Conceptual atomism claims that most concepts cannot be decomposed into features, so that the conjunction of the features is equivalent to the concept in question. Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism. Justificationist semantics in its pure form, therefore, has to be wrong. Nevertheless, its epistemological approach to questions of evaluations and semantic rules could still stand. The main question is how conceptual atomism can be combined with some justificationist ideas. This new synthesis centres on the representational theory of mind and ‘internalist’ semantics, but ties these to ideas which stress the epistemic commitments that accompany successful assertions.
This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics – that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.