This collection of essays examines logic and its philosophy. The author investigates the nature of logic not only by describing its properties but also by showing philosophical applications of logical concepts and structures. He evaluates what logic is and analyzes among other aspects the relations of logic and language, the status of identity, bivalence, proof, truth, constructivism, and metamathematics. With examples concerning the application of logic to philosophy, he also covers semantic loops, the epistemic discourse, the normative discourse, paradoxes, properties of truth, truth-making as well as theology, being and logical determinism. The author concludes with a philosophical reflection on nothingness and its modelling.
VII. Some Analogies between Normative and Epistemic Discourse
VIISome Analogies between Normative and Epistemic Discourse
Kant divided sentences (I will use the terms ‘sentence’ and ‘propositions’ as referring to the same entities) into assertoric, problematic and apoidectic. This division was traditionally considered as very closely related to modals, that is, linguistic words expressing modalities. In particular, problematic propositions express possibility, but apoidectic – necessity. Even if we consider assertoric force as modal (it means that assertoric propositions are regarded as modal), Kant’s account was entirely restricted to so-called alethic modalities and, thereby, it was very narrow. According to the contemporary view, modal sentences, not modal words, are the most basic unit of the modal discourse. The variety of modal sentences is much wider than necessities (utterances expressing necessity) and possibilities (utterances expressing possibility) and includes their various kinds (or species), except paradigmatic alethic modalities (see Portner 2009 for a survey from the linguistic point of view): for instance,4 deontic (it is obligatory, permitted, forbidden, etc.; I will also use the adjective ‘normative’ as referring to equivalents of normative modalities), axiological–ethical (it is good, wrong, ethically neutral, etc.), axiological-aesthetic (it is beautiful, ugly, aesthetically neutral, etc.), epistemic (I know, I do not know, it is not the case that I do not know, etc.) or doxastic (I suppose, I do not suppose, it is not the case that I do not suppose, etc.; the same goes for other personal denominations). We have a lot of another doxastic modalities, for example, I guess, I think, I assert,...
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