Phenomenology and Existential-Hermeneutical Analysis of Knowledge
Keywords: phenomenon, reduction, epoche, alethe, existential
Kant’s theory of the structure and limitations of knowledge provoked a broad reaction among all epistemological schools. Some philosophers criticised Kant for being too intellectual, others for being scientifically too rigid and for misunderstanding the meaning of intuition, belief, etc., whilst others criticised him for underestimating the role and importance of language. One of the most criticised points of his examination was Ding an sich, which was considered hugely problematic because of its ‘incognizability’ (i.e. we are not even supposed to know that it exists) and many found this concept to be unnecessary. Edmund Husserl realised that Kant’s philosophy of knowledge opened dimensions for studying experience in ways which the assumption of the thing-in-itself is not necessary. Everything that we can encounter is in our experience and thus it ← 109 | 110 → is necessary to explore what the subject of our experience is.
Husserl understood that the way we perceive things is influenced by multiple rational and socio-historic circumstances which deflect our attention from how a thing is given to us in experience, and help us reach our assumptions about how the thing is. An example of such an overlook of experience is the effect of bias on a perceived thing. If an object is perceived with bias we do not see how the object is, but we rather what we expect to see. If we really want to know things as they are given to us in an...
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