Selected Problems of Metaphysics and Ontology
11. Metaphysics and Problem of Being. Martin Heidegger
11.1. The Meaning of Being
Heidegger’s philosophical project before the so-called “turn” is based on the search for meaning of being. The question of the meaning of being has, according to him, never been put properly, this ontological question faded into dead obscurity (Heidegger, M.: Being and Time, 2010). If we want to explore being and its meaning we have to use phenomenology (see Dreyfus, D.L.: Being – in-the- world. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, p. 30). However, the early Heidegger always openly committed to phenomenology, he rejected being included in some kind of a movement within phenomenology. By using the phenomenological way of asking a fundamental philosophical question, which means the question of the meaning of being, Heidegger did not, according to ← 83 | 84 → himself, acknowledge “any attitude or movement because phenomenology is nothing like that and it can never be as long as it understands itself” (Heidegger, 2010).
The expression “phenomenology” itself does not primarily represent anything but a method, which means, the way how things are being explored, a way of exploration, of asking questions. He expresses his opinion to a textbook password “to the things themselves” (“zu den Sachen selbst”) and this opinion is opposed to all accidental and unfounded constructions, prejudices, habits, seemingly proved theses. The meaning of the programme motto of phenomenology is so natural that if Heidegger wants to move his exploration of being further, he has to firstly fixate (so natural) the term of phenomenology.
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