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Venture Capital

Fund Certification, Performance Prediction and Learnings from the Past

Series:

Armin Höll-Steiner

This book contains three studies. The first study investigates the relationship between private equity investors and fund managers and how intermediaries can mitigate their agency problems. The incentive structure of three intermediary types and their behavior in signaling fund qualities to investors are studied theoretically. A recommendation which intermediary to consult is given. The second study presents a new statistical method to predict the performance distribution of venture capital direct investments. The accuracy of this method is investigated and compared to existing approaches. The third study is about the European venture capital market’s historic development before and after the internet bubble and reasons for the bad development especially after the bubble.

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Nomenclature XXI

Extract

II RdI A certifier’s total reputation gain from investors in a capital over- demand situation RsI A certifier’ total reputation gain from investors in a capital over- supply situation RPA A placement agent’s total reputation gain RPEF,b A certifier’s reputation loss/threat from fund managers for not certifying a fund RPEF,g A certifier’s reputation gain from fund managers for certifying a fund RPEF A certifier’s total reputation gain from private equity funds RdPEF A certifier’s total reputation gain from private equity fund man- agers in a capital over-demand situation RsPEF A certifier’ total reputation gain from private equity fund man- agers in a capital over-supply situation RRA A rating agency’s total reputation gain s Share of funded private equity funds that leads to market clearing W Compensation of a certifier for his service WC Carried interest payments which a placement agent gets for his support in the fundraising of recommended private equity funds that get capital from investors WF Fixed amount which a placement agent gets for his support in the fundraising of recommended private equity funds that get capital from investors WCLI A lead investor’s compensation with collusion payments XXIV Nomenclature wCLI A lead investor’s compensation with collusion payments stan- dardized by the extent of the private equity fund surplus WNCLI A lead investor’s compensation without collusion payments wNCLI A lead investor’s compensation without collusion payments stan- dardized by the extent of the private equity fund surplus WPA A placement...

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