Ukraine’s complex transition
Edited By Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko
Poland on the Euromaidan
The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to refrain from signing the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement came to Polish politicians as a big surprise. From the very beginning, Warsaw was engaged in supporting Ukraine’s pro-European aspirations and the expectations were that the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November will crown the many-year struggle not only for Ukrainian but also for Polish diplomacy.
In February 2013, in his speech at a joint meeting of Polish and Ukrainian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the head of Polish diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, stated that the ongoing year will be the year of “sealing the close relations between Ukraine and the EU and perhaps also establishing the European perspective for Kyiv.”1 The Polish minister and all other Polish politicians and members of the European Parliament alike all throughout the past year did their best that the agreement would be signed. They managed to convince the officials in the EU that all Ukrainian citizens should not be punished with the slowing down of the process of integration with the EU, for what had happened to the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.
When, in May 2012, Ukraine and the EU initiated an association agreement in Brussels, everybody in Poland thought that Ukraine’s pro-Western course had been settled. The Polish government liked to see this as its twofold success: On the one hand it managed to convince a rather reluctant Brussels to...
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