No doubt there are other historic types of philosophical approaches to knowledge which would be appropriate to mention. We have not thematised the naturalised and cognitive-scientific model (W. V. Quine, A. Goldman), mathematical and logical intuitionism (N. O. Loski, M. Dummet, and others), postmodern concepts (M. Foucault, F. Lyotard), medieval concepts (John Duns Scotus, Nicholas of Autrecourt) and their renaissance modifications (Nicholas of Cusa, Gregory of Rimini), nor have we discussed the most recent – current – concepts (T. Williamson, E. Sosa – Virtue epistemology). Similarly, the length of this text did not allow for a more detailed analysis of individual variants of thematised approaches in their integrity and variability.
The aim of this work was not to give a detailed account of the historic concepts of epistemology, but rather to ← 143 | 144 → give a rough overview of the basic models and problems related to building an image of knowledge. Just as in other areas of philosophy, it is up to each of us to look for the answers to the questions related to knowledge (what is truth? What are the conditions of knowledge? How do I know that I know something?) on our own. The listed models can only serve as various perspectives showing knowledge in certain ways which are specific to them. What we can see through them does not depend on the teacher, but on our ability to look and see. ← 144 | 145 →
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