Implementing Activation Policies

Table Of Contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• About the author
• About the book
• This eBook can be cited
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The challenge of rising numbers of minimum income recipients in Bismarckian-type continental welfare systems
• 2.1 The welfare system in open, market-driven and individualised societies
• 2.2 Minimum income schemes in the welfare system
• 2.2.1 Institutional filter regulation of minimum income schemes
• 2.2.1.1 Internal filter regulation of minimum income schemes
• 2.2.1.2 External filter regulation of minimum income schemes
• 2.2.2 Organisational issues of specific institutional filter of minimum income schemes
• 2.2.3 National institutional orders of filter arrangements of minimum income schemes
• 2.2.4 Conclusion: minimum income schemes as a matter of institutional filter
• 2.3 The role of minimum income schemes in the Bismarckian welfare system
• 2.3.1 Bismarckian institutional filter regulation of minimum income schemes
• 2.3.1.1 Bismarckian welfare systems’ external filtering of minimum income programmes
• 2.3.1.2 Bismarckian welfare systems’ internal filtering of minimum income programmes
• 2.3.1.3 The fragmented regulatory logics of Bismarckian filtering institutions
• 2.3.2 Organisational features of the Bismarckian filter of minimum income schemes
• 2.3.2.1 Organisational features of Bismarckian external filtering institutions
• 2.3.2.2 Organisational features of the Bismarckian internal filtering institutions
• 2.3.2.3 The fragmented organisation of Bismarckian filtering institutions
• 2.3.3 Conclusion: Bismarckian filtering institutions of residual minimum income schemes
• 2.4 Dynamics of welfare system change
• 2.4.1 Retrenchment
• 2.4.2 Re-commodification
• 2.4.3 Recalibration
• 2.5 Development dynamics of minimum income schemes in Bismarckian-type continental welfare systems
• 2.5.1 The erosion of the Bismarckian employment model’s external filter function
• 2.5.2 The erosion of the Bismarckian family model’s external filter function
• 2.5.3 The erosion of the status-based Bismarckian social protection’s external filter function
• 2.5.4 The rise of minimum income claimants: a crisis of classical Bismarckian filter institutions
• 2.6 Conclusion: recalibration demands of Bismarckian institutions in face of rising numbers of minimum income beneficiaries
• 3 Activation reforms in Bismarckian-type continental welfare systems
• 3.1 Activation into employment as a new concept for welfare systems
• 3.2 Flexicurity as reference point for employment-centred welfare systems
• 3.3 Areas of an employment-centred welfare system
• 3.3.1 Flexible labour markets for the activation into employment
• 3.3.2 Workfare elements for the activation from benefits into work
• 3.3.3 Integrated social protection systems for unemployed
• 3.3.4 Services as enabling elements of activation
• 3.3.5 Summarising the components of an employment-centred welfare state
• 3.4 Between European diffusion of ‘good’ governance and national activation regimes
• 3.5 Employment-centred welfare as new filter for minimum income schemes in Bismarckian-type continental welfare systems
• 3.5.1 Changes in labour market regulation in continental European welfare states
• 3.5.2 Reforms of the Bismarckian benefit system in continental European welfare states
• 3.5.3 Work incentives and requirements in continental European welfare states
• 3.5.4 Social services in continental European welfare states
• 3.5.5 Activation as a new approach to regulate minimum income schemes
• 3.6 Conclusion: activation as a new institutional filter of minimum income receipt
• 4 Re-organising minimum income schemes: the local dimension of Bismarckian activation regimes
• 4.1 The local level’s role in institutionalising employment-centred welfare
• 4.1.1 The traditional role of local authorities in continental European welfare systems
• 4.1.2 Activation as a matter of the local delivery of services and policies
• 4.1.3 The co-production of services: a matter of institutionalising local organisational fields
• 4.1.3.1 Co-producing policies and services of different fields
• 4.1.3.2 Co-producing services and policies from different policy levels
• 4.1.3.3 Co-producing services between public, private and third sector providers
• 4.1.3.4 Three local challenges of activating minimum income recipients
• 4.1.4 First hypothesis: local organisational fields as requirement to implement the Bismarckian activation regime
• 4.2 Different local governance patterns of employment-centred welfare
• 4.2.1 Concepts of individual behaviour underlying the co-production of activation
• 4.2.2 The organisation of co-produced policies and services for minimum income recipients
• 4.2.2.1 Local institutional conditions for co-produced policies and services
• 4.2.2.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of co-produced policies and services
• 4.2.2.3 Local control techniques for the delivery of co-produced policies and services
• 4.2.3 Second hypothesis: activation approaches increase variance in local service delivery
• 4.3 Conclusion: two hypotheses on a local dimension of activation
• 5 A methodology for comparative empirical studies on the reorganisation of minimum income schemes
• 5.1 Exploring the local level’s role: elements of a case study approach
• 5.1.1 The strengths of a case study approach: explaining and exploring
• 5.1.2 Defining the case, unit, levels and timeframe of analysis
• 5.2 Proposing a design for the local study of Bismarckian activation regimes
• 5.2.1 Application of various data collection techniques
• 5.2.2 Selection of local cases in two ‘critical’ Bismarckian countries in continental Europe
• 5.2.3 The theoretical framework: a guide for the exploratory analysis of local mechanisms
• 5.3 Methods and techniques applied for the local case study series
• 5.3.1 Semi-structured expert interviews
• 5.3.2 Qualitative content analysis and case study reports
• 5.4 Conclusion: combining local study and welfare state analyses
• 6 The traditional role of minimum income schemes in France and Germany
• 6.1 A circumscribed field: unemployment policy in France and Germany
• 6.1.1 Corporatist institutions in social and labour market policy in France and Germany
• 6.1.2 Services and programmes for ‘normal’ unemployed in France and Germany
• 6.1.3 Conclusion: status-oriented unemployment policy fields in France and Germany
• 6.2 A field apart: minimum income schemes in France and Germany
• 6.2.1 The traditional role of the general minimum income scheme in France
• 6.2.2 The traditional role of the general minimum income scheme in Germany
• 6.3 Conclusion: a Bismarckian legacy of fragmented providers, services and policies
• 7 The institutionalisation of employment-centred welfare in Germany
• 7.1 Labour market- and social policy reforms in Germany
• 7.1.1 A reformed entitlement structure of the benefit system
• 7.1.2 A new organisation of services and work incentives
• 7.1.3 Increased flexibilisation of the German labour market
• 7.1.4 The selective focus of a Bismarckian activation regime in Germany
• 7.1.5 Conclusion: activation as new filter against minimum income receipt in Germany
• 7.2 The re-organisation of service delivery for minimum income recipients in Germany
• 7.2.1 An integrated framework for different benefits and services
• 7.2.2 The distribution of financing responsibilities for the Jobcenter
• 7.2.3 The organisation of services reacting to work-related and social exclusionary risks
• 7.2.4 Instruments for controlling local activities
• 7.2.5 Staff of the Jobcenter
• 7.2.6 Decision-making bodies of the Jobcenter
• 7.2.7 Conclusion: an integrated framework for the local activation of benefit recipients
• 7.3 The local implementation of activation reforms in Germany
• 7.3.1 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority G-A
• 7.3.1.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 7.3.1.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 7.3.1.3 Local control techniques
• 7.3.1.4 Towards a bureaucratic activation logic in region G-A
• 7.3.2 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority G-B
• 7.3.2.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 7.3.2.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 7.3.2.3 Local techniques of control
• 7.3.2.4 Towards a bureaucratic activation logic in region G-B
• 7.3.3 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority G-C
• 7.3.3.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 7.3.3.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 7.3.3.3 Local techniques of control
• 7.3.3.4 Towards a participatory logic of activation in region G-C
• 7.3.4 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority G-D
• 7.3.4.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 7.3.4.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 7.3.4.3 Local techniques of control
• 7.3.4.4 Towards a market-oriented logic of activation in region G-D
• 7.4 Conclusion: varying local activation approaches in Germany
• 8 The institutionalisation of employment-centred welfare in France
• 8.1 Labour market- and social policy reforms in France
• 8.1.1 Changes in the French benefit system
• 8.1.2 A reformed regulation of services, incentives and work requirements
• 8.1.3 An increased flexibilisation of the French labour market
• 8.1.4 The selective focus of a Bismarckian activation regime in France
• 8.1.5 Conclusion: activation as new filter against minimum income receipt in France
• 8.2 The re-organisation of service delivery for minimum income recipients in France
• 8.2.1 A local framework for the delivery of diverse benefits and services
• 8.2.1.1 Financing responsibilities
• 8.2.1.2 The organisation of services reacting to work-related and social exclusionary factors
• 8.2.1.3 Social welfare services for minimum income recipients
• 8.2.1.4 Active labour market policy services for minimum income recipients
• 8.2.1.5 The department as social welfare provider in need of external competences
• 8.2.2 Coordination and activation through local case management
• 8.2.2.1 Coordination and control of access to the different services and programmes
• 8.2.2.2 Orientation through case management
• 8.2.2.3 The crucial role of case management in the French system
• 8.2.3 Local coordination bodies
• 8.2.4 The organisation of benefit payment
• 8.2.5 Conclusion: a fragmented framework for the local activation of benefit recipients
• 8.3 The local implementation of activation approaches in France
• 8.3.1 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority F-A
• 8.3.1.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 8.3.1.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 8.3.1.3 Local techniques of control
• 8.3.1.4 Programmatic renewal but organisational continuity: social treatment in local authority F-A
• 8.3.2 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority F-B
• 8.3.2.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 8.3.2.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 8.3.2.3 Local techniques of control
• 8.3.2.4 Continuity of a social treatment approach in local authority F-B
• 8.3.3 Local governance of welfare interventions in local authority F-C
• 8.3.3.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 8.3.3.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 8.3.3.3 Local techniques of control
• 8.3.3.4 Towards a participatory activation logic in local authority F-C
• 8.3.4 Local governance of the minimum income scheme in local authority F-D
• 8.3.4.1 Local institutional conditions for the take-up of services and policies
• 8.3.4.2 Local modes of interaction for the delivery of services
• 8.3.4.3 Local techniques of control
• 8.3.4.4 Towards a bureaucratic activation logic in local authority F-D
• 8.4 Conclusion: varying local welfare interventions in France
• 9 Conclusion: local coordination of fragmented Bismarckian welfare states
• Literature