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From Humanism to Meta-, Post- and Transhumanism?

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Edited By Irina Deretić and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner

The relationship between humanism, metahumanism, posthumanism and transhumanism is one of the most pressing topics concerning many current cultural, social, political, ethical and individual challenges. There have been a great number of uses of the various terms in history. Meta-, post- and transhumanism have in common that they reject the categorically dualist understanding of human beings inherent in humanism.
The essays in this volume consider the relevant historical discourses, important contemporary philosophical reflections and artistic perspectives on this subject-matter. The goal is to obtain a multifaceted survey of the concepts, the relationship of the various concepts and their advantages as well as their disadvantages. Leading scholars of many different traditions, countries and disciplines have contributed to this collection.
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Rafael Ferber, University of Luzern - Plato’s “Side Suns”: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments Concerning Semantic Monism and Pluralism of the “Good” in the Philebus (65a1–5)

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Rafael Ferber

University of Luzern

Plato’s “Side Suns”: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments Concerning Semantic Monism and Pluralism of the “Good” in the Philebus (65a1–5)1

“Three suns I saw stay on the heaven” First line of Max Mueller’s poem The side suns (Die Nebensonnen) In memoriam Margherita Isnardi Parente

Under semantic monism, I understand the thesis “The Good is said in one way” and under semantic pluralism the antithesis “The Good is said in many ways”. Plato’s Socrates seems to defend a principle of “semantic monism”2. He defends this principle not only concerning common nouns such as “pious” (Euthyphr. 6d2–e7), “bravery” (Lach. 192b5–d12), “beauty” (Hipp. Ma. 288a8–289c) and “virtue” (Men. 72c6), but also concerning the reference to the noun “Good”. The Good, for the sake of which we do everything (Hipp. Ma. 297b3–8; Gorg. 468b1–3; 499e9–500a9; Symp. 205e7–206a1; Phil. 20d7–8), is one single good. In the Republic, it is the Form of the Good (Resp. 505a2; 508e2–3; 519c2). The Philebus starts not with the search for the Form of the Good, but for a certain state of the soul which can render the life of all human beings happy (Phil. 11d4–6). But it asks nevertheless the Socratic ← 37 | 38 → question: “What in fact is the Good?” (ὃτι ποτ’ ἐστνὶν ἀγαθόν) (13e5–6) and holds on to a “single form” (μία ιδέα) of the Good (65a1). Just as in the Republic, only...

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