Personhood and Epistemic Interactivism in Indigenous Esan Thought

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Preface

Epistemic interactivism (which is an aspect of the epistemology of representation) is a cognitive intercourse between the subject and person-object of knowledge that underlies the conception of a person in Esan thought. It is a response to the two-fold deficiency posed by the traditional theories of representation, especially as captured by Descartes and Locke: the ideal asocial self that produces knowledge impersonally, and the grouping of the ‘other’ (persons apart from the subject of knowledge) with nonpersons (objects, things, animals, etc.) as object of knowledge. This two-fold deficiency is influenced by the materialism of Western science that describes persons and non-persons impersonally. However, this two-fold deficiency dehumanised the subject of knowledge and the person-object of knowledge (the ‘other’) because it ignored the cognitive and moral values of persons; and it produces propositional knowledge that also dehumanised the relationship between the subject and the person-object of knowledge.

Recent trends in epistemology, like social, feminist, moral and virtue epistemology, have all responded to the first part of the two-fold deficiency, that is, the asocial and impersonal production of knowledge. But these trends have not yet addressed the second part of the two-fold deficiency, that is, the grouping together of the person-object with nonpersons as object of knowledge. The reason for this may be the inability of these trends to detect the influence of the materialism of Western science in the production of knowledge. This is not surprising for it is easier for a researcher of another cultural background to see through the epistemic limitations of an alien culture since he or she is often not affected by the limitations of locked-in thinking that affects persons within a given culture or professional field.

Thus, there is the need for an epistemology that is cognisant of the cognitive and moral values of persons and produces knowledge that unifies the subject and person-object of knowledge on cognitive and moral grounds, provides adequate basis for personhood, and resolves the dehumanising relationship between the subject and person-object of knowledge. ← ix | x →

Using the critical, analytic, conceptual, and re-constructive methods, I have looked at the two-fold deficiency of the traditional theories of representation and proposed the epistemic interactivism of indigenous Esan thought as a way out of the deficiency. Adopting Hegel’s dialectics, which unified the subject and object of knowledge at the ‘Absolute’, and meliorating the limitations in Hegel’s ‘Absolute Knowledge’ with the personalism of Borden Parker Bowne, I have critically explained how the subject of knowledge in indigenous Esan thought engages in epistemic intercourse with the person-object of knowledge in a way that sustains the dignity of persons, and creates the enabling grounds for a humane relationship between the subject and the person-object of knowledge.

I am immensely grateful to Prof. I. E. Ukpokolo (my PhD supervisor) and other academic staff of the Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan for their contributions towards this work, which was initially my PhD thesis in the department.

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Introduction

What Is Philosophy?

Taking a clue from Pythagoras who first called himself, in the sixth century BC, a philosophos – lover of wisdom – philosophy came to mean ‘a love of thinking about things and the possession of a thoughtful and reflective attitude towards life in general.’¹ This reflective attitude must be critical enough to transcend the everyday assumptions of the common person on the street who has not examined in a very deep manner his or her accepted beliefs and propositions. Plato assigned to the philosopher the task of attaining reality – the essence of things – rather than appearance – things as they seem to be. Since Plato’s time, philosophers have assumed that there is a reality out there independent of persons, their perceptions and conceptualisations; and philosophy has come to mean ‘a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe, taken in its entirety and as a single whole, from an observation and study of the data presented by all its aspects.’²

Arriving at a reliable and indubitable method with which to investigate the universe in order to possibly attain a consensus as to what the universe is composed of is the business of the branch of philosophy known as epistemology. ← 1 | 2 →

Epistemology as a Branch of Philosophy

Epistemology is one of the core branches of philosophy. Kim and Sosa defined it as ‘a philosophical inquiry into the nature, condition, and extent of human knowledge’.³ Kaphagawani and Malherbe also defined it as ‘the study of theories about the nature and scope of knowledge, the evaluation of the presuppositions and bases of knowledge, and the scrutiny of knowledge claims.’⁴ All humans, irrespective of race or colour, have the capacity to know and to learn; so, knowledge is universal. But disputes do arise over knowledge claims due to differences in world-views or presuppositions from one culture or location to another. One implication that can be drawn from this is that ‘although epistemology as the study of knowledge is universal, the ways of acquiring knowledge vary according to the socio-cultural contexts within which knowledge claims are formulated and articulated.’⁵ Hence, epistemology can also be seen as the theory of the justification of knowledge claims.⁶

The justification of knowledge claims varies from culture to culture, and from one epoch to another. Among the many theories competing for the justification of knowledge claims are the traditional theories of representation, especially those of the Western philosophical tradition. These traditional theories of representation are often presented as a paradigm with which to measure all other forms of theories of representation, thus making it difficult for other cultures to make any meaningful contribution to the knowledge discussion in this regard. However, this work identifies and addresses a two-fold deficiency in the traditional theories of representation ← 2 | 3 → in Western philosophy, especially as captured by Descartes in the Rationalist tradition and Locke in the empiricist tradition. In doing this, an aspect of indigenous Esan thought (which is an aspect of the theory of representation) as it concerns epistemology is employed. To fully understand and appreciate the Esan epistemology espoused here, it will be necessary to clarify the concepts of indigenous, personhood, interactivism, and Esan people.

Clarification of Concepts

Indigenous

The term ‘indigenous’ is often used simultaneously with the term ‘traditional’. Definitions of ‘indigenous’ and ‘tradition’ abound with the ideas of that which is customary to a people or a place, that which has been handed down by the founding fathers or ancestors of a people, and that which is original or unique to a given people, place or culture.

However, Kapoor and Shizha in Indigenous knowledge and learning in Asia/Pacific and Africa, stated that defining the concept ‘indigenous’ is problematic; and that some scholars feel that ‘definitions/taxonomies (and their rigidities) are a product/instrument of colonial administration and control.’⁷ In other words, some scholars are conscious of the fact that definitions are value-laden; that is, they contain moral standards that are often biased towards other people’s indigenous beliefs, practices and philosophy.

The reasons above may explain why the UN Working Group on the Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples did not see any need to define the concept ‘indigenous peoples’. Rather, the group explains what the concept ‘indigenous peoples’ incorporates: ← 3 | 4 →

being original inhabitants of a land later colonized by others; nondominant sectors of society with unique ethnic identities and cultures; strong ties to land and territory; experiences or threats of dispossession from ancestral territory; the experience of being subjected to culturally foreign governance and institutional structures; and the threat of assimilation and loss of identity vis-à-vis a dominant society […]; that is, indigenous understood as a location and a historical and contemporary experience with colonialism as the category of common experience.⁸

So, any community, society, or group of persons with any of the above characteristics can be said to be an indigenous community, society, or group.