III. The Phenomenological self
III The Phenomenological self
Keywords: direct access, phenomenological reduction, lived experience, irreducibility
The seemingly unproblematic existence of the self in everyday experience has become a deep theoretical problem. What is the basic structure, the basic conceptual framework of self-experience? Does the self have an experiential reality or is it nothing but a theoretical fiction? Is there any use of the self in our conscious lives? Difficulties in answering these persisting questions are closely related to a “terminological fog” which is spread over the study of the mind and consciousness. In approaching the phenomena of our conscious life, however, scholars seem to agree upon the following:
– The mind and self are embodied, a picture of disembodied reason, the self, consciousness existing independently of bodily structures is either a categorical mistake, a myth or both ← 29 | 30 →
– mind-body dualism has no explanatory force in the contemporary study of the nature of human experience, cognition is both embodied and embedded – people as cognitive agents live and act in the world
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