

## **Section II Civil-Military Relations and PME Reform**



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# The Impact of Political-Military Relations on the Professional Training of the Uruguayan Armed Forces

**Abstract:** Using Charles Moskos' formative concept of the Institutional, Occupational and Plural models for the armed forces, this chapter outlines how the frameworks and objectives of military education are dependent upon and necessarily tailored towards the military's wider organizational structure. Specifically, it examines how civil-military mistrust within Uruguay, from the 1920s until the early 21st century, has resulted in a lack of sufficient direction for the armed forces, which in turn has inhibited their ability to prepare and evolve an educational system relevant for Uruguay's specific national security contexts. The author concludes that, for the Uruguayan military to generate relevant educational programmes for its officers and soldiers, it must be provided with a long-term vision for national security that is not influenced by party-politics.

**Keywords:** PME, military education, civil-military relations, Armed Forces of Uruguay, Escuela Militar, CAEN, CALEN

## Introduction

In the inaugural conference of the Castilian Association of Sociology held in May 1982, Charles C. Moskos – once famously described by Professor David Segal in the *Wall Street Journal* as the “most influential military sociologist in the country, and probably in the world” (Ricks, 1993, p.1) – gave the following assessment of the armed forces:

“The academic definitions and the ideological attitudes towards the armed forces fluctuate between two ends. On one end, there are those who see military men as a reflection of the dominant social values and completely dependent on civilian leadership. On the other end, others accentuate the difference between the values of the military and those of the rest of the society, and affirm that military men exert an independent influence in the civil society”.<sup>1</sup> (Moskos, 1982, p.297)

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1 All quotes, which were originally written in Spanish, have been translated into English by the author of this chapter. Although it has not been explicitly

In Moskos' system, we find two models for the armed forces, complemented by a third one that synthesizes them. These models cover the whole spectrum of military organizations, and are named by Moskos as the "Institutional", "Occupational" and "Plural" (Ibid., 299). The Institutional model is based on values and norms, and views the military career as a vocation that prioritizes the collective interest. This model espouses such principles and values as homeland, honour, loyalty, sense of duty, sacrifice and heroism. The Occupational model sees the military career as an occupation like any other, in which monetary reward is the means by which one regulates the needs of the individual and the organization. This model prioritizes the interests of the individual above those of the military institution, and does not cultivate the same values as the Institutional model, since it classifies military personnel as clerks more tied to civil society than to the military itself. Finally, the Plural model combines the organizational tendencies of the previous models into a heterogeneous military organization where the formation of combat units conforms to the Institutional model and the formation of administrative units conforms to the Occupational one (Ibid., p.299 *passim*).

Evidently, each model implies a worldview of the armed forces and their insertion in society. As this chapter will argue, the evolution of military education in Uruguay is directly linked with the evolution of this viewpoint within politico-military circles, which is itself directly influenced by the ideologies that emerged out of the country's and the region's politico-military experiences and civil-military relations. In order to achieve this, the chapter will first provide a broad overview of politico-military relations and military education from the 1920s until the early 21st century. It will then focus on the shift in political and civil-military priorities seen under the Frente Amplio ("Broad Front") government from 2005 onwards, before considering the repercussions of these changes for contemporary military education in Uruguay.

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indicated which quotes were originally in Spanish, the bibliography has retained the original publication language for all articles used within this chapter.

## From Productive Isolation to Coup D'état

Historically, the Armed Forces of Uruguay were based on the Institutional model. In contrast to its neighbours, Uruguay quickly overcame the trend of military governments that had characterized Latin America after emancipation from Spain until late into the 20th century. As a result, the Armed Forces of Uruguay became increasingly isolated from civilians and politicians from the 1920s onwards, avoiding participation in partisan struggles and non-professional matters, and focusing instead on continued self-improvement (Bañales Guimaraens, 1970, p.290). This meant that the professional quality of Uruguayan officers matched the most demanding European standards and stood out in the sub-continent, despite scarce resources. This is evidenced by the breadth and depth of subjects taught in military training courses within the period. For instance, in the Lieutenant Colonel promotion course, officers were taught tactics, command and staff procedures, military administration, military organization, military law, military history, military geography, sociology, and political economy amongst other topics (Ibid., p.307).

The 1973 coup d'état led to a radical change in this training system, since officers from different forces began occupying political positions in ministries, banks, government departments, police headquarters, educational institutions, and so forth. In these new roles, their professional military training provided them with minimal advantages. This led to a restructuring in the content of training courses within the armed forces, in which the amount of time dedicated to professional military subjects was reduced so as to enable courses oriented towards political and governmental subjects such as political economy, sociology, political science, administration, international affairs and geopolitics.

After the restoration of democracy in 1985, the political parties of Uruguay proposed that the armed forces should be modernized, ensuring their subordination to the civil power and reinserting them into contemporary democracy. In order to achieve this, they enacted two key policy changes. The first one reformulated the task of the armed forces from "contributing to external and internal National Security" (Ley N°14.157, 1974, Art.2) to that of "defending the honor, the independence and the peace of the Republic, the integrity of its territory, its constitution and

its laws” (Ley N° 15.808, 1986, Art.2). Thus, the parliament limited the actions of the armed forces to the external security of the Republic. This policy was further facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a “new world order”, as laid down by President George W. Bush Sr. (Bush, 1991a and 1991b), in which traditional threats to national security would be reduced to a minimum, opening new possibilities for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and allowing more space for international cooperation in pursuit of greater economic and social development.

The second change was aimed at reintegrating the armed forces within civil society by reorienting the curricula of the military academies. The 1989 curriculum of the Escuela Militar del Uruguay (Military School of the Uruguayan Army), for example, raised among other objectives the goal “to transform the Military School into a tertiary institute exclusively, that is to say into a true military college” (Anon., 1989, p.5). Specifically, it sought to increase students’ access to the wider civilian university system by allowing them to revalidate some subjects they had already taken in the Escuela Militar. This gave officers the opportunity to avoid one to two years of additional study in some civilian careers, such as law or engineering.

It was hoped that this measure, amongst other reforms, would assist in reversing the steady decline of applicants for enrolment that had taken place after the removal of the armed forces from power. Although it was not explicitly stated, this objective was recognized implicitly in an article published within the Escuela Militar’s magazine *Destellos*, which hypothesized one potential outcome of this new system: “If the number of applicants for enrollment increases up to a considerable quantity, it will be possible for us to demand another type of test” for admission to the school (Ibid., p.10). The success or defeat of this plan was dependent upon the existence of a few “essential pillars”:

“a) teachers with college level studies and qualified experience; b) suitable and accessible literature; c) places for students to study that should offer the basic comforts required to complete assignments; d) laboratories and offices to support the practical courses and e) planning and evaluation centralized in a technician-teacher organ that can coordinate the processes of education and learning of the whole Institute” (Ibid.)

To achieve this, the Escuela Militar required greater economic resources. Unfortunately, this was not something that the political parties were

willing to grant. Among other reasons, this was due to a lack of trust in the armed forces held by different political sectors and the civil society after its performance as the de facto government. Over the course of 20 years of democratic rule, this scenario gradually evolved, until the 2002 Uruguayan banking crisis that plunged the country into a period of significant economic contraction.

## The Rise of Frente Amplio

In 2005, as a direct result of the banking crisis, the Frente Amplio (a centre-left to left-wing political coalition) succeeded in gaining a significant majority in the Uruguayan national parliament. Fortunately for the Frente Amplio, by the time they had taken office, the economic crisis had already begun to reverse, thanks to a commodities boom that was to generate a period of economic expansion. This led to the re-election of the coalition government with parliamentary majorities for two consecutive periods.

This economic boom, however, did not provide the expected financial relief for national defence requirements. Instead, the new government prioritized spending on social policies and internal safety. This led to a lack of investment in the armed forces to the point whereby they had 27 % fewer personnel by 2011 and approximately a 60 % smaller budget than in 1985, even though they retained the same number and level of deployments (Pelález, 2011, p.158 *passim*). Indeed, although the national defence budget rose by 91.8 % between 2005 and 2016, it still diminished as a percentage of overall GDP. In 2009, it represented 1.4 % of GDP. Yet, from 2009 onwards there occurred an annual decrease up to the end of 2015, by which time it was less than 1.1 % (UyPress, 2016).

In order to change this scenario, the Frente Amplio party promulgated a normative body for national defence, which was the result of the provisions of the National Defence Framework Law of 19 February 2010 (Ley N°18.650, 2010), as well as the Ministry of Defence's Decree 105/014 on National Defence Policy (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2014) and Decree 129/016 on Military Defence Policy (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2016). As a result of these laws and decrees, the armed forces were once again provided with the mission of engaging in domestic affairs

(Ley N°18.650, 2010, Art.1 and 20; Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2014, pp.15–16). The government took advantage of this repeatedly to assist with climatic emergencies such as floods (Anon., 2015a and 2015b), sanitary emergencies such as the National Dengue Prevention Campaign (Organización Panamericana de la Salud, n.d.), guarding the perimeters of national prisons (Anon., 2017), and even assisting in garbage collection to preserve public health during union strikes (Bonilla, 2010).

The expanded role of the military generated frictions within parliament, as some sectors of the coalition did not agree with the new missions that were given to the armed forces. In fact, until 2005, the Frente Amplio's official policy on national security, signed by several political leaders of the coalition, emphasized that:

“The missions of the armed forces, as a rule, will not be internal security/policing. It has been ruled out that the armed forces prepare development plans and fulfil tasks of ‘civic action’, whether these respond to the strategy of the ‘Pan-American military system’ or of another origin. Nor will they be authorized to develop armed forces alien to the Republic.” (Comisión Especial de Defensa del Frente Amplio, Art.III.1)

Although the document clarifies that the Executive Branch, via the national parliament, would be able to authorize the use of the armed forces in “exceptional cases of internal commotion and other serious national emergencies (calamities, floods, etc.) that exceed the installed capacities of the competent public agencies” (Ibid., Art.III.2), the document calls for the avoidance of any civil-military actions that would allow the armed forces to “capture the will and the conscience of the civilian population” (Ibid., Art.III.1).

Despite the fact that some of the signatories of the party's national security policy were to hold posts of Defence Minister after the Frente Amplio's victory in the 2004 general elections, it did not implement this policy once in government; potentially due to political compromise, a disconnect between political strength and parliamentary votes (Licandro, 2011), or a separation between the ideology of opposition and the pragmatic realities of governance. Despite this tactical shift, left-wing officials within the Frente Amplio government still retain serious prejudices against the military (see, for example, Menéndez, 2016) and disagreement with their government's policies regarding the armed forces (Licandro, 2011).



## Civil-Military Relations under Frente Amplio

This inherent distrust of the military across political parties in general and the Frente Amplio in particular raises a key question for the armed forces: is this lack of trust only present at the political level or across Uruguayan society as a whole? This topic is addressed at a broader regional level by Professor Marcela Donadio (2003), who states that:

“in reality this seemingly semantic distinction hides a deeper problem. If the professional soldier serves the state citizens, in a democratic regime this means that the legitimately elected government represents society, and that the relationship between the political class and the military is an expression of the relations between society and the armed forces”.

Despite its logic, Donadio’s conclusion may not be wholly applicable to the scenario now faced by the Armed Forces of Uruguay. As noted in research by Daniel Isgleas, as of 2015 a total of 53 % of Uruguayans have either “significant” or “partial” trust in the armed forces, whereas 43 % have either “little” or “no” trust in them (Isgleas, 2016). Moreover, as noted by Isgleas:

“Since the Frente Amplio came to office in 2005, the confidence of Uruguayans in the armed forces has been steadily rising, ranking in 2015 above the averages recorded during the last two governments of the Partido Colorado, the second term of Julio María Sanguinetti from 1995 to 2000, and the administration of Jorge Batlle between 2000 and 2005.” (Ibid.)

As shown in Tab. 3.1, these results are reinforced by a 2014 survey of public confidence in national institutions within Uruguay, undertaken by the polling organization Factum Digital (see Bottinelli and Vilar, 2014). Based on the *Factum Index of Image* which expresses, on a scale of 0 to 100, the average of the positive opinions and the non-negative opinions gathered in relative terms, which are in turn weighted by the level of opinion, the survey highlighted how public confidence in the armed forces is slightly higher than public confidence in the national parliament and notably higher than public confidence in political parties.

Based on this data, it can be argued that the root of the problem is not the civil-military relationship, but the political-military one. In line with their organizational structure, the armed forces are able to efficiently execute the civil support tasks entrusted to them. This structural efficiency

**Tab. 3.1:** Survey of public confidence in national institutions within Uruguay, by Factum Digital (Bottinelli and Vilar, 2014).

Banks	66
Police	53
Justice	46
Catholic Church	41
Armed Forces	40
Parliament	39
Businessmen	37
Labour Unions	29
Political Parties	27

contrasts with that of political parties which, by their nature, are deliberative and slow in their procedures. This creates a fear amongst Uruguayan politicians that the increasing popularity of the military could result in them losing their status as the ruling elite.

Political parties meanwhile have sought to regulate key functions of the military, such as their promotion system, in a way that appears to highlight a desire to influence the conduct of the armed forces. Colonels and Generals are promoted by the Executive Branch, with the prior consent of the Senate or Standing Committee (Constitución de la República, 2004, Art.68, N° 11). Indeed, whilst promotion to the rank of Colonel is determined “1/3rd by competition, 1/3rd by seniority and 1/3rd by selection”, promotions across the rank of General are achieved only “by selection” (Ley N°15.688, 1984, Art.130.E and 130.E).

Although recommendations for these promotions are initially proposed by the Army General Command for approval by the Superior Court of Promotions and Resources, the process of selection within the executive power relies simply upon a list of merits for each candidate which qualifies them as either “Apt” or “Very Apt” for promotion (Ibid., Art.135 and Ley N° 17.920, 2005, Art.135). This process heightens the need for officers to gain the trust of whichever political party is in power and the possibility of a party-politicized army, as seen both before and after the coup d’état (Bañales Guimaraens, 1970, pp.308–309; Blixen, 2017). The risk inherent in this is highlighted in the declaration made by Lucía Topolansky in 2012,

in her role as the first senator and the wife of former president José Mujica, to the Argentinian news agency *Telam*:

“the armed forces of today are divorced from the past, because we [the Frente Amplio] need the armed forces to be faithful to our project. [...] I need at least a third of the officials and half of the troops on my side, as a goal. I would like everything. But that would be a sustainable base.” (Anon., 2012).

Although this declaration incited criticism from the opposition and even some sections of the Frente Amplio coalition itself, it highlights an interesting reality surrounding the creation of civilian militias for national defence, such as those in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In Uruguay, such militias do not require legislation, due to Article 85 No. 15 of Uruguay’s national constitution, which gives the General Assembly the responsibility “to make the regulations for militias and to determine the time and number in which they must meet” (Constitución de la República, 2004). This clause grants the parliament theoretical access to an alternative armed force under its control.

Such militias previously existed in the 19th century under the name of the Guardias Nacionales (National Guard). In 1860, this Guardias Nacionales consisted of 46 chiefs, 720 officers and 16,012 soldiers, while the army had 9 Generals, 126 chiefs, 261 officers and 895 soldiers (Acevedo, 1933, Vol.3, p.235). As the central government could only exercise its authority in the capital, in the rest of the country the Guardias Nacionales “were repeatedly placed in the service of the regional leaders” (Bañales Guimaraens, 1970, p.293). This military duality from independence onwards, made possible the incessant and bloody civil wars that significantly reduced the potential for national progress. Despite the conflicts that resulted from this duality of forces, there is a clear predisposition in some sectors of the Frente Amplio coalition, to promote the option of a Guardias Nacionales as a resource for national defence and a safeguard against the armed forces. Perhaps more than any other aspect of contemporary government, it is the maintenance of this article within the Constitución de la República that best symbolizes the continued mistrust of the civilian government towards its armed forces.

It seems clear, therefore, that political-military relations have had, and continue to have, an impact on the objectives, conduct and structure of the Uruguayan Armed Forces. The conundrum to be faced is deciding which

of Moskos' three models would be best suited to the goals of national defence and most reliable for the citizenship and the political parties that represent it. This conundrum leads us back to the central question facing military educators in Uruguay: depending on which model is most suitable, how can the armed forces best structure their professional military education in order to achieve this?

## **Developing Military Education for the Uruguayan Context**

To solve these challenges, decisions will have to be taken at the governmental level to further define the national objectives and assign the resources required to achieve these objectives. The first item requires the creation of non-partisan hypotheses and definitions of conflict and war, focused exclusively on protecting the national interest. The second one requires the government to define the resources that the country is able to provide in order to achieve the abovementioned objectives. Only after making these decisions will we be able to best define the extent to which the armed forces require the corporate spirit, organizational loyalty and personal sacrifice generated by Moskos' Institutional model, in comparison to the more technically qualified resources and intrinsic individualism central to the Occupational model.

At the educational level itself, during the administration of the Frente Amplio, the Directorate of Military Training of the Ministry of National Defence, which governs military education, has been occupied by civilians. Regrettably, this civilian community remains both broadly ignorant and disinterested in issues of national defence in general and military defence in particular, as affirmed by one of the leading civilian authorities on military issues, Dr. Julián González Guyer (TNU Canal Cinco, 2016). The creation of the Escuela de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional (School for National Security and Defence) in 1976, which was eventually converted into the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Centre for Higher National Studies – CALEN) in 1978, was intended to rectify this ignorance.

Both institutes sought to train graduates with the skills and knowledge necessary to undertake the management, advisory and planning tasks central to national security and national development policy. It should be self-evident that the training of civilian and military personnel in this area

is essential to enable the government to define precisely the type of armed forces they wish to have and the duties of those forces in accordance with the real possibilities of the country. Unfortunately, after the end of the *de facto* government, CALEN's influence diminished significantly, especially after it became dependent on Army Headquarters. Although it later returned to the Ministry of National Defence, its graduates were not appointed to occupy positions appropriate to their level of training and expertise. In addition, the government's decision to stop sending functionaries to train in CALEN significantly reduced the number of applicants, which led the institution to modify its application requirements in order to reverse this trend.

One result of this scenario is that the process of defining the structure and duties of the armed forces remains a pending task across several political sectors. Only after this political decision has been made will the armed forces be able to define the use of the forces' doctrine, the organizational model to be adopted and the training required for personnel to achieve their objectives. In achieving this formative, initial task of spreading the study of national and military defence across all levels of the state, CALEN has a relevant role to play. To do this, however, its operating mode needs to change. Until now, CALEN has developed an educational provision targeted to students who attend either by appointment or by personal interest. Now CALEN must adopt a more proactive attitude, integrating interdisciplinary groups of lecturers and professors who can engage with the different public and private spheres of the country (including parliament, political parties, public and private universities, business associations, unions and trade unions), giving informative talks on national security and military defence, introducing the issue into public discussion and forming a core of civil and military experts on the subject. Simultaneously, the armed forces should provide the courses for students at the staff officer level and the level of Colonel and Captain, enabling a better understanding of state functions, helping to eliminate mistrust and assuring better interaction and engagement between the armed forces and the rest of the public administration.

Finally, whilst these changes are being implemented and once the political system provides greater visibility surrounding its priorities for the profile of the armed forces, it should be beholden on the military education

community to analyse the possible future stages required to adopt and train personnel for either the Institutional, the Occupational or the Plural model. Each of the models possesses a different challenge. One certainty, however, is that the armed forces need more technical staff to be efficient in a world in which technology is advancing by leaps and bounds. The dilemma facing military educators is whether it is more convenient for the forces to train their personnel in such tasks or to hire technicians from the civilian field.

These differing options would result in different profiles and skill sets for the graduates of military academies. Such academies must, therefore, be carefully analysed in order to identify the advantages, disadvantages and requirements for implementing either model within their existing structures. This will enable military educators to quickly and smoothly apply the necessary changes to adapt to the new paradigm, as well as advising political leaders on these requirements. Perhaps the most important reason for this process of analysis and preparation is the reality that changing the existing military education system to meet these new organizational priorities will involve costs that, for a small country such as Uruguay, may be very high. The cost of not making a decision, however, would likely be higher. It is for this reason that the most important aspect of this process is not the specific model that is chosen but the process of choosing the model. Specifically, in order to ensure that this decision is acceptable for all and persistent over time (independent of the ruling political party), it must occur within the framework of a 'state' polity and not a 'political-party' polity, and must be based upon a carefully planned strategy, created at a high professional standard that considers not only the national situation, but also the regional and global one.

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## The Role of Military Pedagogy and Civilian Academia in the National Security and Governance of Peru

**Abstract:** This chapter provides a historical analysis of civil-military relations through the perspective of military pedagogy and the civilian academe in Peru. It reveals how significant fluctuations in PME reform, from the 19th century to the present day, have been influenced by the different approaches, needs and concerns of successive military and civilian governments regarding the role of the armed forces and the importance of educating military officers at the strategic level. This includes an examination of the evolution of the Peruvian military educational system and the conflicts that have shaped this dynamic. As the chapter highlights, although this scenario has resulted in some integration of the civilian academe in military pedagogy in recent history, it has also demonstrated a lack of cohesion between military and civilian academic communities. In line with Peru's historical contexts and the increasing instability of its political sphere, resulting from the large-scale corruption scandals, the chapter argues that this scenario demonstrates the strategic importance of creating suitable academic spaces for the joint training of civil and military professionals in security, development and defence.

**Keywords:** PME, military education, Peruvian Armed Forces, civil-military relations, Escuela Militar, Estudios Militares, CAEM

### Introduction

The role of the military in Latin America has been shaped by a strong tradition of interference in domestic politics. In this scenario, the armed forces surpass their natural function of national territorial defence, maintaining internal order and assisting in emergency situations, and instead become leaders capable of defining the destiny of their countries. The available studies of this phenomenon usually focus on the perspective of civil-military relations, without examining the influence of military pedagogy and civilian academia. In Peru alone, out of 76 presidents between 1821 (national independence) and 2016, 51 have been army officers; and

between 1900 and 2016, out of 29 rulers, 13 have been army officials and graduates of the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (Chorrillos Military School), including Ollanta Humala Tasso, the democratic leader elected between 2011 and 2016.

This chapter seeks to promote analysis and debate on military pedagogy and the civilian academe within the framework of civil-military relations in Peru, as a way of properly examining politico-military leadership in Latin America. To achieve this, we will approach the role of military pedagogy from its historical perspective and how it has evolved from the Republican warlordism (*caudillismo*) of the 19th century to the military professionalism of the 20th century.<sup>1</sup> This includes an analysis of the evolution of the Peruvian military educational system, the ways in which military pedagogical priorities change, and the internal and external conflicts faced by the military throughout its history that have affected this dynamic. This process will also help us discover the nature and implications of the “Military Professionalism” and “Professional Militarism” that has been developing in the Peruvian Army, in the sense outlined by Frederick Nunn (1983, xi). Finally, we will propose some points of view on the circumstances in which military leadership in defence affairs can help to improve the cooperation required to face regional security challenges.

## The Republic and Military Warlordism

During the period of the Bourbon Viceroyalty (from the middle of the 18th century), all viceroys of Peru were military commanders, as were the “Captain Generals” responsible for the various administrative regions within the Viceroyalty (Tauro del Pino, 2001, pp.2767–2769). Thus, at the beginning of the Republic of Peru, the government had a predominantly ‘military-style’ character, philosophy and vision, characteristic of the need to secure the Bourbon reforms. As a consequence, from the beginning of the republic in 1821 until 1899, civil-military relations in Peru

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1 The main focus of this study revolves around the historical and political role of the army. In the case of the navy and air force, the particularities of their scope and impact would require a far broader study that would not necessarily affect the conclusions of this project.

were defined by the political interaction between military warlords and the nascent liberal-political leadership. Almost all presidents in this interval were army officials (1821–1872).

In line with this scenario, military education was reduced to the continuity of some military ordinances from the vice-regal administration, the intellectual self-preparation of the individual officer, and the experience gained from participation in conflicts for the defence of the warlords' hegemonic interests, the consolidation of liberal-political power and the defence of the borders of the new republic. Furthermore, civilian academies provided absolutely no military subjects; a scenario that would be repeated throughout the nation's history. Between 1879–1883, the Guerra del Pacífico (War of the Pacific), which pitted Chile against Bolivia and Peru, produced a military defeat and the loss of Peruvian territory. In spite of the signing of a peace treaty with Chile (the Treaty of Ancón) in 1883, the continued occupation of Peruvian territories and the sense of conflict between Peru and Chile until the border treaty of 1929 became a determining factor in consolidating the idea of a Peruvian republic that had not yet been assimilated, and a national culture of militarism and military pedagogy in Peru.

## **The Emergence of Military Professionalism**

Between 1894 and 1895 a civil revolution (known as the Peruvian Civil War), designed to counteract the rise of militarism in the political arena, resulted in two events that would go on to characterize civil-military relations in Peru. Firstly, it totally separated military warlords from power (specifically, with the defeat of the militarists of the government of General Andrés A. Cáceres). Secondly, it induced the first major reform of the armed forces towards military professionalism. In order to achieve this, between 1896 and 1940 the responsibility for command and administration of the army was given to a French military mission. In 1898, this mission founded the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (which was the institution responsible for the professional qualification of young cadets for the officer corps), the schools of infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineering, and in 1904, the Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior School of War), for the formation of staff officers.

The military pedagogy of the Peruvian Army now followed the 'French model' based on the spirit of the French Foreign Legion, which also provided the necessary chiefs and instructors (Masterson, 1991, pp.23–29). These changes meant that the educational system was modernized to the highest European standards, and career progression was structured around a strong cult of values and military hierarchy, displacing the model espoused by military warlordism. The military professionalism founded in the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos was centred around a strict philosophy of behavioural and cognitive learning, which was reinforced throughout an officer's career.

The deep dedication this engendered towards military knowledge, together with the evolution of officers' duties in rural areas and their increased awareness of military, political and social issues and realities, produced a whole generation of officers with high intellectual abilities, many of whom continued their studies in Europe. This development of military professionalism forged an efficient, solid and well-trained institution, capable of projecting national power to protect national borders and contributing to the process by which the Republic of Peru was formed (as we will consider later in the chapter). In parallel to this, the constant lack of logistical resources, weapons and equipment would serve to consolidate a spartan and austere character for the officer corps, who originated mainly from illustrious middle classes from the interior of the country.

The wars with Colombia (1932) and Ecuador (1941), validated and reinforced the usefulness of these schools, whilst at the same time raising new requirements. The subjugation of the populist insurrection of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Popular Revolutionary American Alliance) in 1932, the end of the Second World War and the emergence of internationalised revolutionary communism, evidenced the need to face new transnational and asymmetrical dimensions of conflict. These new challenges led to the creation of a new academic institution by the army staff, called the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Centre for Advanced Military Studies – CAEM). This centre was oriented to the study and analysis of the national reality in all areas of national affairs at the political and strategic levels of national defence. At the end of the Second World War, the French mission was replaced by a U.S. military

mission (until 1968), which focused on equipment, technical training and fighting against the expansion of Soviet communism (Kruijt, 1996, pp.263–264).

## **Professional Militarism and the Reformist Officials**

Since the first military reforms introduced by the French military mission in 1898, civilian academia in Peru had not developed any types of study related to military or national defence issues. Either despite or as a result of this scenario, until 1968 civil-military relations were characterized by a continuous recurrence of right- and left-wing political groups who sought support from the army and navy to promote coups against their opponents. Unfortunately for these groups, military pedagogy had produced a whole generation of intellectuals, who would become rulers of the country between 1968 and 1980. For these officers, the military career was structured around a strong system of academic and military training oriented towards the use of new technologies. It included training on external and border conflicts at the tactical level (in the *Escuela Militar de Chorrillos*), on the strategy of military operations (in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra*) and on geopolitical affairs and state administration (in the CAEM). In this way, a kind of “Professional Militarism” (Nunn, 1983, xi) was consolidated, based on the technological, pedagogical and structural/hierarchical modernization of the army.

During this period, the army General Manuel Odría, who was sworn in as constitutional president in 1950 (two years after having staged a coup d'état), faced serious political opposition that forced him, due to the need to form a functional administration, to resort to the CAEM for strategic support in the management of his government (Masterson, 1991, pp.138–141). As a result of this, Brigadier General José Del Carmen Marín, founder of the CAEM (and the first director of the *Colegio Militar Leoncio Prado*), became the main academic advisor on matters of national security and defence, and the most influential ideologue in the construction of military professionalism and the reformist mentality within the Peruvian Armed Forces. The combination of these factors led to the admission of civilian professionals as participants in the CAEM's academic activity, establishing the first link between military pedagogy

and civilian students. As noted by General Carmen Marín (Villanueva, 1972, p.44), regarding the CAEM:

“We do not therefore constitute an organization with teachers and students, but a team [...] that studies the process of comprehensive preparation for the defence of the nation [...] this domain of knowledge is beyond our technical training and that is why we have turned to more than 20 civilian professionals.”

This conception of the ‘national level’ that goes beyond the military pedagogical sphere and projects itself upon the overarching strategic scenario of the state, with the purpose of “creating and disseminating knowledge in the areas of development, security and national defence” as well as forming national leaders “with the capacity to make proposals for change which contribute to the general well-being and strengthening of national identity”, was enshrined in the mission and vision of the CAEM (Lazo Lazo, 2016, p.28). These reforms were influenced by the French military, as General Carmen Marín had himself studied in France in both the *École Nationale Supérieure d’Architecture de Versailles* (as a military engineer) and the *École de Guerre* in Paris.

However, in 1968 civil-military relations went through a complex period with the establishment of the so-called *Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada* (Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces). Led by an army general, Juan Velasco Alvarado, they established between 1968–1975 a socialist, authoritarian military regime, in which the legislative power was abolished, the judiciary was subject to the military government, freedom of the press was suppressed, civil rights were restricted, and selective persecution was carried out against those who opposed governmental decisions, regardless of their ideology (Planas, 2016). Although it is true that the CAEM became the fundamental pillar of intellectual support and strategic political decisions for the government, the Velasco regime’s poor management of General Carmen Marín’s original doctrine, undermined the mutually beneficial points of contact that existed between the military institutions in charge of military pedagogy and the civilian academe.

During this period, the military government nationalized the extractive industries (i.e. oil, gas and mining) that had been exploited by transnational companies and expropriated ownership of the agricultural complexes that had formed the basis of local aristocratic power. Unlike the anti-communist



militarism seen elsewhere in Latin America, the armed forces, and particularly the Peruvian Army, took control of the entire system of public administration. This movement was signalled as the emergence of a new form of reformist officer (Kruijt and Tello, 2003, p.71). Yet, at this time, civil-military relations acquired a new duality. On the one hand, there existed a serious conflict of interest regarding political, economic and social control between the armed forces and the traditional political class that had held power since national independence. On the other hand, the army deployed an effective strategy of ‘social mobilization and participation’ across the working class and the poorer sectors of society who had been removed from politics and kept away from the benefits available to social and economic elites up until that point, which allowed it to build a significant base of popular support.

In 1975, a coup d’état brought about a change in the leftist orientation of the Velasco government, eventually leading to a harmonious transfer of command in 1980 from the *Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada* to the constitutional powers. Once again, the mandate of the military was reduced to the sphere of national defence and security. However, the next decade brought with it significant challenges for the role of the army and priorities for military education. In 1981, a serious military confrontation with Ecuador broke out, forcing the army to alter programs and curricula related to the study and use of military weapons. This conflict was conducted by the armed forces almost independently of the recently formed democratic government. In December 1982, the new government was forced to install “political-military commands” to deal with an armed insurrection, which evolved into the Marxist-Maoist-Leninist terrorist organization known as the *Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso* (Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path - PCP-SL). Then, in 1985, the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement – MRTA) emerged, which was connected with the Castroist guerrilla movements in Latin America and which forced the geographical expansion of the political-military commands even further.

By 1990, Peru was a failed state facing an increasing threat from the PCP-SL and the MRTA, ongoing risks of a military confrontation on the northern border with Ecuador, declared as an “ineligible borrower” by the International Monetary Fund, while fighting to deal with a grave

economic crisis, a severe drought and a rapidly expanding cholera epidemic (McCormick, 1990, p.52; Stokes, 1996, pp.546–547; Brooke, 1991). In this explosive scenario, a tacit alliance was established between the new president Alberto Fujimori, a university teacher with no political affiliation, and the Peruvian Army. This alliance once again removed the traditional political class from power, in line with their responsibility for leading the country into bankruptcy. The military dealt exclusively with matters of defence and territorial control whilst a new civilian political class, later known as the ‘Fujimoristas’, emerged to take over state affairs.

In line with its return to exclusively military matters, the armed forces refocused their doctrine and training on counterterrorism. In seeking a solution for the ongoing threat of the PCP-SL, military education took on a more internationalised aspect. For example, in order to address the PCP-SL’s adoption of Mao Zedong’s ideology, insurrectionary doctrine and terrorist techniques, the armed forces sought out training from Taiwan. This was due to the Taiwanese government and military’s involvement and in-depth knowledge regarding Maoism and the People’s Republic of China gained in the Chinese Civil War against Mao Zedong and his guerrilla forces between 1927–1949 under the command of General Chiang Kai-shek. This education in Taiwanese doctrine came in the form of the ‘Course of Political Warfare’ delivered at the Fu Hsing Kang College, which was attended intermittently by hundreds of Peruvian military, police and even civilians linked to intelligence services from 1978 through to the 1990s (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003, pp.191–195). In addition to this, some 900 Lieutenants, as well as cadets from the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, from Peru took courses at the School of the Americas in the United States between 1980 and 1996 whilst many others experienced education from U.S. military instructors in Peru and at least one Peruvian-American joint exercise in counter-subversive tactics (Ibid., p.325 and fn.85).

This internationalisation coincided with the adoption of the “Low Intensity Conflict” strategy recommended by the U.S. military (Metz, 1995, p.11), from the end of the Reagan administration and throughout the government of George H.W. Bush (i.e. 1988–1993). As noted by Serrano (2009, xxix–xi), this strategy, which was adopted with great enthusiasm by the Fujimori administration from July 1990 onwards,

“was based on a ‘new social contract’ between the state, law enforcement agencies and the rural population (peasant patrols and self-defence committees), together with the urban population (citizens who supported law enforcement agencies with information and demonstrations to repudiate terrorism), isolating the subversives and undermining the support they had in a sector of the population.

This was possible in turn, with a state policy where strategic and operational intelligence was privileged, but also - unlike in the 1980s - an approach carried out by the armed forces and the national police of gaining support from the poorer population through humanitarian assistance, social aid and security, rather than violence or the indiscriminate use of force.”

By 1997 the terrorist groups had been defeated and Peru was no longer a failed state. Although a new border conflict with Ecuador began in 1995, known as the Cenépa War, President Fujimori was able to sign the Brasilia Act with Ecuador in 1998, which paved the way for peace, by definitively delimiting the border between Peru and Ecuador. At this historical stage, military pedagogy in Peru was almost exclusively oriented towards the external defence of the border with Ecuador, and the internal defence against terrorist organizations. Consequently, the army educational system prioritized tactical and operational military components related to their external and internal conflicts which inherently diminished the focus on strategic and geopolitical education, and training on state administration.

Unfortunately, the government’s success came at a social and ethical cost. Firstly, as noted by Serrano, “there were reprehensible excesses in the fight against terrorism” including, in certain places and times, a dirty or clandestine war contrary to human rights, “but this was never part of the national strategy, nor of a state policy backed by the population” (2009, xli–xlii). Secondly, the strategy of ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ was a matter for the hardened Fujimorist political leadership, the armed forces and the intelligence services, with almost no contribution from the civilian academe. Thus, the few opportunities for collaboration between military and civilian educational institutions were extinguished and the spaces and opportunities for germinating civilian academic initiatives in the fields of security and national defence were reduced even more.

One positive development in the area of civil-military integration did occur during this time. From 1995 onwards, army officers incorporated courses from outside of the military system into their studies. In the first case of this, the army and the Escuela Superior de Negocios (Superior

Business School) agreed to allow students from the army's Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior War School) to participate in a Diploma of Administration. In addition to this, the courses of the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Centre for Higher National Studies – CAEN), which had evolved from the CAEM, approved the attendance of numerous civilian students who were members of the public administration.

Despite this, however, there existed a “national culture regarding the military, characterized by mutual exclusion, academic ignorance of military affairs and a secrecy which generated corruption and mistrust” (Tudela van Breugel Douglas, 2011). Indeed, in the period between 1990 and 2000, civil-military relations were marked by significant criticism of the government of President Fujimori, which included prominent accusations of acts of corruption and human rights violations. The effects of President Fujimori's formal resignation in November 2000 and the subsequent regime change were catastrophic to the structure of the military. President Fujimori, his main ministers and almost the entire military hierarchy were prosecuted and imprisoned. To date, more than 900 army officials have faced a series of prosecutions for proven or alleged human rights violations in the fight against terrorist organizations. The civil administration that replaced Fujimori's regime removed any military influence over the government and, without performing adequate damage control, started a radical dismantling of the military and intellectual leadership structure. Thus, the generation of reformist officers ended after their active participation in power for nearly 32 years, between 1968 and 2000.

## **Military Reform and Populist Militarism**

Between 2001 and 2016, a process of institutional reform of the armed forces was developed on the basis of the “constitutional precept of military subordination to political power” (Tudela van Breugel Douglas, 2011). The impact on military pedagogy was profound. The educational system significantly changed its orientation, prioritizing the adaptation of the military educational framework to the academic standards of the national university system (Ley N°30220, 2014, pp.64–65). These circumstances have produced a new dynamic in civil-military relations for officers. Specifically, in line with their increased participation in postgraduate

courses in administration and teaching, officers have, for the first time, been able to approach national realities with an academic perspective separate from the military barracks.

One notable example of this is the Centro del Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos de las Fuerzas Armadas (Centre for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights of the Armed Forces), which is considered as one of the “Academic Bodies of the Defense Sector” (CDIH-DDHH, n.d.). This centre has focused its efforts on becoming a leading institution for international humanitarian law and human rights training for military and civilian personnel of the Peruvian Armed Forces (including the army, navy and air force), as well as the national police force, civil professionals of the judiciary and the Public Ministry or Prosecutor’s Office, and other international officials (Viviano Carpio, 2016).

Unfortunately, despite these tentative advances, there are still serious challenges facing military education. Firstly, studies in military affairs (especially geopolitical and military strategic studies) are still lacking in civilian academia and staff courses remain focused on joint operations between the military services and confined to the operational level (which limits officers’ abilities in understanding and designing strategic responses to regional security challenges). Secondly, there is still not enough historical perspective to gauge the damage that may have been caused to the fragile, positive evolution of the civil-military relationship by the negative outcome of the 2011–2016 government of President Ollanta Humala Tasso.

Specifically, Humala is a former army officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Yet serious questions remain regarding his image and role as a former head of state and his military lineage. One of his brothers (Antauro, a former army officer with the rank of Major), for example, was imprisoned through the civilian judicial system, for having conducted a failed and bloody military coup in January 2005 against the democratically elected government led by Alejandro Toledo. Significant criticisms have also been levelled against Humala for the systematic attacks he engaged in against his political opponents during his time in government.

Most notably, however, one year after leaving government, the Peruvian judiciary implemented a preventative detention order for Humala and his wife, for the alleged crime of “money laundering in tort of the Peruvian state” and belonging to “a criminal organization that goes beyond

national borders” (Sala Penal Nacional, 2017, pp.1–2). Although he was released nine months later, in line with a pronouncement by the Tribunal Constitucional del Perú (Constitutional Court of Peru), Humala was not discharged from ongoing investigations regarding alleged corruption (Anon, 2017). Additionally, there remain allegations and investigations at the political and judicial level, involving “evidence that has become public corroborating longstanding allegations that Peru’s former president Ollanta Humala Tasso [...] would be responsible for egregious human rights violations committed by security forces in the early 1990s, during Peru’s internal armed conflict”, as well as “the attempted cover-up of incriminating evidence when he ran for president” (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p.1).

Humala is not alone in facing such accusations. Indeed, since 2016 the unprecedented, trans-national corruption and bribery case entitled *Operação Lava Jato* (Operation Car Wash),<sup>2</sup> has resulted in the implication of four former Peruvian presidents (i.e. Alejandro Toledo, Ollanta Humala, Alan Gabriel García, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski), as well as numerous other political and business leaders who have been in positions of power since the 1990s from across the ideological spectrum (Morales, 2018). In March 2018, for example, the acting president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was forced to resign his post, in order to avoid potential impeachment by congress due to ‘moral incapacity’, in line with his involvement in acts of corruption relating to the Brazilian company Odebrecht. This event produced a new level of rupture in the legitimacy of the Peruvian political system. Indeed, at the time this chapter was completed, in November 2018, the number of serving and retired senior government officials who had been implicated in acts of corruption, as well as wider officials from the political, business, press, non-governmental and judicial sectors, was continuing to increase in line with the successive legal investigations being undertaken as part of *Operação Lava Jato*. This included the sentencing of Keiko Fujimori, the leader of the main political bloc in Congress, to 36 months of preventive incarceration in October 2018.

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2 An ongoing criminal investigation by Brazilian authorities into a bribery and corruption network reaching across Latin-America and beyond, perpetuated by the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht.

These circumstances have resulted in serious conflicts between the powers of the state, which has led to a scenario of ungovernability and destabilization across the entire Peruvian political system. In line with this, some commentators have again espoused the need for populist, ethnocentric, revolutionary and neo-Marxist principles, similar to those seen in Ecuador's previous military dictatorships. Indeed, despite being incarcerated in a military prison since 2005, the retired army Major Antauro Humala has even announced his candidacy for president for the 2021 elections, receiving the support of a number of individuals and political organizations (Exitosa Noticias, 2018). Faced with these latest developments, both the military academies and the civilian academe continue to be absent from public discussion and proposals for solutions regarding defence and state security.

## Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, in order to comprehend the dynamics of divorce and challenges facing military pedagogy and the civilian academe in matters related to national security and defence in Peru, it is necessary to examine military leadership in the nation's domestic and foreign politics from the beginnings of the republic (1821) to the present day. Specifically, from the military warlordism of the 19th century to the present, there have been significant fluctuations in military education reform, which have been influenced heavily by the different approaches of successive governments regarding the role of the armed forces and the importance of educating military officers at the strategic level. Although the participation of army officers in the civilian academe has gradually increased and has become a requirement for the assignment of military posts and promotions, civilian academies have not developed initiatives for studies in national security and defence beyond those related to democratic control of the armed forces and respect for human rights. This scenario is a by-product of civil-military distrust resulting from human rights atrocities committed by military officers and recurrent corruption at the highest levels of government throughout Peru's modern history.

Contemporary threats, such as organized international crime, drug production and trafficking, terrorism, large-scale forced population

displacement, the illegal gold trade, transnational corruption of officials, human trafficking and contraband, amongst others, should be addressed more intensely within both military pedagogy and civilian academia in Peru, either together or independently. In this context, strategic military schools such as the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (née CAEM) could play an important role as postgraduate academic institutions capable of integrating military pedagogy and civilian academia, generating suitable academic spaces that enable civil and military professionals to be trained and educated for effective decision-making in security, development and defence, whilst also strengthening democratic values and institutions.

However, as long as weak, inefficient and corrupt democratic governments exist in Latin America, separated politically, economically and socially from their armed forces, there will continue to exist a divorce between military pedagogy and civilian academia, and the creation of adequate spaces to promote a robust culture of security, defence, development and democracy. In this scenario, any type of acute conflict in the region will constitute a new opportunity for involuntary military leadership in the national political process. Consequently, integrating military pedagogy with civilian academia in Peru and Latin America constitutes an indispensable requirement for addressing the security challenges in the region.

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## Political Change and Professional Security and Defence Qualifications in Post-Transitional Ecuador (1972–2016)

**Abstract:** This chapter charts the development of military education in post-transitional Ecuador (1972–2016) and the varied impact of state intermediation on PME reform during periods of shifting legal, economic and political renewal. Focusing largely on the country's oldest security training institution, the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Institute of Higher National Studies – IAEN), it demonstrates how the evolution of Ecuador's military education system is representative of a historical process of rapprochement between the armed forces and the strategic political level of the state. It argues that this has resulted in a level of integration of civilians within military education, designed to aid dialogue and enhanced decision-making across the civil-military divide. It concludes, however, that recent legal, institutional and political reforms in Ecuador make it difficult to predict the end result of this process.

**Keywords:** PME, military education, Armed Forces of Ecuador, Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales, IAEN, civil-military relations, educational reform

### Introduction

This chapter deals with the security and defence education process in post-transitional Ecuador, from a qualitative perspective with a structural historic approach. Its main focus is the development of the professional qualification approach at the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Institute of Higher National Studies – IAEN). It will include official and quantitative data, in addition to information obtained through the so-called *customary practice* and *everyday life*. Specifically, it will analyse the impact of political changes on the military education system within Ecuador, from the military coup of General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, through the Latin American debt crisis, to the revolutionary developmentalist government of Rafael Correa.

To achieve this, it is first necessary to understand the particular role played by the military sector in Ecuador's history. Until 1976, the armed forces stood for an agenda of direct intervention in state politics, which was encapsulated in their ambivalent position towards the excess of oligarchic and plutocratic projects, and their goal of extending the political and economic participation of the subordinate sectors (i.e. the proletariat) and establishing a viable democratic model. This approach was demonstrated by the role of the armed forces during conflicts such as the 1925 *Revolución Juliana* (Julian Revolution), which resulted in the end of the liberal oligarchic project, the "La Gloriosa" rebellion of 1944, which resulted in the fall of Carlos Arroyo del Río's authoritarian liberal government, and the promotion of agrarian reform during the military junta government from 1963 to 1966 (Gándara Enríquez, 1980, p.179; Maldonado Donoso, 1980, p.393; Loveman, 1999, p.189).

In 1972, the military coup of General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara led to a confrontation between the existing state apparatus, which had encouraged the bureaucratic specialization of institutions in the classic Weberian style (Weber, 1964, p.698) and a form of military control implemented over that of the state apparatus (Rouquié, 1982, p.402). This military intervention over the state, and the search for control over all levels of government meant that, for the first time in its history, the Ecuadorian state was the direct owner of the revenue generated by its oil resources (its main export product).

In line with this, the revolutionary nationalist government tried to implement a developmentalist project that would modernize the state, strengthen its industrial productive capabilities, expand the role of the middle class in the national economy, and incorporate new sectors of the population within the market. This was all part of a vision proposed and developed by civil and military actors, which was designed to achieve greater intermediation of the state in relation to both national and global affairs (*Filosofía y plan de acción del gobierno revolucionario*, 1972; Bocco, 1987, pp.159–160; García, 2003, pp.120–123). The government consolidated its legitimacy through a close relationship with the Ecuadorian middle classes. This relationship allowed it to establish a process of economic and political reconfiguration, through which it was able to maintain its key visions until 2006 (North, 2006). As part of this,

the government sought to strengthen regional integration, which, at that time, found its first manifestation in the Acuerdo de Cartagena (Cartagena Agreement) of 1969.

Regionally, the official political narratives of military governments from the ‘Southern Cone’ of Latin America must be distinguished from those in Ecuador. In line with the United States’ overarching strategy of neutralizing the expansion of communism in the region, for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay developed repressive political systems structured around the concept of an internal enemy. During this same period the Ecuadorian military project was centred upon the principle that the state’s main focus should be to achieve “economic and social development” (Gobierno del Ecuador, 1972). This objective would require enhanced capabilities to contain internal and external threats to the state’s security. The main concern was the lack of a definitively set border with Peru, which resulted in a war in 1941 and subsequent confrontations in 1981 (the “Paquisha” conflict) and 1995 (the “Cenepa” war).<sup>1</sup> Thus, the military government focused their defence politics on the traditional notion of territorial management, emphasizing the prevention of threats to national sovereignty and the generation of capabilities that would allow for a successful territorial defence.

### **Civil-Military Inclusivity in Ecuadorian Military Education**

The politico-military focus hitherto described resulted in the foundation of three university centres dedicated to professional education in the field of defence and security that permitted the participation of civilian officials (rather than just military officers). These institutions were the Universidad de Fuerzas Armadas - Escuela Politécnica del Ejército (The Army University – ESPE), the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Social Sciences Institute – FLACSO), and the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Institute of Higher National Studies – IAEN). This focus on increasing civilian inclusion was encapsulated by the ESPE, that had evolved from the Escuela de Ingenieros

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1 This conflict was resolved with territorial delimitation and the signing of a peace agreement in 1998.

del Ejército (Army Engineer School) founded in 1922 and was historically oriented exclusively towards army officials. In 1972, however, its admissions and offerings were extended to include students from the civil society. In 1976, it acquired the status of Escuela Politécnica, and since 2013 it has been constituted as the Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas (ESPE, n.d.).

The Higher Education Organic Law of 2010 (*Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior*, 2010) and the related legislation precipitated this transformation, with the intention of centralizing the professional qualification centres of the three military forces within an overarching institution. This act was consolidated with the approval of a statute in 2013 (ESPE, n.d.). By 2016, there were 44 undergraduate and 9 postgraduate programs, of which 5 were technology degrees, 5 were bachelor's degrees and 1 was a specialization related to the military profession. These programs were designed to provide bachelor's degrees for army and navy officials, technology degrees for air force officials, and postgraduate degrees to officers of the 'Joint Staff Course' through the Instituto Nacional de Defensa (National Defence Institute). All of these programs feature collaboration between the civilian and military faculty.

In addition to the ESPE, the FLACSO possessed a master's research degree in 2016 in international relations with an emphasis on security and human rights, which was designed to:

“Train professionals with the theoretical and methodological skills needed to understand the dynamics of current international processes and inform decision-making processes, research and teaching in the area of international studies.” (FLACSO, 2016)

Founded in 1974, through an agreement between the Ecuadorian state and the FLACSO international system (FLACSO, n.d.), this university has traditionally been linked with the topics of security and defence. In fact, between 2005 and 2010, until it was upgraded to the postgraduate level by the Higher Education Organic Law (*Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior*, 2010), FLACSO maintained a 'Diploma Program in Politics, Security and Democracy', which was accessed by many senior officials of the armed forces. The Institution's research in this area has also been very influential and its prestige as an academic institution has resulted in the organization gaining a reputation as one of the thought leaders in the field.

However, it is in the country's oldest security training institution, the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales, that we find the most symbolic example of this national movement towards increased civilian inclusivity in military education. Founded in May 1972, in the first year of Rodríguez Lara's dictatorship, the character of the IAEN is representative of the central planning and nationalist-revolutionary characteristics of the government and military through which it was formed. Organically, the IAEN was a part of the secretariat of the National Security Council and its function consisted of training the leaders and statesmen of the Ecuadorian state. Since its origins, the institution has taught graduate courses on security and development that included 35 consecutive cohorts of the 'Master's Degree in Security and Development', taught between 1973 and 2007. These programs exceeded the minimum requirements set by Ecuador's Higher Education Law, and were taught across the course of a full year (Álvarez, 2008, p.35).<sup>2</sup>

The study programmes at the IAEN were designed to be full-time, so that students could dedicate themselves exclusively to academic life. They were also oriented to both civilian and military officials, from the public and private sectors. The largest number of students at the IAEN, however, came from the public sector and, out of these students, approximately 35 % were military and police officers. Within this subgroup, the army provided the largest number of officials, with 41 % (Álvarez, 2011, p.36).<sup>3</sup>

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- 2 The planned curriculum structure of the IAEN's traditional master's degree in security and development, for example, was composed of 8 modules, lasting approximately 1.5 months each. Within these programs, there were around 34 subjects that were taught as lectures or as 'committees', the latter of which provided a specialized discussion forum and thematic workgroup on specific matters (Álvarez, 2008, p.15). Additionally, extracurricular activities included study tours in Ecuador and one international trip. The purpose of these trips was to enable students to get to know the economic, political, social and defence situation of Ecuador and other countries.
  - 3 The trend of under-representation of air force and navy officers within the IAEN student body – according to conversations with officials from the institution – is due to the fact that their operational centres are located outside of Quito, where the university headquarters are located. Moreover, while navy and army officers have historically met the minimum academic requirements for a master's programme, Air force officers were unable to meet the bachelor's requirement. In addition to this, the relatively smaller quantity of officers in the institution

In line with these origins and demographics, the *habitus* (see Bourdieu, 2006, p.44) of the IAEN tends towards a corporate-military type. The social tensions and contradictions contained within the institution, therefore, are similar to those found across the armed forces and incorporated within the construction of the wider state and its institutions.

## The Debt Crisis and Its Repercussions

By the 1980s, the Latin American debt crisis that had resulted from foreign debt and the limited purchasing power of Latin American countries resulted in a programme of cuts across state institutions in Ecuador in search of a so-called structural adjustment. The effects of this crisis were further deepened by the damage caused from natural disasters such as El Niño in 1982–1983 and the Ecuadorian earthquakes of 1987. Indeed, the latter event resulted in an estimated \$1 billion worth of damage to the Ecuadorian economy (ECLAC, 1987, p.26). It is noteworthy, therefore, that the IAEN seemed to go through this period without any major impact on either its budgets, or its symbolic and academic prestige.

In fact, during this period the IAEN even maintained one of its original missions: to provide thought leadership to the National Security Council for the design of the ‘Concepto estratégico de la defensa’ (Defence Strategic Concept), as well as ongoing analysis of current national and international situations. These inputs were derived from the work carried out by its students, military personnel at the rank of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and public servants strategically positioned in all state institutions.

However, the 1990s resulted in some notable changes to this situation. Budget cuts were deepened by Sixto Durán Ballén’s government (1992–1996), in which reforms of a clearly neoliberal inclination were introduced and technocratic perspectives became predominant (Andrade, 2009, p.57). In this period, there occurred a dual movement that transpired at different rates of speed:

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made it more difficult for the government to issue permits for them to study full time.



- The maintenance and relative increase of investment in the budgets of the armed forces (especially in the context of renewed armed conflict with Peru in 1995);
- The start of a slow decline of the IAEN, visible in the lack of a more diverse master's program offering, diminishing prestige and reduced input into planning and policy in the field of security and development.

With the signing of a peace agreement with Peru in 1998, the need to maintain the defence sector budget began to be publicly questioned. Indeed, among radical liberal-idealist sectors, the very existence of the armed forces in Ecuador was queried. In addition to this, there was a deepening of the rationale of public sector divestment by subsequent governments, in line with the orthodox fiscal arguments of liberal economists. Taking into account these contexts, at the beginning of the 21st century, the IAEN was faced with a scenario of declining academic and teaching offerings in comparison to the first decades of its establishment. Specifically, its previous programmes were reduced to one single master's degree, made available to a limited number of decision makers, and only run every two years.

This 'Master's Degree in Security and Development' at the IAEN offered training and the first means of interaction between the state intelligentsia. This was done with the goal of creating officials within the military and the State Planning and Security Directorates (DIPLASEDE), who had detailed knowledge of the functioning of the state and, above all, its strategic objectives. In practice, particularly in the mid-1990s, government institutions began to send problematic and demotivated officials and those in the late-stages of their careers to the DIPLASEDE (and consequently the IAEN). Exceptions apply to this trend, of course, but this scenario substantially affected the level of discussion within the programme. The military, on the other hand, maintained participation within the master's programme at the highest level.

## **Towards the Overcoming of the Neoliberal Vision**

Reminiscent of the revolutionary developmentalist government mentioned previously, the centre-left social democratic government formed by Rafael Correa and the Alianza PAIS, which took power at the start of 2007 in the *Revolución Ciudadana* (Citizen's Revolution), undertook an increasing

process of state intermediation. This was reflected in the endowment of greater regulatory capacities. The government, which would maintain power until May 2017, welcomed a series of visions that could be described as neo-developmental. This included the reduction of social inequality, creation of infrastructure, institutional strengthening and the resizing of the political system (Verdesoto, 2014, p.243). These activities matched the original philosophy and action plan of the 1972 revolutionary government (*Filosofía y plan de acción del gobierno revolucionario y nacionalista del Ecuador, 1972*).

This new government also resulted in a shift in the overall vision of national security in Ecuador. As argued by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998, p.8), the liberal security agenda is built around economic, environmental, social, political and military concerns, and it incorporates and debates the proposals of human security, multidimensional security and integral security (as exist in international regimes). This conceptual framework is observable in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution (*Constitución de la República de Ecuador, 2008*) as well as its State and Public Security Law (*Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado, 2009*). However, this legal structure is further complicated by the Ministry of National Defence's "Agenda Política de Defensa" (Political Defence Agenda), in which there is an attempt to build a vision of national security centred around the concept of good living, also known as *el buen vivir* or *sumak kawsay* (Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad Interna y Externa, 2008, pp.23–24; Celi, 2009, p.100; Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2013, p.315; Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad, 2014, p.56; Pérez, 2014, p.153). As outlined in the government's "National Plan for Good Living" (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2010, p.6):

"Good Living is based on a vision that surpasses the narrow confines of quantitative economicism and challenges the notion of material, mechanical and endless accumulation of goods. Instead the new paradigm promotes an inclusive, sustainable, and democratic economic strategy; one that incorporates actors historically excluded from the capitalist, market-driven logic of accumulation and (re) distribution. Similarly, [...] Good Living posits that humans should use natural resources in a way that allows their natural generation (or regeneration.)"


This multi-faceted vision for national security constitutes a theoretical framework through which an initial approach to defence and security

education in Ecuador can be constructed. The themes that emerge from this framework can be translated into the components of specific curricula or programmes of study. To highlight this, we will now consider the changes in professional qualification programmes within the IAEN.

In 2008, the Government of Ecuador redefined the IAEN's purpose and entrusted it with the responsibility of providing postgraduate education for the country's civil servants. In line with these changes, which were stipulated in Executive Decree No. 1011, published in the Official Register No. 320 of April 21st, 2008, the IAEN gained legal status as a postgraduate academic institution that is part of the National System of Higher Education attached to the National Development and Planning Secretary (SENPLADES). Its purpose is to offer the academic and research support necessary for the professional education and specialization of officers, civil servants and other persons involved in the public services, so that they can provide services with competence, professionalism and honesty for the good of the country's development.

As a result of this change, an exhaustive re-evaluation of the professional qualification programs taught up until that point was performed, and it was decided to discontinue the master's degree in security and development due to its academic frailty. As mentioned by Álvarez (2008, p.36), the MSD-35 curricular structure possessed significant weaknesses in various areas including the theoretical instruments used, the teaching of analytical and critical perspectives, the development of students' investigative capabilities, and the logic and structure of activities such as national and international trips (which offered few contributions to the students' knowledge, or their investigative, analytical and critical capabilities).

With the Higher Education Organic Law in 2010, the IAEN acquired the status of a state postgraduate university (Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior, 2010, Disposiciones Generales - Novena). This new definition strengthened the institution's administrative and academic autonomy, allowing access to resources that had been previously denied to the university, and thus increasing its capacity to fulfil demands for professional qualifications found in the public sector. In line with this, new curricular plans were created in various subject matters of interest to the Ecuadorian public sector.



**Fig. 5.1:** Origin of Students at IAEN's 'Master's in Security and Defence', 2010–2016 (IAEN, 2017). Illustration: Gualdemar Jimenez.

During this process of restructuring and reform, in 2010, the core security course was reopened with a curriculum valid until 2015, but now entitled the 'Master's Degree in Security and Defence'. The change in the denomination, however, did not affect the essence of the programme.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the thematic innovations of these reforms, the IAEN began to hire faculty members with doctoral degrees (or those in the advanced stages of obtaining such degrees), including both local and foreign professionals. In 2011, an important scholarship fund (named the 'academic excellence scholarships') was initiated to finance the tuition, maintenance and research projects of those students within relevant state universities who displayed high academic capabilities. The new 'call for studies' was open to the general public, civil servants, and officials from the armed forces and the national police.

Since 2011 the master's degree programme in security and defence has tried to maintain its academic quality and its links with military and police institutions, as well as supporting the requirements of civil servants with an interest in the field (see Fig. 5.1). The results are ambiguous. This uncertain scenario can be attributed to a series of institutional tensions within

4 Although later in the year a reform was introduced that altered the program into a research degree.

the IAEN, as well as a growing tension between the armed forces and the national government in the last years of Rafael Correa's political rule. It is also influenced perhaps by the number and speed of changes introduced by the government. For example, during this period the pedagogical model adopted by the IAEN – as well as other universities in the country – had to be quickly adjusted to match a curriculum that was centred around a specific framework of competencies drawn from the guidelines of the governing institutions of higher education in the country, including the Secretaría de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation – SENESCYT) and the Consejo de Educación Superior (Higher Education Council – CES).

The rapid evolution of the IAEN, however, has led to the creation of specific programmes that have responded promptly to various national security issues, including public drug policy, risk management and human security. These programs have increased the depth and complexity of postgraduate research and education undertaken at the IAEN. In addition to these courses, in early 2011 the IAEN, in collaboration with FLACSO, developed and implemented the *Curso de Alto Mando* (High Command Course). This course was designed to fulfil the mission of the Instituto Nacional de Defensa (National Institute of Defence – INADE) to deepen the preparation of military officers in positions of high command requiring strategic-political leadership (i.e. those with the rank of Major General, Rear Admiral and Air Vice Marshal). The course focused on problems relating to the structure of the Ecuadorian state, its legal and normative frameworks, security theories, state conflicts, economy, globalization, international relations and strategic planning. It was taught part-time, over the course of 4 weeks, through a combination of lectures, debates and workshops. The teachers responsible for the course were experts in their fields of study, including both Ecuadorians and other nationalities.

Despite these new programmes, it is important to point out that neither the IAEN nor the two other universities mentioned have job placement programmes for their graduates. As a result, their security courses are not well attended due to the low expectations currently held by university graduates regarding the country's weakened labour market, and the

perceived lack of benefits that university-level competencies will provide within this market. In spite of this, the contemporary political decision to transfer control of security and defence matters to the civilian sectors could increase broader interest within Ecuadorian society in specializing in these areas. Currently, however, as far as the fields of security and defence are concerned, there is still a significant lack of knowledge in Ecuadorian society in general, including amongst those people who hold positions of responsibility and who make decisions on such matters. This often results in weak, non-technical, non-innovative and heavily politicized public debates regarding the national security and defence agenda.

## Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from these curricular changes and the historical evolution of Ecuador's military education system in general? A preliminary evaluation of the changes made allows us to suggest that Ecuador attempted a process of rapprochement between the armed forces and the strategic political level of the state. Through education, it tried to provide greater cohesion between the political guidelines of the Ministry of Defence and the functions of the armed forces, and to improve the decision-making process of both organizations.

In the last decade, the Ecuadorian state has sought to engender a profound process of legal, institutional and political reform that has directly impacted upon teaching structures in the field of security and defence. This situation, like every process of renewal, presents challenges and opportunities that must be evaluated. This can only be done with the collaboration of all the institutions linked to the security and defence sectors and the social, political and academic officials who are connected to these topics. Evidently, the changes that have been undertaken are very recent and so their implementation still generates debate. This makes it difficult to analyse or fully predict the course of the reforms, and presents a scenario with a level of instability. At the very least, however, it can be said that in the new security and defence programme of the IAEN, a dialogue has been built between perspectives from constructivism, critical theory and realism, as well as the perspectives promoted by the liberal security agenda (such as the concepts of integral security and good living).

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