A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology
Chapter 13. Micro-Physical and Cosmic Causal Continuity
← 288 | 289 → Chapter 13. Micro-Physical and Cosmic Causal Continuity
Many philosophical traditions till Locke have differentiated between simple ideas of primary qualities (absolute, objective, immutable and mathematical) and simple ideas of secondary qualities (relative, subjective, fluctuating and sensed). Primary qualities were attributed to substance as its intrinsic, essential attributes. Simple ideas of primary qualities were effects of the action of primary qualities on the senses. Primary qualities were in fact directly attributable to substance, and their ideas were via direct sense impressions. That was the ideal of objective entity and experience, based on objectivity and invariance of primary qualities in things.298
Soon came about the trend, inspired by the mechanistic physical sciences, of reducing quality into quantity by all means, the history of which is well known. Simultaneously came also the trend of treating the epistemological sense-to-understanding realm truncated from possibly existing field of the physical ontology of things. In Chapter 11 we have relativised the Kantian phenomena-noumena distinction and made the two into two aspects of one and the selfsame mutually continuous reality. Hereafter the problems of substance, primary qualities and secondary qualities and of the reduction of the latter two into substance ← 289 | 290 → and quantity may be substituted by the question of theory (the qualities of universals in perception, ideas, theories, etc.) and reality (that about which theory is and of which ontological commitment is). Therefore, it is no more possible to address philosophical questions purely from within mechanistically physical conceptions of two worlds or one world and its qualities.
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