Guilty of Genius

Consequently, what this ‘more sublime theory’ was about is an issue that theologians always dodged and apprehensively sidestepped. Given ineptness to comprehend Origen’s theory, it was deemed more convenient to speak about ‘pre-existence of souls’ being ‘absolutely central to Origen’s theory’, which was postulated as his alleged weakness for that matter. In other words, all those scholars were out of their depth and unqualified to make hair or tail out of Origen’s own caveating statements banning transmigration. It turned out that they were only able to ruminate on the basis of ‘a lesson on Platonism for beginners’, and the ancient myth about the ‘Platonist Origen’ was all they were capable of making out.

Of course, never did Origen have in mind any fanciful ‘primal population of souls or minds’, nor did he ever maintain any incorporeal and yet independent individual entities hovering around from place to place. For an accomplished a philosopher as he was, he knew the fundamentals about the notion of incorporeal, wherefore spatial transition is interwoven with material existence – an elementary axiom that Porphyry copied from him to the letter, as demonstrated in Chapter 2.

However, this logically errant (indeed schizophrenic) mythology is what the uninformed have been claiming about Origen since the sixth century, although Gregory of Nyssa (and Maximus Confessor, to some extent) took up Origen theory of generation to the letter, as I have discussed in detail in the past.

All of this nonsense persistently laid at Origen’s door is but the measles of Origenian studies – only this infantile disease has lasted for far too many centuries, and has been eternised by fake ‘authorities’.

Following my study of Origen over a span of decades, I have come to be convinced that the ‘work’ of the aforementioned scholars and their like is but sheer detriment to Origen’s thought, and, from bad to worse, the scholars that have been misled by those ‘works’ are legion.

Rufinus at points translated ‘minds or souls’, only because he had no inkling of Origen’s real thought. Nevertheless, as clumsy as Rufinus’ Latin translation is, at points he could not help rendering Origen’s theory concerning God’s object of creation as initia, causas, rationes, semina, which were but Origen’s terms, ἀρχαί, αἰτίαι, λόγοι, σπέρματα. Anyway, I have always argued that the Latin De Principiis should not be used as a primal source; instead, this should be used and explained in light of Origen’s extant works in Greek.

Besides, recently, a minor American scholar and unfortunately Origen’s translator, who unremittingly made Origen a ‘Platonist’ that allegedly maintained a primeval ‘world’ of ‘souls’, or of ‘intellects’, or of ‘souls or intellects’, and certainly ‘pre-existence of souls’, began to have suspicions about the soundness of such a folly, and suddenly ‘discovered’ my books and the unsettling theses I have been expounding and arguing for since 1986. However, he did so in a mood struggling to deny facts, then to deny that he denied them, and eventually to allege that he made a point although no hide or hair of this could be found, since, concerning all of the cardinal points, he remained at a loss.

Consequently, from some moment onwards, I felt that it was not possible for me to read that blowhard brag any longer. This is why the present book has been written, and I am delighted that I worked together with the open-minded and highly erudite Editor Dr. Philip Dunshea, whom I sincerely thank. No less am I grateful to the Production Manager, Jackie Pavlovic, for her unfailing help and patience throughout the process of transforming manuscript to a book.

Of course, and since old habits die hard, I have not any illusions that entrenched convictions could be eradicated easily, no matter what the evidence I adduce.

It is high time we forgot about euphemisms and sought catharsis from the theatricality of braggart imposture and the concomitant high-and-mighty autolatry and lordolatry of some well-known pooh-bahs. It is high time for the rambling bloated windbags of both braggart ‘famous’ and petty academia to evanesce and come to terms with their true stature. For quest for the truth is not a matter of niceties, especially opposite braggadocios and swelled supercilious heads: it is a laborious unyielding struggle in order to eliminate contortion, no matter whether this is owing to the ancient bigotry and subjugation to the imperial caesaropapism, or modern arrant ignorance of philosophy, the field that played a pivotal role in Origen’s formulations. For if per impossibile were it allowed that philosophy and true theology are different fields (qua non), the case would be definitely that, first and foremost, Origen was a philosopher.

As a matter of fact, he was a philosopher par excellence, who had been hailed by eminent Greeks (such as Porphyry and Proclus) for his erudition and justified renown. But it was Origen himself who wrote that ‘in philosophy, there are many ones who are fake’ (πολλοὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ νόθοι). It is this kind of self-appointed modern spurious ‘philosophers’ and ‘theologians’ that simply parrot the claims of spiteful prelates of the Late Antiquity and Byzantium, who crassly strove to present Origen’s ingenious analyses and exposition as ignominious failure, such as the allegation that he was a ‘Platonist’, which modern ignorance turned to the asinine ‘Christian Platonist’, so that ‘the last deception should be worse than the first’.

What could possibly be more un-Platonic than this?

Moreover, Plato expelled Homer from his ideal State (Respublica, 387b; cf. 334a; 377d; 378d; 379c–d; 606–607; etc.), which Origen recalled in Contra Celsum, VII.54. Contrast to this, Origen cared to make a decision of his own without being swayed by Plato’s opinion: thus, while still a pagan philosopher, ‘he kept shouting and blushing and very much sweated for a good three days in order to determine whether Homer’s poetry sufficed to induce to virtuous action’. Finally, he decided that it did. Proclus reported this by reproducing Porphyry’s narrative (both of these, in their commentaries on Timaeus), but what matters is also the vocabulary: the ‘pagan’ Origen decided that no one’s speech is more lofty (τίς γὰρ Ὁμήρου μεγαλοφωνότερος;), whereas the ‘Christian’ Origen wrote that ‘there are many things in Homer which are full of loftiness of mind’ (μεγαλονοίας πεπληρωμένα, Contra Celsum, VI.7). Of course, the ‘pagan’ and the ‘Christian’ Origen were but the selfsame person, who believed that ‘Homer was an admirable poet’ (ὁ ἐν ποιήσει θαυμαστὸς Ὅμηρος, Contra Celsum, IV.91 & Philocalia, 20.18); actually, ‘Homer was the best of all poets’ (ὁ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄριστος, Contra Celsum, VII.6).

What if Origen himself styled transmigration ‘folly’ (μωρία), ‘myth’ (μυθικὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν or μῦθον), ‘false teaching’ (ψευδῆ λόγον, ψευδοδοξίαν), ‘a doctrine which is alien to the Church of God’ (ἀλλότριον τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ τῆς μετενσωματώσεως δόγμα)?

What if he referred to those who ‘maintain’ or ‘introduce’ the ‘myth of transmigration’ as naïve ones, who ‘have been afflicted by the inanity (ἄνοια) of this absurdity’?

What if Gregory of Nyssa cogently took up and accounted for Origen’s theory of generation, that is, the Theory of Logoi, which I have demonstrated by means of detailed accounts?

What if Origen at scores of points emphasised that ‘soul’ is not a primal reality, but a subsequent (indeed fallen) one, which has to overcome and transform itself and cease to be soul?

What if Origen wrote extensively in order to inform his audience that ‘mind’ (νοῦς), on the one hand, and ‘soul’ (ψυχή), on the other, are two ontologically different realities?

What if he made it an integral part of his thought that ‘evil did not exist in the beginning, nor is this destined to survive at the end’, hence, ‘Restoration pertains to neither soul nor body, but to mind / spirit alone’?

What if Eusebius rebutting Marcellus’ obloquy against Origen exclaimed, ‘what has Origen to do with Plato?’

Origen’s detractors have always remained recalcitrant and unflinching in their aplomb: Gregory had Origen in mind!

From this point to arguing that Origen maintained ‘transmigration of souls’ appeared all too small a step to take.

Now, if Origen was fully conscious of patently true and inescapable fundamental ‘details’, such as that any incorporeal cannot occupy a certain space or volume, but this is everywhere; or that counting independent incorporeals is impossible, since individuality is inexorably linked with materiality – this was but ‘minutiae’ that his unfortunate ‘audience’ were all but suspicious of. However, these and suchlike incommoding ‘details’ had been pointed out by Aristotle, whose philosophy (via Alexander of Aphrodisias) Origen made abundant use of.

The shenanigan about Origen maintaining (depending on each scholar’s favourite lullaby) a primeval ‘world of souls’ or of ‘intellects’, or (which is worse) of ‘souls or intellects’, or ‘pre-existence of souls’, hopefully now will receive a proper reply once and for all – all the more so since all of this humdrum is but prolix allegations by people who have no philosophical background, let alone basic philosophical training, so as to be able to recognise what underlies Origen’s legion of indomitable formulations. To my experience, once I set out to eradicate entrenched fatuities root and branch already since my Glasgow PhD thesis, I knew full well that this would earn me enemies who were loath to accept (hence, they have been in for a surprise) that their ‘works’ on Origen were hopeless and bootless stuff. But I am not writing to please cliques; I am researching in order to discover and expound the truth about the real Origen.

Concerning the specific topic of the present book, Origen had caveated that such matters were impossible to treat unless a clear theory about the soul and the principles that determine its generation had been laid down and properly grasped in the first place. But this has never happened to date, until I wrote a couple of thousand pages in my book on Anaxagoras and Origen.

Grasping Origen’s real thought is a proposition far tougher than it has been thought to be, not only because of his ingenious and creative constructions, but also because of his vast heathen background, which is present throughout his work and imbues thoroughly it, even though he allowed this to make some explicit mark only in the Contra Celsum. To believe that it is possible to understand, let alone render, his real thought without consummate knowledge of that background is simply delusion – a delusion though which has played a fatal role in the present deplorable state of Origenian studies.

Part of the aim of the Introduction to this volume is to bring to light the representations of Origen by detractors, such as Epiphanius of Salamis and Antipater of Bostra (both of whom were gladly yet uncritically quoted by John of Damascus, indeed views that Justinian simply parroted), as well as by present day scholars, who unfortunately have been taken seriously and fatally misled modern scholarship. I should, therefore, say a few words about the logical train of my exposition and its intrinsic permeating line, which both of peer-reviewers of this book were as erudite as to point out themselves, but perhaps this should be helpful to others.

Chapter 1 builds on my previous book on Anaxagoras in relation to Origen’s concept of the soul: I demonstrate that this is impossible to grasp unless seen from the philosophical perspective (e.g. his understanding of the nature of the soul, mind, etc.), wherefore, one cannot speak about what Origen ‘believed’ while lacking knowledge of ancient philosophy, as well as the marks this made on the Patristic and Byzantine tradition, and on the contemporary philosophical tradition nonetheless.

Chapter 2 explores the notion of ‘incorporeal’, which could have been unnecessary had scholars consistently ruminated on this – but they did not, which is why Porphyry wrote a brilliant series of pithy propositions so that his contemporary and later intellectuals should come to their senses concerning this issue.

Chapter 3 discusses the issue of identity, which has suffered enormously nonetheless.

Chapter 4 is about how new souls are generated, a topic which hinges on Origen’s theory of generation, therefore, on his theory of the Body of the Logos and of the logoi as generative, cohesive, and dissolving causes, which produce, maintain, and transform all aspects of reality.

Chapter 5 ponders on how did Origen understand the notion of causality in relation to souls and human identity, and how do these function ontologically rather than temporally. The point is that Origen maintained a notion of antecedent worlds and antecedent causes, but he flatly rejected any notion of pre-existent souls.

Chapter 6 is about how a soul is related to the body.

Chapter 8 is about Origen’s (Anaxagorean, then, Aristotelian) concept of ‘the mind from without’ (θύραθεν νοῦς), which is critical in order to comprehend why could he have never gone along with the (inconsistent, anyway) Platonic anthropology and its capricious ramifications, which never managed to stand up to elementary logical analyses.

The short and the long of it is that the structure of this book aims to show that determining Origen’s views of the present topic is a tough proposition and can be carried out by means of sound methodology, not dogmatic proclamations, never mind bigotry, or parroting ancient nonsense, and to this purpose, knowledge of not only the entire Patristic thought but also Greek philosophy is impossible to circumvent, let alone evade.

To put this flat out: Origen should be studied by philosophers and by theologians who have a good command of philosophy (and indeed there are such scholars). For Origen wrote his own chapter in the history of philosophy, of which theologians have no inkling whatsoever, since among them knowledge of philosophy is an extremely rare commodity. Their general attitude is that Origen was a virtuous man and a theologian – yet at the end of the day he is a damned heretic, who was rightly anathematised.

Whereas modern theologians, who unfortunately were taken seriously and swayed modern Origenian studies, have argued that ‘to Origen, pre-existence of souls is absolutely central’ and the ‘theory of pre-existence ... is a hypothesis that comes from Platonism’, which is ‘the most vulnerable part of Origen’s thought’, I will be arguing that (1) to Origen, pre-existence of souls was far too alien a theory; and (2) although Origen declared that his theory of soul had ‘nothing to do with Plato’s transmigration, but it was a more sublime theory’, modern as well as earlier scholars have had recourse to the ancient folly, only because of inability make out what Origen’s ‘more sublime theory’ was about. However, the vast majority of modern works more or less keep counterfeiting the sixth-century allegations imposed by Justinian’s barbarous caesaropapism and have been uncritically regurgitated by modern ‘scholars’ who unfortunately have been taken as ‘authorities’ and (which is the most ridiculous yet tragic irony) one of them was styled ‘patriarch of Origenian studies’.

Therefore, the ongoing detriment to Origen’s real thought stems from the fact that knowledge of philosophy, bar a few brilliant exceptions, is far too rare a commodity among modern theologians. One of my arguments in the present book is that Origen’s enormous and demanding Greek philosophical background should be part of syllabus in faculties of philosophy and hauled from the hands of uninformed scholars, in which Origen’s tragic fate has been perpetuated.

However, this is not the full story. For indeed modern brilliant intellectuals have taken exception to the caricature of Origen concocted since the times of Epiphanius of Salamis and Antipater of Bostra (which served as the basis for Origen’s anathematisation).

As an example, I should note the brilliant works by Mark Edwards, who did not hesitate to stand up to current universally maintained follies about Origen, and was criticised for that matter by some scholars who either stuck to the ingrained hogwash about ‘a Platonist Origen’, or argued for the unscholarly drivel ‘Christian Platonism’ – yet none of his critics did ever manage to do away with or abate the force of Edwards’ perceptive analyses.

If, to some, reading and studying primary sources appears far too hard a proposition and probably impossible to carry out, and having recourse to second-hand entrenched follies of old seems a more convenient practice, then, the best for them to do is abandon and stay away from Origen’s works and thought altogether. As for myself, over many years, I have read ‘reports’ by ‘readers’ craving to enforce references to their ‘work’ under the pretext of foisting ‘guidance to modern scholarship’. To this purpose, on the one hand, they demanded from publishers not to reveal their names, while, on the other, they ‘signed’ their reports by anxiously demanding references to their own works, and declaring themselves ready to assent to publication only if they read my work again, in order to make sure that their ‘works’ have been referenced. Never did I cave in to such a blackmailing, which unsuccessfully went underground by means of taking refuge to anonymity, and none of such a quality of ‘readers’ did ever manage to impede a single book of mine from being published.

In this treatise, as it happened with my previous ones, I will not dignify such presumptuousness with references, far less would I converse with trespassers that are infesting the Origenian studies. I am not in the least interested in offering either the facility, which is priggishly styled ‘guidance to modern scholarship’, or the enjoyment of truffle hunting from a concomitant ‘reference preying’. I know that this is not the way things are supposed to be done. But I am not doing things the way they are supposed to be done, nor do I dignify the trite practice that strives to conceal ignorance of the glorious world of ancient philosophers and of the Commentators by means of ‘mutual’ (or, reciprocal) ‘references’ backhandedly exchanged between modern authors. Instead, ample space will be given primarily to exposition and discussion of ancient scholars, which is a methodology that I have prescribed and defended in my book on Anaxagoras.

Opposite this throng, I know of no true scholar who would not be happy, indeed eager, to see the pestilent characteristics that scourge Origenian studies being chucked out not only from the specific field, but also from the cultural physiognomy of any genuine quest for the truth.

For as Shakespeare’s Edgar said upon the conclusion of King Lear, when the tragedy had been consummated, The weight of this sad time we must obey, speak what we feel, not what we ought to say. The oldest hath borne most.