Economic, Monetary and Fiscal Policies
This book examines the resilience of Eurozone Economic, Monetary and Fiscal Policies and the debate surrounding Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis. The country’s policymakers have been widely criticized for their role in causing the Euro crisis and for mishandling the crisis itself. Critics say that Germany has adopted a neo-mercantilist, beggar-thy-neighbour strategy of wage moderation which has suppressed the real exchange rates and has allowed the biggest economy in the Eurozone to enjoy an export boom in the 2000s. This in turn has undermined the competitiveness of the periphery and increased to an unsustainable level the current account balances of the Eurozone. During the crisis Germany has also been criticized for misjudging the causes of the crisis, focusing too much on fiscal deficits and insisting that the solution is fiscal consolidation and austerity. For many, especially those inspired by Keynesian economics, Germany is pushing the whole continent into a depression. By misjudging the causes of the crisis, insisting on widespread austerity, rejecting the mutualization of Eurozone debt and providing financial help in little amounts and too late, Germany is perceived to be responsible for the possible breakup of the Eurozone.
One of the aims of this book is to analyse whether this description – shared by numerous policymakers, academics, pundits and opinion leaders in the EU and beyond – is fair. The academic and public debate around Germany’s role in the crisis has been largely one-sided and superficial. This book aims to fill this gap. The debate...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.