The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology 2013

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List of Abbreviations

The list of abbreviations used in the following contributions

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Introduction

I would like to write a few words about the new yearbook, about its aims and why we have decided to publish it. The idea of The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology came from the Center for Phenomenological Studies which is part of the Department of Philosophy at Trnava University (Slovakia). The Center joins a group of researchers focusing on several aspects of phenomenology and its history, as well as phenomenological interpretations of various fields of science, art and religion. Some crucial questions have emerged in our cultural milieu of the Central Europe which interest us in our work and which we intend to discuss within the broader context of science.

The title of The Yearbook comprises two basic terms: History and Interpretation. We would like to publish contributions about the history of phenomenology because phenomenology has its own specific development anchored in the texts of Edmund Husserl, his predecessors and followers, its distinctive themes and problems set within the frame of the philosophical and scientific discussions of their period. We are also open to inquiries about the interpretation of phenomenology and to different approaches towards understanding phenomenological research, its systematic and methodological insights and its possible contributions to contemporary discussions both about pure philosophy and within the context of more interdisciplinary research. We are open to broad discussions with other philosophical schools of thought and are interested in addressing our common themes

These two purposes are, of course, intertwined. We are convinced that investigations into historical aspects of phenomenology, with its multiple shifts and essential changes, will be valuable not only for us, but also for our readers. In the same vein we believe that it is important to keep clarifying our understanding of various phenomenological motivations and keep returning to the key phenomenological questions. It may seem sometimes that phenomenology belongs to history and is just an artifact from the past. However, phenomenology still presents new and vivid challenges to scientific research; it still poses new problems animating scientific discussion about the limits of science or the crisis of institutions. It opens the door to specific phenomenological theories inspired not only by phenomenological resources, but also by many non-phenomenological approaches. At the same time, phenomenology itself is often be challenged by other scientific disciplines forcing it to rethink, re-clarify or modify its own approaches. ← 9 | 10 →

In short, this new annual journal has specific intentions and goals, and offers a space for contributors to create an integrated unit together with other phenomenological journals oriented more exclusively towards either Husserlian phenomenology or various applications of phenomenology. We appreciate broad research in contemporary phenomenology and often participate in such projects. However, our intention is to create our own subset of phenomenological research in the belief that this will yield fruitful results and open new possibilities both in phenomenology and other scientific disciplines.

The main topic of this current issue encompasses three areas of phenomenological research: person, subject, and organism. These three topics are interrelated in various ways. On the one hand, we address the question of Husserlian phenomenology of personhood and subjectivity, and on the other hand, we address a broader problem including epistemological, ontological and biological approaches. Those great traditional and contemporary themes of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, concept of person, community and interpersonality, questions of humanity, value and biological status of human beings all slowly became part of Edmund Husserl’s focus. We intend to show that a number of inspiring and unexplored questions arose from these thematic areas, questions which are related to various specific and interconnected fields of study. It is up to the reader to decide whether we have been successful in this.

In conclusion, let me express our gratitude to Peter Lang Ltd. for including The Yearbook among its publishing activities. I would also like to thank all contributors, reviewers and editors. Our special thanks go to Jonathan Gresty for his help with proofreading this issue, to Aaron Fortune, and also to Prof. Dr. Dr. Georg Schuppener for his proofreading of German contribution. We are also grateful for the support of the VEGA grant-funded project no. 1/0272/13 by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport in Slovak Republic.

Anton Vydra

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Operatively functioning subjectivity: Toward a history of the received interpretation

Elizabeth A. Behnke

Abstract

Husserl’s notion of functioning subjectivity (functioning intentionality, functioning I, functioning Corporeality) was taken up by subsequent phenomenologists and transformed into a received interpretation still effective today. The present essay traces the trajectory of this historical development across works by Fink, Merleau-Ponty, Brand, Held, and Mohanty, concluding that the assumption of an operatively functioning anonymity at the heart of subjective life may be one of the motivations leading some phenomenologists to collaborate with the project of the naturalization of consciousness. I close by identifying some further investigations needed to pave the way for a comparison between Husserl’s own rich notion of functioning subjectivity and the received interpretation.

Keywords: Husserl, functioning, operative, intentionality, anonymity

Husserl uses the term “functioning” (Fungieren, Funktionieren) as a noun, a verb, and an adjective (functioning subjectivity, functioning intentionality, functioning I, functioning Corporeality,¹ etc.); although he seldom offers anything like a definition of it, this notion plays a crucial role in many of his descriptions and analyses. Subsequently, other phenomenologists appropriated and transformed this notion, turning it into a technical term with a life of its own. The purpose of this essay is to sketch some major “landmarks” in the efficient history² of this transformation, beginning with a key passage from Formal and Transcendental Logic. My procedure, in other words, will be to offer a straightforward scholarly account, carried out within historical consciousness, of a chain of Husserl-interpretations pregiven to me in my own historical situation; the discussion not only of the scope and development of this notion in Husserl’s own writings but also of related issues arising from the standpoint of ← 11 | 12 → a methodologically guided hermeneutical consciousness³ must be reserved for other occasions.