Show Less

The Death and Life of the Self

Post-Wittgensteinian Investigations

Series:

Silvia Gáliková

What is a self? What is the relation between phenomenal consciousness and the self? What are we talking about when we speak of conscious experience, the self, an inner mental world? In order to answer these questions the author reconsiders the «turn to the self» in contemporary philosophy of mind. The human self is considered as a natural phenomenon open to careful theoretical analysis, empirical and experimental research. The loss of everyday intuitions on the nature of self plays a significantly liberating role in self-understanding and explaining man’s behaviour.

Prices

Show Summary Details
Restricted access

VI. The Illusory nature of inner experience

Extract

63 VI The Illusory nature of the inner experience Keywords: illusion, self, subject of experience, conscious will, authorship A crucial point of departure on the nature of the self can be outlined by the contemporary  debate between egological and non-egological accounts of the self. For the followers of egological theories, it is in general a  con- ceptual and experiential truth that any episode of expe- riencing necessarily includes a  subject of experience. Non-egological theories, on the contrary, deny that every experience is for a subject. A prominent represent- ative of this approach is, for Zahavi, the neuroscientist, T. Metzinger, who has proposed a theory based on a kind of no-ownership view according to which the phenom- enological notion of the self has no explanatory value and therefore nothing exists “behind” the concept itself. Recent discussions have revealed even more diverse meanings of the term. Galen Strawson, who considers himself a materialist, argues that: when I talk about selves 64 I  mean selves as classically conceived: “internal men- tal things, internal mental presences” (Strawson, 2010). Whatever a self is, it is certainly a) a subject of experience and it is not b) a human being considered as a whole. So, according to Strawson, the problem about the existence of a self arrives from our everyday self-experience. It is a self described as: a) a subject of experience, a conscious feeler and thinker, b) a thing, c) a mental thing, d) a per- sisting thing, e) an agent, or f ) something that...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.

Do you have any questions? Contact us.

Or login to access all content.