Chapter 3: Multi-dimensional theory of legal ethics
Chapter 3 Multi-dimensional theory of legal ethics 3.1. Preliminary remarks In accordance with what was said at the outset of this work, when examining the relationship of legal ethics with the philosophy of morality, this chapter will attempt to determine whether the theory of legal ethics, and in particular, multi- dimensional theory – as proposed herein – is possible1, i.e. whether it can be meaningfully considered, without exposing oneself to inconsistencies and antinomies. Of particular interest will be the conditions for the possibility of such a theory. These conditions can be determined only at a meta-theoretical level, which includes not only the possibility of this, but also other ethical theories relating to specific social or professional groups or to specific practices and behaviour. The conclusions of this part of the discussion can therefore be only of formal character and it is thus necessary to complement them in the next section which takes up the issues of the content of legal ethics theory, associated with philosophical-legal assumptions. The starting point for examining the meta- ethical issues of professional ethics consists of several assumptions. Firstly, both the traditions of legal ethics as well as its modern transformations allow for a conclusion that this concept has three basic meanings: obligations, social roles and virtues. It may seem, accordingly, that the simplest way of proceeding would be to check whether legal ethics in each of these meanings can be reconciled with a general theory that applies to this concept, and thus whether deontic theory of legal...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.