TY  - BOOK
AU  - Ulrike Neubauer
PY  - 2021
CY  - Berlin, Germany
PB  - Peter Lang Verlag
SN  - 0531-7339
TI  - Costs and Incentive Effects of Stock Option Repricing
UR  - https://www.peterlang.com/document/1097741
N2  - Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract? In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders’ returns.
KW  - USA, Aktienoptionsplan, Schätzung, Corporate Governance, Management Vergütung, Stock Option Repricing, Führungskraft, Anreizsystem
LA  - English
ER  -