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Vietnam, 1968–1976

La sortie de guerre- Exiting a War


Edited By Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau

Avec ses quelque trois millions de morts civils et militaires, et ses innombrables destructions matérielles, la guerre dite du Vietnam reste à ce jour une des plus grandes tragédies humaines depuis 1945.
Une réflexion sur les conditions politiques, diplomatiques et militaires dans lesquelles s’est effectuée la sortie de la guerre, entre 1968, année de l’ouverture des négociations américano-vietnamiennes à Paris, et 1976, date de la réunification administrative du Vietnam, semble d’autant plus opportune que grandit actuellement l’inquiétude sur les perspectives de l’après-guerre en Afghanistan. Inspirés d’un colloque international réuni à Paris, en 2008, les textes rassemblés ici par Pierre Journoud et Cécile Menétrey-Monchau abordent cette étape de la sortie de guerre principalement sous l’angle diplomatique, mais débordant largement le spectre diplomatique traditionnel. Quelques-uns des meilleurs spécialistes croisent ici leur analyse de cette phase finale de la guerre, revenant sur les négociations qui ont mis fin à la dimension américano-vietnamienne du conflit, avec l’Accord de Paris du 27 janvier 1973, avant que les armes ne tranchent l’autre guerre, celle entre Vietnamiens, le 30 avril 1975.
Ce livre est accompagné d’un DVD avec des témoignages inédits sur les coulisses des négociations de Paris qui ont mis fin à la guerre du Vietnam (1968–1973).
With its three million civilian and military casualties and the enormous material destruction it brought about, the Vietnam War remains one of the worst human tragedies since 1945. Growing uncertainty about the potential post-war situation in Afghanistan has renewed interest in the political, diplomatic and military conditions that brought about the end of the Vietnam War – the period covered by the opening of Vietnamese-American negotiations in Paris in 1968 up to the administrative reunification of Vietnam in 1976. The texts collected in this volume by Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau, first inspired from an international colloquium held in Paris in 2008, analyse the full range of exit strategies exploited during this period. Although written primarily from a diplomatic perspective, the focus of this publication extends well beyond the traditional realm of diplomacy. Some of the most eminent specialists present their analysis of the final phase of the war, and re-examine the negotiations which brought the Vietnamese-American phase of the conflict to an end with the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, before the other war, between the Vietnamese themselves, was decided by the force of arms on April 30, 1975.
Provided with this book is a DVD with new testimonies on the Paris Peace negotiations that ended the Vietnam War (1968–1973).


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LA CONFRONTATION DIPLOMATIQUE AMÉRICANO-VIETNAMIENNE, 1968-1973 THE AMERICAN-VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC CONFRONTATION, 1968-1973 99 Hanoi’s Diplomatic Struggle during the American War Pierre ASSELIN The Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) responded to American military intervention in the spring of 1965 with a series of strategies its leaders called the “Anti-American Resistance for National Salvation” (cuoc khang chien chong My, cuu nuoc) or, less formally, the American War. The strategies incorporated three distinct but calibrated modes of struggle. “Military struggle” (dau tranh quan su), the cornerstone of the endeavor, aimed to confront the enemy militarily in South Vietnam and through the sustained application of force spread demoralization and combat ineffectiveness, and finally force capitulation.1 “Political strug- gle” (dau tranh chinh tri) was almost equally important and aimed to win popular support among the people of the South for the Anti- American Resistance, and to recruit active partisans for the revolution- ary cause. Lastly, “diplomatic struggle” (dau tranh ngoai giao) aimed to mobilize world opinion and garner international support for the Viet- namese revolution. It might, depending on future circumstances, also take the form of negotiations with Washington, leading to a peace agreement on the best terms those circumstances permitted. Because any attempt to reach an agreement with the Americans would entail compromise, VWP leaders considered diplomacy marginal in the overall effort to defeat the Americans and their “puppets” in Indochina. They saw no merit in negotiations as such. Thus, as Wash- ington increased troop levels in the South and escalated the bombing of the North,...

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