Consequences of Informal Autonomy

Table Of Contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• About the author
• About the book
• This eBook can be cited
• Contents
• List of acronyms
• List of tables
• List of figures
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Informal autonomy in federations
• 2.1 Rules and outcomes
• 2.2 Mechanisms of informal autonomy
• 2.3 Stability of informal autonomy
• 2.4 Informal autonomy and incentives
• 2.5 ‘Dormant’ formal institutions
• 2.6 Preliminary conclusions
• 3. Three eras of Russian federalism
• 3.1 Early 1990s: Chaos and bargaining
• 3.2 1990s: Decentralization behind a centralized system
• 3.3 Early 2000s: Centralization and informal pact with the governors
• 3.4 Late 2000s – early 2010s: Centralization and informal coalitions
• 3.5 Preliminary conclusions
• 4. The Yeltsin era: Quantifying informal decentralization
• 4.1 Identification strategy
• 4.2 Proxies of informal devolution
• 4.3 Dependent variables
• 4.4 Hypotheses
• 4.5 Preliminary conclusions
• 5. The Yeltsin era: Consequences of informal decentralization
• 5.1 Econometric design
• 5.2 Results: democracy
• 5.3 Results: quality of economic institutions
• 5.4 Results: economic growth
• 5.5 Results: inequality
• 5.6 Preliminary conclusions
• 6. The Putin era: Quantifying informal decentralization
• 6.1 Proxies of informal devolution
• 6.2 Dependent variables
• 6.3 Hypotheses
• 6.4 Preliminary conclusions
• 7. The Putin era: Consequences of informal decentralization
• 7.1 Econometric design
• 7.2 Results: democracy
• 7.3 Results: quality of economic institutions
• 7.4 Results: economic growth
• 7.5 Results: inequality
• 7.6 Preliminary conclusions
• 8. Appointed governors and persistence of informality
• 8.1 Informal coalitions
• 8.2 Performance of informal coalitions: ordinary times
• 8.3 Performance of informal coalitions: extraordinary times
• 8.4 A new type of actors: federal agencies with a regional responsibility
• 8.5 Preliminary conclusions
• 9. Conclusion and outlook
• 9.1 Key findings
• 9.2 Post-Crimean era
• 9.3 Further directions for research
• Appendix
• A1. Index of constitutional centralization – regional constitutions
• A2. Index of constitutional decentralization – power-sharing treaties
• A3. Share of acts contradicting federal law
• A4. Econometric analysis
• Literature