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Physics without Metaphysics?

With an Appraisal by Prof. Saju Chackalackal

Raphael Neelamkavil

This study discusses the substance-tradition from Aristotle to Kant, Gödel, Quine, Strawson, Armstrong and others, the concept of matter and causation in quantum physics, Being-thinking from Aristotle to Heidegger, and system-building from Plato to Whitehead. It synthesizes the Kantian phenomena-noumena, extends the Quinean ontological commitment, creates a Gödelian foundationalist truth-probabilism, relativizes the Whiteheadian actual entity, extends the Aristotelian-Heideggerian Being to a nomic-nominal, verbal-processual To Be and overhauls perspectival-absolutist, non-foundationalist and relativist concepts of Reality. The resulting scientific ontology is termed Einaic Ontology for maximalist, mutually collusive, categorial reasons. The Appendix explains Heidegger’s anthropologized Being as ontologically and cosmologically defective.
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Bibliography

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Ando, Takatura. Metaphysics: A Critical Survey of Its Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.

Antony, Louise. “Semantic Anorexia: On the Notion of “Content” in Cognitive Science” (105–135). In Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, George Boolos, Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vols. 1 and 2, Revised Oxford Translation, Jonathan Barnes, Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series LXXI.2, 1984.

Armstrong, David M. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cited in William G. Lycan, “Armstrong’s New Combinatorialist Theory of Modality” (3–17). In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, John Bacon, Keith Campbell and Lloyd Reinhardt, Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

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