Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Central and Eastern European Forum for Legal, Political and Social Theorists, Celje, 23–24 March 2012
Edited By Péter Cserne, Miklós Könczöl and Marta Soniewicka
Objectivity as Coherence in Practical Discourse
Objectivity in law is one of the most discussed and least settled topics in jurisprudence. The literature is full of volumes dealing with the problems of objectivity1 but nearly all are from a theoretical perspective. The lack of any theoretical consensus within legal scholarship also renders the discourse on the concept of objectivity rather opaque. Indeed, many authors who deal with objectivity create their own conceptual maps, offering their own typologies and understandings.2 Although some legal scholars consider that it is better to use a specialised vocabulary when talking about objectivity in order to be precise and develop a better understanding, this may add to the confusion of the overall picture.
The concept of objectivity is fundamental both to the creation of law and its application. While its role in law creation is generally considered both necessary and a key function (Dworkin 1996; Moore 1992, 1985), objectivity in the application of law is commonly the subject of criticism and strong attacks. In this paper, I focus on objectivity in practical legal discourse in order to demonstrate that its role is much more complex than has previously been realised in scholarship.3 ← 65 | 66 →
This paper does not take for granted any of the existing theoretical perspectives on how objectivity should be defined or the necessary elements for its definition.4 On the contrary, the description I am suggesting, based on an analysis of case law, is one of ‘final...
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