be easier to navigate, because these differences primarily concerned everyday habits, which were easier to change. In Zhovkva, the contrasts related to fundamental issues: national identity, political identity, one's vision of the state, and the past – especially questions about who was a perpetrator and who a victim. It was the categorical weight of these differences that led

to their return as soon as systemic transformation was embarked upon after the fall of the USSR. In Krzyż there were no divisions that could return. It remains an open question – especially in the climate of political uncertainty in today's Ukraine – whether the return of these resentments was the last one, or whether they might recur as an echo in the future.

