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Independence in Crisis

The Argentinean Central Bank and their accountability for bureaucratic and political decisions, 1991-2007

by Juan Miguel Rodríguez López (Author)
©2012 Thesis XII, 192 Pages

Summary

Central bankers like the idea of low inflation, but their actions have a distribution effect of richness. During the 1990s, the independence of central banks increased. What have central banks done with this independence? When we infer that all actors have interests, whether governments, voters or interest groups, why would we assume that central banks are technocratic institutions maximizing the welfare of the state? To answer these questions, this study looks at the Argentinean Central Bank between 1991 and 2007 and researches the incentives of a central bank to act strategically. This book uses a model which is an adaptation of Helmke’s model (2002, 2005) for the Supreme Court of Justice. An inter-temporal conflict of interest explains the Central Bank’s behavior.

Details

Pages
XII, 192
Year
2012
ISBN (PDF)
9783653023350
ISBN (Hardcover)
9783631638262
DOI
10.3726/978-3-653-02335-0
Language
English
Publication date
2012 (July)
Keywords
Central Bank Independence Signaling game Strategic political Argentina
Published
Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2012. XII, 193 pp., 23 tables, 20 graphs

Biographical notes

Juan Miguel Rodríguez López (Author)

Juan Miguel Rodríguez López is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Globalisation and Governance and KlimaCampus (University of Hamburg). His areas of research encompass financial market institutions, political economy and quantitative methods. He is currently researching cross-national comparisons of institutional factors and the economic actions of companies within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.

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Title: Independence in Crisis