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Time, Being and Becoming: Cognitive Models of Innovation and Creation in English


Maciej Litwin

Cognitive linguistics provides tools to discuss identity as a process. Identity depends on the underlying conceptualisation of the present, while innovation and creation are borderline phenomena in epistemology. The two may be seen as generalised accounts of causation as a process: open-ended and closed, where time is conceptualised as real or figurative. Aristotle’s epistemology builds on the conceptualisation of a subject manipulating objects in the visual field. Saint Augustine and Plotinus conceive of time and identity as real and contingent or figurative and necessary. William of Ockham builds on a simple conceptualisation of a time-point matrix as opposed to a duration matrix. British National Corpus findings relate to and comment on these expert philosophical conversations through the medium of cognitive models of «innovation» and «creation», instruments of thought and reason in English.
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Chapter 2. Non-formal solutions of identity: identity as process


Chapter 2. Non-formal solutions of identity: identity as process

2.1 Chapter overview

In the previous chapter I suggested that nominalism were quintessentially separable from the set-theoretical methodology and all its formal specificity. I cited two accounts of identity: identity as a mathematical symbol (1.2.) and identity as a meaning network construct (1.3). Both accounts point to a relationship between a concept and a thing, brain activation and conceptualisation, symbol and object. Both consider this relationship unproblematic or else fit to serve as the foundation of speculative thought. Our interest now is that these accounts consider reference as compressed temporally and transparent to the conscious mind. This is why we chose to call them ‘substantive.’

Below I will advance more evidence to support the notion that nominalism may be divorced from formal methods of analytic philosophy. We shall take three steps together. First, we will expound the classical definition of nominalism in circulation in language philosophy literature. In terms of conceptual organisation, nominalism will be presented as a thematisation of the concept of contingency (as opposed to necessity). Second, we will consider the difficulties resulting from the attempts to frame nominalist teaching as a philosophical position. I will call upon the early 20th century Marburg criticism of the entrenched readings of Plato to demonstrate the conventional character of philosophical taxonomies. Third, I will argue that the paradoxes of nominalism as a philosophical label become resolved if we adopt the cognitive interpretation of conceptualisation as actual...

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