Edited By Arben Hajrullahu and Anton Vukpalaj
For many areas of social science research, including conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and international state-building, Kosovo remains a uniquely interesting and relevant case. This book is motivated by the belief that there is much to be gained, analytically and empirically, from bringing together local scholarship that focuses on Kosovo-specific issues. It helps understand how pathdependent historical legacies set in motion prior to and during the war for independence, coupled with contemporary processes of dependence on and interdependence with external actors, shaped contemporary Kosovo society and institutions. It brings together a methodologically diverse set of local scholarly perspectives on contemporary political, legal and societal developments in Kosovo.
The Relationship between Power-Dividing and Power-Sharing Institutions in Kosovo: The Correlation of Constitutional Review and Minority Veto
Abstract This chapter assesses the effectiveness of complex power-sharing in Kosovo by examining the relationship between consociational and power-dividing mechanisms present in Kosovo’s institutional design. The research will focus on an assessment of the viability of constitutional review in a decision-making system dominated by veto power mechanism in the adoption of constitutional reforms. By examining the dynamics of the relationship between constitutional review and political decision-making process in which minorities threaten the usage of veto power, it attempts to answer the following question: How does the constitutional review affect the decision-making procedure in a system dominated by consociational mechanisms in the context of external involvement? The main finding of this chapter is that the interaction between consociational and power-dividing mechanisms does not provide for effective functioning of institutions, especially in the case where decisions are subject to the veto by non-majority communities.
Keywords: Kosovo, power-sharing, complex power-sharing, power dividing, consociationalism, veto power, constitutional review, constitutional court
International organizations involved in peacekeeping and conflict management are increasingly promoting complex institutional arrangements for post-conflict societies, including consociational, power-dividing mechanisms, cross-border links, autonomy and external supervision (Choudhry, 2008; McGarry et al., 2008; Weller, Metzger, 2008; Wolff, 2009a). These arrangements have been coined as complex power-sharing (Wolff, 2009b). They were established in Kosovo in 2008 through the ←129 | 130→adoption by the Kosovo Assembly of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) proposed by the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK). The CSP strengthened...
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