This book explores the culture of deference by the legislative branch to the executive branch on foreign policy issues, particularly regarding the George W. Bush administration’s rush to war in Iraq in 2003. By authorizing President Bush to go to war in Iraq at his own discretion in its October 2002 resolution, the 107th Congress abdicated its constitutional responsibility and its members failed to honor their oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Although the «war powers» are constitutionally those of Congress, historically presidents have engaged in war making and Congress has with limited success attempted to curb such war making. This book traces how this culture of deference to the chief executive on war making evolved and how, especially in the case of Iraq, it has adversely affected the interests of the nation, its constitutional framework, and its position in the world. This book will serve as an excellent text for courses on U.S. foreign policy, U.S. diplomatic history, and the role of Congress.