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A Path to a Conception of Symbolic Truth


Małgorzata Czarnocka

This book deals with correspondence truth, and offers an explanation of correspondence as a symbolization of reality. The author analyses those basic elements of known correspondence truth theories which are the cause of their inadequacy. She focuses on the theories which try to modify the strongest classical theories and shows that these theories are unable to free themselves from seeing correspondence as copying (mirroring). The book presents a «symbolic» correspondence truth theory claiming that correspondence is a specific kind of symbolisation in a Cassirer-close sense, and correspondence truth is neither a copy, nor any other imitation of reality, but its symbol.

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Chapter 2. Leszek Nowak’s Relative Truth Conception


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Chapter 2 Leszek Nowak’s Relative Truth Conception

At a first glance relative truth conceptions look like a promising class of absolute truth modifiers — they are sound, appeal to scholarly intuition and are well-rooted in scholarly praxis. Most, however, have not been brought together into a comprehensive whole and function as a set of perfunctory views and opinions mainly summoned up in debates on other issues. I will devote this chapter to Leszek Nowak’s relative truth theory, which is based on categories of idealisation and concretization.35

In Nowak’s conception relative truth is opposed to absolute truth and presented as truth based on counterfactual idealistic assumptions, i.e. truth, one can subversively say (even at the risk of falling into apparent contradiction), which is partly false, which carries falsehood. This truth has a specific kind of approximative character. As regards its falsehood content, Nowak’s relative truth theory resembles Popper’s verisimilitude concept, although both offer different falsehood constructs and conditions, and are based on totally different premises, founding ideas and assumptions.

In his approach to relative truth Nowak maintains that its opposition to absolute truth constitutes “the chief issue in Marxist cognition theory,” and presents this issue in the form of the following question: “Does the development of human cognition know any mechanisms ensuring the attainability of (or proximity to) absolute truth?”36 More than four decades after the publication of Nowak’s work the connections between absolute truth, its opposite relative truth and Marxism...

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