La sortie de guerre- Exiting a War
Edited By Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau
Une réflexion sur les conditions politiques, diplomatiques et militaires dans lesquelles s’est effectuée la sortie de la guerre, entre 1968, année de l’ouverture des négociations américano-vietnamiennes à Paris, et 1976, date de la réunification administrative du Vietnam, semble d’autant plus opportune que grandit actuellement l’inquiétude sur les perspectives de l’après-guerre en Afghanistan. Inspirés d’un colloque international réuni à Paris, en 2008, les textes rassemblés ici par Pierre Journoud et Cécile Menétrey-Monchau abordent cette étape de la sortie de guerre principalement sous l’angle diplomatique, mais débordant largement le spectre diplomatique traditionnel. Quelques-uns des meilleurs spécialistes croisent ici leur analyse de cette phase finale de la guerre, revenant sur les négociations qui ont mis fin à la dimension américano-vietnamienne du conflit, avec l’Accord de Paris du 27 janvier 1973, avant que les armes ne tranchent l’autre guerre, celle entre Vietnamiens, le 30 avril 1975.
Ce livre est accompagné d’un DVD avec des témoignages inédits sur les coulisses des négociations de Paris qui ont mis fin à la guerre du Vietnam (1968–1973).
With its three million civilian and military casualties and the enormous material destruction it brought about, the Vietnam War remains one of the worst human tragedies since 1945. Growing uncertainty about the potential post-war situation in Afghanistan has renewed interest in the political, diplomatic and military conditions that brought about the end of the Vietnam War – the period covered by the opening of Vietnamese-American negotiations in Paris in 1968 up to the administrative reunification of Vietnam in 1976. The texts collected in this volume by Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau, first inspired from an international colloquium held in Paris in 2008, analyse the full range of exit strategies exploited during this period. Although written primarily from a diplomatic perspective, the focus of this publication extends well beyond the traditional realm of diplomacy. Some of the most eminent specialists present their analysis of the final phase of the war, and re-examine the negotiations which brought the Vietnamese-American phase of the conflict to an end with the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, before the other war, between the Vietnamese themselves, was decided by the force of arms on April 30, 1975.
Provided with this book is a DVD with new testimonies on the Paris Peace negotiations that ended the Vietnam War (1968–1973).
L’ACCORD DE PARIS ET SES SUITES, 1973-1976 / THE PARIS ACCORDS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, 1973-1976
L’ACCORD DE PARIS ET SES SUITES, 1973-1976 THE PARIS ACCORDS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, 1973-1976 241 The Politburo and the Paris Peace Accords: The Decisions for War, Peace, and the Return to War, June 1971-June 1973 George J. VEITH The spectacular failure of the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which finally collapsed when North Vietnamese armored columns poured into Saigon on April 30, 1975, has spawned numerous articles and books attempting to plumb Nixon’s and Kissinger’s strategy and goals. Less well understood are the motives, strategies, and policies of the North Vietnamese Politburo. Although the Communist Party has permitted the publication of books by several participants, most notably Luu Van Loi’s Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris, along with several official document collections, the majority of the primary sources remain locked in Hanoi’s archives. Enough has been released, however, to discern a faint outline of what transpired during those turbulent times. What did the Politburo hope to accomplish with the 1972 offensive? Why did Hanoi decide to sign the agreement? What events or policies drove the return to war? This paper seeks to explain that process, relying on the above-mentioned North Vietnamese publica- tions. The result is a discovery that the Politburo had, years before the signing, carefully thought-out its options and weighed the likely scenar- ios for the culmination of a peace treaty. As events played out, it fol- lowed that path, albeit with a few detours and setbacks. After the sign- ing, the Politburo again evaluated its options. It...
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