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Introduction to the Study of the History of Epistemology



The text is structured in chronological and ideological order and presents nine basic types of the classical perception of the problem of knowledge through an analysis of the atomistic theory of perception, Platonism, Aristotle’s doctrine, scepticism, rationalism, sensualism, Kant’s theory, phenomenological-existential, pragmatic, and (post) analytical perceptions. The proposed work aspires to be an introduction (not a complete presentation, neither in the number of types, nor in a full interpretation) and a basis for the reader’s interpretations which is reflected in the structure of the text.


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Pragmatic Approach to Knowledge


  Keywords: consensus theory, contextualism, utility, conservativism, fallibilism   The pragmatic approach to knowledge (the problem of truth, experience, certainty, and prejudices – not a  specifi c philosophical school – Pihlström 2011, 1 can be traced especially from the third quarter of the 19th century. Its founder was Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce did not agree with Descartes’ belief that our knowledge should start by doubting everything in order to avoid fallacies. He claimed that this kind of absolute doubt is logically and psychologically impossible (Peirce 1992, resp. EP1, 28) because we have to trust at least the means of doubt. Moreover, it is not possible to doubt certain types of knowledge even though it is possible to pretend we methodologically doubt them. In Peirce’s understanding, knowledge is a refl ection of consciousness, which solves problems (or more pre- cisely, knowledge itself is the solving of problems). It 122 is an interaction of an organism with its environment, a process of transformation of belief and its weakening by doubt for the sake of revision of opinions, or their affi rmation. Knowledge begins by examination which in turn begins with doubt. However, not pretend doubt, but real doubt of a subject and about the validity of some of its beliefs. In this respect, belief (conviction) is the basis of knowledge. However, our momentum of examination is rooted in doubt (the refl ection of confl icting beliefs) which creates a  certain unease related to the possible invalidity of our beliefs which forces us to examine and...

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