Show Less
Restricted access

Recalling the Celtic Tiger

Series:

Edited By Eamon Maher, Eugene O'Brien and Brian Lucey

This book looks at various effects, symptoms and consequences of the period in Irish culture known as the Celtic Tiger. It will trace the critical pathway from boom to bust – and up to the current beginnings of a similar, smaller boom – through events, personalities and products. The short entries offer a sense of the lived experience of this seismic period in contemporary Irish society.

While clearly not all aspects of the period could realistically be covered, the book does contain essential information about the central actors, events, themes, and economic trends, which are discussed in a readable and accessible manner. Each entry is linked to the overall Celtic Tiger phenomenon and its immediate aftermath.

The book also provides a comprehensive account of what happened in this period and will be a factual resource for anyone anxious to discover information on the areas most commonly connected to it. All entries are written by experts in the area. The contributors include broadcasters, economists, cultural theorists, sociologists, literary critics, journalists, politicians and writers, each of whom brings particular insights to some aspect of the Celtic Tiger.

Show Summary Details
Restricted access

Nyberg Report (Sean Barrett)

Extract

Sean Barrett

Nyberg Report

The Report by Peter Nyberg, titled Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland, was commissioned by Finance Minister Brian Lenihan in September 2010. Nyberg was then Director General of the Financial Markets Department at the Ministry of Finance of Finland, having previously worked at the Bank of Finland and at the IMF. Chapter 1 of the Nyberg states that ‘the Report aims to provide answers on why a number of institutions, both private and public, acted in an imprudent or ineffective manner, thereby contributing to the occurrence of the Irish banking crisis’ (p. 1).

The Nyberg Report states that:

it could be argued that bank management in Ireland, like many banks elsewhere in the world, had forgotten the very nature of credit. Providing credit is not a sale of bank services; it is the acquisition of a risky asset. The appropriate prudential focus of such a transaction is therefore limiting and mitigating risk (or, at the very least, understanding the real risk and pricing it accordingly) rather than expanding sales. This apparent inability, some might say unwillingness, of Irish banks to remember this basic principle of banking was a major cause of the banking crisis in Ireland. The problem was further exacerbated as many banks appear to have emphasised and valued loan sales skills above risk and credit analysis skills. (p. 50)

Nyberg found ‘little appreciation – both domestically and abroad – of the fact...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.

Do you have any questions? Contact us.

Or login to access all content.