The utilization of resources in health care is predominantly controlled by physicians. Therefore, a thorough understanding of health care remuneration systems, especially of the influence of reimbursement contracting on physicians’ behavior, is essential for understanding the potential effects of policy interventions and for predicting the long run viability of a health care system. This volume investigates and compares alternative reimbursement schemes and their implications for health care reforms. It analyzes the contractual aspects of the relationship between physicians and patients and the distribution of risks between health insurers and physicians. One major focus is the investigation of the effects of a fixed budget system. Here, empirical evidence for the German market for physician services is given.
Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2002. 165 pp., 20 fig., 5 tab.
Contents: Health Care Economics – Health Care System – Remuneration of Physician Services – Supplier Induced Demand
– Credence Goods – Agency Relationship – Fixed Budget System – Fee-for-Service Reimbursement System – Capitation System –
Risk Sharing between Health Insurers and Suppliers – German Market for Physician Services.