Part 3
The Print Press, Broadcasting, and Politics
Chapter 9
Metaphors in Euroland Press

Christ'l De Landtsheer

Professor of Communications Science, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

Elisabeth Koch

Reuters Amsterdam Bureau, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Abstract

This chapter aims to find some indications of how and to what extent the Euro (European Single Currency) is portrayed in media coverage from various countries. It investigates the use of metaphors in Euronews. Metaphor is a powerful style form; the way a metaphor is used in public speech reveals citizens’ and elites’ interests and emotions toward public issues. This was confirmed in several case studies that applied the metaphor model which De Landtsheer (1994, 1998, 2004) developed. The current study focuses on the six months that preceded the public introduction of the Euro in 2002. It examines a 110,435-word sample of media discourse on the Euro from northern and southern Europe and the US covering the period between October 1999 and April 2000. Metaphor use in Euronews by countries that were willing to participate in the Euro was compared with Euronews from countries that were not planning to participate. The results suggest that media discourse on the Euro in so-called Euroland countries was more metaphorical (therefore, emotive and persuasive) than the Euro discourse in the non-Euroland countries.

Introduction

One study (Taran, 2000) on the use of metaphor in the Ukrainian Parliament concluded that metaphors concur with elements of mythical thinking. Other metaphor research suggests that the “European myth” may currently be more coherent than one could imagine and that the political integration of the EU already exists to a large degree in European mentalities. In fact, the “mapping” of metaphors in the European Parliament reveals the divisions found when they are broken down by political functions, rather than by nationalities, countries, or particular languages (De Landtsheer, 1998).

This chapter considers the topic of metaphor in relation to European integration. It contributes to examining these metaphors that represent the “European Myth.” Metaphor can be studied as a powerful style form that is often employed in print media in relation to the Euro (the European Single Currency), which is the main feature of the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Farell, et al., 2002). Metaphors are important tools for opinion formation vis-à-vis the EMU. Metaphor affects citizens’ and elites’ perceptions of political and economic events (e.g., the introduction of the European single currency). Here, we use the metaphor
research method developed by De Landtsheer (1998, 1994) to investigate persuasive and emotive efforts in press reporting about the Euro (De Landtsheer and De Vrij, 2004).

How important is the Euro for European Union member states that were willing to join the Euro zone and for others that decided not to join? In May 1998, participation in the Euro zone was confirmed for 11 EU member states: Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Spain. At that time, two members (Greece and Sweden) were not admitted because they did not fulfill the convergence criteria. In May 2000, the Commission admitted Greece beginning in January 2001 because it fit the criteria. The Commission decided that Sweden could not be admitted then because the Swedish legislation had not adopted the rules of the EU treaty and its currency did not meet the fluctuation margins set by EMU (http://www.eu.ac.be). The aim of this research is to find (through metaphors alone) some indications of how and to what extent the Euro is portrayed in media coverage from various countries both in and out of “Euroland.”

The sample of newspaper articles for this study covers: the period October 1999 to April 2000. The empirical analysis was performed in Spring 2000, so it falls within the time frame January 1, 1999 (the introduction of the Euro for transactions between banks only) to January 1, 2002 (the actual adoption of the Euro currency for the citizens in the Eurozone countries) (Boles, McDonald, and Healey, 2002; Fella, 2002; http://www.eu.nl). Metaphor use in public speech will be compared for two groups of countries: those that accepted the Euro’s circulation and those that did certainly not.

We begin with answers to these questions: What is metaphor? How can we identify metaphor? Next, we focus on our samples. Then, we detail the coding and interpretation of metaphors. Finally, we present our results.

What is Metaphor?

Metaphor is omnipresent in our life, in language, on television, and in the newspapers. One is usually not aware of such metaphors because they are like eyeglasses. One is aware of them only if they obscure vision. Metaphors describe nouns, reduce complexity, and represent facts from a specific perspective. Metaphors fulfill specific tasks (Luczak, et al., 1997, p. 1; De Landtsheer, 1998, p. 32). Metaphors can “clarify” things, while retaining the ability to “mystify.” Since metaphors often use incorrect analogies, they may transmit certain desirable, but inaccurate, connotations. Metaphors have indisputable manipulative capabilities which help persuade audiences. In this sense, metaphors rely on their inferences and emotive power. They are figures of speech, in which a word (group) symbolizes an idea by using an implicit comparison, rather than a directly stated idea. Most importantly, metaphors seem to function as emotive components of language. De Landtsheer confirmed the longitudinal and cyclical evolution of...

All of these qualities make metaphors extremely useful for political purposes. It can be concluded from the relevant literature that metaphors can be used to sensitize audiences about political issues. At the same time, the use of metaphors in public speech obviously can contribute considerable information about public policy developments and public opinion formation (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004). As many linguistic theorists, from Richards (1936) to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), have argued, metaphors shape our conceptual systems. Metaphor is a “constitutive form” and “an omnipresent principle” not only in language, but also in politics and international relations. Metaphor is an essential part of communications theory and may be used in the social sciences in an expansive way (Richardson, 1994, p. 519).

Aristotle initially formulated the first questions about metaphors: How can we identify and interpret them? What exactly are they? Metaphors go as far back as language itself. They are central to language and ubiquitous in communication (Hahn, 1998). Therefore, many scholars and philosophers have discussed metaphors since Aristotle’s time with a variety of replies. Aristotle’s substitution theory is based on the idea of similarity between two elements, the subject in question and the substitute expression from another sphere of life that is used to describe it. According to a modern formulation of this theory, metaphors are, “...merely figure[s] of speech in which a word for one idea or thing is used in place of another to suggest a likeness between them, as in ‘the ship ploughs the sea’” (Hahn, 1998, p. 133). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1959, p. 748) says that metaphor is basically an “application of name” or a descriptive term for an object to which it is not literally applicable (the dictionary’s example is “a glaring error”). It is an implied comparison or description. Metaphor differs from simile since the latter usually contains the words “like” or “as.”

According to Black (1962, p. 39), metaphors are sentences, not isolated words. A metaphor clearly consists of two components. The metaphorical sentence is “the frame” or the “tenor” and the word or words used metaphorically are the “focus” or the "vehicle" (Richards, 1936). The two basic parts of metaphors are characterized differently by various scholars. For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 230) say “we understand experience metaphorically when we use a gestalt from one domain of experience to structure experience in another domain.” Kittay (1998, p. 229) speaks of two “semantic fields”, a notion based on de Saussure’s and Baily’s earlier concepts.

“One has to ride a bicycle in order to keep it moving,” Jacques Chirac, the French president, suggested in an interview with the newspaper Figaro. The metaphor helped him present his views on Europe’s political unification. Chirac used a metaphor, which is a form of speech or language that consists of an implicit comparison between the topic that is discussed (the political unification of Europe)
that is the primary subject (the “frame” or “tenor” of the metaphor) and a topic that belongs to a completely different domain of knowledge (riding a bicycle), which is the secondary subject (the “focus” or “vehicle” of the metaphor).

According to Black, the two subjects (principal and secondary) that metaphors have should be seen as two “belief systems.” The secondary subject (e.g., riding a bicycle) consists of a set of beliefs that help construct a set of beliefs about the principal subject (i.e., the European political integration). The two subjects interact in the interpretation, where some features of the secondary subject are highlighted (One has to ride a bicycle in order to keep it moving) to fit the principal subject (the European political integration) and to produce the meaning the speaker aims to convey (which is that “one should energetically proceed with the European political integration in order not to destroy it”). Understanding a metaphor involves comprehending the literal meaning called upon in the vehicle of the metaphor (riding a bicycle) and grasping the vehicle’s contrasting relations that are being transferred to a new domain (European political integration).

A commonly used identification criterion for metaphors is “strangeness of the expression to the context.” Dobrzynska (1995, p. 597) thought it a fact that metaphors are images and not notions, because they put together unlike, contrasted, and “unfixed semantic elements,” causing an aesthetic result for the audience. This aesthetic result is crucial to the attention-attracting qualities and the persuasive effects of metaphor. But Black (1962) formulated the currently used metaphor theory: “interaction theory.” According to this theory, the interaction of two ideas produces a new meaning (i.e., one plus one equals three). The conflict or contrast between the two different domains of knowledge or two semantic fields (“politics” and “bicycle”), two subjects, two parts that are often too dissimilar to allow our beliefs about the one to characterize the other directly (Black, 1979, p. 31) produces the metaphorical effect. This effect includes creating new meanings; it is also responsible for the “priming” effect of metaphors. The decision to interpret an utterance metaphorically depends on the “frame” or context: there must be “incongruity” within the utterance itself and its situational context (Kittay, 1987, p. 76).

We assume that the meaning of language is entirely content-dependent (dependent on its use), but that this holds much more for non-literal language, in general, and metaphors, in particular, than for literal language and stereotypes (Kittay, 1987, p. 97). Different kinds of basic frames can be distinguished other than the simple “situational” or “sentence” “frame.” These include the “text frame,” the “author’s frame,” the “geographical frame,” the “common interests frame,” the group frame,” or the “language frame” (Kittay, 1987, pp. 55-57).

A substantial body of literature has been published on metaphors and their meanings in certain contexts (for an overview, see Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004). Political metaphors show what could be said for metaphors in general: most works deal with metaphor in relation to a particular topic and its significance. Chilton’s
(1996) *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* is one of these works. Unfortunately, few works were helpful for this rudimentary research and exploration of the meaning of EMU metaphors in various countries. Works of practical value to this investigation of metaphors in newspapers from countries within and outside of the EMU proved to be those dealing with political language, political psychology, political communication, and European integration (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004; De Landtsheer and Feldman, 2000; Feldman and De Landtsheer, 1998). The Internet contains much data on metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson’s book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) placed metaphor on the agenda for communications and social sciences consideration. It convincingly demonstrated the overall importance of metaphor for our lives and for public discourse. However, our emphasis is on conventional metaphors and how these structure and confirm traditional social values, rather than not on original metaphors or their power to alter political processes.

**Sample**

This study mainly explores possible differences in trends in reporting about the Euro within and outside of Euroland. Indeed, due to the way the study was set up, it was not possible to compose an equilibrated, random, or stratified sample in terms of countries and newspapers. So our mass media language sample consists of 110,435 words representing 183 days of discourse on the Euro and the EMU in Danish, Dutch, Greek, Norwegian, Spanish, Swedish, and American newspapers.

We chose these countries partly because of practical purposes. To perform a metaphor analysis, one must work with coders who are native speakers. The data collection and coding was set up as a research and take-home exam for De Landtsheer's class of 27 international students taking an international communications course at the University of Amsterdam. The nationalities of the students in the class played a role in the choice of countries and the number of newspapers. Prominent papers from northern and southern Europe as well as one paper from the US were included in the sample. The metaphors come from a variety of newspapers from different countries. Dutch and American newspapers dominate, although Danish, Greek, Norwegian, Spanish, and Swedish papers are also included and play substantial roles. Papers from countries that at that time were supposed to be prepared to participate in the Eurozone include the Greek *Eleftherotypia*, the Spanish *El Pais*, and the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter*. When we conducted this research, Greece and Sweden were not yet allowed to participate in the EMU because they did not fulfill or meet the criteria; nevertheless, they were considered as eventual candidates for participation in the Euro. The Netherlands, a “Euroland country,” provided four main newspapers: *Het Parool*, *De Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad*, and *De Telegraaf*.

From the non-Euro countries, Denmark (an EU country that decided not to adopt the Euro) and Norway (a European non-EU member) were represented by
Christ’l De Landtsheer and Elisabeth Koch

Politiken and Aftenposten. We further analyzed The International Herald Tribune, a US newspaper published in Europe. The metaphors were taken only from those articles on or mentioning the Euro or the EMU. Each of the 27 students was assigned a newspaper (in his/her first language) to look through for certain months. Their first job was to search the newspapers for all articles mentioning the European Single Currency, disregarding articles that used the word “euro” only as a currency (e.g., “Sales rose 13 percent to 6.74 million euros from 5.98 million euros on Wednesday”) (The IHT, January 28, 2000).

Their second job included coding and calculating how many and what type of metaphors appeared in newspaper articles for every 1,000 words on the EMU in a particular time frame. These different interpretations of just one metaphor made it hard to perfectly code each and every one of them in the various newspapers. For this reason, the authors read every metaphor (the foreign ones were translated into English) that was received to make sure that the coding corresponds to what the coder wrote. Once the metaphors were coded by the theory and processes explained later in this chapter, it became possible to say how the print media depicted the European Single Currency over the same six-month period (October 1999 through March 2000).

It can be concluded from earlier studies (De Landtsheer, 1994, 1998; De Landtsheer and Recchi, 2000; De Landtsheer and De Vrij, 2004) that several factors other than interest in the Euro may affect the use of metaphor in public discourse in various countries. These include serious economic, political, or military crises; political extremism; and nationalistic events. But these factors are not dealt with in this study; besides, they may not be that significant. Within certain limits, the use of metaphor is affected by the ideology and scope (popular or elitist medium) of selected news media. These are factors that we tried to control as much as possible in our sample by way of our choices of certain newspapers.

Analyzing Political Metaphors

The method used in this study assessed the metaphor power of a given text corpus. Some of the information that the metaphor power provides us with concerns the emotional loading of a text and the persuasive efforts political elites exert in the process of forming public opinion. Metaphor power is expressed in a metaphor coefficient. Coding schemes (De Landtsheer, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, pp. 70-71, and 2004) used in these processes produce two metaphor coefficients, one for studied countries in the EMU and another for those outside the EMU.

The hypothesis that has been formulated is as follows. It is more probable that countries inside the “Eurozone” will have a higher metaphor coefficient since they want to promote their new currency (which is what metaphors help them to do in their use of language). Also, the Euro is a very important issue among those countries and is expected to have more frequent mentions in member countries. The United States, Norway, and Denmark (which are not part of the EMU) would most
probably have a lower metaphor coefficient because the Euro is not expected to be as important a topic in their newspapers and, therefore, was likely to be mentioned less frequently. But there is no doubt that the new currency has and will have effects on these countries. Considering the actual times in which the coding took place, we expected that Euroland would have a greater total metaphor coefficient in comparison to the non-Euroland countries. Euroland countries in our sample are those which at the time of the research had applied to join the Eurozone; these included the Netherlands, Greece, and Spain (or even Sweden).

The following explanation describes how the metaphor coefficient was conceived and how metaphors were coded. The metaphor coefficient (symbolized by C) is the product of three variables that respectively relate to frequency (symbolized by F), intensity (symbolized by I), and content (symbolized by D). Coding metaphors is a process not easily explained in writing; therefore, the following description and information is given in clear, simple, step-by-step fashion.

The first step is that every article with a mention of the Euro and with at least one metaphor had its words counted. This is how we started to calculate the frequency variable (F). It is simply the total number of metaphors per 1,000 words. For example, of the 25 articles on the Euro in the Aftenposten (the Norwegian newspaper) coded during these months (November 1999 through March 2000), there were 11 articles with at least one such metaphor. The total words of these articles amounted to 4,617, which would make the equation look like this: 11 divided by (total of 4,617 divided by 1,000) equals 2.382. (Or 11/(4,617/1,000)=2.382). The frequency coefficient (F) has been rounded off to the third decimal place. For this Norwegian newspaper, F is a bit more than two metaphors per 1,000 words. The same coding was done for the other countries and they were compared with these results.

Two further steps followed in that each metaphor was then "coded." This meant (in this particular case) that each received two different classifications to detail their metaphoric “power.” In the second step, a strength or intensity value is given to each metaphor: s (strong), n (normal), or w (weak). Each of these variables represents a number: a strong metaphor is designated 3 points, normal is 2 and weak is 1. The intensity value that each metaphor is given is based on the coders' own common sense and knowledge. A strong metaphor is presented as original and new, while its literal meaning and emphasis is still quite applicable and current. A normal metaphor is not very creative or unique anymore, although it continues to incorporate distinct implications for its literal meaning. A weak metaphor is popular and frequently used and rarely concerns its literal meaning. To construct the Intensity variable (I), all weak metaphors are tallied and multiplied by 1, every normal metaphor is multiplied by 2, and each strong one is multiplied by 3; the sum of all these is divided by the total number of metaphors. To clarify this procedure, we used the Norwegian Aftenposten as an example (Table 1). The 22-point total is divided by the total number of metaphors in the articles to sum/reach one I (the
total Intensity). This paper had 22 points/11 (total metaphors) = 2 (total intensity of metaphors for Norway). The same formula was used for the remaining countries.

Table 1: Metaphor Intensity of Euro news in the Norwegian paper Aftenposten (November 1999-March 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Total number of metaphors</th>
<th>Total Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W = 1</td>
<td>X 2 =</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 2</td>
<td>X 7 =</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S = 3</td>
<td>X 2 =</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the intensity variable coding is done, another symbol is given to each metaphor (this is the third step). This second series of categories and symbols is used to calculate the content variable or content power (D). Since metaphors are widely recognized as a framework for classifying or assorting behavior, different semantic fields of focus are added. An m is given if the metaphor is related to medical issues or illness; sp for sports or theatre; d for death or disaster; po for political or intellectual issues; na for nature; and p for popular subjects or those from everyday life. These categories and symbols represent various degrees of power: m (the strongest of all) is worth six points. It goes down one point respectively, until p (the weakest degree of strength) is left; it is worth just one point. Metaphors that mention body parts (m) and those that refer to sports or theatre (sp) are the most important in speech and print (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004, contains a taxonomy of metaphorical sources and their possible weight factors).

Metaphors dealing with death, disaster, or violence (d) attract the attention of the audience, but also tend to generate fear. As far as the political and intellectual (po) metaphors are concerned, they do not appeal greatly to mass audiences because the average viewer/reader is not very “intellectual” and has no interest in politics. Metaphors on the topic of nature (na) have an obvious utility since everyone can associate with it. The popular (p) metaphors pertain to everyday life's material aspects (e.g., in the home). These have an inclination to be authentic and genuine and are less associated with the conception of “myths” or “escape” than any of the previously stated classifications of metaphors (De Landtsheer, 1998).

Much of the rhetorical strength of most metaphor categories is that they come from occurrences or events that all audiences can associate with and understand. Hahn (1998) gives examples of these (e.g., air, fire, earth, water, human anatomy, the animal world, seasons, gardening, planting, growing, decaying, and so on). The fact that these are customary and familiar to audiences means that the writer (in this case) need not use much time or space to convey what he/she is trying to say. Hahn (1998, p. 114) uses this example: if someone writes or says, “he’s a bear of a man,” most readers/listeners easily understand the gist of the message being communicated. Basic metaphors are not as simple as one may first believe them to be. In
Hahn's example metaphor, the receiver might have one of four different interpretations. Most people would simply envision a large man. Others who had experienced disagreeable encounters with bears might be convinced that the man is potentially dangerous or dangerously powerful. Some receivers could think of bear cubs and determine that the man is playful, cuddly, and clumsy. Lastly, some people may reflect on the differences between human beings and “lower” life forms (e.g., animals) and decide that the communicator is classifying the man as something of a brute or as less than human.

The content power or content variable (D) is discovered in a fashion comparable to the way intensity is calculated. To find D, every metaphor from one country that has been coded with an “m” must be counted and multiplied by 6, then added to every “sp” metaphor multiplied by 5, then added again to all “d” metaphors multiplied by 4, plus the number of “po” metaphors times 3, and so on. This number is then divided by the total number of metaphors (t) in the relevant press articles in that particular country. It becomes clearer in Table 2, using the Aftenposten example, if closely examined. We can make it easier to understand by writing the formula (De Landtsheer 1994, p. 71) like this:

\[
D = \frac{1p + 2na + 3po + 4d + 5sp + 6m}{\text{Total number of metaphors (t)}}
\]

The final step involves calculating C, the metaphor coefficient. C is the product of F, D, and I, which is how the study is set up, always starting with the frequency, then the intensity, then the content power, and finally, the metaphor coefficient. We calculate one metaphor coefficient for the press articles on the EMU from countries that are within it and another for countries outside it.

Table 2: Content power of metaphor in Euro news of the Norwegian paper Aftenposten (November 1999-March 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content power of metaphors</th>
<th>Total number of metaphors</th>
<th>Total points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p = 1</td>
<td>X 3 =</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na = 2</td>
<td>X 2 =</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>po = 3</td>
<td>X 0 =</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d = 4</td>
<td>X 0 =</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sp = 5</td>
<td>X 3 =</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m = 6</td>
<td>X 3 =</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/11 = 3.636</td>
<td>Total: 11</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p = popular, na = nature, po = political and intellectual, d = death and disaster, sp = sports, m = medical
Results

The formulas and equations used in this research are based on the model that De Landtsheer (1994, pp, 69-72) devised to calculate the metaphor coefficient. As mentioned before, the results should be considered only of exploratory interest because of the selective nature of the experiment.

What results do we see in Tables 3 and 4? The US and Greece ranked the highest, while Denmark and Spain ranked the least frequent. Euroland countries have more metaphors in their newspaper articles on the Euro per 1,000 words than non-Euroland countries. These results seem to confirm the hypothesis that news about the Euro in Euroland countries has more emotional impact than that in non-Euroland countries. Since we know that metaphors are figures of speech which help speakers/writers get a point across more easily, it must mean that the more metaphors there are per 1,000 words, the more easily the receiver understands the speaker/writer. Generally, in this sense, more metaphors are better than fewer in newspapers. The countries that are not in Euroland are not necessarily against the EMU, it is just not a major media concern. Norway and Denmark are part of Europe, but voted against changing their currencies to the Euro (Sweden did the same in 2003). As far as the United States is concerned, the Euro could make trading, import, and export with EMU countries much easier; this could make the US pro-Euro. But, of course, the US/Euro trade/exchange rate would have to be considered as well.

Table 3: Frequency of metaphors in Euro news inside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). These countries wanted to adopt the Euro at the time of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total of words, articles with at least one metaphor</th>
<th>Total of metaphors</th>
<th>Metaphors per 1,000 words (F)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,660</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.118</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9,114</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7.899</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>31,294</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>6.966</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,197</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.621</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58,265</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>6.158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Every number in Tables 3 through 10 has been rounded either up or down to the third decimal place.
Christl De Landtsheer and Elisabeth Koch

Results

The formulas and equations used in this research are based on the model that De Landtsheer (1994, pp. 69-72) devised to calculate the metaphor coefficient. As mentioned before, the results should be considered only of exploratory interest because of the selective nature of the experiment.

What results do we see in Tables 3 and 4? The US and Greece ranked the highest, while Denmark and Spain ranked the least frequent. Euroland countries have more metaphors in their newspaper articles on the Euro per 1,000 words than non-Euroland countries. These results seem to confirm the hypothesis that news about the Euro in Euroland countries has more emotional impact than that in non-Euroland countries. Since we know that metaphors are figures of speech which help speakers/writers get a point across more easily, it must mean that the more metaphors there are per 1,000 words, the more easily the receiver understands the speaker/writer. Generally, in this sense, more metaphors are better than fewer in newspapers. The countries that are not in Euroland are not necessarily against the EMU, it is just not a major media concern. Norway and Denmark are part of Europe, but voted against changing their currencies to the Euro (Sweden did the same in 2003). As far as the United States is concerned, the Euro could make trading, import, and export with EMU countries much easier; this could make the US pro-Euro. But, of course, the US/Euro trade/exchange rate would have to be considered as well.

Table 3: Frequency of metaphors in Euro news inside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). These countries wanted to adopt the Euro at the time of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total of words, articles with at least one metaphor</th>
<th>Total of metaphors</th>
<th>Metaphors per 1,000 words (F)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.382</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9,114</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7.899</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>31,294</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>6.966</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,197</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.621</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58,265</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>6.158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Every number in Tables 3 through 10 has been rounded either up or down to the third decimal place.

These three non-Euro countries (Norway, Denmark, and the US) had fewer metaphors in their newspapers per 1,000 words (see Table 4). Needless to say, since they are not part of the EMU, the Euro has less importance. This may be substantiated with various quotes, like these from the International Herald Tribune: “Euroland is a big question mark” (February 29, 2000) and “Traders ignored a raft of bullish economic news in the Euro bloc that should have breathed new life into the currency” (January 25, 2000). It would be reasonable for non-Euro bloc countries to give priority to articles that are more culturally significant to their particular country. But they cannot avoid writing about the Euro since it is a huge step for the EMU and will make an impact not just on Europe, but also the rest of the world. However, the frequency of metaphors included would be less when they do write about the Euro.

Table 4: Frequency of metaphors in Euro news outside of Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). These countries were not willing to adopt the Euro at the time of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total of words, articles with at least one metaphor</th>
<th>Total of metaphors</th>
<th>Metaphors per 1,000 words (F)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.382</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.174</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>5.048</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,524</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4.182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Intensity power of metaphors in Euro news inside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). Countries willing to adopt the Euro at the time of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity Power</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.256</td>
<td>1.651</td>
<td>1.455</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in all articles on Euro</td>
<td>9,575</td>
<td>16,037</td>
<td>23,824</td>
<td>15,122</td>
<td>64,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of weak metaphors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of normal metaphors</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of strong metaphors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of this analysis in regard to the intensity variables of countries within and outside of Euroland are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The first rank is the country with the most intense metaphors. In this case, Greece again ranked as most intense among the countries inside the Euro zone; the US ranked highest for the non-EMU countries. The lower ranks show the least intense countries: in this case, Spain (again) and Norway. The highest degree of the presence or intensity of metaphor power can be detected among countries inside the Euro zone. This is also in line with our hypothesis and makes sense since the countries in Euroland want to promote the Euro as a good thing that will help, support, and benefit Europeans, making Europe a better place to live. Journalists would be expected to avoid putting the Euro down as a currency that will not do well in the future or to relate it to negative happenings. Setting the Euro in a bad light would help neither the EMU nor the morale of the people living there.

Some examples of metaphors from Euroland countries help to substantiate the theories mentioned previously. The Swedish paper *Dagens Nyheter* (March 2, 2000) writes, “To begin with, the rise [of the Euro] had a strengthening effect.” The Greek paper *Eleftherotypia* mentions, “The Euro is waiting for a goal to set the score even” and “attack the American currency” (November 27, 1999) and ”the markets will not be thirsty anymore” (March 8, 2000). These are very powerful and intense metaphors. From the Spanish *El Pais* we read, “if we cook it [the Euro] with a little mimo, everything will taste as delicious as always” (November 6, 1999). Lastly, some metaphorical examples from the Dutch papers are: “interest fever” (*Het Parool*, February 8, 2000); “the Euro is like dice game” and “Should have ripened the land for the EMU” (both from *NRC Handelsblad*, March 2000); “it’s not easy for sand to get caught in the machine” (*De Telegraaf*, December 20, 1999); “Euro-concern ruins fun” and “the stench of crisis blows through the stock market” (both from *NRC Handelsblad*, November 30, 1999).

On the other hand, the lowest degree of metaphor intensity power is in the non-Euroland countries. Again, this should not be a surprise since non-Euroland papers...
are distributed in countries that will obviously not join the EMU and may depict the Euro as something of lesser value when compared to other countries' treatments. This could suggest that the Euro is not seen as a top priority; rather, it is just a topic they must report with other issues that they consider more important. Countries that are not going to join the Euro club see the currency as a good and positive change for the EMU, but this is not the most meaningful or substantial story for their newspapers. However, the difference between the two groups of countries is not very sizeable.

To exemplify the previous statements, we present some metaphors from outside the Euro zone that were coded. These include “hand in hand,” “make or break,” and “divided roles” from the Danish paper Politiken (March 2000). The Norwegian Aftenposten used the metaphors “slow journey toward the Euro” (November 2, 1999) and “Euro climbs upward” (November 25, 1999). The US includes metaphors like “sinking Euro,” “driving down the Euro” (both from IHT, October 9-10, 1999) and “the Euro must recover” (IHT, January 5, 2000). All are quite weak metaphors and not very significant.

The number of words per country and their totals in Tables 5 and 6 are there for reasons of comparison. Obviously, countries that adopted the Euro had the most relevant words because there were more countries coded and more newspapers involved. Only three countries coded at that time were supposed to stay outside the EMU; therefore, they have a smaller word count. But they average out like this: countries inside Euroland 64,558/4 = 16,139.5, countries outside Euroland 45,877/3 = 15,292.3. This makes the amount of words in articles on the Euro (regardless of whether there are any metaphors in the articles) from countries that at the time were and were not to be members of the EMU more or less even.

**Table 7: Content power of metaphors in Euro news inside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). Countries that were willing to adopt the Euro at the time of the study.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content Power</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.887</td>
<td>3.413</td>
<td>2.273</td>
<td>2.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8. Content power of metaphors in Euro news outside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000). Countries that were not willing to adopt the Euro at the time of the study.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content Power</td>
<td>3.636</td>
<td>2.583</td>
<td>3.355</td>
<td>3.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Number of metaphors in content categories in Euro news within and outside Euroland (for D) (November 1999-March 2000). Countries that were and were not willing to use the Euro as their currency at the time of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Popular</th>
<th>Total metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The content power or variable (D) is found only by putting all relevant metaphors in one out of six content categories (m, sp, d, po, na, or p) and, therefore, adding the appropriate symbol to all metaphors coded which stand for particular values (De Landtsheer, 1998). The results of the content variable are interesting because it is higher for the countries outside Euroland. So far, the results for F and I were higher for Euroland countries. Why is this so? The reason may be that Norway, Denmark, and the US use more metaphors with higher valued symbols, such as m, d, and po. These metaphors deal with medical issues or illness, death, disaster, politics, or intellectual topics. The other countries (Sweden, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain) use “softer” metaphors, dealing mostly with popular subjects that everyone understands, like nature, sports, theater, and everyday life situations. Some examples here are: “the Euro searches for new depths” (De Volkskrant, December 4, 1999); “the Euro has been itching” (Het Parool, December 3, 1999); “analysts could smell the increase in interest” (De Telegraaf, February 19, 2000); “the Prime Minister isn’t putting his cards on the table” (De Volkskrant, February 19, 2000); “the boiling of the markets” (El Pais, December 5, 1999); “they see the bright side of the moon” (Eleftherotypia, November 30, 1999); “a wave of sales” (Eleftherotypia, March 24, 2000); and “the [Swedish] crown is tied to the German mark” (Dagens Nyheter, October 16, 1999).

The metaphor coefficient is the product of the metaphor variables frequency (F), intensity (I), and content (D), which are indicators of the metaphor power of a text (De Landtsheer, 1998). It is obvious in Tables 9 and 10 that C is the last calculation for this research. The overall ranking that shows which group of countries has the highest and lowest degrees of metaphorical presence is also included. This metaphorical base, in correspondence with the hypothesis, is highest among countries that (at the time of the research) were willing to be part of the EMU and lowest among those that were outside the EMU. The average for Table 10 is calculated by the total divided by the number of countries 114.1/4 = 28.525; the average for Table 11 is 51.589/3 = 17.196.
Table 10: Metaphor coefficient in Euro news inside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000).
Countries that were willing to adopt the Euro at the tune of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>F x</th>
<th>I x</th>
<th>D =  C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.118</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.899</td>
<td>2.254</td>
<td>2.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.966</td>
<td>1.651</td>
<td>3.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.621</td>
<td>1.455</td>
<td>2.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>114.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>28.525</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Metaphor coefficient in Euro news outside Euroland (November 1999-March 2000).
Countries that were not willing to adopt the Euro at the time of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>F x</th>
<th>I x</th>
<th>D =  C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.382</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.174</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td>2.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>5.048</td>
<td>1.982</td>
<td>3.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>51.589</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>17.196</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

The results show that countries that were willing to participate in the EMU at the time of the study have a higher metaphor coefficient than those outside the EMU. The frequency and intensity of metaphors indicate metaphor power in the news discourse. They were higher among the same countries (Sweden, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain in this sample), although content power was lower than in the non-Euro countries. As explained previously, reasons for these results suggest that the frequency (F) of the metaphor usage among EMU members’ newspapers is higher. It may also be concluded that the Euroland countries tend to use metaphors with a higher intensity (I) variable, while non-Euro countries use less intense metaphors. Non-Euro countries have greater content power (D), but that does not change the final outcome, that EMU countries have the highest metaphorical standards.

References


Chapter 10
Press Reporting on the Euro
Marianne Law and Jerry Palmer
London Metropolitan University, London, UK
David Middleton
Open University, London, UK

Abstract
The current study aims to analyze certain trends in reporting about the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the press of four EU countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It examines the profile that the new currency has acquired when it was launched and particularly, the extent to which the currency is profiled in press reporting as a matter of national versus transnational as well as economic versus political significance. The purpose of this type of analysis is to examine the “framing” of the EMU. This study follows a well-established tradition in which media output is analyzed to examine how cumulative reporting of an issue (or a series of linked issues) results in a more or less coherent profile of the issue in question.

Introduction
As is well known, the European single currency was launched on January 1, 1999. On the night of March 15-16, the entire European Commission resigned in the wake of allegations of fraud and financial mismanagement. This followed the resignation of Germany’s Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine on March 11, 1999. The exchange rate of the new currency scarcely faltered during March 16: it fell rapidly in the morning, but equally rapidly regained its strength in the afternoon (Die Welt, Guardian, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, Le Monde, March 17, 1999). In early January, it traded at approximately $1.16 (US) and £0.7. During January and February, it fell gradually against these and other major currencies. In the days following Lafontaine’s resignation, it rose against the pound sterling but fell against the dollar. During the week of March 10-17, 1999, it fell to $1.07, but rose again to $1.09 before the Commission’s resignation (Die Welt, March 17, 1999). On the morning of March 16, it fell to $1.0814, but regained its value during the afternoon. It also fell from yen 127.37 to 128.62 (Le Monde, March 17, 1999) or 127.85 to 128.7 (Die Welt, March 17, 1999), but later regained its value. Its sterling value rose somewhat after the Commission resigned. Table 1 records its trading record against the pound sterling during these few days.
It is legitimate to speculate what would have happened to a single nation’s currency if its government had been forced to resign under such circumstances. No doubt, the currency would have suffered a very different fate. Of course, the European Commission is not a government, but neither is its relationship to the Euro entirely a matter of indifference. Also, had the crisis arisen closer to the launch of the Euro, things might have been different. Strasbourg could have provoked the crisis in January, but chose to appoint the commission of “wise men” instead; no doubt, the fate of the Euro was a major factor in the Parliament’s deliberations (Le Monde, March 18, 1999). Searches of the newspapers (Le Monde, Liberation, Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Bild, Sueddeutsche Zeitung) in January 1999 produced no mentions of possible links between the conflicts that led to the Commission resignation and the value of the Euro. Indeed, the rapid fall of the Euro in the few hours following the resignation announcement indicates the possibility that things might have developed entirely differently. According to Die Welt, the slide of the Euro on March 16 was halted by a briefing from the European Central Bank (ECB) that stressed its constitutional independence from both the Commission and other political authorities. According to the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian (March 17, 1999), the briefing also hinted that interest rates would not be altered.

An online search through the archives of major newspapers in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK using the terms “Commission,” “resignation,” “Santer,” and “single currency” in varying combinations (plus relevant cognate terms and in translation as appropriate; dates searched were March 12-18, 1999, inclusive) produced few articles. Of course, searches using these terms separately produced many articles. The reason for the massive reduction of mentions in combination was soon apparent: the number of articles which actually analyzed the possibility of a link between the Commission’s resignation and the exchange rate was very small. There was one article each in the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, Die Welt, Le Monde (quoted above), the Daily Mail, and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung; two appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. All these articles followed the event (i.e., were dated March 17, 1999 or later). Searches of de Telegraaf and Volkskrant found no articles analyzing (or even mentioning) the possibility of a link between the two. While the online searches

---

**Table 1: The Euro versus the pound sterling (March 10-17, 1999). 1 Euro = £ sterling. Trading information on the Euro taken from Dutch national bank statistics at www.dnb.nl**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sterling exchange rate</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 10</td>
<td>0.6746</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11</td>
<td>0.6694</td>
<td>Lafontaine resigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12</td>
<td>0.6686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15</td>
<td>0.6739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>0.6703</td>
<td>Commission resigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 17</td>
<td>0.6744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
may have been fallible, it seems certain that the volume of reporting of the possibility of a link was extremely feeble and entirely retrospective. The consensus of all reports which did mention it was that currency markets were largely indifferent to the resignation; mentions of the resignations’ possible impact on the stock market were even fewer.

In other words, in advance of the mass resignation, the possibility of a flight from the Euro was not part of any mass media agenda. In retrospect, the issue scarcely seemed worth mentioning. Media silences are difficult to account for unless alternative formation sources reveal that a silence was deliberately organized and maintained by some mechanism or other (Palmer, 2000). Silence can always be dismissed as simple absence: nothing happened; therefore, there was silence. In a sense, this is what happened in this instance; however, the reason why “nothing happened” is clearly that there was sufficient confidence in the insulation of the new currency from Brussels politics to ensure that nothing happened. Such a position (and its public acceptance) has to be created and maintained as much in public opinion as in any other forum. While it is possible that sudden events may have a rapid and dramatic impact on public opinion, in the circumstances in question, it would appear that trust in the ECB was a long-term matter, linked to its perceived independence from political pressure and its role as the trustee of a transnational currency. The relative silence about the link between the Commission resignation and the exchange rate is a mark of that trust and of the perceived independence of the currency from political pressures.

At first sight, this indicates that press agendas did not see EMU as primarily a political matter during the period in question. An earlier comparative analysis (Palmer, 1998) found that previous attention was primarily focused on the political dimension of EMU; the study referred mainly to Autumn 1995 (i.e., the period leading to the Madrid summit, where the name “Euro” was chosen and the nature of convergence criteria was high on public agendas). Studies analyzing the German press of the same period indicate that the political dimension of currency union was high on agendas (Settekorn, 1998; Loenneker, 1998). A study of the francophone Belgian press during the same period finds that, although political aspects of the currency union were indeed mentioned with some frequency, the matter had a low level of prominence and was not regarded as a controversial matter, except in one left-wing regional daily (Lits, 1999). A recent comparative study of television news coverage of EMU in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK finds that the introduction of the new currency was overwhelmingly reported in terms of its economic consequences at the moment when it was introduced (De Vreese, 1999). In combination, these studies may indicate that the profile of the new currency has shifted away from the political, toward the economic. However, an analysis of UK broadcast news coverage of European economic issues highlights the many ways in which the issue is presented in terms which emphasize opposition (Britain-and-Europe), rather than unity (Britain-in-Europe). The same study points to a dearth of
analysis focusing on the relationship between media coverage and attitude formation in pan-European matters (Gavin, 2000).

The analysis of “frames” derives from the study of agenda-setting. In the words often quoted as the starting point of this tradition:

The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about (Cohen, 1963, p. 13).

This perception was confirmed by the original (1972) Chapel Hill agenda-setting study (McCombs and Bell, 1996). The agenda-setting function is operationalized as the parallel rank ordering of a set of nominated issues, both in the mass media and in public opinion, as shown by content analysis and opinion polling. Thus, what is measured in the two parallel survey instruments is comparative issue salience in a given body of media output and in a body of public opinion. Reviews of the now substantial body of research literature in this tradition point out that the majority of studies support the central hypothesis of a substantial correlation between the two agendas; reviewing 375 such studies, Dearing and Rogers (1996, pp. 10, 49-50) state that 65% support the central contention. Although correlation, alone, does not prove any causal link, further studies in this tradition demonstrated that the inference of causality (explicit in Cohen's statement) is legitimate (Dearing and Rogers, 1996, p. 92; McCombs and Bell, 1996, pp. 99-100). However, in later studies, the place of the agenda in the communication process as a whole has been foregrounded in a way that makes the simple attribution of linear causality dubious. The central question here is: Where does the media agenda come from? Dearing and Rogers’ review of the concept of agenda-setting shows that agendas cannot realistically be analyzed without reference to some external agency. In particular, they stress the role of two entities: policy elites whose actions lead them to seek to dominate public agendas via the mass media and so-called “spectacular news events” (Dearing and Rogers, 1996, pp. 25-28, 34-35). The emphasis on the role of policy-making elites is broadly in line with a well-established research tradition into news sources which, in general, concludes that “Sources Make the News” (according to Sigal, 1973 and 1986; Gandy, 1982 and 1992). However, the central role of spectacular news events (also called “trigger events”) is not entirely compatible with the stress on policy elites since it is unclear whether such events acquire their public profile as the result of initiatives by such news sources; indeed, the example they choose (the striking profile of the Ethiopian famine) is usually attributed to journalistic initiative (Philo, 1993). Some analysts conclude that a linear explanatory model is not useful and that a “multi-polar” model of meaning production, involving “multiple systems of meaning production” with multiple fora and interacting feedback processes is more useful (Hansen, 1991; Palmer, 2000).

The previous discussion is based on the presupposition that the focal point of any discussion of agenda-setting is issue salience. However, it has become central
to debates about agenda-setting that “salience” may not be an adequate concept for the task it is allotted in two respects: 1) “salience” lacks any evaluative dimension and 2) perhaps as a result of the first, it is only a cognitive concept, entirely lacking a persuasive dimension.

The lack of an evaluative dimension clearly reduces its usefulness. For example, it would be easy to demonstrate that abortion is an issue with a high degree of salience in public agendas in the US in recent years; it would probably turn out that there was a high correlation with media agendas in this instance. However, there is a big difference between abortion having a high salience in the context of the pro-life argument and salience in the pro-choice argument. The traditional agenda-setting thesis explicitly rejects this distinction. However, if issue salience derives from the activities of policy elites, then we can be sure that (in this instance) media content will not be entirely separate from the attempts of the two (opposed) elites in question to define the issue. In this instance, we can clearly see the link to the second criticism, based on the absence of a persuasive dimension: attention to abortion considered as a question of issue salience tells us nothing about how this issue is publicly understood and the extent to which elite domination of news agendas is successful in producing shifts in public opinion.

Recognizing that this is a problem in agenda-setting studies, it is manifest in the argument by McCombs and Bell that there is now a “second generation” of agenda-setting studies. Here, it is no longer the salience of an “object” which is studied though correlations between two rank orderings of issues, but the salience of some “attribute” of that object (McCombs and Bell, 1996, pp. 101-102). In other words, it is no longer what is talked about that is the focus of analysis, but what is said about it. It is this “second generation” of agenda-setting studies to which the term “framing” is commonly applied.

Frames consist of patterns of “persistent selection, emphasis and exclusion” in reporting (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Entman defines them as a combination of four factors: selection and salience of issues; definitions of problems; diagnosis of the cause of the problem; and judgment about their nature. He finds that consistency of framing over a long period may amount to establishing an “agenda” in the public domain or something even more stable and fundamental: “culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames” (Entman, 1993, pp. 52-53). If an issue is analyzed not in terms simply of its most general outline (e.g., “abortion”), but in terms of how it is framed, then its capacity to dominate public understanding may be clearer. For example, Jasperson, et al. (1998, pp. 207-208) analyzed the role of the framing of the federal budget deficit in US news media during Winter 1995-1996. During this period, the salience of this long-running policy issue changed dramatically once it was publicly linked with the President’s decision to shut down all federal offices because of political disagreements between the executive and the legislative branches of the government about the budget. Before the link was publicly made, the budget deficit was not a salient issue; once the link was made, it became salient.
In other words, the “framing” of the issue was responsible for its increased salience.

However, the status of framing, itself, is uncertain (Scheufele, 1999). The origin of the concept is in the “social construction of reality” tradition (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106; Pan and Kosicki, 1993, pp. 55-56); therefore, it refers as much to how audiences “decode” messages about the world as to how the messages are “encoded” in the moment preceding emission. Scheufele demonstrates that analyses using the concept of framing move between conceiving of the “frame” as a construct of the individual mind and a construct of media representations, as well as between conceiving of the frame as determined by some outside force or determining public understandings. He presents this as a 2 x 2 matrix (see Table 2).

Table 2: Framing variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames seen as:</th>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Independent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When frames are analyzed in the variety of ways that this schema suggests, we find that some studies present “frames” not as caused by media agendas, but as a resource used by audiences in their efforts to decode media messages and/or understand the world around them. Indeed, this resource may not even be the dominant one in this undertaking (Gamson, 1989). Thus, the move from “agenda-setting” in the original sense to its “second generation” version involve a reduced capacity to produce an attribution of causality.

Studies showing the existence of news frames are numerous. For example, the reporting of HIV/AIDS in the UK in the early 1980s eventually produced a “frame” in which this matter was defined as a public health issue, rather than an issue of personal morality (Miller and Williams, 1993); here (arguably), a long-term frame of reference was established. A more short-term example is the reporting of the confrontation between Shell and Greenpeace over the Brent Spar oil storage facility in 1995, which framed the issue as one of protest about environmental damage, rather than routine oil industry engineering procedures (Palmer, 2000). As Scheufele’s schema implied, such studies may focus on “upstream” communications strategies by news sources as is the case in the last two mentioned plus many others (Weaver, 1994; Gandy, 1982 and 1992; Deacon and Golding, 1994). They may also focus on the downstream “impact” on the public or some defined segment of it (Capella and Jamieson 1996; Newman, 1986; Bruce, 1992, pp. 137-140). In the interest of terminological consistency in this chapter, “issues” refers to particular events or a linked series of events; “agenda” refers to some ranking of issues in a hierarchy of media attention; and ”frame” refers to the way in which combining these two leads to establishing an overall profile of the entity or entities in question. Our analysis concentrates on the “persistent selection, emphasis and
exclusion” that Gitlin uses as his definition of a frame; we make no inferences about the behavior of news sources nor of the frame’s impact on public opinion. Establishing what the “frame” constitutes is a necessary preliminary to the analysis of either “upstream” strategies or “downstream” impacts. This approach is akin to the “tracking” studies used to evaluate the impact of communications strategies (Hampton, 1997).

While different studies use many different approaches to analyze news content, quantitative content analysis is frequently used on the grounds both of reliability and its capacity to handle large volumes of material. This is the method chosen for the current analysis. The choice of method was dictated partly by the sheer volume of potentially relevant material and partly by the need to develop a method that would be capable of handling material in different languages and referring to numerous discrete real-world referents. For example, any analysis of real-world individuals and institutions referred to in press reporting across national boundaries must deal with the fact that the empirical entities are individuated, yet functionally equivalent (e.g., heads of state, national banks, political decisions, economic reports, exchange rates, etc.). This requires creating an analytic device that is capable of recording the presence or absence of these entities in several national media spaces and allowing strict comparability. Content analysis is well suited to such a task.

Sample

The analysis is based on a sample of the national press systems (i.e., nationally circulating newspapers) of the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Regrettably, resources did not allow any analysis of broadcast coverage. The number and selection of nations was dictated by resources and the availability of relevant language skills. All coding was done by native speakers of the languages in question, with the exception of French; two of the researchers have adequate bilingual skills in this respect. It is important that the nation sample includes one “out” country. The basis of the equivalence is that the sample is approximately equally representative of the four national systems. It is partly dictated by the availability of online archive access. Table 3 shows the titles chosen to represent each national system. Horizontal alignment indicates approximate equivalence among titles based on a series of indicators: market sector, political allegiance, and level of business reporting.

The time frame of the sample was October 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999. All analysis of this sample is based on percentage distributions of the units of analysis within each national press system. This allows for the fact that each national system has very different quantities of coverage. The total number of articles located by online searches for “single currency,” “economic and monetary union,” and various cognate terms in relevant languages was approximately 10,000. The sample analyzed covers between 5% and 10% of articles in each national sample devoted
to the single currency. It follows the levels of journalistic interest by taking every 10th or 20th article in the chronological sequence of articles. Therefore, the sample is not random and its stratification follows the logic of news agendas insofar as the agendas are indicated by numbers of reports.

Table 3: Nationally circulating newspapers of countries included in the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>De Telegraaf</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>Volkskrant</td>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>Sueddeutsche Zeitung</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Design of the Analysis

All sampled text was divided into units of meaning. All units of meaning are either agents or events. “Agents” are the persons, organizations, or institutions whose activities are reported. “Events” are all the sets of circumstances, actions, and contexts which are mentioned. Each “unit” is a mention (i.e., a piece of text of indeterminate length but with a single focus); typically, it is a word or phrase.

Both agents and events are assigned to one of the following categories: political, economic, or civil. The first two categories are used in their commonsense meaning, although the coding scheme has rules for their application to ensure consistency. For example, a minister of finance is considered a political agent, a central bank is an economic one; this usage reflects constitutional arrangements. “Civil” means everything that is not political or economic; basically, it refers to everything to do with public opinion, except actual elections. Thus, trade unions are economic agents when they take action (e.g., strike), but individual trades unionists or officials expressing an opinion count as civil agents.

In addition, both agents and events are categorized according to their location. If they are located inside the nation whose press system is being analyzed, they count as “national home.” If they are located in one another country in the European Union, they count as “national foreign.” If they are located in more than one EU country or belong to the EU as a whole, they count as “transnational.” If they are located outside the EU, they count as “international.”

Reliability was achieved iteratively. A significant percentage of the articles sampled were double-coded after preliminary individual coding; the resolution of any discrepancies that were revealed was then applied to the rest of the sample. For example, this sentence would be coded in the following manner:

Europe’s most powerful banker yesterday cast a shadow over the launch of the euro by delivering a humiliating snub to the French (Daily Mail, December 31, 1998).
Agents: a) “Europe’s most powerful banker” (identified in the following sentence as Wim Duisenberg, President-designate of the European Central Bank): Agent = Economic, Transnational; b) “the French” (French government, in this context): Agent = Political, National, Foreign.

Events: a) “cast a shadow”: Event = Economic, Transnational (this refers to his refusal to accept an abbreviated appointment); b) “over the launch of the Euro”: Event = Economic, Transnational; c) “by delivering a humiliating snub to” (the French): Event = Economic, Transnational (because it involves a transnational entity, the ECB, in addition to a European country).

Each of these entities would be recorded as one mention of the appropriate category. Additionally, all agents are given an “authority” score that indicates how much objectivity and partisanship is involved in the reporting of their actions. Analysis of this feature of the study is not included in this chapter. However, at this point, it is important to realize that the relationship between “active” and “passive” mentions of agents as well as “positive/negative” reporting of their actions is encoded with authority scores, not mentions. One crucial element of the authority score is a numerical indicator of the fact that an agent is presented as responsible for the event being reported; in the previous example, Duisenberg would be the responsible agent.

The purpose of these devices is to let us see whether the EMU is presented as primarily a matter of politics, economics, or public opinion; and whether it is a matter of primarily internal/domestic or transnational concern. Therefore, these devices are the operationalization of our focus on the “framing” of the EMU issue. They are intended to locate elements of meaning that are relatively independent of the details of the ebb and flow of everyday events, in the sense that their presence/absence is unlikely to be directly event-sensitive. The size and stratification of the sample were dictated by this factor.

Given the nature of the subject under discussion, it is obvious that the distinction between “political” and “economic” is not always easy to establish with certainty. Two issues arise: validity and reliability. Where validity is concerned, we followed the constitutional separation between government and central banks in EU countries and the Union institutions, themselves. Where reliability is concerned, the iterative double coding (the basis of the reliability of the coding in general) produced consistent agreement about the assignation of agents and events across these two categories.

The Results

Agents by Domain of Activity

Table 4 shows the extent to which the national press systems give different levels of attention to political, economic, or civil agents. The differences in tables 4 and 5
are statistically significant at p<0.001, using chi square on the original Ns. This only records the fact that these agents were mentioned and the distribution of these mentions; it says nothing about what the agents said. It gives a preliminary indication of whether the EMU is considered primarily as an economic, political, or civil matter. The UK press is dominated by reporting the activities of political agents; the Dutch press gives approximately equal attention to political and economic agents. While it appears that the French and German press are similar in their emphasis on economic agents, in both cases, there is only a 12% to 13% difference in the reporting of economic and political agents. Although it is true that the reporting of the EMU is seen as primarily economic (in terms of agents), it is also viewed as having a large political dimension in these two countries. This is probably not to be explained by variations in the amount of business reporting in the press title sample because the UK and German press are close to equivalent in this respect. The same is true of the French and Dutch press; however, the French/Dutch press sample is different from the UK/German press in this respect since it is likely to reflect genuine differences in agendas.

Table 4: Percentages of all mentions of agents by domains of activity and nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all four countries, attention to civil agents is relatively marginal. In general, public opinion on this matter is not much reported in any of these countries. No doubt, this is partly because events which are directly the product of civil activity (such as conferences and opinion polls) are relatively less frequent than the activities that figure here under “economic” and “political” headings. However, it also reflects the categories of people whose activities are seen as relevant; in other words, it is a clear indicator of framing. Lits (1999, pp. 123-124) also finds that in the Belgian press, civil sources (such as unions or associations of citizens) are rarely quoted. The marginalization of the representation of civil agents is a significant silence in the framing of the EMU in the international press. Further analysis is needed to establish what political or communication strategy was responsible for this marginalization.

Events by Domain of Activity

Table 5 shows the extent to which national press systems give different levels of attention to political, economic, or civil events. Here, we are looking no longer at
the identity of the agents whose actions are being reported, but at what those actions are and the contexts in which journalists think they are being carried out. This is when agents’ actions start to be interpreted since journalists exercise editorial choice over the actions or the context that they portray as significant in respect of any individual or organization. The UK press gives equal attention to economic and political events, whereas the other press systems are heavily dominated by the reporting of economic events where the EMU is concerned and, to a degree, that is relatively consistent across “Euroland” countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>4,183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparison of These Two Indicators**

In Euroland countries, the two indicators tell roughly the same story. In France and Germany, both agents and events are markedly more economic than political, if by a different margin. Throughout Euroland, the difference between mentions of agents and events shows that many of the political agents are portrayed as acting in a context defined as economic, not political; this is scarcely surprising given the subject matter. In the Netherlands, the difference between the two indicators (agents/events) is striking. It is probably accounted for by the nature of the sample. A high percentage of the Dutch coverage comes from the tabloid *De Telegraaf*; in general, tabloid reporting features less description and analysis of the actions of each agent whose actions are reported than is usual in broadsheets. As the analysis of the German and French media (not to mention common sense) suggest, if political agents are acting in an economic context, then the pattern of tabloid reporting would produce a relative increase in the number of political agents and a relative decline in the number of economic events.

It is not possible to give a clear interpretation of this without reference to material from outside this analysis. In other words, it is only by looking at other details of the articles in question that it would be possible to see any further pattern of ascription of political agents' activities to one or the other domain of activity (e.g., any pattern of individual agents' ascription to a particular domain, a pattern of positive or negative mentions of such activity). If this pattern were visible, it would theoretically be possible to analyze the communication strategies of the various political actors to see if they were attempting to define events as either political or economic. To date, this analysis has not been done.
In the UK, the discrepancy between the two indicators also suggests that a significant percentage of politicians are seen as acting in a primarily economic context when their actions are related to the EMU. The difference between mentions of political and economic agents is both wider than in Euroland and shows the opposite emphasis (more political, rather than less), yet the margin between political and economic events is narrower (in fact, nonexistent). This suggests that a significant percentage of the UK political actors are being portrayed as dealing in economic matters and that this percentage is far greater than in Euroland. The implication is that everything is more politicized in the UK press than in the Euroland press. However, background knowledge of UK politics in this respect suggests that the Conservative Party (and the Conservative press) constantly seeks to make potential UK membership of the EMU into a directly political issue by bringing the question of sovereignty and national identity to the foreground. The Labour government seeks to define it as a pragmatic and economic matter. The figures in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the Conservative Party is not succeeding in persuading journalists to see the EMU as primarily a political matter, but also that the Labour government has not succeeded in defining it in an entirely economic and pragmatic fashion. This point only holds good for the period analyzed, up to March 31, 1999; no evidence is available for the subsequent period. Also, these distributions include business page reporting. If the sample included only general news pages, the distributions might be very different. At a seminar at London Guildhall University in 1999, Bob Worcester (head of MORI opinion polls) pointed out that one difficulty for the English Conservative Party’s policy of increasing opposition to the UK’s membership in the EMU was the volume of favorable reporting of EMU in the business pages.

If we amalgamate the two indicators, Table 6 shows that for the UK press, monetary union is primarily political (subject to what was previously mentioned), whereas for the Euroland press, it is primarily an economic matter. The divergences between the three Euroland countries do not seem to indicate any significant difference. In other words, the lack of divergence may be taken to indicate a high degree of transnational press consensus on this matter.

We can also amalgamate the indicators to express the contrast between Euroland and the UK more directly in Table 7.

### Table 6: Percentages of all mentions of events and agents by domains of activity and nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “Ins” column shows the averages of the three Euroland press systems; the divergence between the UK and Euroland is striking. This table confirms what could have been deduced from the earlier evidence: the UK press is operating to a different set of news values than the Euroland press where the EMU is concerned. As a result, the framing of the issue is significantly different in the two cases. To avoid confusion, we are using news values in one of two possible senses. Possibility 1 is “universal” news values (such as timeliness, proximity, human interest, etc.); possibility 2 (used here) is the “local” features of particular events which are timely, proximate, interesting, etc. (Palmer, 2000).

Analysis of the Distribution of Meaning by Domain of Activity

Although it appears obvious that in Euroland, the single currency will be seen primarily as an economic matter (since the single currency now exists in Euroland), in reality, it is far from obvious. It means that those in Euroland who want to define national participation in the single currency as primarily an economic matter have succeeded in gaining the initiative where press agendas are concerned.

Location of Agents and Events

Is the EMU mainly a domestic or a transnational matter? Agents and events are coded according to their location as well as their domain of activity. Table 8 examines the distribution of agents according to whether they are located in the country whose press system is being analyzed or elsewhere in the world.

This indicator suggests that the UK press is preoccupied with internal UK agendas, whereas the Euroland press is dominated by transnational matters if by significantly different margins. If we turn to how the analysis of events informs the same question, we see essentially the same thing. Table 9 also shows that the UK is dominated by internal concerns, Euroland by transnational ones. Amalgamation of the two indicators in Table 10 tells the same story.
Table 9: Percentages of mentions of events by nation: domestic/non-domestic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-domestic</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Percentages of events and agents by domestic/non-domestic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-domestic</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inferences from these tables is subject to caution because the amalgamation of meaning objects into the categories “domestic” and “non-domestic” is likely to give more of the latter, since there are three ways of being non-domestic (refer to Possibility 2). However, this restriction does not invalidate inferences based on the differences of priority that separate the UK from the Euroland countries, nor those based on the differences between the margins of difference in the various countries. As can be seen from Table 10, the UK press is dominated by domestic matters (albeit by a relatively small margin), whereas the Euroland press systems are clearly dominated by non-domestic matters (albeit by different margins). The extraordinary imbalance between Dutch attention to domestic and non-domestic matters is no doubt due to geographical and cultural factors deriving from the size of the nation and the extent of its now-traditional orientation to the outside world; but the margin of difference in the French and German presses is also clearly significant.

Analysis of Distribution of Meaning by Location

In the UK press, the distribution between domestic/non-domestic agents and events is similar (Tables 8 and 9), suggesting that agents are dealing with matters that are dictated by their location. In the French and German press, there are more domestic agents than domestic events (and conversely for non-domestic), which implies that domestic agents are dealing with non-domestic matters in some greater proportion than in the UK. This is a further indicator of a difference in framing between the UK and Euroland. In the Dutch press, the balance between national and transnational matters is unequivocal in every respect.

Again, it may appear obvious that inside Euroland, the EMU will be seen as a transnational matter. But it has been successfully defined as such and, at least during the period surveyed, domestic concerns are not above transnational ones in the press agendas in these Euroland countries.
Conclusions

News reporting is event-centered. Each event is presented in terms based on a judgment about which aspect or dimension of the event is considered significant, according to news criteria (Palmer, 2000). To use the terms discussed earlier in this chapter, each news story is about an “issue.” In the case of “human interest” stories, the issue base may be less than obvious. (For a discussion of an example of sexual scandal, see Palmer, 2000.) Journalists’ choices of which issues to report collectively constitute an agenda (which may or may not result in the “setting” of a wider public agenda). The combination of the two results in a “frame,” in terms of which the issue(s) in question acquire a more or less defined profile. This profile may be the result of “upstream” activities by news sources, autonomous journalist decisions, or some mixture of the two. It may have some “downstream” impact on public opinion. Certainly, news sources make well-documented efforts to ensure the compatibility of event-profiling with their strategic intentions (Weaver, 1994; Miller and Williams, 1993; Palmer, 2000; Gandy, 1982; Sigal, 1986). The study reported here aims to show how two significant dimensions of the reporting on the EMU underlie the mass of reporting of individual events and issues in the press. These dimensions are the questions about the national/transnational and the political/economic/civil. A propos each of these dimensions, it is clear that the UK press “frames” the EMU distinctively differently from that adopted in the Euroland press systems studied. Whether this is the result of conscious “upstream” communications strategies cannot be established on the basis of this analysis; an analysis of the range of sources used would go some way to achieving this. Nor does this study allow any analysis of the actual impact on public opinion. However, it seems likely that the framing in question corresponds to some significant element of public opinion (upstream or downstream) in the countries in question.

References


Chapter 11
The Ukraine Media on the Orange Revolution

Natallya Krasnoboka and Christ'lı De Landtsheer

University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

Abstract

This chapter is a part of a larger analysis of Ukrainian political transition. It reports the results of one case study. Based on the importance of media and their message in the country, we argue that media language helps us understand the process of political transition in a given society. Transition is inherently a political crisis. Thus, the language of transition is, by definition, a language of crisis. Crisis Communication Combination (CCC) theory is our major theoretical and methodological tool. CCC theory says that the language of crisis is less complex, more metaphorical, and directed toward the audience (demagogical). This lets us determine if the current language of Ukrainian transition can be qualified as a language of crisis. It helps us to register possible language diversity between different media outlets. It allows us not only to answer questions about language complexity, its metaphorical filling, and audience-directed modality use, but also to watch these trends evolve and compare them. The central questions of this chapter are: Does the language of Ukrainian media follow a crisis pattern? How does it change over time and between outlets? Our study confirms that the language of Ukrainian media follows a crisis pattern. This is particularly visible in less complex, more metaphorical language. As we expected, different media outlets showed different levels of crisis pattern.

Introduction

In November-December 2004, a peaceful Orange revolution occurred in Ukraine. Despite the real danger and threats, weapons were not used. Instead, Kyiv celebrated its biggest carnival. There were many oranges, dances, songs, costumes, and words: words that united people and some that separated them; words that celebrated victory and others that promised unrest and bloodshed. Ukrainians believed it was a real revolution, using words as weapons. Another weapon was a color. There was a clear distinction between the words and colors of both camps: “white-and-blue Russian” for the outgoing regime and “orange Ukrainian” for the opposition. These “colorful languages” became factors of success or failure. Undoubtedly, the combination of a color-word struggle resulted in a highly picturesque rhetoric that was very symbolic and expressive.

Ukrainians like to use expressive, vivid language. It is a part of their national culture. Soviet censorship contributed to the development of a language of “hidden meanings.” Ever since its independence, Ukraine faced a period of transition, the critical nature of which only reinforces the use of expressive talk. The last years of Kuchma’s regime reintroduced censorship practices, pushing people to refresh their skills in using “coded” language. The Orange revolution became the highest point
of the post-Soviet crisis. Thus, it would be reasonable to suspect that the expressiveness of the language reached its heights as well.

This chapter reports the results of one case study. Based on the importance of media and their message in the country, we argue that a media language helps us understand the process of political transition. Crisis Communication Combination (CCC) theory was our major theoretical and methodological tool (De Landtsheer and De Vrij, 1999, 2004).

Theoretical Framework

Evaluating the importance of language in politics, Feldman (1998, pp. 195-196) claimed that “language becomes an important instrument of power, a means for winning political office, a tool for influencing policy, and a weapon for mobilizing the public’s support.” It helps people change or influence political reality. “As people assess their environment, language is created which structures, transforms, or destroys the environment. Language serves as the agent of social interaction; as the channel for the transmission of values; and as the glue that bounds people, ideas and society together” (Denton and Woodward, 1998, p. 45).

While language helps people explain reality, it is as polyphonic as reality itself. Within its polyphonic nature, language is political based on who and what kinds of meanings are chosen for the linguistic signs. We believe polyphonic language is very important for a transition period characterized by an intense struggle for the country’s future directions, including future meanings of language signs. At the same time, within its social function, language “prescribes, constrains, socializes, reinforces, and conserves the status quo” (Corcoran, 1990, p. 70); when a society/regime strives for language stability (resulting from a group’s victory), it has a certain vision of reality. With its victory, this vision will be “fixed” in language status quo till the next transition. “Society produces different techniques in order to stop the floating line of signifiers which are called to overcome the horror of meaning uncertainty of iconic signs” (Barthes, 1989, p. 305) to have “one nation, one people, one society [which is] often simply translated into ‘ours’ – ‘our’ industry, ‘our’ economy, ‘our’ nuclear deterrent, police force balance of payments, etc.” (Hartley, 1982, p. 82).

Meadow (1980) finds several reasons to use symbolic discourse in political affairs: 1) symbols that contain a huge amount of information in a compressed form are adopted easily and get quicker responses from people than long messages; 2) symbols with many meanings can mobilize larger numbers of adherents; 3) even if there is always a danger of a symbol’s response to a wrong object, the behaviors that follow such responses may be “uniform” (Meadow, 1980, pp. 34-35). What is its aim? “To arose groups and individuals to action” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 85) and to support political decision.
Crisis

Crisis heightens metaphoric use of a language (De Landtsheer, 1994, p. 77) and elevates the importance of symbolic discourse in real life (Kiew, 1998, p. 81). Pocheptsov (1997, p. 24) considers a function of the symbolic discourse during such times as a kind of psychotherapy “when society is in panic and trouble, it tries to find new ways out of crisis, it necessarily switches to the metaphoric language.” Voloshinov (1930, p. 27) suggested that only periods of social crises and revolutionary changes could open the real multi-accentual nature of the signs.

Research into the language of prosperity and crisis (De Landtsheer, 1994, p. 77) concludes that “political language becomes more ornamental, emotive, and less similar to everyday-life language as economic recession progresses.” Kiew (1998, p. 81) sees the language of crisis as a terministic/dramatic screen, which “directs our attention and through which one sees reality.” The selection of words, symbols, and terms may make people experience reality in a certain given way and not any other. At the same time, Kiew stresses the power of crisis to “unite people around a plot and a narrative” (Kiew, 1998, p. 81).

Transition

We believe that political transition is one of the most vivid examples of political crisis with all implications this may have for its language. We also argue that transitional crisis differs from critical patterns in more stable societies. Language use in stable societies seldom goes beyond the boundaries of the existing social and political order. So even when language and society are seriously shaken by revision and changes in the discourse, the entire political system and language signification does not collapse and a “new order” is not created. On the other hand, transition can be characterized by its “intermediary” position between two political systems as well as their differences in language. Transition is a combination of a previous political system and a new (declared, but still rather vague and unknown) one. This leads to a combination of at least two discourses: the previous system’s and the new one’s emerging discourse. Moreover, the nature of transition itself leaves a vivid mark on a current situation and discourse.

Symbolic language holds society together and bridges the gap (Meadow, 1980), but it is possible only when a symbolic discourse is understood and recognized (if not by all, at least by many). A period of transition is characterized not only by a struggle of various political and ideological possibilities but also by a variety of language and symbolic patterns, many of which are understood and recognized only by a certain social group. In this respect, we can talk about a double crisis (of transition): a critical situation needs to be explained via the critical use of language, which finds itself in a period of crisis.

The countries of the former Soviet Union provide good examples of society-language crisis. The rapid, unpredicted shift from totalitarianism toward
democracy produced quick and rather unforeseen changes in the people’s perception of reality. These countries are caught between the old and new myths (Pochepctsov, 1997, p. 40) of reality. The collapse of the Soviet Union came naturally, but too early for other alternatives to be ready to replace old system(s).

Post-communist dynamics cannot be explained by referring to the previous regime’s universally shared social, economic, cultural, and institutional structures. Negative “inheritances of the past can be overcome, and that a more nuanced explanations should be constructed in order to determine which legacies will and which will not play a role in shaping the direction of change” (Kopecky and Mudde, 2000, p. 527).

Based on the political transformation of former Soviet republics, we may expect that their languages undergo similar dramatic transformations. We assume that the language of transition is, by definition, a language of crisis. For this reason, we believe that applying Crisis Communication Combination (CCC) theory to our case study will be beneficial in several aspects: 1) we can determine if the current language of Ukrainian transition can be qualified a language of crisis; 2) we can register possible language diversity between different groups; 3) the combination in one theory of the three important indicators of semantic and cognitive use of language will allow us not only to gain answers to the questions of language complexity, its metaphor filling, and audience-directed modality use, but also to see the evolution of all these trends in their unity and comparison.

**CCC Theory and Method**

Crisis Communication Combination (CCC) theory is our major theoretical and methodological tool (De Landtsheer, 1998, 2004). It lets us theoretically and empirically examine the crisis (non-crisis) pattern in political speech (text). It assumes that crisis language is simple, is easily accessible, appeals to emotion rather than cognition, and addresses the audience directly. Political communication during crises is increasingly persuasive and demagogic. The CCC index reflects the level of crisis in political discourse.

De Landtsheer’s CCC theory was based on original methodology developed to study language complexity (Suedfeld and Bluck, 1988; Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977; Baker-Brown, et al., 1992), metaphor power (De Landtsheer, 1994, 1998; Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004), and pragmatically ambiguous modals (Sweetser, 1990; Anderson, 1998). The final stage of analysis is the crisis communication combination index (CCC). It is measured in accordance with De Landtsheer’s methods: multiplying a metaphor power index (C) by empathic modals index (E+) and dividing this result by the cognitive complexity index (CC) multiplied by the content modals index (E-): CCC=(C*E+)/((CC*E-)).
Language Complexity

The crisis pattern approach is based on assumptions and observations that language during periods of political, economic, or social crisis differs considerably from language in times of political or economic stability (Lasswell, 1949; De Sola Pool, 1956). Several studies on language complexity showed sometimes dramatic changes in complexity of politicians’ speeches during periods of crisis (Suedfeld and Rank, 1976; Suedfeld, et al., 1977; Wallace and Suedfeld, 1988; Suedfeld, et al., 1993; Wallace, et al., 1993; Wallace, et al., 1996). According to the theory of integrative complexity, low levels of complexity in public speech represent black-and-white thinking; intermediate levels represent increasing differentiation between points of view; and high levels point to integrative thinking and the ability to synthesize. Low complexity of political speech makes the speech simple and accessible to a broader audience. The lower the complexity of the speech, the more it resembles the impressive rhetoric by demagogues who are only interested in their audiences (Windt and Ingold, 1987, p. xix). We symbolize integrative complexity via the CCC index.

Integrative complexity is measured on a 7-point scale: 1 is undifferentiated perspectives or dimensions toward a topic; 3 is a clear differentiation between alternative perspectives or judgments; 4 and above indicates different degrees of perspectives and dimensions of integration. To find integrative complexity (CC), divide the sum of all scored paragraphs by the number of paragraphs.

Metaphor Power

“Metaphors are emotive components of language that are highly reassuring as they simplify reality. [T]hey, beside, add particular desired subjective connotations to the subject which is discussed, and can therefore also have a mobilizing effect” (De Landtsheer and De Vrij, 1999, p. 6). Metaphors can be seen as broadening (non)complexity in political rhetoric. In metaphor theory, innovative and original metaphors are more intense and persuasive than commonly used ones. Metaphors taken from the “vocabulary” of sports, crime, violence, or illness are more powerful than those from the everyday or nature “vocabulary.” Based on these features, De Landtsheer’s theory measures a metaphor’s power index (of a text) as “a meter reader of anxiety in society” (De Landtsheer and De Vrij, 1999, p. 6). A period of crisis provokes an increasing use of metaphors; then, metaphors have stronger than usual expression and are linked to less everyday notions (e.g., crime, violence, game, disease, death). Trend studies for the European Parliament and the Belgian press confirmed that both political language during economic crisis and rhetoric by “extremist” politicians are more metaphorical than during periods of economic prosperity and speeches by “democratic” politicians (Landtsheer, 1994, 1998). To support these conclusions, one study of Ukrainian parliamentary rhetoric suggests a strong relation between metaphor use and mythical thinking. Extremist politicians
use more metaphors and mythical thinking to criticize the present situation; they aim to destroy the logic of the present and its semantic discursive construction. Moderate politicians emphasize the merits of the actual situation, which they analyze logically (Taran, 2000). In a transitional political situation, the logic of the present and its discursive construction are continuously challenged. Metaphor relies on contrast, conflict, and a distorted perception of reality. With the past and present on fire, metaphor becomes any politician’s weapon in the struggle for a new reality and its discursive construction. Metaphor power in political rhetoric is symbolized by C.

The metaphor power index (C) is measured by multiplying the frequency of metaphors per 100 words (F) with metaphorical intensity (I) and the content score (D): C=F*I*D. Frequency is the number of metaphors (m) per 100 words from a general number of words (w): F=(m*100)/w. Intensity (I), measured on a 3-point scale, is the sum of weak (w, value 1), normal (n, value 2), and strong (s, value 3) metaphors, divided by the total number of metaphors (t): I=(1*w+2*n+3*s)/t. Content score, measured on a 6-point scale, is a sum of popular metaphors (p, value 1), nature metaphors (n, value 2), political/intellectual metaphors (po, value 3) disaster/violence metaphors (d, value 4), sports/games metaphors (sp, value 5), and medical/illness metaphors (m, value 6), divided by the total number of metaphors (t): D=(1*p+2*n+3*po+4*d+5*sp+6*m)/t.

**Modals**

The content use of modals refers to the social or physical world a communicator experienced; the epistemic use of modals directs the audience’s attention to the communicator’s state of mind; the use of “speech act” modals aims at interaction with the audience. Anderson (1998) suggests that electoral politicians who try to collect support (to mobilize people) chose epistemic and speech act modals rather than content modals, contrary to totalitarian rulers for whom content use of modals is crucial. Applying these assumptions to the study of political speech in pre- and post-independent Russia, Anderson concludes that the Soviet Union’s totalitarian regime used only content modals, while post-Soviet political discourse is characterized by using a combination of three types of modals.

Modals “inject possibility, necessity, or obligation into unmodified utterances” (Anderson, 1998, p. 65). Anderson based his research on Sweetser’s (1990) concept of pragmatic ambiguity of modals. “Because some modals are pragmatically ambiguous, an audience encountering these parts of speech must think about, however momentarily, whether the speaker is communicating about the content of the message, the reasonableness of the speaker, or the relationship with the audience established by the utterance. Of course, resolution of the ambiguity goes unnoticed; the decision is overlearned and automatic. ... Nevertheless, this unnoticed decision controls the interpretation of the whole utterance. Control of the interpretation determines whether the audience attends to the event reported by the
speaker, to the warrant for the speaker’s belief about the event, or to the linguistic interaction between the speaker and the audience” (Anderson, 1998, pp. 67-68). In other words, the speaker can choose to seek direct contact with the audience through the speech act use of modals or let the audience share some of his own thoughts through the epistemic use of modals; in which case, we say that the speaker’s use of modals is “empathic.” To the extent that the use of modals gets more emphatic, the rhetoric becomes the “impressive” type favored by demagogues (Windt and Ingold, 1987, p. xix). We symbolize the empathic use of modals by the E+ index. E+ is calculated on the basis of the general number of epistemic and speech act modals (e) per 100 words from a general number of words (w): $E+ = (e*100)/w$. If the speaker uses the “content” modals and does not interact with the audience, the speech resembles the “expressive” rhetoric of doctrinaires. We symbolize this nonempathic use of modals by the E- index. E- is calculated on the basis of content modals’ use (c) per 100 words from a general number of words (w): $E(c*100)/w$.

**Media**

Can CCC theory be applied to study the media’s language patterns? Nowadays, delivery of public speeches is mainly performed via the media. One study of media performance in international crisis suggests that democratic regimes use the mass media prior to a conflict to prepare public opinion for war.

Sorely (1998, p. 119) states that media “offer a linguistic rendering of events that is typically perceived as a proxy for an objective reality.” He also claims: “Given that media productions are perceived as objective representations of reality, they attain a status that enhances their legitimacy and ascendancy over alternative accounts and allows them to become a ‘material’ for construction of opinions, norms, and judgments.”

Based on the previous studies, we may argue that as well as the language of politicians, the language of media changes during politically and economically critical periods. We may expect that during such periods, a language of media is far removed from its everyday pattern (which in the case of media, means an unemotional, dry language of facts). We may also expect that in these periods, a language of media particularly highlights and emphasizes the issues and/or personalities most important and/or controversial for a current moment.

The importance and evolution of the media in the former Soviet Union lets us assume that media may be a major source of information for post-Soviet citizens on any issue. We assume that people seek answers in media outlets. Simultaneously, we realize that certain political and cultural groups (elites) successfully affect and manipulate media’s message. Media cannot be considered “innocent” transmitters of impartial, unbiased information, particularly when sensitive issues of a country’s identity and future are concerned.
Case Study: Orange Revolution

Ukrainian society’s euphoria on gaining independence in 1991 was replaced by deep pessimism, apathy, and distrust of possible rapid changes, once citizens realized that the country was falling into a new type of oppressive regime. Soviet totalitarianism was replaced by the transitional authoritarianism of Leonid Kuchma (who stayed in power for almost 12 years as prime minister and, later, president). At that time, Ukraine lacked serious political opposition and a strong civil society movement. After 1999 (Kuchma’s re-election for a second term), the independent media were stifled by the reintroduction of the Soviet practice of censorship. With very few exceptions, media outlets accepted practices of self-censorship and loyalty to the president. Those trying to resist were pushed to the “margins of information discourse” of the time: they moved online. The Internet paper *Ukrainska Pravda* has become the front post of media struggle for freedom of speech. In summer 2000, Internet media began to shape into the most visible and strongest civil opposition to the ruling regime. That was followed by the dramatic disappearance and murder of *Ukrainska Pravada’s* chief editor, Georgy Gongadze. In November 2000, Olexandr Moroz (the leader of Ukrainian Socialist) publicly accused Kuchma of masterminding the killing of the journalist. Mass protests and the creation of an oppositional coalition followed. By the time of 2002 parliamentary elections, the country was divided between two political and information realities: the regime and the opposition. These were two parallel realities, where the regime’s right hand was the opposition’s left hand. Media were discussing similar issues, highlighting similar events, but applying opposing discourses. Slowly, the general rather vague but highly expressive division within the country emerged. On one side, the ruling regime was openly supported by Russia and other post-Soviet authoritarian rulers. It controlled traditional media by predominantly using Russian language and focusing on their stronghold in the country’s east and south (where the majority of the ruling elite resided). On the other hand, the more or less united opposition was strongly supported by civil society groups and Internet media whose priority was European integration; their stronghold was in the country’s center and west with its predominantly Ukrainian speaking population. That division was reinforced by a so-called Soviet identity among the supporters of the ruling regime and a new Ukrainian national identity as a part of a broader European identity among opposition supporters.

This division continued until the 2004 presidential elections, which everybody saw as the most decisive moment in the country’s future evolution. According to the constitution, President Kuchma did not have any legal right to stay in power after 2004. By that time, the opposition had its national leader widely supported and praised around the country. Victor Yushchenko had an image not only of a democrat and a professional, but also of a highly moral and deeply religious person; these qualities were very important for Ukrainian voters. The ruling regime
declared Victor Yanukovich as its candidate. In addition to his ruling class identity (Soviet type of manager, Russian-speaking, from the heart of Eastern Ukraine), Yanukovich was twice convicted and imprisoned during his youth. As a result of their respective backgrounds, the competition between Yushchenko and Yanukovich became a battle between good and evil, white and black. When Yushchenko was poisoned in the midst of the election campaign, it added yet another highly symbolic and emotional point to the struggle. Yushchenko won the first round of elections, but he did not get 51% of the vote; therefore, he and Yanukovich entered the second round of elections. When Yanukovich was announced the winner of the second round, the opposition called for mass mobilization of its supporters and mass protests. Millions of people went on the streets and did not leave them until the new re-vote was called and Yushchenko was proclaimed the new president of the country.

**Media During and After the Orange Revolution**

Ukrainian media is deeply divided; the 2004 presidential campaign and the Orange revolution reinforced these divisions. Although the Internet confirmed its position as the opposition’s major information tool, television continued to serve as the ruling regime’s major mouthpiece. Newspapers were more or less equally divided (quantitatively) between the opposition and the president.

Although it became rather obvious during the early stages of the presidential campaign that the opposition would not give up this time and in case of falsifications would call for civil mobilization and disobedience, the first days of the Orange revolution took the majority of the traditional media by surprise. They continued to obey the regime until occasionally individual journalists or small groups of journalists began to openly announce their support of the revolution. In contrast to the events of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, journalists as a professional class and intellectual elite were no longer in the vanguard of the civil movement. However, that did not prevent the ability of separate media outlets and journalists to become front posts of the revolution. The Fifth Channel has been named “the channel of the honest news.” On that channel, news was broadcasted non-stop on the huge TV screen on the Kyiv’s Independent Square. Interestingly, the position of this channel and a few other outlets and journalists has been self-presented as a civil position of citizens in contrast to a professional position of journalists. The later meant subordination to the will of authorities. Needless to say, the Internet was totally “Orange.” Internet journalists were doing their best to combine their civil and professional duties, to be on the Square, and to support the flow of information and news on their websites. As a marginal information medium of marginalized opposition yesterday, online media then became the major information tool and news source of the Orange revolution.

Post-revolutionary reality supplied (and continues to do so) media with another test of their civil position and professional standards. The new power proclaimed
freedom of speech among its key priorities. Then, media proclaimed their independence from any political influence. What does it mean in practice? Both online and traditional media are struggling to find their ways. For online media, a major question is: Should we support the new authorities which we helped to bring to power by giving them time and an opportunity to evolve or should we “constructively oppose” any authority by definition because media belong to the civil society and ideally perform a watch-dog function? Traditional media ask: Should we believe that these authorities are qualitatively different and will not impose new controls over media, thus allowing media outlets to develop their own strategies or should we “change our color” and become mouthpieces of new authorities because no power would ever give up a chance to control media? Traditional media’s dilemma is complicated by the fact that, financially, most of them still belong to the former ruling regime and the current opposition.

This problematic, multidimensional situation raises the questions: How do media behave in such conditions? Do these political changes and transformations have any impact on them? And if so, what exactly is this impact? One way to answer these questions is to look at the content of media messages in its dynamics in the period between the presidential election, the Orange revolution and the former opposition’s rise to power, and its subsequent performance.

This study looks at the media’s language use. The key questions are: Does the language of Ukrainian media during the period between the 2004 presidential election and the subsequent performance of the new government follow a crisis pattern? Does this crisis pattern differ between outlets and change across time periods? In this study, we test a set of hypotheses applied in a study of crisis and non-crisis language patterns in political speech by De Landtsheer and De Vrij (1999, 2004); these hypotheses are known as the CCC theory. In some ways, this study diverges from the theory’s original application; in others, it stays intact with the original settings. Although it examines language patterns in the period of crisis (as well as shortly before and after it), this study applies CCC theory to a transitional society and compares patterns of language use between different media. Based on previously conducted content analysis of the 2002 parliamentary elections by different groups of Ukrainian media (Krasnoboka and Brants forthcoming), we concluded that “traditional media and most of the Internet provide a mirror reflection of each other in their reporting; but at the same time, this is a distorted reflection because different media highlight and ignore different parts of reality. In the most radical cases and situations, such differences between old and new media can result in the presentation of different political realities.” Also the study of the media content during the first wave of the political crisis in Ukraine 2000-2001 has shown serious differences between online and traditional media in their coverage of the former regime and opposition activities (Krasnoboka and Semetko, forthcoming).
We studied the crisis language pattern during the 2002 parliamentary election (Krasnoboka and De Landtsheer, 2004), revealing significant differences in crisis language patterns between different outlets; the Internet had the highest levels of crisis language use. That was explained by the highly oppositional nature of the Internet toward the ruling regime. At that time, newspapers featured the middle position (between Internet media and television); we argued that the newspapers’ position may make them more reliable and balanced sources of information for those who did not take any side. More interestingly, newspapers have chosen a position of the “country’s interest” and evaluated any occurrences from such a “safe tower.” In terms of metaphor use, the discourse of construction prevailed, reflecting precisely the situation in the country and job-to-be-done mentality. Another feature of that discourse was the “relocation” of the major “enemy” outside the country, positioning it more as an external threat. This external threat, according to the media discourse, might become a real challenge through the help of foreign satellites who “work” inside Ukraine and try to “sell” the country to the “overseas sellers of dog food” or to allow the “Russian tractor to plow our field.” These conclusions from our previous studies allow us to make certain assumptions about more general language patterns of media reporting.

Hypotheses and Expectations

We believe that the Orange revolution in Ukraine is a clear example of political crisis. This allows us to assume that political discourse during the revolution follows a crisis language pattern. Since the election campaign occurred shortly before the Orange revolution and was a direct cause of the public unrest, we expect that the rhetoric during the election campaign also reflects the crisis. For two “ordinary” time periods in our analysis, we expect to see a reverse picture.

We expect that the crisis language pattern will differ between online and traditional media and that this difference will change while the political situation evolves. We expect that online media will follow the “original” pattern of crisis, which will reach its highest point during the time of the Orange revolution and, to a lesser degree, the election period and then, it will go down. At the same time, we expect to see lower levels of crisis pattern in the traditional media during the period of the Orange revolution and in the election campaign. Traditional media will try to downplay the crisis, applying (among other tools) less critical discourse to preserve the feeling of stability and control of the situation.

Based on these assumptions, we expect that the mass media rhetoric of the Orange revolution (and, to a lesser degree, the rhetoric of the 2004 presidential election) will show the crisis pattern (high CCC index), with a (subsequently) low level of integrative complexity (low CC index), high metaphor power (high index), low use of content modals (low E- index), and frequent use of empathic modals (high E+ index). The crisis pattern will show up as more outspoken in the online media than in the traditional media. During the two “ordinary” periods, we expect
no crisis pattern (low CCC index), with a high level of language complexity (high CC index), low metaphor power (low C index), high use of content modals (high E-index), and low use of empathic modals (low E+ index).

Selection Criteria

We studied the language patterns of two media outlets: an online paper, *Ukrainska Pravda* (UP), and a traditional newspaper, *Den’*. We selected four weeks for the analysis: a week prior to the second round of elections (November 15-21), called “election week”; a week of political crisis (December 1-7, beginning on Wednesday), called “revolution week”; a week after the new government was formed (February 7-13, beginning on Monday), called “ordinary week 1”; and a week in May after the so-called “100 days” of the new power (May 16-22, beginning on Monday), called “ordinary week 2.”

Quantitatively compared samples were composed from each outlet, which included only political news. We analyzed full articles for each outlet. As a result, a sample of the newspaper *Den’* contains 194,663 words; a sample of the online paper *Ukrainska Pravda* contains 136,180 words.

We do not apply any differentiation between news and editorials because Ukrainian media are still, as a rule, very opinionated and, in most cases, do not correspond with the formats of Western media (e.g., distinction between news, analysis, and comments sections). Although this can be seen as a big challenge in terms of general media performance, it fits well the end of our study: we can treat selected news items as entire and comparable texts. There are few unscorable paragraphs in the texts.

In this study, we tested two hypotheses. The first predicts that during the period of the Orange revolution, the media’s language will follow the crisis language pattern. At a lower level, this pattern will also be preserved for the election week. Two ordinary weeks will show lower (non-crisis) language patterns. Applicability of the CCC theory has been tested on each of its components, namely the metaphor index, use of modals, and language complexity, and on the general crisis communication pattern.

Metaphor Index

The highest score for the metaphor power index is 22.10 for the online paper *UP* during the “revolution week” and 25.22 for the traditional newspaper *Den’* during the “election week.”

The metaphor power index of *UP* clearly follows the predicted pattern. It reaches its highest score during the “revolution week,” decreases during the election week, and declines further during the two ordinary weeks. The pattern of the traditional *Den’* is different: its highest score is reached during the “election week” while the three other weeks (including “revolution week”) have similar, relatively low scores. These metaphor power index differences mainly arise from
high frequencies of metaphors in Den’ (4.89) during the “election week” and high frequencies of metaphors in UP (4.18) during the “revolution week.”

Average frequency of metaphors is 3.90 for UP and 4.12 for Den’. Average intensity scores are 1.66 for UP and 1.55 for Den’. Compared to Den’, UP has a greater percentage of normal (34.15%) and strong (16.35%) metaphors against 26.38% of normal and 14.35% strong metaphors found in Den’. Both outlets have the highest intensity score during the “election week” (1.72 for UP and 1.65 for Den’). Both outlets also have an equal average score (3.10) for the content of metaphors. Distribution of metaphors is also similar between different content categories. The category “society” has the highest percentage (33.25% for UP and 34.71% for Den’), followed by the “everyday” metaphors (24.23% for UP and 23.65% for Den’) and “sport” metaphors (16.94% for UP and 16.66% for Den’). In the case of metaphors’ content, both outlets have their highest score during the “revolution week” (3.15 for UP and 3.16 for Den’).

Modals

In terms of modals’ analysis, we see a clear decline of empathic modals and a definite rise of content models for the traditional newspaper Den’ while the political situation changes from a crisis to more ordinary times. This pattern (but somewhat less clearly) can also be seen in the online newspaper UP.

![Figure 1: Metaphor index (c)](image)

On average, Den’ has higher frequencies of both content (0.38) and empathic modals (0.36). Most frequently, content modals appear in “ordinary week 1” for UP (0.46) and in “ordinary week 2” for Den’ (0.45). Empathic modals are most frequent during “election week” for UP (0.37) and equally frequent during “election week” and “revolution week” for Den’ (0.39).
Language complexity confirms our expectations in both cases: it has its lowest (almost equal) scores for both “crisis weeks” and much higher scores for both “ordinary weeks.” Average language complexity is 2 for UP and 2.68 for Den’. The lowest language complexity is observed during “election week” for UP (1.84) and “revolution week” for Den’ (2.20). The highest language complexity appears during “ordinary week 1” for Den’ (3.42) and during “ordinary week 2” for UP (2.24).
Crisis Style Pattern

The average CCC index is 9.13 for UP and 8.08 for Den’. It reaches its highest during “revolution week” for UP (12.38) and “election week” for Den’ (12.30). “Ordinary week 1” has the lowest CCC index for both outlets (6.04 for UP and 3.65 for Den’).

Discussion

This study clearly shows that CCC theory can easily be applied to a transitional society. There were also no difficulties in applying this theory to media outlets. Our CCC index in both cases shows clear differences between “crisis weeks” and “ordinary weeks.” For UP, the difference between the highest CCC index during “revolution week” is twice as high as the lowest CCC index during “ordinary week 1.” For Den’, the difference between the highest CCC index during “election week” is more than three times higher than the lowest CCC index during “ordinary week 1.” Thus, the CCC index for UP completely confirmed our hypothesis about crisis language pattern during the Orange revolution. Den’ similarly confirmed our hypothesis but in more general terms, namely it shows great difference in CCC indexes between the “crisis weeks” and the “ordinary weeks,” but it has its highest CCC index during “election week,” not “revolution week” as we might expect. However, such “behavior” of the CCC index for the traditional newspaper Den’ confirms our second hypothesis which expects to find differences in language patterns of both outlets, particularly as far as the “revolution week” is concerned. Based on our previous studies of content and political/partisan differences between traditional and online media, we expected Den’ (as a “representative” of more traditional media) to somewhat downplay the significance of the Orange revolution. In this respect, the result of this study indicates that the CCC theory can be used not only to investigate crisis language
patterns, but also the general political performance of the media, similar to the way in which such behavior is investigated using content or discourse analysis. The question then is: How do we link differences in crisis language patterns between two outlets with their more general role and performance within the political context of the country?

![Figure 5: CCC index](image)

The high CCC index of *Den’* during “election week” can be explained by the following political factors. It is known that *Den’* experiences two major political influences. One comes from the former head of the National Security Council, Evhen Marchyuk, who has not openly supported any candidate in the election race. However, neither has he expressed any concerns about obvious falsifications employed by the pro-presidential groups. The second influence comes from the members of the Social Democratic Party (united) who have been actively involved in the election campaign on the side of the pro-presidential candidate Yanukovich. These two influences may differ in their affiliation with the pro-presidential candidate, but in both cases, the possibility of any civil unrest or disagreement with the final results of the elections has been rejected. Therefore, “election week” was perceived and presented by the newspaper as the highest crisis moment in the recent political situation in the country.

Lower indexes of *Den’* during the week of the Orange revolution can have several explanations. In our opinion, they confirm the fact that traditional media have failed to be in the vanguard of the civil movement; they were unprepared and did not believe in the possibility of civil unrest and disobedience. As a result, their message during this week was one of confusion, inability to take any side. Another possible explanation is that, based on its previous experience of “survival” during a period of unrest (as in 2000-2001), *Den’* decided to downplay the importance of this protest as well. This approach can be most clearly seen in its metaphor indexes.
for “revolution week,” which is almost equal to its metaphor index of “ordinary weeks.” Hoping that this protest would not bring change in elites and that the ruling regime would ultimately regain control over the situation, the newspaper decided not to get at the frontline of protest but to safeguard its position as an “independent” witness. In this respect, discourse is similar to president Kuchma’s and Evhen Marchyuk’s (the political guardian of the newspaper), both of whom took a position “above the battle.” During the Orange revolution, Den’ did not openly and clearly support any of the two candidates, thus it followed in the footsteps of the persons to whom it remained loyal throughout all previous periods of contention.

On the contrary, Ukrainska Pravda has always been at the frontline of the civil opposition movement. Together with other civil groups and political opposition, it registered all violations of the pro-presidential candidate during the election campaign. From early on, this outlet supported the possibility of civil unrest and disobedience if the final results of the elections were falsified. Thus, it was not only prepared for the possibility of the Orange revolution, it prepared the very revolution. We suggest that the CCC index for the crisis language pattern of UP during “revolution week” would be even higher if its journalists and regular contributors had not become the most active participants of the revolution. They simply did not have enough time to write articles because they were spending days and nights on Independence Square in Kyiv or travelling through the regions. Their articles during this period are mainly short reports of the ongong events which do not require a lot of thinking and beauty of style. However, even in such conditions, they managed to use highly crisis-like language.

Based on this analysis and more specifically the language complexity analysis, we noticed another interesting tendency in media performance: the online paper Ukrainska Pravda clearly serves a more partisan, but also more “watchdog,” function. Its very low language complexity score demonstrates that it does not provide different alternatives (which may correspond with different opinions and points of view), at least not in the same paragraphs. The UP follows a more black-and-white or zero-sum approach than expected if it had followed the objective, nonbiased liberal model of media performance. In comparison, Den’ shows higher levels of language complexity which are related not only to the presentation of different alternatives, but also to its attempts to find consensus between alternatives as well as to respect the position of non-involvement.

In this respect, we would like to discuss the two “ordinary weeks” in our analysis. Indeed, very low CC indexes Den’ had during these weeks may be interpreted as a sign that finally, with the change of power in the country, media outlets (which are now free from any political pressure) are making rapid attempts to follow the Western liberal model of objective, unbiased journalism. However, the real political situation in the country is far from being settled and resolved. Already in May (“ordinary week 2” in our analysis), only six months after the elections, the new government and the president were facing unpleasant complaints
and allegations, which are only increasing with time. "Ukrainska Pravda" has clearly taken the position of the uncompromising critic of the new power holders. As such, its position is reflected in higher (and rising) CCC indexes than "Den'" for both ordinary weeks. Certainly, "Den'" follows the same pattern of the CCC index rising in the last analyzed week, although at the lower rate. Which of these two tendencies will become decisive in the further logic of traditional media performance? Will they preserve the tendency to react to the critical moments in the country’s political life (as the rising CCC index suggests) or will they go back to the old practice of serving the man in power (as lower "Den'" CCC indexes during the last two weeks suggest)? The current political and media situation in Ukraine provides an excellent opportunity to follow these (and possibly other) tendencies. Next spring, the country faces new parliamentary elections as well as a possible change in its political system from a presidential to a parliamentary republic, which can bring more new and interesting data into the analysis. Moreover, further analysis should not neglect television, the country’s most widespread and popular medium.

References


Chapter 12
Post-Communist Media in Russia

Vitaly F. Konzhukov

Abstract
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, coupled with the full-scale collapse of communism in East/Central Europe, brought expectations of Russia’s quick transformation into a democracy. Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin repeatedly expressed his commitment to democratic processes and launched an ambitious program of changes to reform the country, making it a truly open and economically stable society.

One of the major tasks of such a transition, creating free and independent media, has proven quite difficult. This chapter overviews Russian media (both print and electronic) and concentrates mainly on the economic challenges they faced during the early years of the country’s post-communist history. In addition, it reviews the Russian government’s attempts to control the press and television.

Introduction

Since 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power and realized the importance of controlling access to information, the media have been an intricate part of Soviet politics. According to doctrine prevailing then:

. . . propaganda and agitation have general and permanent roles to spread the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, to explain to the masses the policy of the party, and to influence them emotionally to support this policy actively (Buzek, 1964, p. 17).

For over 70 years, the Soviet media served as one of the most important tools of official propaganda supervised by the Communist Party and several censorship agencies, including the KGB. On many occasions, the latter also forced journalists to perform intelligence or counterintelligence duties or sent its own agents abroad as “foreign correspondents” of different Soviet news organizations (Vachnadze, 1992, Chapters 2 and 10). Often, the KGB resorted to quite underhanded tactics. For instance, in 1990-91, many Russian publications ran a series of articles exposing the agency’s clandestine operations. But according to Yasmann, one source of those exposures was orchestrated to “pit younger security officers against ‘democrats’ and vice versa, as well as to prevent officers from joining Yeltsin’s camp” (Yasmann, 1993, p. 19).

A major change in Soviet media began in 1985. Then, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated his perestroika (restructuring) campaign. He apparently considered a liberated media instrumental to his reforms, but was reluctant to loosen control over them, so he set certain limits on media glasnost (openness). While he almost never criticized the more conservative publications, he often lashed out against those that were the most persistent and vigorous supporters/critics of his policies, such as Argumenty i Fakty and Moscow News.
But Gorbachev had released the media genie from the communist bottle. The limits of media freedom were continually expanded until the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. The post-Soviet media faced the challenges of economic chaos and political instability in Russia. Their managers and journalistic staffs had to deal with numerous and unprecedented problems of transition, including continuing governmental control without enough financial support from advertisers.

Newspapers and Readership

Much as in the Soviet past, newspaper reading remained a major leisure activity in democratization (Rhodes, 1993a, p. 39). Russian polling companies conducted a series of surveys in 1993 and produced some important statistics on the country’s readership then (Rhodes, 1993a, pp. 39-42). For example, in 1993, 36% of adults in European Russia living outside Moscow read a newspaper almost daily. More than half those respondents (58%) claimed to do so at least three days a week; 78% at least once a week (Rhodes, 1993a, p. 40).

According to this survey, Muscovites were more avid newspaper readers than other Russians, with 50% of the city’s adult population reading one daily. Only 16% of adult Muscovites did not read newspapers at all or had not read one within the three months prior to the poll, compared with the 20% in the rest of European Russia. When asked whether they read more or less than they did a year before, 15% of Moscow residents said they were reading more; 45% claimed to be reading less. Approximately 39% of those questioned did not notice any changes in their reading patterns (Rhodes, 1993a, p. 40).

The local press had a larger regular readership throughout the country than did the national press. Such publications combined political articles with coverage of social problems, sports, and popular culture. Also, readers’ interests varied substantially, depending on their demographic characteristics. Moscow men tended to be more interested in sports, while readers under 25 years old looked for information about music and concerts. Younger readers leaned toward many of the new papers which presented a more popular format and more liberal views; women and older Muscovites preferred the more established press.

Women were the primary readers of many papers. Apart from sports publications, only two newspapers (Kuranty and Kommersant) had a predominantly male readership in Moscow (53% and 68%, respectively) (Rhodes, 1993a, p. 41). Moscow readers named local news and listings of television programs as the topics which interested them most. National and international politics also ranked in the top ten popular issues. At the same time, most other interests on the list related to local problems, practical information, and entertainment.
Television and Its Audience

Television has been an important medium in Russia since the late 1960s when TV sets became common in most households. As in the Soviet past, television networks were still overwhelmingly state-owned and subsidized from the country’s budget. In the early 1990s, a series of attempts were made to create independent TV, such as the Moscow-based Sixth Channel and NTV. The former was started in 1992 as a joint venture with CNN; the latter went on the air in October 1993. However, the viewing audience for programs on both stations was limited because their broadcasts could not be received outside Moscow (Wishnevsky, 1994, pp. 11-12). The number of available channels in the country varied from place to place, but nowhere did it exceed six. The two major state-owned national channels attracted the largest audiences. Cable TV was relatively new to Russia. Its presence was substantial in large metropolitan areas (e.g., 35% of Moscow households) (Rhodes, 1993b, p. 5).

A number of surveys of European Russia in the early 1990s showed that 96% of all households had TV sets (94% ownership in rural areas; 96% in urban centers). Approximately 40% of urban households had two or more sets; about three-quarters of the households had a color TV.

Prime time viewing throughout the week was between 8:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Most Russians watched TV daily. About 60% of urban respondents did so every weekday and 50% on weekends. Rural residents watched slightly less frequently. Men spent more time in front of their TV screens than did women. People under 25 and over 54 were the most frequent viewers.

In 1991-93 the two most popular programs in the country were the newscasts “Vesti” at 8:00 p.m. and “Novosti” at 9:00 p.m., with 40% and 50% of all Russian households watching each, respectively. Television remained the most important source of domestic and international news for both rural and urban Russians. At the same time, the majority of people still regarded TV as an entertainment medium (Rhodes, 1993, pp. 54-56).

Economic Challenges and Struggle for Survival

As soon as Yeltsin started his economic reforms and lifted government price controls on January 2, 1992, all of the Russian media found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. Under the former Soviet system, the print media belonged to the state (i.e., the Communist Party). They were financed from its budget and were centrally distributed. Since all media were part of the propaganda machine, nobody was really concerned about their cost. The nationwide system of delivery (Soyuz-pechat) was centralized. Most print media did not make a profit; the state covered all the deficits. After the USSR disintegrated, newsprint and ink prices skyrocketed. While in 1991, newsprint could be purchased at 33 rubles a ton, by January 1992, it...
cost 240 rubles a ton, and by July 1992, it rose to 21,000 rubles (Daniloff, 1993, p. 44).

By early 1992, Soyuzpechat split into a number of national systems in the newly independent states. Each was given its own media monopoly. Few new privatized alternative delivery services could compete with Rospechat (the successor). Distribution prices also skyrocketed.

Soaring publishing and distribution costs, aggravated by inflation, sent subscription and newsstand prices sky high. As a result, newspaper and magazine circulations decreased dramatically. In 1991, the Soviet press lost about one-third of its 1990 subscribers, even though numerous new publications were started. In 1992 and 1993, this trend continued. According to the subscription rates for 1993, Izvestia kept 25% of its 1992 subscribers (800,000 compared to 3,200,000), Komsomol'skaya Pravda 15% (1,831,000 of 12,941,000), Nezavisimaya Gazeta 39% (27,000 of 70,000), and the weekly Argumenty i fakty 35% (8,873,000 of 25,693,000) (Androunas, 1993, p. 15). In their struggle for survival, newspapers and magazines attempted to increase advertising revenues and sought (with varying degrees of success) to diversify their activities by publishing supplements and setting up joint ventures with domestic and foreign firms.

The audiovisual media were not immune to economic problems either. Unlike the bulk of newspapers and magazines, which by 1993 had already been privatized, the overwhelming majority of TV and most radio stations were still state-owned. In the early 1990s, a major change in the electronic media was the disappearance of what used to be Gosteleradio (Soviet State Television and Radio Company). Control shifted to the former Soviet republics. But each of them, including Russia, continued with its own state TV and radio broadcasting.

In the previous Soviet model, the major expense for TV broadcasting was not programming, but transmission costs. Since the Ministry of Communications was responsible for the entire transmission system, a part of the national TV budget was appropriated for it. In the post-Soviet era, in addition to these expenses, Russian TV had to pay producers for movies it showed, which it never did before. The payment situation with sports events and entertainment was the same. At the same time, expansion of commercials and joint ventures on TV went faster than in the press because larger investments were made. Nevertheless, economic hardships forced TV organizations to fight for their survival.

**State Subsidies and Political Pressures**

In the Soviet system, the state both controlled and supported the press. But with the disappearance of the communist regime, financial support for the media faded away, too. Interestingly enough, finding themselves in dire straits, many “privatized” editors and journalists appealed to the government for help. Apparently, they failed to realize that they were putting themselves in a very vulnerable position and...
risking their newly won independence. The financial situation became critical in February 1992.

When a few large newspapers did not appear for several days, President Yeltsin signed an executive order “About additional measures for legal and economic defense of periodical press and state book publishing” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 22, 1992, p. 1). This order restored fixed prices (lower than production costs) for 70% of the newsprint and other kinds of paper for printing and publishing in the country. It guaranteed supplies for state book publishing and “newspapers and magazines published according to programs approved by the Ministry of Press and Mass Information of the Russian Federation” (Androunas, 1993, p. 61). Government-sponsored publications were not only guaranteed supplies, but also exempt from paying taxes on their hard currency revenues. Special funds to reimburse them for distribution and delivery expenses were also provided “within the framework of subscription circulation” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 22, 1992, p. 1). Not unexpectedly, there were also a number of cases in which the government tried to make its financial support conditional on a newspaper’s agreement to refrain from publishing an article which criticized the government (Tolz, 1993, p. 3).

Since government-owned TV and radio fell under Yeltsin’s strict control, it adhered to the “party line.” During Yeltsin’s confrontation with the Russian parliament and the subsequent October 1993 armed reprisals in Moscow, TV played an important role as the main source for pro-government propaganda.

In January 1992, Yeltsin authorized the merger of the country’s biggest news organization, TASS, with the Russian Information Agency “Novosti” (RIAN), thus creating a huge media structure under the auspices of the government. Officially, this move was explained as a solution for budget problems, but critics raised the issue of Yeltsin’s desire to monopolize information sources. (Interestingly enough, by the end of 1991, TASS had actually begun to show a small profit.) It is reasonable to assume that the government chose to subsidize the agency to prevent it from becoming independent (Androunas, 1993). At the same time, RIAN also aggravated Yeltsin by running a series of articles critical of his economic policies.

To strengthen presidential control over the state-run media even further, Yeltsin in late 1992 set up a Federal Information Center to supervise both television and radio and the TASS-RIAN conglomerate. He put one of his close associates Mikhail Poltoranin, in charge of the Center.

From 1991-93, when executive and legislative members waged a full-scaled political war, most of the country’s media joined one or the other side which explains obvious pro- or anti-government biases of different media outlets at the time. The government, in turn, also paid close attention to what journalists had to say. In the aftermath of the October 1993 mutiny, the president reinstated censorship and imposed a ban on 13 newspapers and one TV show (The New York Times, October 15, 1993, p. A7).
The Law on the Press

In the communist past, the media were regulated by the “Law on the Press and Other Mass Media,” adopted by the Soviet legislature in June 1990. In fact, this was the only legal document of its kind in the entire Soviet history.

After the USSR ceased to exist, all Soviet laws were declared invalid. But the new “Russian Federation Law on the Mass Media” was passed in December 1991. According to one observer, the Law on the Press reveals many compromises to accommodate the conservatives and their penchant for suppression. The 30-page law has none of the simplicity and ambiguity of the First Amendment to the US Constitution (Daniloff, 1993, p. 40). The document proclaimed prior censorship “inadmissible” (Article 3) (all articles are quoted from European Broadcast Statutes, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 625-656); however, it required media organizations to register with the Ministry of Press and Information (Articles 8-15). Registration was not just a formality since it could be denied (Article 13). The media bore “criminal, administrative, disciplinary, or other responsibilities” for various violations and could be silenced (Articles 4 and 59). Journalists had certain rights (Article 47) and responsibilities (Article 49). Retail sales of erotic publications required discreet packaging (Article 37); calls for a “seizure of power,” racial violence, propaganda, or war were prohibited (Article 4).

Despite the existence of numerous restrictions and regulations, the press was able to operate quite freely much of the time. For instance, the pornography boom that started in the late 1980s continued into the 1990s. By 1991, pornographic publications became available virtually everywhere in Russia. As one expert notes, “the pornography issue pits conservatives against liberals, with the former wanting complete suppression and the latter urging civilized ways of control.” In another example, some Moscow newspapers also embarked on aggressive anti-Semitic campaigns (Daniloff, 1993, p. 40).

A lack of any professional standards and a passion for sensationalism resulted in many libel suits against media outlets. The Russian media in this period were “much more opinionated and less fact-based than their American counterparts” (Daniloff, 1993, p. 41). To some extent, this can be explained by the historical lack of access to information in a Soviet closed society. They saw themselves as heroes, crusaders, and independent journalists who had something to say, just like their Western European counterparts:

... common in Europe is the concept of the active or participant journalist, the journalist who sees himself as someone who wants to influence politics and audiences according to his own political beliefs (Horvat, 1991, p. 196).

Finally, harsh economic conditions and political chaos in Russia took their toll on the media, making journalists vulnerable to the influence of special-interest groups. Bribery became common for many news organizations (Daniloff, 1993, p.
41; Androunas, 1993). In 1991, Yegor Yakovlev, then head of Russian national TV, publicly admitted that “the level of corruption around advertising, including information programs, is difficult to describe” (Kommersant, No. 44, 1991, p. 11). For example, on numerous occasions, different private businesses paid for commercials illegally and directly to the TV crew, which subsequently stole the money. Similarly, newspaper journalists were involved in what was called “hidden advertising” (interviews or reports that were actually advertising but not identified as such) (Androunas, 1993).

Conclusions

The transformation of Russia’s media, which started in the mid-1980s, continued into the early 1990s. The freedom of expression which Soviet journalists had first experienced under Gorbachev was expanded even further after 1991. Substantial progress was also achieved in privatizing Russia’s press.

Yeltsin and subsequent economic hardships affected the media, leaving them struggling. In addition, the new Russian government was quick to use a new (not ideological, but rather economic) means of media control. It subsidized the “loyal” publications and gave them tax breaks as well as special deals on newsprint, ink, and publishing expenses. The result was that “economic pressure has, at times, become political pressure for the media in terms of . . . government subsidies or lack thereof” (Wilson, 1995, p. 113).

In its attempts to restrain the media, the government also employed some of the tactics of its communist predecessors, such as the reinstatement of censorship and trumped-up criminal prosecutions. It also consolidated its control over the state-owned press and created a superficial media watchdog agency: the Federal Information Center. The government refused to privatize TV and radio so that the most influential remained under state ownership. Because of the chaotic conditions in the country, the government frequently failed to enforce its own new laws regarding the press (e.g., regulating pornography and advocating racial violence prohibitions).

Generally, the situation in the Russian media by the mid-1990s reflected the situation in the country as a whole: a painful transition from the old authoritarian communist system (with no comparable experience from previous history) to an uncertain future which may (or may not) be based on democracy and the market. (For an update on this topic, see Fossato and Kachkaeva, August 1999.)

References


