IV. The Self in experimental settings
39 IV The Self in experimental settings Keywords: introspection, rubber-hand illusion, out-of-body experience, self-deception Neurocognitive research supports the idea of asymmetry between introspectively experienced conscious states and a theoretically founded explanation of ongoing causal processes. As recent ﬁ ndings show, the experi- enced priority of thoughts before the act and the con- sistency of thoughts about the planned act feature more magical than causal relations in explaining a person’s behaviour. David Wegner puts it concisely in the following remark: “the experience of will is like magic” (Weg- ner 2002, 289). The study of normal and impaired con- sciousness indicates that the experience of conscious volitional activity can occur: a) before the act, b) right after the act, and c) during the act. A person may feel conscious will in an action he/she has not anticipated (a confabulation of intentions), or he/she does not feel 40 responsibility for a performed action (the “alien-hand syndrome“). Besides this point, when actions are caused unconsciously, people tend to explain their behaviour in terms of mysterious forces (automatisms) or they just “make up” stories (cognitive dissonance). People feel a need to justify their attitudes and actions. An “ideal model” is that of a rational, conscious, responsible and free agent. Scholars have demonstrated in a number of experiments several ways of separation of action from the experience of will. People feel a conscious will in an action they did not anticipate, e.g. in the confabulation of intentions they revise what they think they intended to do after...
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