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Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance

Empirical Evidence and Value Effects

Series:

Christian Thamm

This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany. The evidence presented supports the strong shareholder rights perspective. It conflicts with the weak shareholder rights view brought forward in the international literature.

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Table I.1. Definitions of Shareholder Activism .................................................... 2 Table I.2. Research Methodologies and Results of Studies on Shareholder Activism .......................................................................... 10 Table I.3. Possible Definitions of Activist Event and Evaluation for Event Study Purpose...................................................................................... 16 Table I.4. Matrix of Pearson Sample Correlation Coefficients .......................... 22 Table II.5.Overview of Empirical Studies on Shareholder Activism in Germany ............................................................................................. 30 Table II.6. Comparison of Disclosure Requirements in the U.S. and in German .............................................................................................. 32 Table II.7. Introduction of Activity Levels ......................................................... 35 Table II.8. Percentage Size of Activist Stakes .................................................... 36 Table II.9. Value of the Activist Stakes in EUR Million .................................... 37 Table II.10. General Classification of Potentially Activist Shareholders ........... 38 Table II.11. Timing of Activist Investments ....................................................... 39 Table II.12. Change in Annual Meeting Attendance Rates ................................ 43 Table II.13. Simultaneous Investments by Multiple Activists ............................ 44 Table II.14. Possible Effects of low Attendance Rates in the Sample ................ 46 Table II.15. Major Corporate Events at Sample Target Firms. .......................... 47 Table III.16. Sample Description ........................................................................ 59 Table III.17. Announcement Effects on Different Activity Levels .................... 61 Table III.18. Announcement Effects of Non-Activist Investments .................... 62 XII Table III.19. Announcement Effects and NewBET ........................................... 64 Table III.20. Difference-in-Means-Test ............................................................. 67 Table III.21. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression ............................. 69 Table IV.22. Comparison of U.S. Board of Directors and German Supervisory Board ........................................................................ 78 Table IV.23. Company Description and Market Information ............................ 82 Table IV.24. Shareholder Activists on German Supervisory Boards ................ 92

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