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Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance

Empirical Evidence and Value Effects


Christian Thamm

This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany. The evidence presented supports the strong shareholder rights perspective. It conflicts with the weak shareholder rights view brought forward in the international literature.


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CAPM: estimated alpha CAPM: estimated beta Regression: constant Regression: coefficient CAR Event study: Cumulative abnormal return Event study: abnormal return of firm i on day t i Event i Firm i Observation N Number of observations r Pearson’s sample correlation coefficient CAPM: stock return CAPM: market return Variability of the differences between two sample means t Event study: day t Testing: test statistic of standard T-test Regression: control variable Sample mean y Regression: dependent variable z Testing: Boehmer-Poulsen-Musumeci test statistic z Testing: Standardised Wilcoxon test statistic

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