Edited By Joao Fonseca and Jorge Goncalves
The Division of the Mind: Paradoxes and Puzzles
1. Beyond divisionism
The hypothesis that the mind is divided is often put forward as a means to make sense of irrationality, whether in the cognitive sphere (delusional beliefs) or in the practical sphere (weak-willed actions). In essence, the “divisionist” argument states that we cannot understand irrational actions and beliefs without assuming that the mind is composed of different sub-systems. Donald Davidson (1985b, p. 353), one of the most prominent proponents of divisionism, explicitly endorses this methodological assumption:
I have urged in several papers that it is only by postulating a kind of compartmentalization of the mind that we can understand, and begin to explain, irrationality.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.