This book deals with correspondence truth, and offers an explanation of correspondence as a symbolization of reality. The author analyses those basic elements of known correspondence truth theories which are the cause of their inadequacy. She focuses on the theories which try to modify the strongest classical theories and shows that these theories are unable to free themselves from seeing correspondence as copying (mirroring). The book presents a «symbolic» correspondence truth theory claiming that correspondence is a specific kind of symbolisation in a Cassirer-close sense, and correspondence truth is neither a copy, nor any other imitation of reality, but its symbol.
Chapter 7. An Investigation of Correspondence Truth — Method and Assumptions
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Chapter 7 An Investigation of Correspondence Truth — Method and Assumptions
7.1 Focusing the Study on the Correspondence Relation
If we anticipate the idea of correspondence as constitutive for the nature of truth, then our inquiries into this nature should focus on the correspondence (representation) relation. Therefore, most important in investigating correspondence truth is to grasp the character of the relation between the objects of truth133 and true cognitive results. Preferred in contemporary studies of correspondence truth analysis limited to true sentences or their usages in language is unable to uncover the nature of correspondence, or even to provide essential premises needed to reveal it, because the essence of the correspondence relation lies in binding linguistic objects with non-linguistic ones. The correspondence relation lies outside the scope of language-restricted research or, more bluntly, is totally inaccessible to such inquiry which treats language as a set of symbols equipped with meanings134 but devoid of the objects being references of symbols.
Therefore it seems that inquiries into the nature of the correspondence relation and correspondence truth are best initiated by the step linguistic philosophy (i.e. philosophy subordinated to the linguistic paradigm) finds unacceptable: the transgression of language towards a perspective which offers a view of both language and non-linguistic reality. In other words, in undertaking such inquiries one should adopt a dually distanced (though not necessarily external) approach to language and reality in its metaphysical sense. This is a perspective Putnam calls the...
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