Analytical and Post-analytical Epistemology
Keywords: analysis, fact, deflation, verificationism, holism
Representatives of the modern analytical epistemology (mostly G. Frege, B. Russell, G. E Moore, L. Wittgenstein, R. Carnap) believe that a “philosophical explanation of our thinking can be achieved by philosophical explanation of language and […] that a complete explanation can be achieved only this way” (Dummet 1998, 4 – 14). The basic assumption of their opinion is a consequence of Kant’s belief that “thoughts without content are empty; and intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant 1996, 107, resp. CPR, B75). If we want to analyse knowledge, we have to analyse language, especially the relationship between our terms and what they refer to, or what they are meant to refer to.
The classic idea of modern knowledge suggests that language enables us to grasp the reality (either directly or through sensory representations). This means that ← 131 | 132 → there is some sort of reality on one side of knowledge and there are language forms, which are meant to express it, on the other side. Because reality external to humans can be influenced only minimally, or not at all, it is obvious that analytically oriented philosophers turn their attention to variables that can be influenced. According to representational theory, it is possible to purify all mental representations from useless additives and confusions. This is possible only through the most exact observations, which, in terms of their content, are divided into the simplest possible elements of experience and by control of all relevant...
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