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Modelling Dual-Use Trade Control Systems


Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor, Quentin Michel and Sylvain Paile

The Chaudfontaine Group was established in 2010 as an annual two-day gathering of young Europeans with diverse academic backgrounds, including lawyers, economists and political scientists, from relevant national authorities, European institutions, scientific centres and industry. Its members are invited to discuss their respective viewpoints on the European trade of sensitive goods, focusing on the strategic issues confronting this sector in a rapidly evolving international context.
In December 2013, at its fourth conference, the Group met with African experts to debate the question of how African countries control the trade of dual-use items and the challenges they face in their search for effective regulations. The objective was to study whether international norms and experiences, pertaining both to states and to organisations, could be used as standardised models for African countries affected by unique security concerns.
This volume analyses and discusses those trade control systems which could be described as «models» and might therefore serve as a standard to be exported to the African countries in question. The debate is multi-levelled and studies the possibility of setting universal, regional or even-sub-regional norms.
The contributors to this book, who display a wide variety of expertise, call for the adoption of norms which they argue have the potential to reconcile freedom of trade with international security, without presuming that these norms should be universal.
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Russian Dual-Use Trade Control. An Example to Follow? (Ekaterina Chirkova)


An Example to Follow?

Ekaterina CHIRKOVA

PhD Candidate – University of Liège

The current system of export controls in Russia was established in the 1990s after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the disappearance of the USSR, the gap in Russian export control laws created opportunities for some “grey market” sales and attracted States and non-state actors interested in acquiring sensitive technologies without having to comply with the restrictive export policies and regulations.1 It raised fear in the international community and the Russian establishment of a potential accelerated spread of WMD. For Russia, an active member of the international nuclear non-proliferation system, it was vital to prove capable of respecting its commitments, maintaining its relations with other States and country’s competitiveness.2 These factors explain the Russian membership and active role in five out of the six major export control regimes (all but the Australia Group).

Non-proliferation export controls

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