V. The Embodied mind and self
V The Embodied mind and self
Keywords: embodiment, phenomenology, metaphor, self, illusion, subject
The meaning and use of the term “embodiment” and especially “embodied cognition” has undergone a revision in the development of both cognitive science and philosophy. Within the first-generation of cognitive science – up to the 1960s – philosophers focussed on ideas related to the representational-computationist theory of the mind. The popularity of the metaphor, The Mind as the software of the Brain, has become a popular and useful heuristic tool in cognitive research. Conscious states of minds were studied independently from the workings of the brain. Cognition was considered as embodied when it was deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent or system. More precisely, the physical body has been understood as functioning beyond the brain, as “something” that plays a significant causal role in cognitive processing. This view contrasted with the ← 49 | 50 → traditional view of those philosophers of the mind that have considered the body as peripheral to understanding the nature of the mind and cognition. Proponents of embodied cognitive science appealed consistently to novel findings in cognitive neuroscience, clinical practise and experimental work. By the late 1970s, the situation culminated dramatically due to evidence of a strong dependence of concepts and reason on the body and the centrality to conceptualisation and reason on metaphorical language (metaphor, imagery, prototypes, etc.).
The major difference between first and second generation cognitive science lies in the fact that followers of...
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