Case Studies in International Security

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LUCA RATTI

Introduction

Since the early 1990s the notion of national security and the area of security studies have been the subject of an intense intellectual debate and of a fast growing literature that has embraced both the disciplines of international history and international relations. Alongside traditional conceptions of security, that focus on the preservation and protection of the international order, state borders and sovereignty, new and alternative definitions of security have emerged and gained increasing influence in the study of world history and politics. These new conceptions have been inspired by a common concern to question static and state centred notions of security, that long dominated the academic disciplines of international history and international relations. By contrast, these new conceptions have broadened the definition, depth, and scope of the field of security studies, endeavouring to emphasise the subjective and multi-dimensional character of the notion of security. The emergence of these approaches has followed a rapid evolution in the structure of the international system, that was brought about by the end of the East-West division and by the emergence of non-state actors, but also a growing intellectual concern to broaden the depth and scope of the disciplines of international history and international relations.

More specifically, new research paradigms, now labelled as post-structural, post-colonialist, feminist and green analytical perspectives, have questioned and, to an extent, undermined prevailing notions of security, which reflected the long domination of positivist scholarship in the disciplines of international history and international relations. Their contribution has challenged and undermined traditional and state-centred accounts of security that, while focusing on the protection of the state and the material distribution of power in the international system, discarded the role of other agencies in world politics. These contributions have reflected an ethical and normative concern and a critical anxiety to give voice to marginalized actors and agencies in historical analysis. At the same time, they have generated an attempt to challenge a static conception of ← 9 | 10 → security, develop new analytical frameworks that could challenge dominating narratives and paradigms, and create spaces of intellectual and political dissent in the study of world politics.

Nonetheless, positivist scholarship has not remained silent, emphasising how traditional and state based notion of security remain paramount both in the political and academic discourse. This intellectual dynamic has generated an intense debate within the disciplines of international history and international relations. On the one hand, prevailing concepts of security, such as the defence of state borders, the balance of power, nuclear and conventional deterrence, and the study of traditional systems of alliances have remained paramount for the mainstream literature and for the historiography of international relations. On the other hand, new analytical contributions have risen to challenge prevailing military and territorial conceptions of security studies, emphasising the transnational, humanitarian, cultural, gendered, and linguistic conceptions and dimensions of security. These new approaches have also rejected prevailing discursive practices and narratives, which confined the notion of security to the protection of the state against external military threats, overlooking the impact of these policies on other agencies, such as national and ethnic minorities, women, the environment, and extra-European cultures.

In the early 1990s both critical theorists and the new post-positivist scholarship hailed the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the post-Cold War international system as a ‘paradigm shift’ for the discipline of international relations, blessing the rise of a new intellectual era in the study of world politics, that would be dominated by globalization, transnational agencies, democracy, and international organizations, and in which state-centred and communitarian notions of territorial security would become increasingly obsolete. Their quest for the development of new intellectual paradigms was powerfully rooted in the evolution of the international system from the bipolar structure of international politics in the 1970s and 1980s to the crisis of the logic of the blocs and to the difficult search for a new international order throughout the 1990s and after.¹ This transition was shaped by the emergence and consolidation of new ← 10 | 11 → powerful agencies in international relations, including international organizations and institutions but also by the expanding role of non-governmental organizations and transnational non-state actors. Undoubtedly, these dynamics had powerfully contributed to the crisis and disintegration of the Soviet bloc and to the emergence and affirmation of new sensitivities and research paradigms in the study of world politics, which questioned the domination and scientific foundations of prevailing positivist research programs and historiographical traditions, such as realism, liberalism, and neo-Marxism. The impact of these agencies had also shaped Western and Soviet policies, particularly as a result of the development and consolidation of an anti-nuclear peace movement in the U.S. and across Western Europe during and after the period of East-West détente but also as a result of transnational peace networks that were able to perforate the Iron Curtain and penetrate the Soviet system.²

However, while such an intellectual shift has indeed occurred to an extent, traditional and state-centred conceptions of security have not disappeared. If anything, they have acknowledged and incorporated to an extent in their analysis the role of new agencies, thus somehow expanding the discipline’s traditional academic boundaries. At the same time, they have benefited from a concerted effort, particularly in the United States and the countries of Western Europe, to declassify and make available to the public an increasing number of old and new archival sources, which has allowed historians and political scientists alike to refine and expand prevailing accounts of the end of the Cold War and of the transition of world politics towards a new international system.³

Nonetheless, despite the normative and optimistic predictions of liberal scholarship and critical theorists, the international order that emerged at the Cold War’s end, although overseeing the rise of transnational actors and agencies, has also confirmed the ongoing and paramount importance ← 11 | 12 → of traditional and state-centred conceptions of security. At the same time, many of the systemic issues that were left unresolved at the end of the East-West division have surfaced again, somehow confirming that the end of the Cold War did not equate to the disappearance of broader concerns about power distribution in the international system. As early as December 1994 at a Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Budapest, Russian President Boris Boris Yeltsin had already warned about the risk of a new Cold Peace in Europe.⁴ More than twenty years later at the 2017 Munich security conference Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized the need for the establishment of a post-Western international order. The combined effect of these dynamics has slowed down the emergence of a new and more harmonious international order, which in the liberal view should have been based on increasing interstate cooperation and on the growing role of transnational actors and agencies. These dynamics also revived the historiographical interest in the academic debate on traditional conceptions of security and on the international system’s evolution from the Cold War to the post-Cold War world.

This volume, although acknowledging the growing importance of transnational agencies and non-state actors, is firmly grounded in the positivist narrative of international history and international relations. Nonetheless, its purpose is to shed light on this debate, by providing a theoretically informed discussion of a number of case studies that reflect the changing notion of security from the second half of the 20^th to the early 21^st century. The volume relies on the use of old and newly available archival sources and draws upon competing analytical perspectives in the study of international history and politics, providing a historical reappraisal of international and regional security issues from the early stages of the Cold War to the most recent dynamics in the evolution of the international system. Its aim is to provide a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of transforming conceptions of security by evaluating a number of case studies, the origins and evolution of which are linked both to the dynamics and legacy of the East-West confrontation and to interstate disputes over territorial claims, competition over resources, as well as to ethnic, cultural, religious, or identity issues. ← 12 | 13 →

More specifically, the book explores some of the fundamental dynamics which have shaped the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold war international system, including the changing nature of European and Middle Eastern security, the evolution of transatlantic relations, NATO’s transformation and adaptation and its relations with Russia, the development of the U.S. strategic posture, and the transformation of security dynamics in the Far East and South East Asia. Combining together historical analysis with analytical reflections, this volume is poised to provide a useful reference for students and scholars of international history and transatlantic relations and, at the same time, to make a major contribution to the ongoing international debate among historians and political scientists on the changing nature of security.

The book is divided into four sections: the first section explores some of the key issues that inspired prevailing security conceptions in the early stages of the Cold War from the search for a new international order and the establishment of the transatlantic bargain in the 1940s and early 1950s to the evolution of East-West relations during the period of détente in Europe. More specifically, this section reviews the establishment of the transatlantic bargain and the evolution of security issues in Europe and North America during the Cold War and the period of East-West détente. Its contributors address U.S. and European views of, and approaches to, the emergence and transformation of the transatlantic system in East-West relations during the Cold War. The bulk of the analysis centers on the origins and development of U.S. strategy, as well as on the role of the Western European nations during the early stages of the Cold War and the process of détente in East-West relations. More specifically, the chapters in the first section assess the significance of, and linkage between, the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, U.S. covert operations in Europe, German rearmament, the advent of détente in East-West relations, and Italy’s contribution to the thaw between the two blocs. The second section of the volume focuses on some relevant aspects of regional security in the Middle and the Far East from the Cold War to the Cold Peace. This section provides a critical reappraisal of a number of key issues and challenges in security discourses and practices in the Middle and the Far East during and after the Cold War. The establishment and evolution of the Arab League and the Baghdad Pact, the security dimension of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf after the crisis of containment, the changing strategic environment in the Far East, the rise of China and its ← 13 | 14 → challenge to the U.S.-Japanese transpacific bargain, are among the key themes assessed in this section. The third part of the volume addresses security issues during the Cold War in Latin America. The contributions to this section stretch from the 1950s to the 1980s, with particular reference to relations between the United States and Chile during the Eisenhower administration, the cultural policy of Czechoslovakia in Uruguay in the context of the Cold War, and to Anglo-American policy during the Falklands crisis. The fourth and final section of the volume debates the renewal of the transatlantic relationship in the early 1990s and the evolution of the Western alliance from the Cold War to the post-Cold War international system. More specifically, the contributions to this section assess the steps towards the search for a new international order after the end of the East-West division, focusing on the evolution, transformation, and enlargement of the Western alliance in the post Cold War international system. These contributions highlight that, whereas the changes brought about in the structure of the international system by the Cold War’s end led to a qualitative adaptation in Euro-Atlantic relations, current conceptions of Euro-Atlantic security continue to be rooted in the bargains and arrangements that the U.S. and its European partners negotiated at the end of World War II and renewed throughout the Cold War. The process of alliance’s transformation and adaptation, which began in the aftermath of Germany’s unification in October 1990, and NATO’s out-of-area engagements, particularly in Afghanistan and Libya, in the context of U.S. quests for a broader post-Cold War strategy are also among key themes debated in this chapter. Despite the disappearance of the original catalyzing threat that brought about the formation of the Western alliance, and a deepening estrangement between the United States and Germany as a result of the world financial crisis, the solidity of the West remains one of the most discernible aspects of the post Cold War international system.

As a result of the breadth and depth of its contents and of the issues addressed by contributors, we are confident that this volume will provide a belated but significant contribution to an intellectually thriving debate on Cold War historiography and on the study of the world politics.

1 See R. L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) and the many contributions to the volume Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, ed. F. Bozo, M. P. Rey, P. N. Ludlow and L. Nuti (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008).

2 M. Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

3 Most of these efforts have been carried out by the Washington based Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), which since the early 1990s has endeavoured to promote the release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War and to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former Soviet bloc into Western historiography. New documents are periodically made available through a digital archive, which can be consulted at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org.

4 M. A. Smith, Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership? (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13.

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Section 1
The Shaping and Evolution of the Transatlantic System during the Cold War

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ALFREDO BRECCIA

The U.N. Charter and the Development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1.   Introduction

In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall, a rapid process of disintegration of the Soviet bloc began, and the conviction of the forthcoming break-up of the Western bloc grew. The end of the “Cold War” prompted speculation whether NATO had already fulfilled its role and functions and that was no longer necessary to keep it alive. On 17th November 1989, in an interview titled “NATO is no longer useful”, the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared to have been a “strong backer of the NATO, but nowadays the Russian threat is changing. Facing this issue, the USSR will modify its military policy…and so I believe that the security factor – the element that in a way ‘provoked’ the birth of NATO itself – needs to be reconsidered”.¹

In this way, a new debate began, focusing more on what new layout to give the East-West relationship, than on reconsidering NATO origins, to evaluate if its role had already been fulfilled or if, on the contrary, it would remain an essential tool to continue to carry out tasks and commitments provided in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4th April 1949. Member States, by expressing “their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter”, engaged to cooperate to fulfil them, “in order not to endanger again peace and international security, and justice as well”. To reach this goal, they would have gather their efforts for a common defence, in the full respect of “rights and duties that derive from the U.N. Charter to countries who are member of the U.N.” and of the “prominent responsibility of Security Council in the preservation of peace ← 17 | 18 → and international security”.² The Atlantic Alliance was created with the aim not only to frame the Organisation in a collective security system – created by the U.N. at the end of the Second World War – but also to keep it open to the adhesion of other countries and to foster the setting up and the development of “regional and universal” organisations that would give their contribution to the safeguard of peace. The current role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation could be evaluated only re-discovering its strong link with the origins of the Treaty itself, and the context in which it was shaped. Due to a not-always adequate attention of historians on the influence of the U.N. Charter in the relationship between the winner powers of the WWII, historical gaps remained. With this approach, on the contrary, these gaps will be finally filled.

2.   The U.N. Charter and the construction of a collective security system at the end of the Second World War

The building of a “permanent collective security system” for strengthening peace in the second post-war was fostered by the United States even before they entered the conflict. On 14th August 1941, the U.S. President Roosevelt – together with the U.K. Prime Minister Churchill – declared the war targets in the Atlantic Charter. Principles contained in this Charter would be inserted in the Declaration of the United Nations, signed in Washington on 1st January 1942. The USSR too subscribed these two documents, but Stalin, in the meantime, decided to declare its war targets, showing no trust in a collective security system after the country’s experience as a member of the League of Nations, where the USSR was expelled from for “moral unworthiness”. Stalin was aspiring to the creation of a collective security system on its own, against a revival of the German threat. He explained its plan to the U.K. Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Eden, during a meeting at the Kremlin at the end of December 1941. Stalin, recalling its attention on the consequences of the French fall, affirmed that France would be never again a strong “bastion” against Germany: so the ← 18 | 19 → U.K. – in Stalin’s opinion – would have the duty to take its place. In order to accomplish this task, if the country would need to create military basis on the European continent, in The Netherlands, in Belgium or in France, the USSR would recognise these demands. In return, Stalin was asking for an equal acknowledgement for the security concerns of his country, East of Germany. Eden avoided to take into account Stalin’s plan, and on the contrary he tried to make him change his mind: “We aren’t thinking to struggle to share between us Europe, but instead to create a new Europe, free from Nazism and Fascism.” The division would have been determined by the developments of military and strategic actions on the two opposite fronts: that’s why Churchill pushed Roosevelt for starting the negotiations for setting up of a collective security system organisations, in order to take Stalin’s plan under these institution.

In September and October 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks – near New York – the preparation of the Charter for these international organisation, supposed to take the League of Nations’ place, went along. Chapter VII contained rules to make the collective security system effective: the task to determine the “existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” was given to the Security Council. It “shall make recommendations” or “decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace or security” (Articles 39–40). “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions” (art. 41) and if the Security Council “consider that measures provided would be inadequate, it may take other measures, involving the use of armed forces of Members of the United Nations, provided with special agreements” (art. 42–47). The actions required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council “shall be carried out directly, or through their action in the appropriate international agencies”. Moreover, the members shall join in affording mutual assistance (art. 48–50). Members’ right of individual or collective self-defence is recognised, if an armed attack occurs, and measures

“taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council…to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security” (art. 51). ← 19 | 20 →

The acknowledgment of the contribution of international organisations was regulating in the Chapter VIII, dedicated to “Regional Agreements”, and concerning these articles:

Article 52–1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional agreements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every efforts to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.