

# **Section IV Balancing Internationalisation and National Requirements**



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# The Role of Military Pedagogy in Creating Internationalised Leaders of Character: The Malaysian Way

**Abstract:** This chapter provides a comparison of Malaysian and Western concepts of military pedagogy. It highlights how variations exist in existing definitions, philosophies, characteristics and implementation of military pedagogies across different scholars and countries. It then demonstrates how the military pedagogy of the National Defence University of Malaysia, centred upon the concepts of *Fikrah* (Nature), *Amal* (Practices) and *Akhlak* (Attitudes), can be seen as both similar and divergent from Western military pedagogical concepts. This includes variation in areas such as the attributes deemed necessary for military officers, the need for internationalised military leaders, the emphasis placed on student-led learning and digital learning technologies. The subtle contrast found between European and Malaysian pedagogies, it argues, demonstrates how military pedagogy must be tailored to a nation's cultural contexts.

**Keywords:** PME, military education, military pedagogy, National Defence University of Malaysia, flipped classroom, student-led learning, intercultural education

## Introduction

This chapter examines how military pedagogy can contribute to the production of capable graduates and internationalisation within military forces, through an analysis of the educational programmes of the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM). By providing new insight on variations between European and Malaysian practices in military education, the chapter aims to counteract the broad absence of military pedagogical analysis in the Asian region. It is divided into two main sections. The first section presents selected literature on military pedagogy. The second provides the core analysis and discussion of how internationalisation at the NDUM can be achieved through increased emphasis on military pedagogy.

The methodologies used in this chapter are observations of the teaching and learning approaches at the NDUM, and content analysis of important documents at the university and other related institutions. Observations have been undertaken over the past six years, in relation to students' perceptions and critiques of the teaching and learning approaches employed at the NDUM (including approaches used by this author). During the six years of observations, four action research projects were conducted by the author which focussed on students' behaviour in the classroom, teaching approaches used by staff at the NDUM, and students' learning activities during classroom sessions. The results of these projects are discussed later in the chapter, and directly inform the two key research questions that this chapter seeks to address. Firstly, what differentiates Malaysian methods of military pedagogy from European practices, where the term and concept of military pedagogy originated? Secondly, how can military pedagogy assist in the internationalisation of military students?

In answering these questions, it is important to note that the term military pedagogy is not as well known in Asia as it is in Europe and North America. The lack of documentation and studies on military pedagogy in these countries may, in part, be due to the use of different terms/phrases to refer to the field. Another potential reason is a lack of understanding surrounding the importance of educating future military personnel and a lack of interest by scholars on the subject of military pedagogy. Given the absence of military pedagogy resources in Malaysia and the neighbouring region, the analysis and arguments in this chapter are based on longitudinal observations on the learning and teaching environment at the NDUM and the approaches employed to teach students. Before proceeding with this analysis, therefore, it is important to contextualise these observations by assessing the underlying notions of military pedagogical theory.

## Understanding Military Pedagogy

For many decades, there has been an ongoing debate over how best to educate military officers especially at the tertiary level. The increasing involvement of armed forces personnel in military and humanitarian operations across the world has heightened the need for such debates and for systematic education and training programmes. So, what is military pedagogy?

Toiskallio (2003, p.52) has argued that “military pedagogy is the part of military sciences that inquires into the philosophies, conceptions, visions, doctrines, aims, methods, and technologies of military education and training”. Schunk and Nielsson (2000, p.13) define military pedagogy as a tool “to solve the problems connected with learning in relation to military education and training.” Falk (2008, p.13) argues that “the term military pedagogy encompasses teaching in a military setting or with a military purpose,” but that “any knowledge and education can be weaponised if there is the political will to do so.” Beyond such definitions, there are a range of philosophies and characteristics that differentiate military pedagogy from civilian pedagogy.

Toiskallio (2003, p.54), for example, asserts that the military’s goal to protect life means that “for military pedagogy everything that protects and enhances human life is good.” Mälkki and Mälkki (2013, p.28) on the other hand, opine that military pedagogy describes the demand to “change or transform soldiership in order to make progress instead of repeating the habits of the past”. Schunk and Nielsson (2000, pp.14–15) underline their philosophy by compiling a set of characteristics integral to military pedagogy, which include: (1) loyalty, willingness and ability of military personnel to undertake tasks “in accordance with the decisions of the political leadership”; (2) personnel with the fitness and skills to survive and work “under conditions of extreme strain”; (3) an emphasis on the successful functioning of the “unit,” in which individual personnel have specific roles; (4) the “condition for learning” that all students are considered to be adults; (5) instructors who are not only teachers, but have other functions such as “tactical commanders and administrators”; (6) educators who have different backgrounds, knowledge and skills, and who train students in multiple and varied settings; and (7) teaching principles that are “valid in all situations and at all levels” and, thus, must “have a common substance”. These criteria also indirectly point to two additional facets of military pedagogy: that instructors are likely to be military personnel, and that students may undergo academic and military training concurrently and are required to achieve well in both aspects.

Although Schunk and Nielsson’s analysis is valuable, scholars such as Paile (2013, pp.280, 288) among others have argued that the education system of each country is different and that this contributes to natural

diversity in the understanding and implementation of military pedagogy. Caforio (2000, p.11), for example, proposes that one means of assessing these differences is by examining how far a nation's military education is "convergent" with or "divergent" from the traditional civilian higher education systems, in six key areas:

1. Selection (e.g. entrance exams or previous exam results, such as high school diplomas);
2. Teaching staff (e.g. fewer military, more civilians);
3. Curriculum (e.g. more civilian than military);
4. Military training and studying (e.g. how much is included within the course);
5. Acceptance of the officer diploma (e.g. how many non-military institutions accept or acknowledge this accreditation); and
6. Academy socialisation (e.g. achieved across the institution or within a specific student body).

As argued by Caforio (2007, p.91), in comparison to ex-Communist countries and the USA, officer education in Europe has tended "more and more to resemble the model of the civilian universities." These two sides of the scale, however, do not contradict each other; they complement one another. Divergence from civilian education ensures that officers receive the military skills required of them to accomplish their core tasks. Convergence with civilian education, on the other hand, equips them to function better as officers and incorporate within society, as well as increasing their eligibility to receive teaching from any civilian education system. As noted by Paile (2013, p.289), ignorant of exactly how convergent or divergent specific institutions are, there exists a broad trend in which higher education for military personnel is becoming more of "an intellectual process."

How far do these pedagogical philosophies, characteristics and methodologies compare with the Malaysian version of military pedagogy? In the opinion of the author, military pedagogy in Malaysia may be divided into three functions. Firstly, it provides a concept for teaching and learning in a military setting (such as those outlined above by Caforio and Paile). Secondly, it provides a philosophy for teaching and learning, focussed on building the personalities and characters of future officers. Thirdly, it can be considered an approach to teaching and learning, especially in practical

areas including classroom layout, teaching methods and the use of various learning theories and technologies (such as blended learning). To assess these three functions within the Malaysian context, it is pertinent now to analyse the military pedagogies used to provide students with the attributes of intellectual leaders of character at the NDUM.

### **Creating Intellectual Leaders of Character: The Malaysian Experience**

In order to better understand the practical application of military pedagogy in Malaysia, the teaching and training philosophy of the NDUM must be examined. As the youngest public university in Malaysia, the NDUM is expected by the taxpayers to provide the best learning and teaching environment and experience for its graduates. The Malaysian system combines three concepts within its overall teaching and training philosophy: *Fikrah* (Nature), *Amal* (Practices) and *Akhlak* (Attitudes). This combination is designed to ensure that graduates of the NDUM are given comprehensive education in the skills required to be both a soldier and a global citizen. In terms of its pedagogical objectives, the NDUM seeks to provide its students with six attributes of intellectual leaders of character, including becoming:

1. Graduate officers;
2. Commissioned officers;
3. Spiritual leaders;
4. Sportsmen/women;
5. Black belt holders in an unarmed combat; and
6. Officers and gentlemen/women.

These attributes, which are embedded in the implementation of military pedagogy at the NDUM, arose during long and meticulous discussions in 2009 about what NDUM graduates should be expected to achieve. This process, which started as a profiling exercise for the graduates, was led by the second Vice Chancellor of the NDUM (Abidin and Sembok, 2010, p.11). As shall be illustrated, to achieve these attributes, the learning environment and experience at the NDUM must be adoptive and adaptive to the changes and challenges of an unknown world.

Obtaining higher education is the first attribute of intellectual leaders of character. Students attend the NDUM to undertake various degrees, such as the Bachelor of Engineering (including Civil, Mechanical and Electronic engineering); Bachelor of Computer Science (including Artificial Intelligence and Security Systems); Bachelor of Strategic Studies; and Bachelor of Social Sciences (including Languages and Cross Cultural Communication). The most crucial part of education and training at the NDUM is that cadet officers are already assigned to their services from their first year of studies, including the Malaysian Army, Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force. This enables cadets to be sent for single service training during their semester breaks and, ultimately, this training moulds them into the officers that Malaysia needs. In addition, graduates sponsored by the Ministry of Defence are obligated to undertake military service for a minimum of 10 years. Only with undergraduate education qualifications will cadet officers at the NDUM achieve their second attribute, to be commissioned as officers into their respective services. This qualification is central to their role as professional officers within the workforce and their potential to be future leaders of Malaysia.

The third attribute of the intellectual leaders of character is that of spiritual leadership. The NDUM should allow for students to not only grow their mental and physical ability but also, of equal importance, their belief in God. To achieve this, the NDUM has designed various supporting programmes to train students in properly practising their faiths. For Muslims there exists in-house training to become *Imams* (leaders during prayers) and *Khatibs* (one who reads the sermons) for Friday prayers, mock pilgrimage and so forth. For other religions, students are sent to practise their faiths at churches and temples located outside of the campus. Special arrangements, such as providing transportation or organising religious activities, are catered to these students' needs. Thus, the graduates are equipped with the cognitive, psychomotor and affective capabilities necessary for all-round development. To match this requirement, academics are also 'retrained' to become *Murabbis*, role models who are not only knowledgeable in their areas of expertise but also in their attitudes and daily practices. For the NDUM, academics should not only teach but should also inspire graduates to become 'human beings'. As promoted by the Ministry of Higher Education (2015, pp.9–10) in the *Malaysia Education Blueprint*



2015–2025 (*Higher Education*), it is no longer relevant to simply provide students with knowledge and skills, for this must be balanced with ethics and morality (*Akhlak*). Only through producing students who are “ethically and morally upright, spiritually grounded, compassionate and caring” can a workforce of balanced human beings, with steadfast minds, hearts and souls be developed (Ibid.).

The fourth and fifth attributes require the graduates to be physically robust and fit. All students of the NDUM must participate in at least one individual or team sport/game. They will not only be trained to excel at playing these games, but also to become coaches so that they can later train their own teams. Further, all cadet officers are required to graduate and commission with black belts in one form of unarmed combat, so that military personnel can defend themselves if required without the assistance of any weapons. For the NDUM, a black belt in Taekwondo is the main aspiration. The training for Taekwondo is undertaken every Friday from 3:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., in classes grouped according to students’ competency levels.

Moulding graduates to become officers and gentlemen/women is the most difficult attribute to achieve. This is because it naturally takes longer to inspire and instil great values, and this process starts as early as the graduates’ first day at the NDUM. Students are exposed to the etiquette of dining, socialising and other areas. One reason for this difficulty is that graduates may find it hard to balance the training they receive to become war fighters and defenders of a nation, alongside the process of being moulded into gentlemen or ladies. Yet, the manifestations of this sixth attribute are necessary across all levels of diplomacy from the inter-departmental to the international and can be seen in the way that officers carry themselves in their respective work environments.

## **Achieving Internationalisation**

Although these pedagogical foundations are intricately connected with Malaysian cultural contexts, their implementation at the NDUM occurs hand-in-hand with an emphasis on internationalisation. This priority may be linked both to the increasing importance of defence diplomacy regionally and globally, and the consistent participation of Malaysian forces in

coalition operations abroad. Since its independence in 1957, for example, “Malaysia has participated in over 30 peacekeeping operations with the deployment of 29,000 peacekeepers from the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Royal Malaysian Police” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). These contexts raise two significant questions which shall now be considered. Firstly, how do the attributes of intellectual leaders of character contribute to the internationalisation of the NDUM? Secondly, how far does military pedagogy (including the Western pedagogical tradition) impact upon NDUM teaching and learning practises and the internationalisation process?

There are two main strategies through which internationalisation could be achieved within the Malaysian version of military pedagogy. The first one revolves around the teaching and training philosophy at the NDUM. As academics are transformed into *Murabbis*, they are also expected to transform their teaching and training philosophy to provide comprehensive education to graduates. In the NDUM this is done through a teaching and training philosophy that combines three key tenets:

- *Fikrah* (Nature), which refers to the needs of students to obtain higher education and the responsibility of academics to share their knowledge;
- *Amal* (Practices), which refers to the importance of practising what is being taught and shared during classroom learning; and
- *Akhlak* (Attitudes), which refers to the significance of attitudes of both academics and students in their daily life.

Classroom teaching and learning is the most common scenario in which all three components of this philosophy are demonstrated. The classroom environment requires the successful balancing of the nature (*Fikrah*) of the students (who in the case of the NDUM are usually eager to explore something new), the practices (*Amal*) of teaching and learning, and the ability of the academics to act as role models to the students, so that the students’ attitudes (*Akhlak*) are complementary to their targets for academic achievement.

To further illustrate this, it is imperative to consider two specific courses at the NDUM. The first, Language Diversity: Variation, Choice and Change is a course offered under the Bachelor of Social Sciences (Languages and Cross-Cultural Communication). The author, who is also the instructor

for this course, uses the flipped classroom concept for learning. In line with this, there are no lectures employed, only classroom activities to complement the online lectures and notes that must be read and understood before coming to the classes. The flipped classroom approach gives room for students to be more active, independent and critical in their thinking and learning. The students' assessments for the course include regular tests, a case study report, a fieldtrip report and a final examination. The combination of all these assessments compels the students to become more aware of their surroundings, more responsible towards themselves and others, and more capable of reflecting upon what is important and what is not. The format of this course, and others similar to it, better prepares the graduates to be part of a professional workforce and eventually to embark upon international endeavours.

This course highlights how students become active and more engaged in their learning if the classroom activities are interactive (i.e. if lectures are minimised or not practised at all). Although some academics are willing to change their teaching approaches in line with this student-led model, a handful of staff maintain that conventional teaching methods are still effective and relevant. Contemporary students, however, are unaccustomed to an old-fashioned learning environment and face challenges in adapting to it. Sometimes referred to as Generation Z or Digital Natives, this new generation of students are prone to multitasking across digital technologies. Thus, as argued by Prensky (2001, p.5), in creating greater interactivity in lessons "the debate must no longer be about whether to use calculators and computers – they are a part of the Digital Natives' world – but rather how to use them." One inhibitor towards this necessary shift in teaching practices at the NDUM is the fact that the university does not have a proper documented teaching and learning policy to which its academics must adhere. This policy deficit is something that must be addressed immediately by the relevant NDUM officials since it directly impacts upon the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of teaching and learning at the university.

The second course that bears analysis is Al-Ghazali's Dialogue: English Communication, a compulsory language course for all students at the university which adopts case study approaches for teaching and learning. This course, started in February 2017, is expected to widen and strengthen

students' ability to use English for communication after their graduation. Preliminary feedback from students taking the course is promising. A key factor behind this is that students are 'forced' to use English more when they discuss, argue for and against, and present case studies. Furthermore, students are given the opportunity to relate these case studies to real situations that happen all around the globe. Based on the existing courses and academic programmes offered, graduates of the NDUM are well prepared to participate in international activities, in terms of their knowledge, exposure and language abilities. It should be emphasised that this course is a signature course for the English language development programme, and thus also showcases specific strategies used at the NDUM for the teaching and learning of the English language.

Although these strategies possess significant similarities to European pedagogical concepts, their application as part of the NDUM's wider goals highlights a subtle contrast between European and Malaysian models of military pedagogy. In order for internationalisation to be meaningful for the NDUM, graduates must carry with them a sense of identity and belonging. Regardless of the concept and hype surrounding globalisation, it is crucial that graduates of the NDUM believe in their spiritual roots and socio-cultural values. It is this spiritual aspect of military education and learning that appears to be far subtler than in European pedagogical models. Perhaps it is embedded indirectly or under an alternative guise and, thus, is more difficult to distinguish. Or perhaps it is an aspect that has lost favour in the European tradition. Either way, the Malaysian Armed Forces adheres to the concept that a lack of spiritual values and practices may affect an officer's ability to function appropriately. This principle informs the teaching and learning philosophy of *Fikrah*, *Amal* and *Akhlak* at the NDUM, in which students' nature dictates their desire to depend upon God, and this dependency is manifested in their practices of prayers and behaviours, which then lead to a realisation of good conduct of self. What makes the graduates of the NDUM unique at the end of the day is their ability to lead and portray good behaviours that bespeak of their learning and training at the university.

That is possibly the main reason that military pedagogy is viewed differently in Malaysia, as emphasised in the introduction. The education systems of European states and Malaysia focus on different values,

which reflect the practices and expectations of society at large. As the manifestations of religion also differ in these nations, so do the ways in which the armed forces act and react in their daily routines. In terms of the readiness of military graduates, the author would argue that the NDUM provides the necessary skills for graduates to face diverse challenges locally and abroad. This ability was highlighted by the invitation of 20 NDUM graduates by the Australian Government for a five-day leadership programme conducted by the Australian Institute of Management in Perth in November 2016, together with military and civilian students from countries across the world. The students were chosen not only in line with their academic excellence, but more importantly because of their ‘demonstrated’ ability to adapt to a foreign environment. They showed confidence in communication and were able to make decisions effectively and think analytically.

## What Next?

Military pedagogy is a popular subject of discussion mainly in the German-speaking countries of Europe as well as in Scandinavian nations. In the opinion of this author, it is high time that other nations take military pedagogy seriously since it can directly shape and affect the education and training of military personnel. The principles of military pedagogy, however, necessarily depend on each nation’s individual defence policy and education system. Therefore, military pedagogy must be understood and developed locally to ensure successful implementation.

Military pedagogy provides a key foundation for moulding intellectual leaders of character at the NDUM. Since cadets are trained for military purposes in a military learning environment, it is only apt that these future officers and leaders demonstrate the ability to function and adapt to unknown challenges locally and internationally. In addition to defending the nation with their physical agility, they also need to possess the intellectual and academic competencies required to make the best decisions during critical moments, in war and peace.

In order to achieve this, the Malaysian version of military pedagogy is concerned with producing the best leaders for the nation through an emphasis on six attributes of intellectual leaders of character, and a

complementary focus on internationalisation. The fact that no other universities in Malaysia have a similar pedagogy to the NDUM suggests that military pedagogy provides a unique means of ensuring that the education of future defenders of the nation is systematic and effective. Nonetheless, the implementation of these practices is not university-wide, since few academics are aware of the existence of military pedagogy.

Implementing these practices successfully will require the establishment of a teaching and learning policy, which incorporates *Fikrah*, *Amal* and *Akhlak*, as well as highlighting best practices for educating future defenders of the nation. At the same time, exchange programmes for military students and academics should be arranged with military academies and defence universities in European countries, to enable ongoing knowledge sharing and debate surrounding military pedagogy and its implementation in respective countries. The good news is that all of these steps can be taken concurrently.

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Lieutenant Colonel Mahammad Moumin

# Analysing the Challenges Facing Military Education in Francophone Sub-Saharan African Countries

**Abstract:** This chapter seeks to illustrate the difficult course faced by military educators in francophone African countries in balancing national autonomy and trans-national collaboration. It highlights how military forces in Africa face a broad range of threats, including transnational terrorist groups and human trafficking networks. It then demonstrates how these forces also face a number of budgetary and human resource deficits that affect the development and implementation of educational policies necessary to secure their territories. This has led to a partial reliance on a number of foreign-funded colleges and training activities. In order to avoid dependency on such systems, the chapter contends, militaries in francophone African nations must consider a number of options, such as better staff rotations and military exchange programmes.

**Keywords:** PME, military education, Djibouti Armed Forces, terrorism, peace-keeping, military expenditure, staff college, ENVR

## Introduction

In the 21st century, it is inconceivable to be commissioned as an officer or to become a non-commissioned officer without attending a military education institution for a set period of time. This process of educating and training military personnel has been given many different names, including:

“adult education, professional military education (PME), joint professional military education (JPME), voluntary education (VOLED), continuous learning, continuing education, lifelong learning, organization knowledge, and adult learning” (Gleiman and Zacharakis, 2016, p.82).

Historically, the tradition of military education dates back to the 18th century. Ignoring the oldest functioning college, the Royal Danish Naval Academy (founded in 1701), early academies were often created to train officers for artillery and engineering branches. Key examples of this include the Royal Military Academy of Woolwich (1741) in Great Britain, and the

École Royale du Génie in Mézières (1748) in France. It was in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, however, that most early Western European military academies were created. This was catalysed by the continued impact and threat of the Napoleonic wars, and resulted in the formation of institutions such as the Royal Military College (1800) in Great Britain, the Kriegsakademie (1801) in Prussia, and the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (1802) in France.

In Africa, by comparison, the evolution and institutionalization of military education was and still remains highly variable, depending on the particular needs of each nation and the relative influence of foreign governments within those nations. In some countries such as Ghana, military colleges were formed soon after national independence as part of a political emphasis on military autonomy and Africanization (Hettne, 1980, pp.175, 178), whilst other countries have only recently found the capacity within their military and governmental structures to support professional military schools. Taking this sharp contrast between continents as a starting point, this chapter analyses and explains the challenges that French-speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are facing in terms of military education. In order to do this, the chapter outlines some of the key security challenges facing these countries, followed by the challenges facing military education itself. It will conclude by proposing some potential solutions for the way ahead.

## **African Security Challenges**

Since the 1950s, the African continent has been a theatre for various security challenges such as terrorism, armed rebellion, illicit drug trafficking and human trafficking. Decades before the infamous terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 in the United States, terrorism was profoundly shaping African security and politics, from the Mau Mau Rebellion against British government rule in Kenya in the 1950s, to the uMkhonto we Sizwe's guerilla campaign against the apartheid government of South Africa.

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, however, terrorism in Africa has evolved significantly from its origins as an alternative and often secular means of achieving national independence or political equality. Using the examples of the Sahel region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), it is possible to see how terrorism has developed into an increasingly complex range of intra- and inter-national factions, with diverse and sometimes competing objectives, fluctuating allegiances and resources, and varying levels of internal cohesion.

In the Sahel region, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has presented a serious threat to countries including Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. Although Boeke (2016, p.930) concludes that AQIM's "objectives and ideology [...] indicate a strategy of terrorism rather than insurgency" and that "the evidence does not support the accusation that AQIM is a criminal organization with a religious façade", the evolution and merger of AQIM from the Front de Libération Nationale's initially secular struggle for Algerian independence (Baken and Mantzikos, 2016, pp.320–321) has led to continued debates over its status.

In the DRC, there exists a broad spectrum of insurgents and rebel groups whose objectives have ranged from overthrowing the government, to "defending the national integrity and inviolability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo against foreign forces" (Verweijen, 2016, p.58).<sup>1</sup> Many of these terrorist groups blur the lines between state and non-state actors by imitating the uniforms, governance practices, language and organizational hierarchies of the official armed forces (FARDC) (Ibid., pp.56–57). Despite the support of United Nations peacekeeping forces (MONUSCO) since the 1990s, the government's "confused mix" of military action and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, has not only failed to restore peace and security but may even have stimulated further armed mobilization (Ibid., pp.73–74).

In the CAR, various armed groups control vast areas of the country and exploit local resources to fund their illicit activities. Out of these armed groups, it is worth highlighting two recently prominent insurgent forces that significantly impacted both the civilian population and government policy in the CAR. The first group, known as the Séléka, is an

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1 All quotes which were originally written in French, have been translated into English by the author of this chapter. Although it has not been explicitly indicated which quotes were originally in French, the bibliography citation has retained the original publication language for all articles used within this chapter.

alliance of broadly Muslim insurgent groups created to fight the government of General Bozizé, leading to the appointment of the Séléka leader Michel Djotodia as president of the CAR from March 2013 to January 2014. The second group is the Anti-Balaka, which claims it was created to protect Christians against the Muslim insurgents who seized power. Both insurgent groups are notorious for the weak control they have on their respective combatants and have been accused of numerous war crimes against the civilian population (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2013; Bouckaert, 2014).

Although this scenario may seem clear-cut, some commentators contend that security measures (including the UN Mission in the CAR) have failed to eradicate national insecurity “in part from focusing on Séléka and Anti-Balaka clashes and atrocities – two supposed entities that never truly existed as such and that have by now melted into long-held inter-communal tensions” (Mehler et al., 2016, p.1). Indeed, more recently, these two groups have been accompanied by a range of criminal militias predominantly composed of Muslim Fulani herder groups. In addition to these ‘native’ groups, the CAR has been used as a base by rebel groups from neighbouring countries such as the DRC and Uganda. For example, despite the intervention of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and the provision of logistical, equipment, humanitarian and advisory support by the United States (Arieff et al., 2015, pp.9–13), the infamous Ugandan-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has used the CAR as a safe haven. During this time, they have been accused of committing acts of violence and crimes against the civilian population (Anderson et al, 2016).

Mali is another example of a weak state confronted with well-armed and well-organized insurgents. In 2012, the Malian defence and security forces were defeated in the north of the country and lost vast areas of territory to a coalition of insurgent and terrorist groups. The insurgents had taken advantage of the fall of the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi by acquiring weapons and personnel to the extent that they were better equipped and manned than the Malian forces attempting to contain them (Nossiter, 2012).

International and transnational criminal groups are also taking advantage of weak states that are unable to secure and control their territories.

Since 2008, South American drug cartels have adopted West Africa as a key route to transport cocaine to Europe (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008, p.13 and 2016, xiv, pp.38–39). This transit zone for criminal organizations includes countries such as Senegal, Mali and Niger, as well as vast areas of the Sahara Desert. In addition to drugs, the influx of African refugees and migrants fleeing for economic, social or political reasons, has led to extensive human trafficking networks that seek to profit from transporting migrants from their home countries to Europe (Smith, 2015). This journey ends with death so frequently that thousands of Africans have perished in the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara (Yardley and Pianigiani, 2016).

In addition to this, many African countries have been unable to adequately protect endangered animals from the transnational poaching trade that has decimated certain species for their skins, ivory, bones or horn. One example of this involved poachers from Sudan passing through the CAR to attack and kill elephants in a reserve in Cameroon (Neme, 2012). African countries in general, including French-speaking ones (with the exception of Chad), have been broadly unable to address the security challenges associated with this increasing spectrum of transnational threats.

To respond to African capability gaps, the international community has mandated several peacekeeping operations to protect the population, to restore peace, and to create the conditions for political and social reconciliation. Take for example the United Nations mission in the DRC, designed to assist in creating the conditions of peace and security required to allow the rebuilding process of the country. Originally designated as a UN “Mission”, this was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution No.1279 in 1999 and then reformatted into its current form as a “Stabilization Mission” by Resolution No.1925 in 2010 (United Nations Security Council, 1999 and 2010). Individual countries, such as France, have also embarked on military intervention to prevent this situation worsening. Operation Serval in Mali (2013–2014) and Operation Sangaris in the CAR (2013–2016) are two recent examples. Besides France, other countries such as the United States have built and maintained strategic military bases in countries such as Niger and Djibouti (Müller-Jung, 2016).

## Military Education Challenges

As shown, there are many factors that influence the various insecurities in the region and, to address them all, more than one solution is needed. However, military education remains one of the most important instruments for this, as it helps provide future leaders with the personal and professional abilities required to develop solutions to these insecurities. In order to reach a point at which this can occur, military education in francophone African countries must overcome certain shared challenges that prevent them from implementing the policies necessary to create and build military education institutions and, therefore, to provide the training required for the full spectrum of military personnel.

The first challenge is linked to the fact that such countries are trying to respond to competing demands in an environment of limited financial means. As noted by Huus (2013), the “cost of attending four years at West Point is estimated at \$200,000–\$250,000” per student. This cost seems significant, yet in real terms it constitutes 0.000038 % of the total military expenditure of the U.S. Armed Forces, which in 2013 (the same year as Huus’ article) totalled over \$650 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016). As shown in Tab. 10.1, as a means of contrast, if we were to apply this same spending ratio to the total military expenditure of African nations in 2013, then the cost of providing one student

**Tab. 10.1:** Relative cost of providing one cadet with four years of education in Africa as a percentage of total military expenditure, in contrast with West Point.

<\$3000	Algeria
\$1000–\$3000	South Africa; Morocco; Angola;
\$500–\$1000	Nigeria;
\$250–\$500	Chad; Tunisia; Kenya; South Sudan;
\$100–\$250	Botswana; Gabon; Uganda; Zimbabwe; Zambia; Namibia; Congo; DRC; Ethiopia; Cameroon; Côte d’Ivoire; Tanzania;
\$30–\$100	Rwanda; Swaziland; Benin; Mauritania; Mali; Mozambique; Burkina Faso; Ghana; Guinea; Senegal;
\$10–\$30	Sierra Leone; Lesotho; Burundi; Madagascar; Togo; Malawi;
>\$10	Gambia; Cape Verde; Seychelles; Liberia; Guinea-Bissau; Mauritius;

with four years of education at the officer-cadet level would vary from just over \$3000 to under \$10.

Although this is a clearly artificial method of predicting the finances available to educate African officers, it highlights the difficulties faced in creating globally competitive military education in countries that do not have the same level of economic resource available to invest in military education institutions. One obvious factor surrounding this is the fiscal reality that any governmental increase in military budgets in general and military education budgets in particular must come from cuts to other government institutions and programmes. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore, that in the 2013 fiscal year the six countries featured at the bottom of the table received collectively around \$1.9 million of direct U.S. funding for military education and training programmes (U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, 2013) – equivalent to 2.1 % of their total, national military expenditure.

One key repercussion of this lack of funding is that African military institutions face difficulties attracting and retaining instructors and faculty members with the level of experience required to provide the highest quality training. This challenge is further affected by limitations in terms of human resources for those countries engaged in national or international operations. In this situation, greater priority is given to assigning military personnel to units engaged in active operations instead of military education institutions. The Joint Military Academy of the Republic of Djibouti, for example, has faced continued problems with human resources due to the deployment of 2,000 troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia since 2011 (African Union Mission in Somalia, n.d.).

In addition to staff, such institutions require high quality equipment. Indeed, infrastructure and equipment remain the core tools that influence the quality of military training, and the ability to fulfil the old adage “train as you fight and fight as you train”. The Joint Military Academy of the Republic of Djibouti, for example, is a 10-year-old institution that currently lacks a swimming pool, gymnasium and even a library.

Whereas most francophone African countries possess academies that provide basic training for junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), there exist some exceptions such as Gabon and Comoros who rely on foreign academies to train their officers, and Djibouti where

there exists no NCO academy. Moreover, whilst some countries have the capability to deliver basic and even advanced infantry courses (due to their relatively low cost), a significant number still lack branch schools, junior and staff colleges, and naval and air force academies. Exceptions to this can be found in the continued development of Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale (National Schools for Regional Vocation -ENVRs), in which:

“The host country provides location, buildings, resources and supervision necessary for general running of the school. France provides technical support and expertise in training curricula. In return, the host country agrees that the school welcomes students from other African countries whose transportation and training fees are sustained by France.” (Anon., 2012, p.11)

These schools are designed to train military personnel from francophone countries instead of sending them to France. As noted by Lieutenant General Clément-Bollée (2012, p.3), “the sixteen national schools, supported by the DCSD, train now each year nearly 2,400 African students from across the whole continent.” This network of schools has increased local access to training in areas such as peacekeeping, engineering, logistics and aviation, in a range of schools including the basic infantry school in Thiés (Senegal), junior staff college in Libreville (Gabon) and the senior staff college in Yaoundé (Cameroon).

Although, the contribution of these schools cannot be denied, they are only partially able to fulfil the high demand for training. For instance, the junior and senior staff colleges train on average one or two students from each country per year. In 2014, over 15 years since its creation, the junior staff college of Libreville had trained 500 officers from 21 countries, which is an average of 1.6 officers per year and per country (Anon., 2015, p.9). These figures do not respond adequately to the needs of francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though African militaries in francophone nations can generally rely on similar institutions in other countries (such as France and Morocco), there are no specific guarantees that places on these courses will be offered to a particular country every year. Having officers trained in different countries can also affect the cohesion among those respective officers' corps.

Moreover, although francophone countries started exchanging students on a bilateral basis very early on, there are far fewer examples of exchanges



between faculty members. Such examples are often one-way exchanges. For example, Moroccan instructors are present in Djibouti's military academy, whilst Djibouti does not send instructors to Morocco. This lack of faculty exchange has hindered the ability for francophone military education institutions to harmonize curriculum and to share best practice. This is also hindered by the absence of a dedicated multilateral organization or discussion forum for francophone institutions (such as the Partnership for Peace Consortium or the African Conference of Commandants).

Beyond the level of the junior and senior staff college, there exist very few military training institutions at the higher level of the senior War College. Out of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, only Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania possess a 'National Defence College'-level institution, with Uganda currently in the process of developing such an institution. Moreover, no francophone countries possess a War College to train senior military at the strategic level. Instead they rely on foreign institutions to fill this gap. It should be noted, however, that because of the size of their respective armed forces and because foreign assistance may be sufficient to train officers at this level, one could argue that many francophone African countries do not need this kind of institution.

## The Way Ahead

As has been shown, there exist a wide range of operational, financial and socio-political challenges for military education in francophone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. These obstacles exist both at the national and multi-lateral levels. In order to address the situation, such countries have to implement effective military education policies and programmes at the institutional level. Specifically, they must take measures not just to consolidate their existing military education programmes, but also to increase the quality of the training.

Central to this is a need to combine ambition with pragmatism. Ambition is required to drive change across military education institutions, and to create and communicate a sense of purpose and urgency to educational reform across the armed forces. Yet, pragmatism dictates that these countries will have to accept that any changes in military education

will necessarily occur within the confines of limited financial and human resources. Whilst this does hinder progress, it does not preclude it. For example, militaries could significantly improve education at minimal cost by assigning and rotating their best personnel and those with recent operational experience to military training institutions.

In addition to factoring in the financial and human resources available, any such policies for improving education must ensure a balance between national autonomy and trans-national collaboration. Realistically, franco-phone countries must continue to take advantage of the ENVRs that are providing cost-effective training of good quality. Yet, equally each country must ensure that it does not rely on these systems. Whilst investment in national institutions for the sake of prestige must be avoided, the ability to support and develop autonomous military education programmes is the only the guarantee for a lasting and resilient military education system. This independence is not only a strategic priority but could result in increased ownership and stewardship that will impact beneficially upon the quality of education.

This capacity for autonomy and self-reliance would also provide a stronger foundation by which African francophone countries can then increase cooperation among themselves. Such bilateral or multilateral cooperation is vital for sharing best practices and benchmarking similar courses and can be achieved through multilateral organizations that foster and coordinate national measures to improve military education. It should be noted that there exist a range of options for francophone African military educators to integrate within larger communities. Key examples include the African Conference of Commandants; the peace support teams provided by the United Kingdom in Eastern and Southern Africa, which include yearly joint exercises among staff colleges (Muddiman and Chabinga, 2013); and programmes offered by the United States, such as the African Military Education Program (AMEP) organized by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Despite the clear benefits of these pan-African organizations, their effectiveness is inhibited by two key issues. Firstly, the membership of such forums is comparatively limited. Out of the 21 countries in Africa with French as an official language, for example, only 5 have colleges represented at the African Conference of Commandants (i.e. Burundi,

Gabon, Rwanda, Senegal, Cameroon). Secondly, greater benefit could be derived by having a dedicated forum for each level of military education (Anon., 2014, p.20) or, for countries with specific regional and linguistic links, enabling tailored research collaboration, curriculum benchmarking and faculty and student exchanges. One potential exemplar for this cooperation can be seen in the bilateral cooperation between the Ghanaian and Nigerian staff colleges, which includes faculty and student exchange programmes, harmonization of curriculums and joint exercises such as the ECOWAS Combined Joint African Exercise (CJAX) organized each year by both institutions (Adjei, 2016). Another exemplar of a region-specific programme can be seen in the multilateral meetings organized between military academies in the East African Community to strengthen inter-organizational cooperation (Yan, 2016).

## Conclusion

Francophone countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are confronted with insecurity in a range of formats such as terrorism or criminal activities. They are unable to overcome them due to various factors, one of which is the inability to provide good quality training to their respective military personnel. A lack of financial and human resources are key elements affecting this inability to improve military education. These limitations are currently improved by access to colleges funded by non-African militaries. However, it is vital that nations seek to enhance their own educational programmes rather than relying on these systems.

As a small article, this chapter can only provide a limited analysis of military education in francophone countries and in sub-Saharan Africa more generally. This subject remains under-studied and more research is required to help better understand the problems and to propose tailored solutions for each country. However, even with a limited study it is possible to see that cost-effective solutions can and should be achieved by making changes to staff recruitment policies in military colleges, increasing bilateral and multilateral student and faculty exchanges, and expanding the number of colleges with memberships to pan-African or regional forums such as the African Conference of Commandants.

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