Common or Divided Security?

← 8 | 9 → List of Contributors

Robin Allers, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo

Annegret Bendiek, PhD, Senior Fellow and Deputy Head of Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin

Lene Ekhaugen, M.A., Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Geir Flikke, PhD, Associate Professor at the Department for Literature, Area Studies and European Languages (ILOS), University of Oslo

Sven Bernhard Gareis, Professor, Dr., Deputy Dean and Director Resident Courses at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen

Helga Haftendorn, Professor, Dr. Emeritus at the Freie Universität in Berlin

Paal Sigurd Hilde, PhD, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Patrick Keller, PhD, Coordinator for Foreign and Security Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin

Carlo Masala, Professor, Dr., Bundeswehr University Munich

Alister Miskimmon, PhD, Head of Department of Politics and International Relations and Philosophy and Co-Director, Centre for European Politics at the Royal Holloway, University of London

Kristin Hemmer Mørkestøl, M.A., Senior Adviser at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Ida Maria Oma, M.A., Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

← 9 | 10 → Michael Paul, PhD, Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

Pernille Rieker, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo

Håkon Lunde Saxi, M.A., Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Rolf Tamnes, Professor, Dr., Former Director of the Norwegian Institute for Studies

Helene Forsland Widerberg, M.A., Adviser at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

← 10 | 11 → Abbreviations

← 14 | 15 → Introduction

Robin Allers, Carlo Masala and Rolf Tamnes

Setting the Scene

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, Euro-Atlantic security is under pressure. Because of major geopolitical shifts and domestic disorder, the European nations and their American allies will have to rethink how to design common security. Failure to animate the European Union (EU) and to reinvigorate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as efficient tools for peace and security might lead the West back to the spectre of divided security, to fragmentation and renationalisation. This book addresses the main challenges to Western security from the perspective of two European allies: Germany and Norway.

After the end of the Cold War, European and transatlantic security has gone through two transformative phases. The first one started around 1990, with the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the end of bipolarity that had divided Europe for more than 40 years. Faced with colossal transitional challenges, the Western response was reactive and characterised by much chaotic improvisation, but NATO and the EU played crucial roles in bringing former East European countries into the Western economic and security communities, most importantly by welcoming them as members. Both organisations failed to forestall appalling atrocities and mass murders when Yugoslavia fell apart, but in the end they contributed significantly albeit differently to quelling the fires in the Balkans.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of crises in the European neighbourhood were strong incentives for trying to reformulate polices and rebuild institutions. French and German plans for a pan-European organisation quickly proved unrealistic. The roles of NATO and the EU, and the relationship between them, were open for debate. Since the Soviet threat had gone, politicians and scholars alike questioned the raison d’être of NATO unless it was prepared to undertake new missions, in particular outside its traditional area of responsibility (out-of-area). In spite of the disbelievers, NATO remained the main framework for Western security. Most countries also began to restructure their armed forces to make them more usable for expeditionary operations on short notice, but the result was unimpressive if we look at Europe as a whole.

← 15 | 16 → The EU decided early on to strengthen its voice in international affairs. By the end of the 1990s it had also raised its ambitions regarding security and defence, which was embodied in the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 10 years later. Washington saluted the European ambition to act, but warned that further integration should not lead to decoupling from the Alliance, duplication of structures, or discrimination of non-EU members.1 European countries that were not member of both organisations were challenged with finding their place in the new framework.²

While regional instability and wars dominated the first phase of post-Cold War transformation, asymmetric global threats and risks were at the forefront of the second. Terrorism was the overriding concern, but the spread of weapons of mass destruction also remained an important issue, and among new threats the management of cyber space climbed up the priority lists. The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 initiated this phase. NATO acted in solidarity, and the assaults led to the Alliance’s biggest joint out-of-area operation. The subsequent long war in Afghanistan contributed to transforming the military in most European countries. At the same time, the so-called “war on terror” strained transatlantic cooperation severely, in particular the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. Divisions over the intervention led to one of the biggest transatlantic crises ever, a crisis which also divided the European camp. France and Germany sided with Russia in a diplomatic initiative against Washington, and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld infamously spoke of new and old Europe pointing at the support from Eastern European allies.³ In the end, as so many times before, the transatlantic crisis of the mid-2000s rather proved the strength and durability of the Euro-Atlantic security framework.⁴ It did not, however, lead to a clarification of the most important issues, i.e. the relationship between NATO and EU, and the burden-sharing between the United States and its European allies. There was no ← 16 | 17 → common European understanding and framework to deal with military intervention, developing capabilities, and cutting costs.

This book is being written at a time when we are beginning to see the contours of a third transformative phase of European and transatlantic defence and security. The Afghan military operation will be reduced substantially, but asymmetric threats and risks remain a key challenge. Equally important, some traditional and emerging great powers will increasingly shape international relations in a multipolar system. Among the emerging great powers, the rise of China stands out, and it might become a superpower in tandem with the United States. Regional powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa will also leave strong footprints in international politics, and Russia remains a global power player and works hard to regain influence in the Eurasian region. The west stood helpless in the face of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and was unable to find effective countermeasures as Moscow moved on to destabilise Eastern Ukraine. The crisis was a reminder that Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin does not accept further western enlargement and is willing to challenge NATO and the EU in areas not covered by security guarantees.

The geopolitical shift impacts Europe’s position and security in several ways. Most importantly, the Western world, and Europe in particular, is in relative decline, losing influence vis-à-vis the emerging great powers and Asia on the rise.5 Furthermore, the emergence of a new international (dis)order might weaken multilateralism and global governance in important areas such as trade, climate, terrorism and non-proliferation, and it might make it even more difficult to manage political, military and humanitarian crises in unstable and failed states.