Heisenberg’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics
Edited by Babette Babich
A contribution to continental philosophy of science, the phenomenological and hermeneutic resources applied in this book to the physical and ontological paradoxes of quantum physics, especially in connection with laboratory science and measurement, theory and model making, will enrich students of the history of science as well as those interested in different approaches to the historiography of science. University courses in the philosophy of physics will find this book indispensable as a resource and invaluable for courses in the history of science.
Chapter Six: The Uncertainty Relations: Paradigm or Ontology of Nature?
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The Uncertainty Relations: Paradigm or Ontology of Nature?
Is it possible to infer which of the elements of Heisenberg’s interpretation he held to belong to the basic descriptive ontology of quantum mechanics and which formed merely a part of a proposed paradigm? According to his own account,1 it was not until some months after the paper on the Uncertainty Relations was written, that he abandoned the belief that the old classical descriptive concepts were inadequate for quantum physics. I surmise then, that in that 1927 paper classical visualizable pictures of quantum phenomena were intended to belong merely to the paradigm and not to the underlying ontology. I conclude then that the underlying descriptive ontology was still controlled by the abstract principle of E (instein)-observability, Heisenberg started out with.
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