An application of cooperative bargaining theory to an allocation problem in medicine
5 Different types of monotonicity in a cooperative bargaining model of distributing medical resources
5.1 Introduction Allocating medical budgets among hospital departments can be tough, especially, when the budget is sufficient to give full treatment to each individual group yet not to all. For example, we have a medical allocation situation in which two patients groups compete over medical resources based on individual claims. Both groups differ in the type of disease, number of patients and medical quantity claimed. Patients in one group are identical with respect to type of disease and medical quantity needed to treat. In more detail, a large group of surgery patients without any other disorder stands face to face with a small group of hemophilia patients who need special medical treatment under surgery which is extremely expensive. So a large group of patients with small individual medical claim and a small group with an extremely high individual claim compete for scarce medical resources. Imagine that in preliminary bargaining process an agreement on what share of the budget each group receives has been achieved. Since the budget is restricted not all patients may be treated fully according to their claims. In fact, we allow partial treatment, that may relate discussed measures in chapter 4 such as postponing surgeries. In addition, we now examine how changes in the initial conditions affect the solution. Compared to the initial situation either the number of patients that claim treatment or patients’ individual claims or the amount of medical resources available has changed. In our example of surgery patients, we may experience e.g., that more...
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