Edited By Andrzej Bator, Zbigniew Pulka and Jan Burzyński
Post-analytical philosophy of law departs from the traditional view which considers philosophical cognition merely as a sense-making and optimizing activity. It also questions the apparently universal and objective character of the theorems put forward by existing analytical philosophy. Just like every scientific trend whose name is supplemented with the "post" prefix, it does not break with its past, but rather seeks to critically revisit its established achievements. The main goal of post-analytical philosophy is no longer to impose a conceptual structure upon chaos in the realm of legal and political phenomena. Rather, it seeks to deconstruct the analytical, both philosophical and legal, narrative to expose it as a collection of schemes which oversimplify – if not mystify – the legal and political reality. This kind of diagnosis paves the way towards the construction of a positive program of post-analytical philosophy of law, which the focus of this book.
Philosophical Premises of the Concept of Systemness of Law in Jerzy Wróblewski’s Theory of Interpretation
1 Metatheoretical Assumptions
Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation is characterized by a philosophical attitude based on the adoption of Marxist rules as philosophical premises of theoretical activity in jurisprudence. According to Wróblewski, we may say that the relation between his theory of interpretation of people’s law and the Marxist philosophy is both the relation of invocation and that of attribution. This means the connection is not only of declarative character (the relation of invocation) but also of subject-matter nature (the relation of attribution). The author formulates the following definition of the relation of attribution: “Tp theorem is attributed to Tf theorem if and only if from Tf Tp can be concluded based on the adopted directives of reasoning and potentially with the assistance of other theorems Te of analytical or synthetic character.”1 In turn, the directives of reasoning that the definition mentions are “the most broadly understood directives of logic, which encompass not only the inferring of sentences from sentences, but also of norms and evaluations.”2 In a slightly different perspective, Wróblewski characterizes the relation of attribution, indicating that it occurs when there appear “broadly understood logical connections”3 between theoretical and philosophical claims. Stressing the heuristic function of philosophy towards the theory of law, the author indicates that in the case of the Marxist theory of law, the connections between theory and philosophy are of deductive character because the theory is inferred from a set of philosophical-methodological assumptions and may...
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